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Founding and Re-founding: A Problem in Rousseau's Political Thought and Action
By Mark J. Hill, Brasenose College
DPhil Thesis, Hilary 2015
The foundation of political societies is a central theme in Rousseau's work. This is no
surprise coming from a man who was born into a people who had their own celebrated
founder and foundations, and immersed himself in the writings of classical republicans
and the quasi-mythical histories of ancient city-states where the heroic lawgiver played
an  important  and  legitimate  role  in political  foundations.  However,  Rousseau's
propositional political writings  (those written for Geneva, Corsica, and Poland)  have
been accused of  being unsystematic and running the spectrum from conservative and
prudent to radical and utopian. It is this seeming incongruence which is the subject of
this  thesis.  In  particular,  it  is  argued  that  this  confusion  is  born  out  the  failure  to
recognize  a systematic  distinction  between  "founding"  and  "re-founding"  political
societies in both the history of political thought, and Rousseau's own work (a distinction
in Rousseau which has  rarely been noted,  let alone treated to a study of its own). By
recognizing  this  distinction  one  can  identify  two  Rousseaus;  the  conservative  and
prudent thinker who is wary of making changes to  established political systems and
constitutional  foundations  (the  re-founder),  and  the  radical  democrat  fighting for
equality,  and  claiming  that  no  state  is  legitimate  without  popular  sovereignty  (the
founder). In demonstrating this distinction, this thesis examines the ancient concept of
the lawgiver, the growth and expansion of the idea leading up to the eighteenth century,
Rousseau's own philosophic writings on the topic, and the differing political proposals
he wrote for  Geneva, Corsica, and Poland. The  thesis argues that although there is a
clear  separation  between  these  two  types  of  political  proposals,  they  remain
systematically Rousseauvian.
Abstract (1500 words)
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The foundation of political societies is a central theme in Rousseau's work. This is no
surprise coming from a man who was born into a people who had their own celebrated
founder and foundations, and immersed himself in the writings of classical republicans
and the quasi-mythical histories of ancient city-states where the heroic lawgiver played
an  important  and  legitimate  role  in political  foundations.  However,  Rousseau's
propositional political writings  (those written for Geneva, Corsica, and Poland)  have
been accused of  being unsystematic and running the spectrum from conservative and
prudent to radical and utopian. It is this seeming incongruence which is the subject of
this thesis.
Instead of looking at individual texts (i.e., the Contrat social) or influences (i.e.,
Geneva), this thesis argues that there is a systematic distinction between "founding" and
"re-founding" peoples in Rousseau's various works – including, but not limited to, the
Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, the  Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de
l'inégalité parmi les hommes, the  Discours sur la vertu du héros, the  Contrat social,
Émile, the Lettres écrites de la montagne, the Projet de constitution pour la Corse, and
the  Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne. This distinction is clearly drawn
out in the Contrat social, where Rousseau argues that a people who have already been
given a constitution and have had their habits and mœurs settled by an original lawgiver
cannot be "founded" or given a new political way of life (that is to say, cannot be given
the political  system developed in the  Contrat  social),  but  the topic has  rarely been
noted, let alone treated to a study of its own.
The distinction being examined is born out of Rousseau's familiarity with both
classical and contemporary sources, and thus to make this argument the thesis is divided
into six chapters which examine these different sources and examples of lawgiving and
how they emerge and are used in Rousseau's own writings. The first chapter examines
the  ancient  tales  of  lawgivers  and  the  philosophical  writings  which Rousseau  was
familiar with  and influenced by –  specifically, those recorded in Plutarch's  Lives and
Plato's  Republic and Laws.  There, the genre of lawgiving itself is established, and the
distinction between founders (such as Moses, Numa, and Lycurgus), the less successful
heroes (such as Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus), and re-founders (in particular Solon), is
first made.
The second chapter  offers a broad examination of political  thought from the
decline and fall of the Roman Empire, to humanist attempts to address governing, to the
emergence of the legislator as a topic worthy of discussion during the Enlightenment –
a discussion which Rousseau himself was a part of. In doing this it touches on the role
of the legislator in politics  through the ship-of-state metaphor in the works of Cicero,
Seneca,  Augustine,  Aquinas,  Erasmus,  More,  and  Machiavelli.  Particular  themes
emerge, such as the importance of customs and traditions for those who would wish to
influence politics  or  change  political  systems.  The chapter  then  looks at attempts to
move beyond these problems in the writings of French theorists published in the lead up
to, and during the Enlightenment. It highlights how a number of historical and emerging
ideas,  from  Plato  to  Newton's  scientism,  resulted in  new  ways  of  thinking  about
governing, including the return of the legislator  as a legitimate idea (seen in concepts
ranging from the enlightened despot to renewed republicanism),  all of which not only
legitimized the idea of a contemporary founder, but argued for the necessity of one.
The third chapter draws out the theoretical distinction between founding and re-
founding as Rousseau himself developed and described it. This is done by first looking
at his most famous discussion and description of the character as found in the Contrat
social,  while his other texts  are then used to  highlight and expand on the particulars
which are less fully developed in the political treatise. The chapter then turns to the idea
of the "corporate metaphor" – a recurring theme in Rousseau scholarship that can  be
used  to  highlight  a  number  of  important aspects  of  Rousseau's  understanding  of
peoples, and allow one to come to understand more clearly how giving laws is directly
related to  the historical circumstances  and particularities of  a people. In doing this  he
develops a more robust understanding of not only who can give laws, but when and to
whom they can be given. This is followed by a brief examination of Rousseau himself
within the genre of the lawgiver – both historically, through biographical information,
and literarily, as the imagined tutor in Émile.
Chapter four  turns to the propositional aspect of Rousseau's political writings,
beginning  with a  historical examination of Geneva.  This allows for a  contextualized
reading of Rousseau's own writings and proposals for the city, arguing that the Contrat
social,  although historically influenced by Geneva, was not a propositional piece of
political work attempting to support radical and democratic agitation in the city (that is,
it did not offer a set of proposals to be embraced by the city), but instead, his  Lettres
écrites de la montagne offer his prudent advice calling for a re-founding. This argument
is  made  by  examining  contemporary  political  debates  in  Geneva  and locating
Rousseau's own proposals within them, and noting that they are distinct from both the
political agitators and conservative aristocrats.
Chapters five and six take the now developed distinction between founding and
re-founding  and apply it to  Corsica and Poland,  the  two  nations for  which Rousseau
attempted to  write  propositional  political  works.  Chapter  five  begins  with  an
examination of the  historical circumstances  of the island and contemporary reports of
its  people and troubles.  This  allows for one to  come to understand  how  eighteenth
century Europeans  saw the Corsican people as unique in  Europe,  and in particular,
similar  to  the people  highlighted  as  ideal  in  the  Contrat  social and  Discours  sur
l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes. In doing this, one can then
recognize how  and why  the propositions Rousseau makes for the island are akin to
those in the Contrat social – that is proposals for the founding of a people.
Chapter six is an examination of Rousseau's work on Poland, and an attempt to
explain why it is radically different from the proposals made for Corsica and found in
the Contrat social. The chapter begins by demonstrating that in the eighteenth century
Poland was already a well-established state. Thus arguments akin to those found in the
Lettres  écrites  de  la  montagne were  necessary  –  that  is,  arguments  offering  a  re-
founding based on  established customs and traditions as well  as  an already existing
political system and constitution.  In  demonstrating this,  the chapter first looks at the
political  history  and  intellectual  culture  of  Poland and then  compares the
Considérations and Rousseau's other works. The chapter moves on to highlight why the
people of Poland were, in Rousseauvian terms, inappropriate for being given new laws;
it examines  the idea of Polish freedom being discussed in the text and how it differs
from the ideals  Rousseau described in the  Contrat social;  it looks at  the emphasis he
placed  on  education  in  his  proposals,  rather  than  political  reforms;  and  finally,  it
touches on the contextually similar (in the case of the Lettres écrites de la montagne)
and dissimilar  (in  the  case of  the  Contrat  social)  arguments  in  Rousseau's  political
system as a whole. In doing this one finds that Rousseau argues that Poland's only hope
is to embrace its ancient constitution and the aspects of the Polish people which have
shown themselves to be positive influences on political stability. The people cannot be
reshaped into something new, and accepting and expanding on this already-developed
constitution is the only possible way of maintaining the Polish people.
Again, it is in recognizing this distinction that one can identify two Rousseaus:
the conservative and prudent thinker who is wary of making drastic changes to political
systems and constitutional  foundations  (the  re-founder),  and the  radical  arguing for
equality  and  claiming  that  no  state  is  legitimate  without  popular  sovereignty  (the
founder).  In this  way  the contradictory interpretations of Rousseau's  works begin to
make  sense,  and  ultimately,  this is  where  this  thesis offers  something  new  to  the
literature. It draws attention to the fact that, in Rousseau scholarship, both approaches to
understanding Rousseau (the radical and the conservative) have been correct at times.
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In 1763 Rousseau wrote to M. de Beaumont: "J'ai écrit sur divers sujets, mais toujours dans les
mêmes principes: toujours la même morale, la même croyance, les mêmes maximes,  et, si l'on
veut,  les  mêmes  opinions."1 Despite  this, interpretations  of  his  works have  been radically
divergent,  with him being labeled a  "liberal,"  "totalitarian," "ancient,"  "modern," "Christian,"
"deist,"  "individualist,"  "communitarian,"  "existentialist,"  "Romantic,"  and  "Enlightenment
philosophe."2 He has been identified as a "lachrymose madman" and an "impious revolutionary";
an "anti-revolutionary" and as someone who would "ingratiate himself" with conservatives; and
both  a "prophet of untrammelled reason"  and "untamed irrationality."3 This  failure to agree on
what it  is Rousseau actually was  has led to works claiming  either  there is no consistency in
Rousseau at all, or one needs an interpretive key with which a reader is able to unlock the "true"
or  "authentic" Rousseau.  As  Margaret  Canovan  wrote:  "The  problem  which  has  exercised
generations of Rousseau-scholars is to find consistency within Rousseau's bewildering conflicts
of thought and action, to discover the key to his thinking that will make the chaos intelligible."
She concludes that this failure to find a system makes it "natural to go further, and to conclude
that it does not exist."4 To some extent, this thesis, like nearly all works on Rousseau, attempts to
overcome  this  problem.  The  goal,  however, is not  to  offer  an  interpretive  key,  but  to  find
consistency  in  the  works  themselves  through  careful  reading  and an  emphasis  on  historical
relevance. In doing this, it is argued that what to many appears to be inconsistency, is in reality
1 Rousseau, Beaumont, OC iv, p. 928.
2 S. Bourgault, ‘The Many Faces of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, Eighteenth-Century Studies 42.2 (2009), p. 320.
3 E. Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington, 1963), p. 1; G.H. McNeil, ‘The Anti-
Revolutionary Rousseau’, The American Historical Review 58.4 (1953), p. 808; W. Kendall, ‘Introduction: How 
to read Rousseau’s "Government of Poland"’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Government of Poland (Indianapolis, 1985),
p. xiv; xvi.
4 M. Canovan, ‘The Limits of Seriousness: Rousseau and the Interpretation of Political Theory’, European 
History Quarterly 2.1 (1972), p. 2.
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Rousseau's  own distinction between situations which allow for idealistic  solutions,  and those
which call for pragmatic  responses.  That is to say, although  this thesis does not claim to have
discovered the entirety of Rousseau's system, it does argue that one can recognize a systematic
distinction in Rousseau between "founding" polities, as seen in the Contrat social and his work
for Corsica, and "re-founding" them, as seen in the Lettres écrites de la montagne and his work
for Poland.
To understand where this argument sits in relation to Rousseau scholarship as a whole,
one must begin by reviewing the state of the literature. In doing this, one may identify three
rough approaches to reading Rousseau: those which offer grand interpretations that recognize
something historically unique and important about Rousseau's political theory and its impact;
those  which  interpret  his  work  by  recognizing  something  unique  about  Rousseau  himself,
offering interpretations that rely on biography and psychology to understand his meaning; and
those interpretations which focus on conceptual or historical keys which can be used to unlock or
further understand his meaning. All of these approaches do, however, share one common thread:
they all accept that coming to understand Rousseau's meaning is problematic.  During an 1878
festival in Geneva marking the one hundredth anniversary of Rousseau's death, Henri F. Amiel
stated that Rousseau's "talent is the only thing about him which is not open to discussion... But
the character, the philosophy, the influence of Rousseau are still a matter of dispute." Therefore it
was the task of the Rousseau scholar to "[set] aside the eleven thousand pages of our author, and
the fifty or sixty volumes on, for, or against him; letting all the old quarrels sleep... [And] to pass
a rapid judgement upon his thought and his work."5 In 1912, this time marking the bicentenary of
Rousseau's  birth,  Gustav  Lanson went  further  by addressing  "L’unité  de  la  pensée  de  Jean-
5 H.F. Amiel, Jean Jacques Rousseau (New York, 1922), pp. 10–12.
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Jacques Rousseau"6 – a task which has been picked up by most writers since. In fact, the only
thing most Rousseau scholars seem to be in agreement over is the existence of a coherent system
somewhere within his  writings.  The methods of discovering it,  however,  remain elusive and
radically divergent.
Finding  unity  was  the  task  embraced  by  one  of  the  most  influential  interpreters  of
Rousseau's work of the twentieth century: C. E. Vaughan, and  The Political Writings of Jean
Jacques Rousseau  (1915),  argued that the  solution to Rousseau's apparent contradictions was
overcome when one broke his writings into distinct categories or eras: "He began as the pupil of
Locke. In the crucial years of his growth he was the whole-hearted disciple of Plato. And towards
the close [...] he passed,  and was indeed the first  great  thinker to pass,  beneath the spell  of
Montesquieu."7 Undoubtedly all three of these thinkers were hugely important to Rousseau, but
Vaughan relies on their differences to identify distinct arguments in Rousseau's work, rather than
identify Rousseau's own distinct argument which may owe inspiration to these thinkers: 
[In Rousseau] two strands of thought, the abstract and the concrete, lie side by side in his mind [...]
each  held  with  intense  conviction,  but  each  held  in  entire  independence  of  the  other.  At  one
moment he is more abstract than Locke or Plato; at the next he is as ready to yield to circumstances
as  Montesquieu or  Burke.  At  one moment  he holds  that  all  men are equal  and,  in respect  of
capacity for freedom, that all men are alike. At the next he assures us that there is no such thing as
equality between one group of men and another; and that the differences are due not to their own
doing, but to the tyranny of soil and climate and of the conditions, economic or political, which
spring partly from these physical causes, partly from the inherited traditions of the past. He follows
the one line of thought no less ardently than the other.8
This  thesis  has  sympathies  with what  Vaughan  was  doing,  and the  distinction  between  the
pragmatic and the idealistic Rousseau will be developed more fully in its later chapters. However,
rather  than developing an interpretation that  identifies  a systematic  and consistent  Rousseau,
6 G. Lanson, ‘L’unité de la pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, Annales de la société Jean-Jacques Rousseau 8 
(1912), pp. 1–32.
7 C.E. Vaughan, ‘Rousseau as Political Philosopher’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Political Writings of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, 1, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1915), p. 2. The individualistic Rousseau is found in the Second Discourse and 
initial chapters of the Contrat social; the Platonic Rousseau followed (and can be seen in Émile); the follower of 
Montesquieu is found in parts of the Contrat social, but most fully in Pologne.
8 Ibid., p. 77.
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Vaughan does the opposite and argues that there are multiple, and incompatible, Rousseau's. 
Another  similar grand  interpretation  was  offered  by Charles  W.  Hendel,  whose  Jean
Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (1934; republished in 1965) set out to understand the consistency in
Rousseau's thought explicitly: he embraced Amiel's call and claims to "study the man himself and
his  own intention,  without  being distracted by the interpretations and prejudices  which have
accumulated."9 In this way argued he was able to "push through" the contradictions, and found a
Rousseau who, in everything he did, moved politics away from a world of political subjugation
and into a world of self-imposed moral obligation.10 That is, he was a moralist before a politician,
and  the  utility  of  politics  was  in  the  service  of  allowing for  a  moral  society.  To make  this
argument Hendel turned to biography to find "the authentic Rousseau" and "determine what the
ideas of Rousseau really were."11 However, he limited himself to 25 years of Rousseau's life and
works (1740-1765), avoiding the "Early Rousseau" and the "Apologetic Rousseau."12 In doing
this he not only ignores the works for Poland and Geneva, but perpetuates Vaughan's position that
some aspects of Rousseau may be incommensurable.13
A text which, in many ways, works in tandem with Hendel is Alfred Cobban's Rousseau
and  the  Modern  State  (1934).  Cobban  argued  that  there  were  two  grand  interpretations  of
Rousseau available: as the "disciple of Locke and the philosophes, and the Contrat social as the
last and greatest of the works of the individualist school of politics" and as the source of "the
German ideals of the following century."14 These two perspectives, according to Cobban, can be
9 C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), p. xiv.
10 Ibid., p. v.
11 Ibid., pp. xiii–xiv.
12 The discussion of an "early" and "later" Rousseau continues to this day. For one example, see: D.R. Cameron, 
‘The Hero in Rousseau’s Political Thought’, Journal of the History of Ideas 45.3 (1984), pp. 397–419.
13 Hendel avoids these other writings by arguing that the Contrat social was a propositional piece of philosophy 
which Rousseau thought "ought to be followed out" and that "[a]ll the solutions Rousseau had ever entertained" 
were to be found in it (C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist [Indianapolis, 1962], p. 320; 330).
14 A. Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (Hamden, CT, 1964), p. 7. 
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combined if one "study his works as a whole, and disengage what fundamental unity one can."15
The outcome of  this study is  a Rousseau who was primarily concerned with individual liberty,
and that the divergence focused on by other authors – that is, between the state and individual – is
a concern situated in the twentieth, rather than the eighteenth, century. Instead, for Rousseau the
state is a means of which a better individual is the end. The core problem Rousseau wrestles with
is how to "safeguard the liberty of the individual, while at the same time giving the state the
moral authority and actual power which it needs if it is to function effectively for the benefit of
the individuals composing it."16 From this, Cobban argues, Rousseau's relationship to the concept
of nationalism can be understood: "[F]or the appearance of the nation state no political inventor
can be given credit or blame... But the fact that he is perhaps its first theorist is undeniable."17
Cobban's method of getting to this conclusion, however, is problematic. He wrote: "My intention
is not to relate  [Rousseau]  to individual thinkers who proceeded or followed him; or to trace
generally his origins or influences... [To link] a theorist too closely with his predecessors [is] to
obscure  his  real  originality."18 In  this  way,  he  argues,  it  is  possible  to  not  only  understand
Rousseau, but come to "understand the fundamental political ideas of our world."19 How one is to
know whether any of these ideas are or were, in fact, Rousseau's is not made clear.
Leo Strauss also saw Rousseau as a turning point in the history of political thought. In his
two works dedicated to the thinker, "On the Intention of Rousseau" (1947) and his chapter "The
Crisis of Modern Nature Right" in  Natural Right and History (1953),  he  identifies  him  as the
thinker who  both  recognized and initiated a crisis in modern political philosophy by attacking
15 A. Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (Hamden, CT, 1964), p. 19. Although this may also mean one must 
accept that there is some fundamental disunity.
16 Ibid., p. 9.
17 Ibid., p. 100. On this interpretation of Rousseau's relationship to nationalism, see also: S.T. Engel, ‘Rousseau 
and Imagined Communities’, The Review of Politics 67.03 (2005), pp. 515–37.
18 A. Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (Hamden, CT, 1964), p. 15.
19 Ibid., p. 17. 
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ideas of  progress, enlightenment, the sciences and arts,  and perhaps most importantly, natural
right.20 The "modern venture was a radical error," for Rousseau, which one could see when it was
contrasted with the  polis  of the  classical world  and nature.21 This,  Strauss argues, is the grand
theme in Rousseau's works  and what is unique about them in the history of political thought
fully.22 Robert  Derathé's Rousseau et La Science Politique de Son Temps  (1950)  also identifies
Rousseau's  work as a turning point in the history of political  thought and natural law: "[L]a
doctrine  politique  de  Rousseau  est  issue  d'une  réflexion sur  les  théories  soutenues par  les
penseurs qui se rattachent à ce  qu'on a  appelé L'école  du droit de la nature et des gens."23 By
arguing that  the state  needed to be something more than an institution which fulfilled some
criteria set out by a theory of natural law, he was questioning the legitimacy of governments.
Rather than happiness or comfort afforded by a material wealth, freedom of the individual as a
member of a collective sovereignty needed to be addressed, as it was freedom of this sort which
was of value, according to Derathé's Rousseau.
As noted, grand interpretations are not the only form Rousseau scholarship has taken. In
fact, in the closing years of the 1950s more personal examinations began to emerge. Bertrand de
Jouvenel's  "Rousseau  the  Pessimistic  Evolutionist"  (1961)  demonstrates  this  break  clearly.
Jouvenel wrote a number of works on Rousseau, but they were works directed towards informing
our contemporary understanding of politics.24 "Rousseau the Pessimistic Evolutionist," however,
engages more  directly  with  Rousseau's  thought,  and  does so  by  disregarding  the value  of
20 For more on Strauss' relationship to Rousseau, see: V. Gourevitch, ‘On Strauss on Rousseau’, in E. Grace and C. 
Kelly (eds.), The Challenge of Rousseau (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 147–66.
21 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), p. 252.
22 Although Strauss went further, arguing that part of his (and our) task is to "understand their author better than he
understood himself" (V. Gourevitch, ‘On Strauss on Rousseau’, in E. Grace and C. Kelly [eds.], The Challenge 
of Rousseau [Cambridge, 2012], p. 148).
23 R. Derathé, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps (Paris, 1988), p. 1. Italics in the original.
24 B. de Jouvenel, On Power, its Nature and the History of its Growth (New York, 1949); B. de Jouvenel, 
Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good (Chicago, 1963).
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Rousseau's  ideas and  instead  returns  to  "consistency"  as  its  own  subject.25 He  finds  this
consistency,  and  the  reason  to  abandon  any propositional  aspects  of  Rousseau's  thought, in
Rousseau's belief that men are naturally good, but progress has corrupted humanity. This attitude,
Jouvenel writes, "is fundamentally pessimistic: the course of social history cannot be reversed or
indeed stopped, except in isolated cases."26 This  position highlights  a new question  which had
emerged amongst historians of political thought: if his ideas were of little use, what can we make
of Rousseau? Many commentators turned inwards and focused on the man himself.
Written  prior  to  Jouvenel's  work  is  Jean  Starobinski's  doctoral  thesis  Jean-Jacques
Rousseau: la transparence et l’obstacle (1957, first published 1958, re-issued with additional
essays  in  1971).  Starobinski's  attempted to come  to  understand Rousseau's  philosophy by
studying Rousseau the person.  He highlights two themes which bind all of Rousseau's works
together: a desire for transparency and a fear of obstacle or obstruction. The bulk of Starobinski's
argument  can be found in the sixth chapter,  "Les  Malentendus,"  where  he argues that  being
misunderstood was a recurring theme in Rousseau's life which manifested itself in his writings,
and  made  expressing  himself  hugely  important  in  his  works.27 Thus,  not  only is  it  through
recognizing Rousseau's unique biography that one can come to understand him better, but it is
this unique biography which manifested itself in makings his writings difficult to understand. A
similar  psychological  work,  although  a  more  explicitly  political,  is  found  in  in  Lester  G.
Crocker's  Rousseau's  Social  Contract:  An Interpretive  Essay  (1968). Crocker  argues  that  his
25 B. de Jouvenel, ‘Rousseau the Pessimistic Evolutionist’, Yale French Studies 28 (1961), p. 96.
26 Ibid., p. 93. This pessimism is brought into the realm of reality in Jouvenel's "On the Nature of Political Science"
(1961), in which Rousseau's writings on corruption are redrafted as a warning for the contemporary world, and a
call to study political behaviour if one wants to change the world (B. de Jouvenel, ‘On the Nature of Political 
Science’, The American Political Science Review 55.4 (1961), p. 773; 779.
27 See also: J.P. Dobel, ‘The Role of Language in Rousseau’s Political Thought’, Polity 18.4 [1986], p. 657; A. 
Abizadeh, ‘Banishing the Particular: Rousseau on Rhetoric, Patrie, and the Passions’, Political Theory 29.4 
(2001), pp. 556–82; M. Canovan, ‘The Limits of Seriousness: Rousseau and the Interpretation of Political 
Theory’, European History Quarterly 2.1 (1972), pp. i–24; C. Kelly, ‘"To Persuade without Convincing": The 
Language of Rousseau’s Legislator’, American Journal of Political Science 31.2 (1987), pp. 321–35.
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analysis offers its reader insights into "the meaning and the inherent tendencies of [Rousseau's]
vision of the good society" and does so by "reconstruct[ing] to some degree the type of mind that
conceived [Rousseau's works]."28 Context here, however, is not historical. Instead Crocker looked
at the outcomes and analogues of Rousseau's works. Unsurprisingly, this leads to a problematic
conclusion: Rousseau's "character and thought" present a "classic example" of the " authoritarian
personality and the totalitarian society."29 This turn to the psychological is also seen in another,
and much better, work by Judith Shklar.
Shklar,  in  Men and Citizens:  A Study  of  Rousseau's  Social  Theory  (1969),  explicitly
embraced the psychological and dismissed much of the political. The secondary literature which
was  noted as  being  worthy is  important  because  of  its  psychological  insight;  Bertrand  de
Jouvenal  for  his "psychological  nuance" and Jean Starobinski  for  his  "general  knowledge of
psychology."30 On Rousseau, she argues that there was very little propositional usefulness to be
found, and that he was instead a psychologist himself, in the same vein as Plato and Freud31 and
any political insights he did have were those of a social critic rather than a "designer of plans for
political reform."32 For example, she argues that Rousseau was a critic of property, yet he also
understood that  man could not do away with it.  Thus,  the best  society could hope for is  to
understand its nature and distribute property in a more equitable way. That is, "at best, Rousseau
thought one could lessen the degrees of inequality that prevail."33 Rousseau did this, she argues,
by developing "utopias" through which his reader was able to witness better societies, and thus
question  their  own. Ultimately,  however, even  this  was  of  little  use;  the  "enormity  of  his
28 L.G. Crocker, Rousseau’s Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay (Cleveland, 1968), pp. viii–ix.
29 Ibid., p. 163.
30 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. 230.
31 This is what he meant, she argues, when he called himself a historian of the human heart (Rousseau, Juge, OC i, 
p. 728).
32 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. vii.
33 Ibid., pp. xi–xii.
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condemnations was such that it was impossible to introduce any suggestion of possible political
improvement or to find grounds for any turn for the better in the world in which he lived, and it
was  not  Rousseau's  purpose  to  do  so."34 Shklar's  analysis  has  much  to  offer  (especially  her
examination of the body-politic metaphor). However, she fails to adequately engage with what is
considered to  be Rousseau's  actual  propositional  works,  particularly his  Lettres écrites  de la
montagne, and the historical context in her interpretation is lacking.35 
While the  psychological interpretations complicated  the  relationship  between Rousseau
scholarship  and history,  some works  responded by  abandoning  history entirely,  as Roger  D.
Masters did with The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (1968). Masters text begins by claiming
that  it  corrects a  recurring problem  in  Rousseau  scholarship:  it  examines  the  entirety  of
Rousseau's  writings carefully.  Other works, he claims, distracted themselves from the text  by
turning  to historical  details,  many  of  which were  ultimately irrelevant  to understanding
Rousseau's philosophy.36 Instead, his approach abandons many of the common themes addressed
in Rousseau scholarship and instead offers an exegetical reading.  However, although he claims
there to be a drought of works which address the entirety of Rousseau's ouvre, he limits himself
to  "three principle"  bodies of work:  Émile, the first two discourses, and  Rousseau's "political
philosophy proper," the  Contrat social.37 The limitation of this approach becomes even more
clear when Masters writes that "Rousseau's science of the legislator shows conclusively that he
did not content himself with the formulation of abstract principles of political right... Rousseau's
principles of legitimacy [...] can never be fully realized in practice; they can only be applied to
political reality if the particular circumstances of each society are fully taken into account."38 This
34 Ibid., p. xiii. 
35 For her own take on historical importance, see: Ibid., p. 218.
36 R.D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 1976), pp. vii–x.
37 Ibid., p. xv.
38 Ibid., p. 410.
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conclusion  is  not  without  merit,  but  Rousseau  does  explicitly  address  how "particular
circumstances" interact with his "abstract principles of political right" in his works for Geneva,
Corsica, and Poland – works which he chooses to not substantively address.39
A similar approach is found in John C. Hall's Rousseau (1973). Hall was critical of works
which  attempted to understand Rousseau through his  psychological  reaction to the world, be it
conscious or unconscious. He conceded that they "may have some use for some purposes of the
literary critic; but it is of no use to the philosopher, who looks to Rousseau for arguments that
may be  true  or  false."40 However,  for  someone  claiming  to  explicitly  examine  the  political
arguments on their own merit he limits himself to three texts: the Second Discourse, Économie
politique, and the Contrat social. Although his study does correct the errors of some less rigorous
interpretations – in particular, he notes that those who read totalitarianism in Rousseau base their
readings on misunderstandings of key terms "such as state, sovereign, general will, legislation"41
– his conclusions are ultimately no more helpful, arguing that "Rousseau does not himself draw
the conclusion that all existing social institutions and conventions should be scrapped, but the
reader can easily draw it for himself."42 This is clearly not the case if one has read Rousseau's
Lettres and Pologne. By limiting his sources, Hall, just as Masters, fails to to examine Rousseau's
work thoroughly.
In  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s  the  debate  over  the  psychological  importance  of
Rousseau and his  personal  history began to fade,  and a  new theme in Rousseau scholarship
became more predominant  (and remains today).43 One now finds works which are united by
39 Masters himself admits this weakness in his work (Ibid., p. 411).
40 J.C. Hall, Rousseau: An Introduction to his Political Philosophy (London, 1973), p. 7.
41 Ibid., p. 53.
42 Ibid., p. 41.
43 Masters himself identified it as one of the two types of works on Rousseau being written in the late 1960s (along
with those which offered introductions to the life and thought of Rousseau) (R.D. Masters, The Political 
Philosophy of Rousseau [Princeton, 1976], pp. vii–x). Hendel also highlighted its usefulness (C.W. Hendel, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist [Indianapolis, 1962], p. viii). Earlier examples include A.C. Keller, ‘Plutarch 
and Rousseau’s First Discours’, PMLA 54.1 (1939), pp. 212–22; P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The ‐
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arguing that  to  understand Rousseau one  must  come to  understand some key concept,  idea,
theory, or historical issue which unlocks or enlightens his thought.44 This is in many ways an
improvement,  although  as  is  always  the  case  some  works  are  much  better  than  others.
Nonetheless,  this  approach provides  for  deeper  studies  into particular  aspects  of  Rousseau,
leading to  much more detailed investigations,  and it has  emerged  as  the predominant form of
interpretation  in Rousseau scholarship.  This is important to this thesis for two reasons. First,
these focused studies, rather than grand interpretations, form the intellectual background for this
thesis.45 Second, these studies have have brought with them ever new methodological approaches
and understandings. No longer does one "push through" contradictions, as Hendel once argued
one must. However, before moving on to a methodological discussion explicitly, it is necessary to
quickly note one more area in which Rousseau scholarship has been lacking, and thus, highlight
one way in which this thesis is offering something new.
This thesis examines those works of Rousseau's which may be considered propositional;
those writings which had something specific to say for Geneva, Corsica, and Poland. However,
for the most part, these texts have largely been seen as problematic when considered alongside
the Contrat social. This has led to them often being ignored or only briefly addressed. Since 1915
petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau’s thought’, Historian 20.2 (1958), pp. 127–52; F.G. Healey, ‘Rousseau, 
Voltaire and Corsica: Some notes on an interesting enigma’, Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century 10 
(1959), pp. 413–9.
44 To offer a few examples: Stoicism in K.F. Roche, Rousseau: Stoic and Romantic (London, 1974).; 
"nonindividualism" in S. Ellenburg, Rousseau’s Political Philosophy: An Interpretation from Within (Ithaca, NY,
1976).; language in J.P. Dobel, ‘The Role of Language in Rousseau’s Political Thought’, Polity 18.4 (1986), pp. 
638–58.; disorder in M. Viroli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the ‘Well-ordered Society’, trans. D. Hanson 
(Cambridge, 1988).; natural goodness in A.M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of 
Rousseau’s Thought (Chicago, 1990).; the conception of the "ordinary" in T.B. Strong, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: 
The Politics of the Ordinary (Thousand Oaks, Calif, 1994).; Geneva in H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva 
(Cambridge, 2007).; the influence of Stoicism and Augustinianism in C. Brooke, ‘Rousseau’s Political 
Philosophy: Stoic and Augustinian Origins’, in P. Riley (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Rousseau 
(Cambridge, 2001), pp. 94–123.; religion in M.S. Cladis, Public Vision, Private Lives: Rousseau, Religion, and 
21st-Century Democracy (New York, 2006).; and gratitude in P. Coleman, Anger, Gratitude, and the 
Enlightenment Writer (Oxford, 2010).
45 This thesis will address additional literature in corresponding chapters. For more on secondary literature 
regarding Rousseau and the ancients see: pp. 19-22; the legislator see: pp. 88-92; Geneva see: pp. 131-136; for 
Corsica see: pp. 197-198; for Poland see: pp. 226-229.
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this has been the case, with Vaughan noting that the Projet de Constitution pour la Corse had yet
to be included in any of Rousseaus' collected works, and argued that when studied, "the political
work of Rousseau [becomes] an unbroken movement from one position almost to its opposite."46
This may have led others to ignore the works as being somewhat un-Rousseauvian. Hendel was
explicit that they were not a part of his interpretation, and Hall claimed he was not investigating
them because, as writings, "they are not those on which [Rousseau's] reputation as a philosopher
rests."47 At other times the importance was noted, but the investigation still ignored:
To trace out fully the manner in which Rousseau conceived of his political thought as a guide to
sound political action, it would be necessary to study in detail the relationship between the Social
Contract  and  the  works  in  which  Rousseau  applied  his  teaching  to  concrete  circumstances.
Although the most obvious of these works are Rousseau's constitutional proposals for Corsica and
Poland (in which he acts as legislator or advisor to the legislator), it would be equally necessary to
consider his two major studies of Geneva... [But] such a task is far beyond the limits of this work.48
Another problem which has emerged is that when works attempt to offer a detailed investigation
into Rousseau's works on Corsica and Poland,  they  treat them  as one project.49 In doing this,
these works often make claims so broad, and lacking in nuance, that not much use can be made
of them. To offer one example:
The occasions when Rousseau did apparently emerge from his dream-like realm of theory and try
to apply his ideas seriously to practical politics are not encouraging. [H]is projected constitutions
for Corsica and Poland demonstrate [...] that his whole approach to the problem, in both cases, is
Utopian in the worst sense: that is to say, he has his eyes fixed on an ideal, a mixture of Sparta and
Republican Rome.50
These studies, thus, fail to address the particularities of each nation, let alone each text, in their
attempts to develop a singular description of Rousseau's politics.  This is, of course, not always
46 C.E. Vaughan, ‘Rousseau as Political Philosopher’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Political Writings of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, 1, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1915), p. vii; 80.
47 C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), pp. xiv–xv; J.C. Hall, Rousseau: An 
Introduction to his Political Philosophy (London, 1973), p. 8.
48 R.D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 1976), p. 411.
49 R.P. Hanley, ‘Enlightened Nation Building: The "Science of the Legislator" in Adam Smith and Rousseau’, 
American Journal of Political Science 52.2 (2008), pp. 219–34; E. Putterman, ‘Realism and Reform in 
Rousseau’s Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica’, Political Studies 49.3 (2001), pp. 481–94.
50 M. Canovan, ‘The Limits of Seriousness: Rousseau and the Interpretation of Political Theory’, European 
History Quarterly 2.1 (1972), p. 22. For a much better example of treating both topics see: J.-P. Massias, ‘Les 
projets de Constitution selon Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, in M. Lafourcade (ed.), Les origines du 
constitutionnalisme et la Constitution de Bayonne du 7 juillet 1808 (Donostia, 2009), pp. 113–46.
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the case. There are works which investigate Geneva, Corsica, and Poland in detail, and they will
be addressed later in this thesis in more detail. Unfortunately, however, these are the exceptions
rather than the rule.
One  of  the  primary  problems  identifiable  in  works  addressing  Rousseau  is
methodological. Although with the emergence of the Cambridge School readings have improved
and historically contextual readings have become more common, Robert Wokler argued that the
focus largely remained politically situated. Historical reality is such that the interests of someone
like Rousseau went beyond politics, and therefore non-political readings, influences, and writings
must  not  be  ignored.  Instead,  one  must  be  aware  of "the  various  languages  [...] from
anthropology, psychology and the philosophy of music and language, for instance, just to name
certain themes of particular interest" to him.51 This thesis accepts this position, and adds to it a
concern  for particular  peoples' histories. This is not an entirely new position  to hold; Vaughan
argued in 1915 that "[Rousseau] concerns himself with action no less than with theory; that he is
at least as much a practical reformer as a political philosopher... [His] arguments, so far from
being abstract, have the closest reference to conditions of time, place and historical antecedent."52
That is, the histories of the specific peoples and places Rousseau was writing for must be studied
and understood as Rousseau himself would have come to know them if one hopes to understand
the potential political solutions available.
Of course, in saying this, one must be careful to not claim too much. This thesis does not
offer  the  "authentic  Rousseau."53 The  goal,  instead,  is  to  historically  situate  a  reading  of
Rousseau's works such that one can overcome at least one of the inconsistencies in his writings:
51 R. Wokler, Rousseau, the Age of Enlightenment, and Their Legacies, ed. B. Garsten (Princeton, NJ, 2012), p. 
128.
52 C.E. Vaughan, ‘Rousseau as Political Philosopher’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Political Writings of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, 1, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1915), p. 18.
53 C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), pp. xiii–xiv.
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that between his propositional and his philosophical political writings. Concern has been taken to
ensure  methodological  legitimacy  while  doing  this,  avoiding  what  Skinner  calls  errors  of
"mythology."54 A particular concern for this thesis is the "mythology of doctrines" – taking "some
scattered  or  quite  incidental  remarks  by  a  classic  theorist  into  his  'doctrine'  on  one  of  the
mandatory themes."55 On this concern, it should be noted that what is being addressed in this
thesis  is not a "doctrine" (such as "equality,  progress, Machiavellism, the social contract, the
great chain of being, the separation of powers, and so on")56 but a recurring problem addressed by
thinkers in various ways throughout history. In fact, much of this thesis and its methodology is
structured around making this clear by, first, offering a description of the distinction between
founding and re-founding in  the history of  political  thought,  and second,  demonstrating  that
Rousseau himself was aware if this distinction. This thesis does not claim that the distinction
between the  two categories  described  in  this  thesis'  title  ("founding"  and "re-founding")  are
entirely of Rousseau's  creation,  nor does it  claim that Rousseau himself  would construct  the
division in  these particular  terms.  Instead,  the distinction can be understood as an analytical
framework, and not an "interpretive key" which offers the secret to unlocking Rousseau's "true"
meaning. Again, the aim of the first two chapters is to demonstrate that such a problem (between
founding and re-founding) was addressed in the writings of those thinkers Rousseau was familiar
with. This, however, leads to a second concern: "Besides this crude possibility of crediting a
writer with a meaning he could not have intended to convey, since that meaning was not available
to him, there is also the (perhaps more insidious) danger of too readily 'reading in' a doctrine."57
The third chapter aims largely to overcome this potential mistake. While the chapter on peoples
54 Q. Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory 8.1 (1969), p. 7.
55 Ibid., p. 7. This is one part of Skinner's "mythology of doctrine." The second part is the criticism of those 
thinkers who failed to recognize "mandatory themes."
56 Ibid., p. 10.
57 Ibid., p. 9.
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in the  Contrat social, and Rousseau's reference to Corsica in the same text,  arguably make  it
explicit that Rousseau was aware of such a distinction, a thorough discussion is offered on the
ideas,  role,  and  limited  capabilities of  the  legislator. The  three  chapters  which  follow
demonstrate how Rousseau's own propositional  writings fit into  both  this  historical  distinction,
and his own philosophical system, by examining his proposals in light of the particular histories
of Geneva, Corsica, and Poland.
More  broadly  a  few methodological  rules  have  been  followed  throughout:  the  thesis
accepts Rousseau's own claim that he is a consistent thinker;58 it does not ignore or abandon any
of his texts; it recognizes that historical antecedents exist, and ideas do not emerge from nothing,
and thus attempts to locate Rousseau's ideas within a larger historical discussion which Rousseau
was aware of;59 it recognizes that intellectual history is not only political, and that history as a
broader subject must be turned to; it does not search for the political practicality of Rousseau's
thought; it does attempt to understand the intention of Rousseau's work when possible, but it does
not attempt to identify Rousseau's impact on the world.60 Overall, the goal is not to say whether
Rousseau was an ancient or a modern, or a Genevan or a cosmopolitan. Instead, that he was a
political theorist who wrote in response to the problems which he was presented with. As this
individual he drew ideas and influence from various sources which ideally can be recognized.
Recreating this intellectual world which he had access to is difficult, but difficulty should not
stop an endeavor.
58 Rousseau, Beaumont, OC iv, p. 928. Thus, this thesis does not accept Skinner's criticism of the "mythology of 
coherence" is applicable in this case (Ibid., p. 16).
59 Preference is given to writers we know Rousseau was familiar with, and thus, avoid Skinner's "mythology of 
parochialism" (Ibid., pp. 22–26).
60 Thus avoiding the "mythology of prolepsis" (Ibid., pp. 22–23).
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Chapter I: Lawgiving and the Ancients
David Wisner wrote that Rousseau was the "writer who best explored the logical potential" of the
legislator having made it central to his own political system.1 This, however, should not lead one
to  ignore the rich and long tradition of the character as it stretched to the ancients.  In fact, the
idea  of  the  great  and  heroic  founder  of  political  societies  can  be  traced  from  Moses  to
Robespierre  and Plato  to  Lenin;  it  is something  which  has  both  influenced  actions  and
philosophies, and something pragmatic, idealistic, and realistic all at the same time. Importantly,
this heritage was not unknown to Rousseau, and although the Enlightenment is recognized as an
era of radical new ideas, he looked to the ancients for political inspiration: "Qu'ont de commun
les Français, les Anglais, les Russes, avec les Romains et les Grecs? Rien presque que la figure."
He continued:
Je regarde les nations modernes:  j'y vois force faiseurs de  lois et  pas  un  législateur.  Chez les
anciens,  j'en  vois  trois  principaux  qui  méritent  une  attention particulière:  Moyse,  Lycurgue et
Numa. Tous trois ont mis leurs principaux soins à des objets qui paraîtraient à nos docteurs dignes
de risée. Tous trois ont eu des succès qu'on jugerait impossibles s'ils étaient moins attestés.2
One must therefore come to know this history if one wants to understand Rousseau’s thoughts on
the topic. 
This relationship has not gone unnoticed. Hendel wrote: "The great law-givers, Lycurgus
and Numa, told in the Lives of Plutarch, were among the boyhood admirations of Rousseau; and
Moses of the Old Testament could scarcely have been absent from the fancies of the youth of
Geneva."3 Shklar touched on this relationship as well, noting that laws are an expression of a
people's virtue rather than a cause: "to structure the will that creates rules, to give a people its life
in the first place, requires a single hand and a single voice." She continued: "The Great Legislator
1 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 4.
2 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 956.
3 C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), p. 320.
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must not only invent [laws], but create the moral climate that is needed for their acceptance...
That was the way of those ancient political paragons, Moses, Lycurgus, Numa, and Solon. Of
such men, alas, modern history knows nothing."4 What is more, Rousseau's debt to these ideas in
his own writings has been recognized by scholars. Byron Wells argued that Rousseau's legislator
in the  Contrat social  is based on Plutarch's Lycrugus.5 Jimack has shown that Plutarch is the
ancient  writer  that  Rousseau  took  greatest  inspiration  from.6 Keller,  similarly,  wrote  that
Rousseau's writings as an adult were "a natural result of his earlier background," and argues that
one is able to recognize more in Rousseau's works if they are familiar with this inspiration.7 And
finally,  Rousseau himself  wrote that  Putarch's  heroes  had inspired in him "cet  esprit  libre et
republicain, ce caractere indomptable et fier, et impatient de joug et de servitude."8 
Plutarch is not, however, the only ancient Rousseau is argued to be indebted to. Others
draw attention to Plato as a key inspiration: Vaughan saw him as Rousseau's strongest influence;
M. J. Silverthorne has argued that by closely examining Rousseau's marginal notes in his copy of
Plato's works one can discover a clear relationship between their thought;9 David Lay Williams'
Rousseau's  Platonic Enlightenment (2007) argues that  Rousseau was,  before anything else,  a
Platonist;10 and  finally,  Brent  E.  Cusher's  recent  PhD  thesis,  Rousseau  and  Plato  on  the
Legislator  and  the  Limits  of  Law demonstrates  that  the  relationship  continues  to  engage
researchers.11 Thus, while Rousseau's relationship with these ancients is accepted, as with most
4 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 155–156.
5 B. Wells, ‘Rousseau’s Legislators and the Exemplar of Sparta’, in R. Grant and P. Stewart (eds.), Rousseau and 
the Ancients / Rousseau et les Anciens, Pensée libre 8 (Montreal, 2001).
6 P.D. Jimack, La genese et la redaction de l’Émile de J.-J. Rousseau, SVEC, 13 (Geneva, 1960), pp. 350–353.
7 Specifically, he offers a study in which he finds direct links between Plutarch and the First Discourse on the 
topics of patriotism, virtue, luxury and inequality, the arts and sciences, and education (A.C. Keller, ‘Plutarch 
and Rousseau’s First Discours’, PMLA 54.1 [1939], pp. 213–214).
8 Rousseau, Confessions, OC i, p. 9.
9 M.J. Silverthorne, ‘Rousseau’s Plato’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century CXVI (1973), pp. 235–49.
10 D. Williams, Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment (University Park, PA, 2010), p. 88.
11 B.E. Cusher, ‘Rousseau and Plato on the Legislator and the Limits of Law’, Library and Archives Canada = 
Bibliothèque et Archives Canada (2010). For more on Rousseau and the ancients see: R. Grant and P. Stewart 
(eds.), Rousseau and the Ancients / Rousseau et les Anciens, Pensée libre 8 (Montreal, 2001).
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issues surrounding Rousseau, it is not entirely settled. 
The aim of this chapter is not to demonstrate which school of thought Rousseau is most
indebted to, however. Instead, the goal is to come to know the ideas which he could be indebted
to. When examining the legislator as a Rousseauvian concept, one must, in Skinner's terms, come
to understand what Rousseau "at least could have thought,"  and to do this one must  develop a
historical sketch of the concept as it  would have been familiar to Rousseau.12 Such a task is
necessary if one's aim is is to understand Rousseau's own proposals in regard to Geneva, Corsica,
and Poland. For example, if Rousseau proposes that Geneva should embrace public gatherings as
a method of  instilling virtue, or that Corsica should embrace a life austerity  so as to fight off
corruption,  or  that  Poland  should  embrace  equestrian  competitions  to  create  a  sense  of
competition, one may want to find analogues for these proposals in the works he drew inspiration
from. In this way we may come to understand his intentions with greater clarity. Again, the goal
of this chapter is not to demonstrate that Rousseau is a students of Plato or Plutarch. Nor is this
thesis  looking  to  find  an  interpretive  key  to  unlock  Rousseau's  thought.  Influences  and
inspirations are the subject of this chapter, and the anecdotes and ideas furnished by Plutarch and
Plato aid the reader of Rousseau elsewhere. The actual goal of the chapter, then, is twofold: first,
to  locate  the  distinction  between  founding  and  re-founding  in  these  ancient  sources,  thus
demonstrating that it was a political problem and was recognizable in the writings Rousseau was
familiar with. Second, to draw links between this distinction, these sources, and Rousseau. These
links, the relationship between the ancients and Rousseau's use of them, and their importance to
this thesis becomes clearer when one recognizes their utility during the Enlightenment. 
During the  eighteenth  century,  Ancient  Greek and Roman  sources were an  important
12 Q. Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, in J. Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context: 
Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Princeton, N.J, 1988), p. 49.
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intellectual  resource.13 Ancient  republicanism,  in  particular,  offered  its  own  unique,  and  in
Rousseau's view, superiour, conception of government which saw the administration of the state
as being something which aimed towards "justice and the good of all."14 As Benjamin Constant
argued as early as 1819, Rousseau, inspired by nothing but a pure love of liberty, had transposed
this idea of politics, these ideas of social power, and these concepts of collective sovereignty two
thousand years forward.15 Thus, Rousseau placed himself in a long republican tradition of which
both  Plato and Plutarch were  parts.  In  fact,  the political  context  of  Plutarch's  own works  is
relevant here: although he was well-traveled throughout the Mediterranean, and was a Roman
citizen, Plutarch wrote his works from his hometown of Chaeronea. He consciously chose to
"look at his contemporary world through the eyes of a small Greek polis."16 In many ways, this is
true also of Rousseau and Geneva. In both cases the city took precedence over the empire in the
realm of the political. The polis should be independent from Rome as far as possible for Plutarch;
Geneva's independence, too, was threatened by her neighbours. The lives Plutarch reported were
those of people who had worked to ensure the survival of their particular cities.17 These lives,
then,  were  just  as  relevant  to  Rousseau's  interests.  What  is  more,  in  using  these  ideas  and
concepts  in  contemporary  debates,  Rousseau's  goal  was  an  "archeo-teleological  quest  to
reconstruct  a  mythical  Golden  Age"  based  "on  models  of  antiquity,  both  institutional  and
individual."18 And ancient republicanism, as embraced by Rousseau, aimed to "supplant the false
doctrines of the modern writers like Grotius."19 In the stories of Plutarch and the arguments of
13 R.A. Leigh, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Myth of Antiquity’, in R.R. Bolgar (ed.), Classical Influences on 
Western Thought A.D. 1650-1870 (Cambridge, 1979), p. 157.
14 C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), p. 323.
15 B. Constant, Oeuvres politiques de Benjamin Constant (Paris, 1874), p. 271.
16 E. Koulakiotis, ‘Greek Lawgivers in Plutarch: A comparison Between the Biographical Lycurgus and the 
Rhetorical Alexander’, in A. Nikolaidis (ed.), The Unity of Plutarch’s Work: ‘Moralia’ Themes in the ‘Lives’, 
Features of the ‘Lives’ in the ‘Moralia’ (Berlin, 2008), p. 404.
17 P.A. Stadter, ‘Plutarch and Rome’, in M. Beck (ed.), A Companion to Plutarch (Oxford, 2014), p. 21.
18 B. Wells, ‘Rousseau’s Legislators and the Exemplar of Sparta’, in R. Grant and P. Stewart (eds.), Rousseau and 
the Ancients / Rousseau et les Anciens, Pensée libre 8 (Montreal, 2001), p. 211.
19 C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), p. 324.
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Plato Rousseau witnessed a different way of governing, one which unlocked a people's general
will, rather than legitimizing a government's right to will. That is, the intellectual ammunition
which Rousseau would come to fire at his enemies was based on a political worldview developed
while reading the ancients, and therefore anyone interested in understanding Rousseau's thoughts
on legislation must begin with what he found so powerful about these histories:
Le même esprit guida tous les anciens Législateurs dans leurs institutions. Tous cherchèrent des
liens qui attachassent les Citoyens à la patrie et les uns aux autres, et ils les  trouvèrent dans des
usages particuliers, dans des cérémonies religieuses qui par leur nature étaient toujours exclusives
et nationales (voyez la fin du  Contrat social), dans des jeux qui  tenaient beaucoup les citoyens
rassemblés, dans des exercices qui  augmentaient avec leur vigueur et leurs forces leur fierté et
l'estime d'eux-mêmes,  dans des  spectacles  qui,  leur  rappelant l'histoire de leurs  ancêtres,  leurs
malheurs,  leurs  vertus,  leurs  victoires,  intéressaient leurs  cœurs,  les  enflammaient  d'une  vive
émulation, et les attachaient fortement à cette patrie dont on ne cessait de les occuper.20
To develop  a  sketch  of  these  legislators,  this  chapter begins  with  an  examination  of
particular characters – Moses, Lycurgus, Cyrus, Romulus, Numa, Theseus, and Solon – and the
recurring themes and motifs which make up the genre.21 In doing this, this chapter is divided into
three parts: First, it looks at the common traits in the personal histories of these characters: their
mysterious or turbulent births and heritages; their inert noble characteristics; the common theme
of  travel;  and  their  education  or  close  acquaintance  with  philosophers  and  great  statesman.
Second,  their  political  actions are  examined,  and the tactics  used to bring about  their  goals.
Specifically:  art,  religion,  ceremony,  trade,  training,  trickery,  the  establishment  of  class
structures, and exit strategies. Finally, the similarities and differences between the tales are drawn
out, and the characters are categorized into three classes – heroes, founders, and re-founders – a
distinction  which  will  allow us  to  highlight  themes Rousseau embraced in  his  own political
thought.
20 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 958.
21 Sources used in this section are those which we know Rousseau was familiar with. In particular: the bible, 
Diodorus Siculus and Herodotus. For more on the lawgiver as a genre see: A. Szegedy-Maszak, ‘Legends of the 
Greek lawgivers’, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 19 (1978), pp. 199–209; G.B. Lavery, ‘Training, Trade 
and Trickery: Three Lawgivers in Plutarch’, The Classical World 67.6 (1974), pp. 369–81.
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The Making of a Lawgiver
Plutarch's  Lives  provided Rousseau with both a historical source from which he could come to
know the biographies and tales of ancient lawgivers and statesmen,  as well as a  starting point
from which he could come to judge and develop his own ideas. This type of exercise was, in fact,
encouraged by Plutarch. Attached to each set of coupled lives, when they have escaped antiquity,
is a comparison and judgment. However, these comparisons were not only intended as political
lessons. Instead, they have much in common with Stoic act of contemplation or askêsis. Plutarch
himself noted this: "I began the writing of my 'Lives' for the sake of others, but I find that I am
continuing the work and delighting in it now for my own sake also, using history as a mirror and
endeavouring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues therein
depicted."22 In this way they offer their reader something in addition to a simple history; in this
way "we can enjoy with earlier generations the delight of observing through Plutarch’s eyes the
nobility of Pericles or the fickleness of Alcibiades, the viciousness of Sulla or the tragedy of
Antony. And thus we can use Plutarch’s Lives in creating our own understanding of the ancient
world, and of human character."23 Or, as Rousseau wrote: 
Plutarque excelle par ces mêmes détails  dans lesquels nous n'osons plus entrer.  Il  a une grâce
inimitable à peindre les grands hommes dans les petites choses; et il est si heureux dans le choix de
ses traits, que souvent un mot, un sourire, un geste lui suffit pour caractériser son héros. Avec un
mot plaisant Annibal rassure son armée effrayée, et la fait marcher en riant à la bataille qui lui livra
l'Italie; Agésilas, à cheval sur un bâton, me fait aimer le vainqueur du grand roi; César, traversant
un pauvre village et causant avec ses amis, décèle, sans y penser, le fourbe qui disait ne vouloir
qu'être l'égal de Pompée; Alexandre avale une médecine et ne dit pas un seul mot: c'est le plus
beau moment de sa vie; Aristide écrit son propre nom sur une coquille, et justifie ainsi son surnom;
Philopœmen, le manteau bas, coupe du bois dans la cuisine de son hôte. Voilà le véritable art de
peindre.24
Plutarch was more than a "mirror of antiquity and human nature," but a "secondary authority." 25
The lessons provided were historical, but also timeless – as appropriate to ancient Athens, as they
22 Plutarch, Lives, Aemilius i [ed. Perrin, vi, p. 261])
23 P.A. Stadter, Plutarch and the Historical Tradition (London, 2002), p. 3.
24 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, pp. 313.
25 D.A. Russell, ‘On Reading Plutarch’s Lives’, Greece and Rome 13.02 (1966), p. 139.
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were to citizens of  the Roman Empire, Rousseau,  and Rousseau's student  Émile.26 That is, the
examples Plutarch provided are both historical and philosophical; they can tell us how great men
acted, as well as how we ourselves may want to act. Thus, the first task in coming to understand
Rousseau's own understanding of what a legislator was and could be, is to develop a sketch of
Plutarch's.
Plutarch's biographies are of people who are "born with certain tendencies [...]  which
education may develop, diminish, or conceal, but not fundamentally change or eradicate."27 Thus,
innate qualities of character from birth are important in his  representations of lawgivers and
legislators. Common themes include being of noble stock, whether known or not, such as  with
Theseus and Solon, and having escaped infanticide, such as Cyrus, Romulus, and Moses.28 Their
extraordinary histories are matched by extraordinary early lives: Theseus passed a number of
divine tests which were left for him by his father, travelled the country side executing murderers
and brigands, captured the bull of Marathon, and released Athens from the Minotaur. Cyrus, due
to his naturally regal characteristics, was declared king of the playground by his fellow playmates
despite his  seemingly low station,  and it was this regal quality that ultimately belied his true
identity.29 Romulus is said to have had a natural superiority of strength as well as character. As a
youth  he  had "political  sagacity,  while  in  his  intercourse  with  their  neighbours  in  matters
26 While it may have been one of Plutarch's intentions to show the Romans that Greeces greatness was in the 
political sphere, they are also lessons on "humanity and magnanimity, the essentials [...] of civilized life" (Ibid., 
p. 141).
27 Ibid., p. 144.
28 Theseus was the illegitimate child of the god Aegeus and grandson of Pittheus, wise founder of Troezen. Solon 
gave up the life of a noble to become a merchant. Romulus, and his brother Remus, were born to the virgin 
daughter of Numitor, heir to a kingdom which had been usurped by Amulius. When Amulius heard of the birth 
he ordered them to be exposed. Like Cyrus, the two boys survived – taken in by a she-wolf and nursed until they
were found and raised by Amulius' swineherd. Cyrus, grandson of the king of Medes, Astyages, was ordered to 
be executed after his grandfather had a dream which foretold that Cyrus would overthrow him (although his 
servant was unable to kill the child, and instead had him raised by a cowherd – and like Romulus there are also 
myths of him being suckled by a dog). Moses was born at a time when all male Hebrew newborns were thrown 
into the Nile. However, the infant Moses was rescued by Pharaoh's daughter, and raised as her adopted son.
29 Herodotus, Histories, i. 114-115; i. 118 (ed. Godley, i, pp. 147-151).
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pertaining to herding and hunting, he gave them the impression that he was born to command
rather than to obey."30 Moses' natural virtues led him to turn on the very people who had raised
him, giving up his adopted royal  position, and fleeing Egypt.31 Similarly, Lycurgus gave up his
royal position in order to save the life of the very person who would ultimately take it: his sister's
unborn child.32 Finally:
By natural temperament [Numa] was inclined to the practice of every virtue, and he had subdued
himself still more by discipline, endurance of hardships, and the study of wisdom. He had thus put
away from himself not only the infamous passions of the soul, but also that violence and rapacity
which  are  in  such high  repute  among Barbarians,  believing that  true  bravery consisted in  the
subjugation of one's passions by reason. On this account he banished from his house all luxury and
extravagance, and while citizen and stranger alike found in him a faultless judge and counsellor, he
devoted his hours of privacy and leisure, not to enjoyments and money-making, but to the service
of the gods, and the rational contemplation of their nature and power. In consequence he had a
great name and fame.33
These future lawgivers were also strangers to the people they would come to legislate for
– either by being literally foreigners, having been raised as such, or through self-imposed periods
of exile in which they learned the ways of foreign peoples. For example, Lycurgus visited Crete
where  "he studied the various forms of government and made the acquaintance of their most
distinguished men. Of some things he heartily approved, and adopted some of their laws, that he
might carry them home with him and put them in use; for some things he had only contempt." He
then  visited  Asia  Minor  where  he  contrasted  the  "simple  and  severe"  Cretans  with  the
"extravagant and luxurious, [and] just as a physician compares with healthy bodies those which
are unsound and sickly; he could then study the difference in their modes of life and forms of
government." It was also claimed that he visited Egypt, where he studied their warrior caste, as
well as Libya, Iberia, and India (where he may have met and studied with the gymnosophists).34
Similarly,  Theseus travelled Greece by foot rather than the safer naval voyage so as to emulate
30 Plutarch, Lives, Romulus vi (ed. Perrin, i, p. 105).
31 Num. xvi. 41-50.
32 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus iii (ed. Perrin, i, pp. 211-213).
33 Plutarch, Lives, Numa iii (ed. Perrin, i, pp. 315-317).
34 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus iv (ed. Perrin, i, pp. 213-217).
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the heroic and virtuous deeds of Hercules and Solon chose to become a merchant so as to interact
with,  and  gain experiences  from,  different cultures. Cyrus moved from Medes to Persia as a
young man, receiving an education from both cultures, and Moses, beyond having to flee Egypt,
spent years in the wilderness. What is more, they also came into contact with great philosophers
and  statesmen  on  their  journeys:  Theseus  studied  with  Konnidas;  Lycurgus  and  Solon  both
studied  with  the  philosopher  and  poet  Thales;  it  was  reported  that  Numa's  teacher  was
Pythagoras; and Jethro advised and offered basic ideas on governing to Moses.35 However, for all
the similarities between their heritages, the most important aspect of their stories are their actions
as lawgivers.
Founding and Giving Laws
As discussed  above,  Plutarch  saw people  as  having  innate  qualities  which  dictated  to  some
degree what they were capable of. The other contributing factor was circumstance.36 In this case,
to give laws, a would-be lawgiver needs a people ready to receive them, and in most cases this
was brought about  by a state of  political  crisis.37 For example: Lycurgus lived in a time when
"lawlessness and confusion prevailed."38 Some kings  were hated for attempting to use force to
maintain order, while others would give into the people's demands, either to preserve themselves
or out of weakness of character. In either case, chaos reigned in the streets. Lycurgus' own father
was murdered while interrupting a brawl. As Rousseau put it: "Lycurgue entreprit d'instituer un
peuple déjà dégradé par la servitude et par les vices qui en sont l'effet."39 Attica was in a similar
state  when Theseus arrived: Athens was a number of villages which were  "scattered about and
35 Plutarch, Lives, Theseus ii-iv; Lycurgus iv; Solon iv-vi (ed. Perrin, i, pp. 5-11; 213-217; 413-419). Livy, History 
of Rome, i. 18.1-3 (ed. Foster, i, pp. 63-65). Exod. iii. 13; ii. 16-21; xviii. 17-27.
36 As Russell wrote "the interaction between natural qualities and circumstances is at the heart of all biography, and
it is natural that Plutarch should have thought about it" (D.A. Russell, ‘On Reading Plutarch’s Lives’, Greece 
and Rome 13.02 [1966], p. 145).
37 The relationship between lawgiving and crisis is remarked on by Rousseau in the Contrat social (OC iii, p. 385).
38 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus ii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 209).
39 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 957.
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were not easily called together for the common interests of all,  nay,  they sometimes actually
quarrelled and fought with each other."40 He inadvertently worsened this state by igniting a war
between himself and his competitors,  and even after the tribes were brought together, conflict
remained: "The Hill-men favoured an extreme democracy; the Plain-men an extreme oligarchy;
the  Shore-men  formed  a  third  party,  which  preferred  an  intermediate  and  mixed  form  of
government, was opposed to the other two, and prevented either from gaining the ascendancy."41
This was still the state of Athenian politics when Solon arrived. And Cyrus, King of the Persians,
found his title meant little; the Persians were not a unified people, but instead a number of tribes
held together through common rule by the Medes. Rome differed  slightly in this regard,  as its
existence came directly from having been founded by Romulus and Remus. It was a refuge for
fugitives  and  other  unsavoury  characters  which  quickly  grew  in  size  and  power.  However,
although  it  had  a  political  and  military  structure  under  Romulus,  there  was  little  done  to
overcome its disparate makeup, and as Rome continued to grow it became increasingly divided.42
This  is  the  city  Numa  was  confronted  with:  no  borders,  no  unified  people,  and  no  laws.43
However, it was  exactly  these circumstances  which allowed lawgiving  to  take place, and why
Rousseau wrote: "Romulus n'eût fait qu'assembler des brigands qu'un revers  pouvait disperser,
son ouvrage imparfait n'eut pu résister au temps. Ce fut Numa qui le rendit solide et durable en
unissant  ces  brigands  en  un  corps  indissoluble,  en  les  transformant  en  Citoyens."44 Before
detailing the giving of laws, though, it must be noted that would-be-lawgivers shared one more
quality: legitimization through popular support.
Lycurgus gained support while living in self-imposed exile. The Spartans, familiar with
40 Plutarch, Lives, Theseus xxiv (ed. Perrin, i, p. 51).
41 Plutarch, Lives, Solon xiii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 435).
42 Plutarch, Lives, Romulus vii-ix; xiii; ix-xx (ed. Perrin, i, pp. 105-117; 123-127; 147-157).
43 Livy, History of Rome, i. 16 (ed. Foster, i, pp. 57-59). Plutarch, Lives, Numa v; ii (ed. Perrin, i, pp. 321-325; 
309-313).
44 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 957.
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his virtuous eight month  reign as king, "missed Lycurgus sorely, and sent for him many times.
They felt that their kings were such in name and station merely, but in everything else were
nothing better than their subjects, while in him there was a nature fitted to lead, and a power to
make men follow him."45 Similarly,  Solon won over  Athens with a  one-off  political  act  –  a
successful military expedition to the Salamis.46 Numa's legitimacy came from being the only
potential king that the differing tribes of Rome could agree upon,  with no  one  able to suggest
another, even from their own tribe, who was his equal.47 And Cyrus was accepted due to, "first,
his birth, because of which he seemed to be something more than mortal; and next, his victories
in his wars: for no nation that Cyrus undertook to attack could escape from him."48
In addition to being chosen, however, one of the most important tasks facing a lawgiver
was making the people  themselves  recognize  that they  were united as  a people. How this was
accomplished was never straightforward: Theseus used games to encourage the Athenian people
to  come together,  train,  and honour their gods – that  is,  to  redirect  a  population's  free time
towards moral and political ends.49 Lycurgus made use of the poetry of Homer and Thales to
temper  spirits;  "exhortations  to  obedience  and  harmony...  [T]heir  measured  rhythms  were
permeated with ordered tranquillity, so that those who listened to them were insensibly softened
in their dispositions, insomuch that they renounced the mutual hatreds which were so rife at that
time,  and  dwelt  together  in  a  common  pursuit  of  what  was  high  and  noble."50 Solon  "put
philosophic maxims into verse, and interwove many political teachings in his poems, not simply
to record and transmit them, but because they contained justifications of his acts, and sometimes
45 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus v (ed. Perrin, i, p. 217).
46 Plutarch, Lives, Solon vii-xi (ed. Perrin, i, pp. 419-431).
47 Livy, History of Rome, i. 18 (ed. Foster, i, p. 65).
48 Herodotus, Histories, i. 204 (ed. Godley, i, p. 257).
49 Plutarch, Lives, Theseus xxv (ed. Perrin, i, p. 57).
50 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus iv (ed. Perrin, i, p. 215).
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exhortations,  admonitions,  and  rebukes  for  the  Athenians."51 Others turned  to  religion and
ceremony to inspire unity. Lycurgus reported that he had received the constitution of Sparta from
the Oracle  of Delphi,  making their  laws divine rather  than man-made.52 Numa made similar
claims: "by heralding to them vague terrors from the god, strange apparitions of divine beings
and  threatening  voices,  he  would  subdue  and  humble  [the  Roman's] minds  by  means  of
superstitious fears." In  fact,  Numa made  sacrifices,  processions,  and religious dances an all-
encompassing aspect of Roman life "to soften the city, as iron is softened in the fire, and change
its  harsh  and  warlike  temper  into  one  of  greater  gentleness  and  justice."53 As  Rousseau
commented:
[Les Romains est devenu citoyens]  moins par des lois, dont leur rustique pauvreté n'avait guère
encore besoin, que par des institutions douces qui les attachaient les uns aux autres et tous à leur
sol en rendant enfin leur ville sacrée par ces rites frivoles et superstitieux en apparence, dont si peu
de gens sentent la force et l'effet.54
Rousseau reported that Lycurgus also embraced these techniques (combining games, ceremony,
and religion with everyday life):
Il  lui imposa un joug de fer, tel qu'aucun autre peuple n'en porta jamais un semblable; mais il
l'attacha, l'identifia pour ainsi dire à ce joug, en l'occupant toujours. Il  lui montra sans cesse la
patrie dans ses lois, dans ses jeux, dans sa maison, dans ses amours, dans ses festins. Il ne lui laissa
pas un instant de relâche pour être à lui seul; et de cette continuelle contrainte, anoblie par son
objet, naquit en lui cet ardent amour de la patrie qui fut toujours la plus forte ou plutôt l'unique
passion des Spartiates, et qui en fit des êtres au-dessus de l'humanité.55
Like religion (and often connected), a recurring tool of legislation was education, the task
which Plutarch, in fact, saw as the lawgiver's prime care.56 This was also the basis of Lycurgus'
Sparta;  he  believed  the "the  most  important  and  binding  principles  which  conduce  to  the
prosperity and virtue of a city were implanted in the habits and training of its citizens, they would
51 Plutarch, Lives, Solon iii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 411). Plutarch later writes that Solon used this same poetic skill to 
overcome a law prohibiting calls to arms against the Salamis – an elaborate plan that ended him being made king
(Plutarch, Lives, Solon viii [ed. Perrin, i, p. 421]).
52 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus v (ed. Perrin, i, p. 217).
53 Plutarch, Lives, Numa viii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 331).
54 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii pp. 957-958.
55 Ibid., p. 957.
56 Plutarch, Lives, Comparison of Numa with Lycurgus iv (ed. Perrin, i, p. 397).
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remain unchanged and secure, having a stronger bond than compulsion in the fixed purposes
imparted to the young by education, which performs the office of a law-giver for every one of
them."57 Melissa Lane has argued that, to this end, he refused to have the laws written, forcing the
population to internalize, rather than memorize, them.58 Instead, he linked laws, legislation, and
law-making  entirely  to  education,  and  to  encourage  social  cohesion  he  arranged  it  so  that
"[c]horal dances and feasts and festivals and hunting and bodily exercise and social converse
occupied their whole time, when they were not on a military expedition."59 The population were
to  abandon  all  things  which Lycurgus felt  would have a  negative effect  on  unity.  Arts  were
limited to those which were practical (furniture making, for example) while literacy was largely
ignored; "there  would  be  no  rhetoric  teachers,  fortune  tellers,  harlot-mongers,  gold  or
silversmiths,  engravers  or  jewellers.  The professor  and the prostitute  now shared  a  common
distinction: not wanted in Sparta."60 Banning luxuries  meant a life of simplicity, equality, and
practicality was encouraged, and stopping trade stunted travel, cosmopolitanism, and exposure to
foreign cultures which could harm Sparta's own. It was this strict and insular regime which the
Spartans became famous for.
Moses also abandoned luxuries,  and specifically banned those  professions  which were
superfluous to survival,  or which God  had not given them a particular skill  in.61 Trading with
non-Jews was also forbidden,  so as to prevent their own culture form being polluted.  A similar
move was made by Numa,  believing  that the  Romans should be focused  on Rome and self-
sufficiency,  and  thus  he  turned  their thoughts  of  profit  through  conquest  into  plans  for
57 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus xiii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 241).
58 M. Lane, ‘Platonising the Spartan Politeia in Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus.’, in ‘Platonising the Spartan Politeia in
Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus.’, History of Political Ideas (, Institute of Historical Research, London, 2012).
59 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus xxiv (ed. Perrin, i, p. 281).
60 G.B. Lavery, ‘Training, Trade and Trickery: Three Lawgivers in Plutarch’, The Classical World 67.6 (1974), p. 
375.
61 Exod. xxxiv. 11-13; xxxv. 30-35.
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agricultural growth. As Plutarch wrote: "[T]here is no other occasion which produces so keen and
quick a relish for peace as that of a farmer's life."62 Unlike Lycurgus, Numa, and Moses however
(who together make up Rousseau's three ideal lawgivers in Pologne), Theseus encouraged trade
and Solon  followed,  reforming education  so as to put an emphasis on trade.  This was out of
necessity,  however: "Solon, adapting his laws to the situation, rather than the situation to his
laws, and observing that the land could give but a mere subsistence to those who tilled it, and was
incapable of supporting an unoccupied and leisured multitude, gave dignity to all the trades."63 
Another recurring technique of uniting a people was, perhaps surprisingly, the re-ordering
of  them into classes. For example,  Theseus "was the first to separate the people into noblemen
and husbandmen and handicraftsmen..  [H]e established a balance of  privilege,  the noblemen
being  thought  to  excel  in  dignity,  the  husbandmen  in  usefulness,  and the  handicraftsmen in
numbers."64 Similarily,  Solon established four classes, of which the poorest only had rights to
attend public ceremonies and sit as jurymen. However, "laws were obscurely and ambiguously
worded on purpose to enhance the power of the popular courts."65 The nobles could legislate,
while the jurymen could judge. Numa,  seeing the two tribes of  Rome refusing to be united,
divided them into even smaller groups, "aware that hard substances which will not readily mingle
may be crushed and pulverized, and then more easily mix and mingle with each other."66 And
Moses, in addition to offering a set of basic divine tenets by which the Jews were to live, divided
tasks and roles amongst the different houses.67
Importantly,  what  unites all  these differing methods of lawgiving is  an acceptance of
62 Plutarch, Lives, Numa xvi (ed. Perrin, i, p. 363). Agriculture is a recurring theme in foundational politics.
63 Plutarch, Lives, Solon xxii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 465). Although, it should be noted, he forbade the export of all 
produce other than oil, as they were too valuable to the city (Plutarch, Lives, Solon xxiv [ed. Perrin, i, p. 471]).
64 Plutarch, Lives, Theseus xxv (ed. Perrin, i, p. 55).
65 Plutarch, Lives, Solon xviii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 453).
66 Plutarch, Lives, Numa xvii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 365-367).
67 Lev. x. 11; xiii-xiv. Num. xviii. 21-22.
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trickery. That is, the ends of laws are often distinct, and at times hidden by, what is explicit about
the laws themselves. For example, Lycurgus' opposition to trade was imposed by replacing gold
and silver with iron  as a currency hoping to discourage trade by making it physically difficult.
The upshot being: "many sorts of iniquity went into exile from Lacedaemon. For who would
steal,  or  receive  as  a  bribe,  or  rob,  or  plunder  that  which  could  neither  be  concealed,  nor
possessed with  satisfaction,  nay,  nor  even cut  to  pieces  with any profit?"68 The point  being,
Lycurgus did not simply ban those things which he saw as negative. Instead, the nature of the
people themselves had to be used to achieve the desired ends. And Lycurgus was not alone in
this: it was argued that Solon used trickery to gain support for his position; that Romulus tricked
Remus at the very founding of Rome by misreporting an omen; that in his travels through the
wilderness, Moses used trickery to accomplish a number of goals – from spying, to lying, to
knowingly  tricking neighbours  into  battle  so  as  to  win lands.69 And  the  necessity  of  these
deceptions was recognized by ancient commentators: Plutarch wrote that it is certainly possible
that  "Lycurgus and Numa and their like  [...] pretended to get a sanction from the god, which
sanction was the salvation of the very ones against whom it was contrived."70 Diodorus was also
sceptical of claims to spiritual authority, writing that "among the Jews Moyses referred his laws
to the god who is invoked as Iao" but he  wondered whether religion  was used by lawgivers
"because they held that the common crowd would be more likely to obey the laws if their gaze
were directed towards the majesty and power of those to whom their laws were ascribed."71 And
Livy wrote that, recognizing the utility of religion, Numa worked to "imbue [the Romans] with
the fear of Heaven. As he could not instil this into their hearts without inventing some marvellous
68 Plutarch, Lives, Lycurgus ix (ed. Perrin, i, p. 231).
69 Plutarch, Lives, Solon xiv [ed. Perrin, i, pp. 437-441]; Romulus ix [ed. Perrin, i, pp. 113-117]. Exod. xvii. 4-7. 
Deut. ii. 26-30; vii. 1-6. Numb. xx. 1-8; 5-9. 
70 Plutarch, Lives, Numa iv (ed. Perrin, i, p. 321).
71 Diodorus, Bibliotheca historica, i. 94 (ed. Oldfather, i, p. 321).
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story, he pretended."72 Plutarch adds to the mystery  of Numa's  religiosity. He tells how Numa
gave his collected wisdom and the laws of Rome to the priests,  and having "inculcated in their
hearts the scope and meaning of them all," and  ordered the books "be buried with his body,
convinced that such mysteries ought not to be entrusted to the care of lifeless documents," thus
hoping to ensure their contents were never made public. However, four hundred years later the
books were recovered and read by a praetor, who declared to the Senate that their contents should
be  made  known to  the  people,  and  they  instead  were  taken to  the  Comitium and  burned.73
Importantly, this mysterious event points to another problem facing lawgivers: exit strategies.
Having  established  a  legal  system,  a lawgiver  has  one  final  task:  ensure  its  lasting
stability. By nature of being the authors of these laws they are also above them and must be able
to exclude themselves from this position, while also preventing anyone else from taking it. It is a
one time, extra-constitutional, office. There are a number of ways in which this was  achieved.
Lycurgus used one last trick: he told the Spartans he was going to Delphi to enquire into the
goodness of his laws, and ordered them not to modify anything until his return – which he never
did,  ensuring the laws could never be modified.74 Moses also excused himself  (and those who
would claim to be like him) from the promised land after he was given a divine order never to
enter  it,  thus  ensuring  the  laws  he  had  given  to  the  Hebrews  remained  untouched.75 The
importance of this final task and the cementing of laws for posterity is highlighted by Rousseau
when he names Moses as one of history's great lawgivers:
[Moïse]  forma  et  exécuta  l'étonnante  entreprise  d'instituer  en  corps  de  nation  un  essaim  de
malheureux fugitifs, sans arts, sans armes, sans talents, sans vertus, sans courage, et qui n'ayant pas
en propre un seul pouce de terrain faisaient une troupe étrangère sur la face de la terre. Moïse osa
faire de cette troupe errante et servile un corps politique, un peuple libre, et tandis qu'elle errait
dans les déserts sans avoir une pierre pour y reposer sa tête, il lui donnait cette institution durable,
72 Livy, History of Rome, i. 19.1-5 (ed. Forster, i, pp. 67-69).
73 Plutarch, Lives, Numa xxii (ed. Perrin, i, p. 381).
74 G.B. Lavery, ‘Training, Trade and Trickery: Three Lawgivers in Plutarch’, The Classical World 67.6 (1974), p. 
378.
75 Deut. i. 24-25.
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à l'épreuve du temps, de la fortune et des conquérants, que cinq mille ans n'ont pu détruire ni même
altérer, et qui subsiste encore aujourd'hui dans toute sa force, lors même que le corps de la nation
ne subsiste plus.76
Not all rulers were able to let go, however. 
Theseus  continued  to  act  as  king  after  founding  Athens,  and  with  disastrous  results.
During his reign he developed a penchant for kidnapping women, which led to wars with the
Amazonians  and Sparta,  while  his  primary role  within  the  Athenian  political  system caused
jealousy, intrigue, civil war, and finally his own exile. And this was not the only failed attempt to
give Athens lasting laws: having established his own position, Solon instructed that his laws be
left untouched for one hundred years and left the city. Unfortunately, factions quickly emerged in
his absence and he was forced to return in an attempt to pacify the city (before leaving he had
said that "tyranny was a lovely place, but there was no way down from it").77 When he was
unable to  bring about peace  he became disgruntled  and turned to chastising the Athenians in
poems.78 Cyrus'  lawgiving  was  similar  to  that  of  Theseus', and  likewise,  his  lust  for  power
ultimately ruined him.  After twenty-nine years of ruling he lost his life in battle. One sees this
again with Romulus, who held on to power as tightly as he could, denying the Roman patriarchs
a say in governing, thus frustrating the nobles. In the end he mysteriously disappeared, replaced
by a new wave of civil disorder.
Types of Ancient Lawgivers
Having examined some of the recurring themes found in the histories of ancient lawgivers, a
comparison  can  now  take  place.  In  particular,  it  is  worth  noting  the  areas  of  commonality
amongst those who failed and those who succeeded in creating lasting political orders. In the
cases of Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus, the cause of failure seems clear; they were little more
76 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 956.
77 Plutarch, Lives, Solon xiv (ed. Perrin, 439).
78 Plutarch, Lives, Solon xxx (ed. Perrin, 493).
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than men willing laws through force, rather than founders uniting laws with the people they were
creating. They succeeded in the primary task of bringing together or freeing a people, but were
unable to move beyond this stage to create lasting laws, customs, and mœurs. With their deaths,
the peoples they had founded were once again left in the wilderness. They were perhaps heroes,
but not true founders.
On the other hand, Numa, Moses, and Lycurgus – again, Rousseau's three ideal lawgivers
–  were  men who  had  successfully  created peoples by providing individuals with  a  political
existence and social conscience. They worked with people who, up until that moment (or in the
case of Lycurgus, at that moment),79 were not part of a political body. They instituted the regimes
which brought them together and gave them a lasting social and political existence. They were
founders and lawgivers.
Finally, there was Solon. He was unique in  that he worked  with an already established
people.  Although they had an initial  founding,  it  was  poor,  and  with Theseus'  departure  the
Athenians came undone.  However,  this initial,  albeit poor, founding meant Solon had to work
with an already existing  Athenian character  (Theseus' culture of trade and commerce). Solon
therefore took a pragmatic approach to the laws he developed, using persuasion when he could,
and turning to force when necessary. He attempted to fit his laws in to the already existing state
of things, rather than manufacture new laws  to create new customs;  he attempted to take what
was already in the Athenians and turn it into something better.80 This meant, however,  that  he
knew his laws were not ideal. When questioned as to whether he had given the Athenians the best
laws, he answered: "The best that they would  receive."81 His concerns point to the problem of
reforming a political  body.  It  already has its  own character  and one must  be aware of these
79 Lycurgus offers an exceptional case, according to Rousseau, in which violence caused a people to be reborn 
anew (Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 385).
80 Plutarch, Lives, Solon xv; xxii (ed. Perrin, i, pp. 443; 465-467).
81 Plutarch, Lives, Solon xv (ed. Perrin, i, p. 443).
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existing realities regardless of how good or bad they may be. It is because of this that Solon was
not a founder, but a re-founder.
Importantly this distinction between founder and re-founder is recognizable in other texts
from the era. Plato, for example,  clearly  distinguishes between the lawgiver  for a new people,
and the lawgiver for an already established people.  One finds the former in  the Republic  and
Socrates' description of the philosopher king:
[T]he philosopher whose dealings are with the divine order himself acquires the characteristics of
order  and  divinity  so  far  as  a  man may...  [Therefore]  the  philosopher  is  compelled  to  try to
introduce the standards which he has seen there, and weave them not into himself only, but into the
habits of men both in their private and public lives.82
That is to say, the qualities of philosophy which allow one to understand the natural order of
things – to see ideals – are also the qualities which allow one to know what the natural order of
things  for  a  people  should  be.  From this  he  argues that  the  constitution  of  a  state  and  the
individual souls of a population are reflections of each other (again, "the habits of men both in
their public and private lives"). Thus, a poorly constituted state will result in a poorly constituted
populace; and likewise, a poorly educated populace can only make for a poor state.83 The upshot
of this being, a people who already have a political foundation are corrupted. It is for this reason
that Socrates warns his interlocutors that his ideal city may not be possible, and it is "sheer folly"
to try and educate a people whose beliefs are contrary to the lessons being given: "To produce a
different type of character, educated for excellence on standards different from those held by
public opinion, is not, never has been, and never will be possible."84
There  are  two  points  that  should  to  be  reiterated  here:  First,  lawgivers  must  be
philosophers for the same reason they are so often foreigners and outsiders. They are exceptional
82 Plato, Republic, 500c-d (ed. Lee, p. 297). It is worth comparing this quote to Rousseau's on the legislator's need 
to make "gods talk" (Contrat social, OC iii, p. 384).
83 Plato, Republic, 434d-e; 435e; 541b-592b (ed. Lee, pp. 206-208; 209-210; 356-420).
84 Ibid., 473a-b; 492e-493a (ed. Lee, pp. 262; 287-288). Plato does continue, writing "short of a miracle."
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people  because  they are  capable  of  seeing the  world  from  outside  of the  constraints  of  the
political community; they are the miracle "whose dealings are with the divine order," not the
customary or  popular.85 The metaphor  which  Plato uses  to  make this  point  becomes a  trope
returned to throughout history: the pilot of a ship. Plato argues that the prudent management of a
state is like that of sailing a ship; the person best suited to the job is the one who should hold it.
Unfortunately, this is often not the case. Instead the strongest, or most popular, or loudest, or
richest, is able to take the helm, while the true navigator, whose attention is turned towards the
stars, is ignored and dismissed as a "star-gazer" just as the philosopher is in politics.86 
The second point to note is the interaction between human nature (the soul) and political
societies (the constitution). This explains why giving laws to an established people is dangerous:
one would be facing a human nature which has already been moulded, and attempts to remould it
are akin to squaring the circle.
The Republic, however, is a description of an ideal society. To address the problems faced
by those who would give laws to an established people, Socrates  found a solution which has
made the book infamous: he proposes the banishment of "all citizens over the age of ten; having
thus removed the children from the influence of their parents' present way of life, they would
bring them up on their own methods and rules... This is the best and quickest way to establish our
society and constitution."87 In the Laws, however, Plato offers a different sort of political project.
It too touches on many of the specific themes of lawgiving examined (such as correct education;
trickery; the role of music; religion), but unlike the Republic, it does not attempt to start fresh.
Instead,  it  is  the  description  of  the  establishment  of  a  Cretan  colony,  and  thus  accepts  the
uncontrollable situation of an already established people with their own histories and customs.
85 Ibid., 484b; 500d (ed. Lee, pp. 276; 297).
86 Ibid., 488a-489d. Plato was not the first to use this metaphor. Alcaeus and Aeschylus both used it before him.
87 Ibid., 540e-541a (ed. Lee, pp. 354-355).
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The  distinction  between  the Republic  and  the Laws  is  made  clear  in  the  Athenian
Stranger's comparison between the legislator and the physician.  He claims that both work in a
world  in  which  they,  unlike  artists,  face  unpredictable  chances  (tuchē).  That  is  to  say,  the
uncontrollable realities which the legislator encounters prevents the possibility of creating a polis
in the same way an artists produces a painting from a blank canvas. Instead,  the world  is such
that  one  must  respond to  the  situations  which  present  themselves  (such as  history,  customs,
natural disasters, war, poverty, disease, and climate).88 The art of legislation in the Laws is the art
of  overcoming these realities; not creating something out of nothing. This is what the Stranger
means  when  he  argues:  "[N]o  human  being  ever  legislates  anything,  but  […]  chances  and
accidents of every sort, occurring in all kinds of ways, legislate everything for us… [A]lmost all
human affairs  are  matters of chance."89 It  is,  however,  a supreme quality of humanity which
allows  one to overcome these uncontrollables.  Chance  literally  means opportunity  in Ancient
Greek.90 The art of legislating is thus "cooperating with the opportune moment;" it allows one to
understand the process of an event, and take the right action exactly when necessary. Just as a
sailor knows how to manage in the "midst of a gale," and a doctor knows how and when to apply
a cure, the legislator is a pilot and physician, caring for their city's well-being.91 The approach to
lawgiving found in the Laws, therefore, is akin to the actions of Solon. One does not witness that
moment  in which a people are  truly made into something new. Instead, the city being founded
already has its heritage, even though it does not yet exist. It has an established Cretan population
and it is the lawgiver's task to recognize this (in the constituent aspects of the Cretan people) and
re-found a city as best he can.92 Or to use the physicians metaphor, the city  has a pre-existing
88 Plato, Laws, 704d; 681b; 677a; 709a-b (ed. Pangle, pp. 89-90; 63-64; 59; 94).
89 Ibid., 709a-b (ed. Pangle, p. 94).
90 Tuchē is the ancient Greek word for both chance and opportunity. The founding of the colony in The Laws is 
itself an example of tuchē.
91 Ibid., 709c (ed. Pangle, p. 94).
92 Ibid., (ed. Pangle, p. 89). Leo Strauss highlights the ways the Athenian Stranger deals with already established 
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condition, and if it is to survive the condition must be taken into consideration.
These are preliminary observances  on  founders and re-founders available to those who
wish to look for them, and as they would have been available to Rousseau. The next step, having
drawn out this description and examined some methods of lawgiving, is to examine the ways in
which these ideas  continued to be  expressed – in particular, amongst those writers  who would
come to have an influence on Rousseau.
customs when ordering the new city (L. Strauss, The Argument and the Action of Plato’s Laws [Chicago, 1998]).
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Chapter II: Lawgiving from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the 
Eighteenth Century
The goal of this chapter is twofold: offer a historical sketch of the political  concerns around
legislating before Rousseau, and highlight the emergence of ideas and themes which Rousseau
addressed and are examined more closely in coming chapters. That is, first, it aims to offer a
sketch of the history of the legislator as explored by thinkers Rousseau was familiar with, and
second, it offers a more broad, albeit brief, history the themes this thesis is examining in the
history of political thought. In doing this it both highlights many of the political ideas which the
Enlightenment was a response to, and continues to trace the distinction between founding and re-
founding, thus following and supporting the analytical framework being drawn out in this thesis.
To this end, the chapter is not to be seen as a large-scale analysis of the legislator in the history of
political thought, but is a collection of investigations which inform the overall argument being
made by this thesis.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first is an examination of the use of the ship-of-
state metaphor by political thinkers from the Roman Republic to the Renaissance. This metaphor
is particularly useful because of its prolific use in political thought – it has already been seen in
the previous chapter with Plato – and it offers an efficient method of exploring thoughts on the
legislator. That is, because the thrust of the metaphor is to demonstrate the qualities necessary in
a particular person to be the head of a state, or pilot of a ship, the subtle differences in the ways it
is deployed allows for differences to be easily recognized. And although the depth with which the
metaphor is used differs with each thinker, this itself is of interest. The specific authors examined
were  chosen  due  to  their  canonical  contribution  and  chronological  convenience.  While
Rousseau's relationship with each thinker varies, we do know that he was familiar with all of
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them.1 However, as already noted, the goal of this chapter is not simply to draw out Rousseau's
influences, but to demonstrate that the problems Rousseau addressed, and the framework that this
thesis develops, existed as a problem throughout the history of political thought. The specific
thinkers examined are: Cicero and Seneca, in whom one can recognize the shift of the legislator's
importance conceptually, if not politically; Augustine, and his dismissal of the importance of both
the character  and the political  sphere in which it  acted;  Aquinas,  and the re-emergence of  a
secular sphere of politics; Erasmus, and the recognition of a world in which the ideal pilot is in
fact not at the helm; More, who follows Erasmus' lamentations, and reflects more deeply on the
problem and its potential solutions; and finally Machiavelli,  who returns to classical ideas of
republicanism and allows for the re-emergence the legislator. 
The second part of this chapter examines Enlightenment political thought. It begins by
turning to Fénelon, a thinker who, like Machiavelli, returned to the classical world for inspiration
to overcome the problems highlighted by the humanists  examined in the first  section of this
chapter.  These  ideas  were  of  particular  importance,  as  we  will  see  later  in  this  thesis,  to
Rousseau. The chapter then examines the thoughts and treatment of the legislator explicitly in the
works of Rousseau's contemporaries. It highlights how ideas, from Plato to Newton's scientism,
allowed for new ways of thinking about governing, and the return of the legislator as a legitimate
political concept.
1 M. Richebourg, ‘La Bibliothèque de Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, Annales de la société Jean-Jacques Rousseau 21 
(1932), pp. 181–250.
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Legislators and The Ship-of-State 
Cicero
Peace and tranquility are like a ship or a minor illness: you can be undisciplined when there is no
danger. But when the sea gets rough or the disease gets worse, the sailor or the sick man calls for
one person’s help.2
The world of the legislator following the fall of the Roman republic was turbulent. The Greek
lawgiver had one task: develop a society in which arête – excellence – could come to the fore. It
was with the success or failure of this that legitimacy was established. However, with the rise of
Rome,  and the  emergence of  powerful  individuals  able  to  challenge  the established political
order,  these ideas began to take on new meaning. In  fact,  politics  itself,  more than political
philosophy, came to play an important role, as apparent in Marcus Tullius Cicero's (106-43 BCE)
writings from the first century BCE. 
Cicero, a politician himself during the waning years of the Roman Republic, criticized the
politicking of his contemporaries, and, like Plato, turns to the ship of state metaphor to make his
point. In De officiis (44 BCE) he wrote: "Electioneering and the struggle for positions of honour
is an altogether wretched practice... [T]hose who compete between themselves over who should
administer the republic act as if sailors were to fight over which of them should be principal
helmsman."3 Instead, politics was the maintaining and protecting of the already established ways
of  the  Roman  Republic.  In  De  legibus  (54-51  BCE), Cicero's  response  to  Plato's  Laws, he
described the legislator as a pragmatic actor, arguing that the "very effectiveness of [a city's]
foundation as a support for a stable and long-lasting commonwealth depends on its ability to
2 Cicero, De re publica, i. 63 (ed. Zetzel, pp. 27-28). Although De re publica was lost until being discovered in the
Vatican library in 1819, it was "a canonical text in antiquity and was widely known until the fifth century CE," 
thus part of the intellectual world of its own time, and demonstrative of the issues thinkers were dealing with. 
What is more, quotations and arguments taken from it abound, not least of all in Lactantius' Divine Institutes and
Augustine's City of God – texts we know Rousseau was familiar with. For more on its intellectual influence see: 
J.E.G. Zetzel, ‘Introduction’, in M.T. Cicero, Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws (Cambridge, 
1999), p. xiv; xx.
3 Cicero, Officiis, i. 87 (ed. Griffin and Atkings, p. 34).
 43
avoid violent and radical change... As a legislator, he must, for the good of the city, keep at bay
arguments that he suspects may succeed in upsetting the city."4 That is, while Rome was engaged
in internal strife, Cicero argued for the preservation of its existing laws, and argued that only the
laws that could be changed without risking any harm to the society should be manipulated.5 
The pragmatic argument is also developed in Cicero's text on the best constitution: De re
publica  (54-51 BCE). The work is  Cicero's answer to Plato's  Republic,  and in it  he  uses the
character of Scipio to develop the traditional division of constitutional systems seen in Plato and
Aristotle before him: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, along with their corrupted pairs.6
Scipio uses this division (with the aid of Stoic natural law) to demonstrate that the best, and only
legitimate, political system is Rome's mixed constitution. He concedes that a benevolent monarch
would certainly be an ideal political regime, but claims that "the alteration of the monarchic form
is  the first  and the most  certain:  when a king begins  to  be unjust,  the form is  immediately
destroyed, and that same person is a tyrant, the worst form, but closest to the best."7 This same
process of corruption,  he argues, is  true for the other two systems. Thus, he abandons ideal, or
philosophically  rational,  systems and turns  to  the  most  practicable:  Rome  and  its  mixed
constitution; "I will state my own opinion and belief and judgment that no commonwealth, in
either its organization or its structure or its conduct and training, can be compared to the one our
fathers received from their ancestors and have passed on to us."8 Importantly, while this limits the
realm of possibility for legislators in Rome, it does not mean there was no room for great men –
Cicero accepted that a ship needs one captain; but this captain exists to ensure the safety of the
4 J.W. Atkins, Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason: The Republic and Laws (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 186–
187.
5 For example, in De divinatione (46-44 BCE) he argued that Rome's religion, and in particular auspices, are 
beyond philosophical criticism because of the benefit they provided the masses (Cicero, Divinatione [ed. 
Falconer, p. 451]).
6 Cicero, De re publica, i. 42 (ed. Zetzel, pp. 18-19); Statesman (291c-d); Aristotle's Politics (1289a).
7 Cicero, De re publica, i. 65 (ed. Zetzel, p. 29).
8 Ibid., i. 70 (ed. Zetzel, p. 31).
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ship. 
Although Rome's republican laws were established, they were not certain – Cicero argued
that the "Roman state stands upon the morals and men of old" and the state, therefore, needs to
have this foundation constantly strengthened and reinforced.9 The duty of a political actor, he
argued, was "to be a very great and very learned man, so as to be wise and just and temperate and
eloquent, in order to be able to express fluently and easily his inner thoughts to rule the people."10
Thus, although Rome was threatened by men like Julius Caesar and Marc Antony, it also needed
to be protected by such men at times. And like the Greeks before him, Cicero believed that the
person who  held a position of power held it because their own excellence would be reflected
outwardly and become a public  good.  Through correct actions and the continuation of Roman
institutions  and  customs  it  was  possible  to  transmit  the  values  of  Rome's  founders  to  the
population and maintain the Republic. In making this argument Cicero once again used the ship-
of-state metaphor: "As a helmsman aims at  a good voyage,  a doctor at  saving his patient,  a
general at victory, so this guide of the commonwealth aims at the blessedness of the life of his
citizens, that they should be solid in their resources, rich in property, well endowed with glory,
honorable in virtue."11 The role of these men was not to rule, but to create the conditions in which
the Romans themselves could rule: 
Cicero compares the situation in which the res publica had recently found itself under the rule of
Caesar to the condition of an enslaved person, he is referring to the condition defined by Roman
law as one in which a person is subject to the ius, or jurisdiction, of another person, and therefore
in their power... According to this view, the free people of Rome had lost their ability or power to
live  under  their  own  jurisdiction  during  Caesar’s  period  of  domination  and  had  suffered  an
illegitimate form of subjection to the will of one of its citizens.12
Cicero's political philosophy, then, is not a piece of propositional work, nor an argument for
9 Ibid., v. 1 (ed. Zetzel, p. 87).
10 Ibid., v. 2b (ed. Zetzel, p. 88).
11 Ibid., v. 8a (ed. Zetzel, pp. 89-90). If Scipio's arguments were not enough to convince his audience, the text 
concludes with the "Dream of Scipio," a story akin to Plato's "Myth of Er," giving cosmological support for the 
arguments that proceed it.
12 P. Stacey, Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince (Cambridge, 2007), p. 25.
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reform. It is a call for the continuous re-foundation of what made Rome a republic. Although he
accepts the need of great men at times – the office of dictator – this should not be read as an
argument for the political superiority of this actor. Instead, it was a concession. With the decline
of the Republic, and the emergence of Caesarian politics, Cicero saw that traditional politics and
oration were no longer relevant in achieving the prudent maintenance of the state. His writings,
then,  are  a  description  of  what  was,  and what  was  being  lost,  but  what  could  perhaps  be
recovered. This is perhaps most clearly seen in him turning to Gaius Octavius, hoping to turn the
young man into a buffer against Marc Antony's dictatorial politics. That is, he continued to hope
that a virtuous dictator who respected Rome's historic institutions could maintain the republic. He
was neither the first, nor the last, philosopher to offer lessons to political leaders in the attempt to
instil  what  they believed to  be correct  thinking,  nor  was he the  first,  nor  last,  to  have it  to
backfire. When Octavius and Antony  reconciled,  and the Second Triumvirate was established,
Cicero  was executed.  Perhaps  even  more  tragicly,  the  outcome  of  his  pragmatic  politics  is
highlighted by Tom Stevenson: "What lurks behind this apparent concession [that is, of a truly
virtuous dictator] is the possibility of a true vir sapiens whose wisdom and virtue really do single
him out as  princeps. Cicero duly gives room to some arguments which later become central to
Seneca’s monarchical theory."13
Seneca
If you don't know what harbour you sail for, no wind is favourable.14
Within  a hundred  years the  republican  lamentations  of  Cicero  had  been  quietened,  and  the
Roman Empire – and its emperors – had emerged. This is made clear in Lucius Annaeus Seneca's
(4 BCE-65 CE) treatise for a young Nero in De clementia (55-56):
13 P. Stacey, Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince (Cambridge, 2007), p. 28.
14 "Letter 71: Seneca to Lucilius Junior" in B. Inwood, Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters (Oxford, 2007), p. 
25.
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[C]ast one's eyes on the huge crowd here – quarrelsome, factious, uncontrolled, as likely to run riot
for its own as for another's downfall, if it breaks the yoke now on it... [S]ay to oneself: 'Have I, of
all mortals, found favour with the gods and been chosen to act on earth in their stead? I am the
judge with power of life and death over nations, I have the fate and condition of everyone in my
hands. All dispensations of fortune to mortals are made through pronouncements on my lips. My
verdict is what gives people and cities cause to rejoice.15
Seneca's  political  theory  was  questioned  almost  as  soon  as  he  had  finished  giving  it.  Two
centuries after his death Cassius Dio wrote: "his conduct was seen to be diametrically opposed to
the  teachings  of  his  philosophy.  For  while  denouncing  tyranny,  he  was  making  himself  the
teacher of a tyrant."16 To this day his  contribution to the history of political thought  remains
uncertain. Cooper and Procopé argue that "Seneca is not writing as a 'political theorist' nor as an
advocate of any political programme. He has nothing to say about divisions of power, virtually
nothing about sources of authority or forms of government, and very little on social regulation.
He  has  no  conclusions  to  draw  from  institutional  reform.  He  is  simply  not  interested  in
institutions."17 However, although she notes that "it is often said that Seneca showed no interest
in political theory," Griffin disagreed: "Only if political thought and, indeed, political theory are
not  conceived in  too narrow a sense,  can  Seneca's  contribution be understood."  Instead,  De
clementia as "theoretical exposition" through "political eulogy" has mush to say.18 As Stacey put
it: it is "the only surviving example of a systematic attempt to theorise the Roman monarchy"
and, in fact, it is exactly Seneca's avoidance of political theory, as Plato and Cicero before him
engaged with it, that is of interest in this context.19 
Before this point the word rex had been a treasonous term. It was avoided by both Caesar
and Augustus, who instead embraced princeps. While Seneca acknowledges that to speak in this
15 Seneca, On Mercy: i. 1.1-2 (ed. Cooper and Procopé, p. 128).
16 Cassius Dio, Roman History, lxi. 10.1 (ed. Cary, p. 57).
17 J.F. Procopé and J.M. Cooper, ‘Introduction’, in L.A. Seneca, Seneca: Moral and Political Essays (Cambridge, 
1995), p. xxv.
18 M.T. Griffin, ‘Seneca and Pliny’, in C.J. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and 
Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), p. 532; 534.
19 P. Stacey, Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 4–5.
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way is prudent, he does not do so himself. Instead he writes of "princes and kings and whatever
other titles there may be for guardians of the public order."20 Unsurprisingly then, the text does
not  engage  with  philosophical conceptions  of  the  legislator,  let  alone  the  legitimacy of  the
emperor's position. There was too little intellectual room to do so. Attached to this new imperial
position were two political maxims: "the Prince is not bound by the law" and "the emperor has
sole power to make laws."21 There  was no legal framework  with which the Senate, or anyone
else, could hope to remonstrate the king. Thus, Seneca had no business dictating who should or
should not pilot the ship of state. He could, however, discuss where such a pilot should hope to
harbour, and to achieve this Seneca turned to instruction, and the mirror for princes genre. 
De clementia begins by explaining to Nero that it exists to "serve in a way the purpose of
a mirror, and thus reveal you to yourself."22 The mirror's surface is of a Stoic tint, however, and
by developing an image of the monarch which reflects "a principle of universal law and justice
upon the person of the prince," positive law can be dispensed with theoretically (as it had already
been done in practice).23 Specifically, the Stoic virtue of mercy is used in an attempt to temper the
monarch's actions. What is more, Seneca argues that through the correct actualization of this
morality – by becoming the vir sapiens – legitimization is no longer a concern: "No one could
conceive of anything more becoming to a ruler than mercy, whatever the manner of his accession
to power and whatever the legal basis."24 This then – Stoic morality – was what informed the
pilot of the ship-of-state, and Seneca's political goal in writing De clementia seems to have been
to to aid the already chosen pilot decide upon their destination. As Griffin wrote: "Seneca did not
write about the relative merits of different constitutions and showed little confidence in what
20 Seneca, On Mercy, i. 4.3 (ed. Cooper and Procopé, p. 133).
21 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), pp. 14–15; 18; 19; 21. 
22 Seneca, On Mercy, i. 1.1 (ed. Cooper and Procopé, p. 128).
23 P. Stacey, Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince (Cambridge, 2007), p. 31.
24 Seneca, On Mercy, i. 19.1 (ed. Cooper and Procopé, p. 150).
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could be achieved by legislation."25 However, this in itself is of importance to those wanting to
understand the limits imposed on conceptualizing the role of the legislator,  if not the legislator
itself – a pattern which continued with the emergence of Christianity.
Augustine
Rome had collected for her protection far too many gods, summoning them, as it were, at a given
signal by the immense volume of smoke of the sacrifices. By establishing for them a supply of
temples, altars, sacrifices and priests she was bound to offend the true supreme God, to whom
alone those honours are rightly due. She had greater happiness when she lived with a smaller
number. But it seemed that she needed a larger supply when she grew greater, as a larger ship
needs a larger crew. I suppose she felt no confidence that those few gods, under whom she had
enjoyed a better life (though storing up for herself a worse future), would suffice to support her
increasing grandeur.26 
Augustine's use of the ship-of-state metaphor breaks with those who wrote before. No longer is
the ship inhabited by people, but gods. This shift, located in the religious and political context of
the time, has relevance to his political theory as a whole.
With  the  rise  of  Christianity  the  maxims  of  the  rex  were  strengthened  by divine
legitimacy. Conceptually,  kings were no longer legislators  or lawgivers,  nor did they rely on
arête  to  legitimize  their  positions.  They were  instead men  whose ancestry  legitimized  their
position by divine dictate, and while the idea of an autocratic monarch was not new – many of
the characters examined in the previous chapter were just such people – the impact Christianity
had was. As Christians began to hold positions of political importance, the relationship between
exercising  political  power  and  maintaining  one's  Christian  faith began  to  show  itself  as
complicated.  Whereas  before,  the good of the city  was the same as the ends of civic religions,
with Christianity the religious well-being of citizens beyond the polis began to enter the political
realm  as a concern  (particularly  following Constantine's conversion in 312). What is more, as
congregations  grew, their leaders  began to hold greater political and moral power.  Laws which
25 M.T. Griffin, ‘Seneca and Pliny’, in C.J. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and 
Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), p. 532.
26 Augustine, City of God, iii. 12 (ed. Bettenson).
 49
had previously favoured Roman paganism were abandoned, and ultimately other religions were
banned. These changes came to a head when Rome was sacked in 410. Many saw the event as a
divine message  concerning the weakening of the Empire  as it embraced Christianity.27 Not all
were of this opinion, however.
Augustine of Hippo's (354-430) The City of God (413-422) was a response to those who
argued Christianity's relationship with politics had weakened Rome. The form the argument took,
however, was entirely new. Rather than disagree with the conclusions,  Augustine attacked the
conception of the political and temporal, and drew attention to the importance of the spiritual. He
and his followers argued that politics itself was a side-effect of the fall, and thus, it and all the
things that made it necessary, were deplorable – including the civil Roman virtues embraced by
the likes of Cicero.28 Instead, he argued that the life of Christ provided the most perfectly defined
source for virtues; piety and Christian courage should be celebrated and imitated, rather than the
Roman  civic heroes of the past.  This was not to say there was no reflection on the realm of
politics. The division between the two cities is not as simple as secular and spiritual, but instead
everyone is split between the two cities, and even the godly inhabit the City of Man. Everyone is
sinful  since  the  fall,  and thus  everyone must  be restrained:  "Let  everyone be  subject  to  the
governing  authorities,  for  there  is  no  authority  except  that  which  God  has  established.  The
authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the
authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment
on  themselves."29 Who these  authorities  should  be,  or  what  the  best  regime  is,  were not
Augustine's concern.30 However, this does not mean that the political dominates the Church. 
27 E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro, ‘Introduction’, in Augustine, Augustine: Political Writings (Cambridge, 2001), p. 
xii.
28 Augustine engages with Cicero and the arguments found in De re publica directly – first in II. 21, and more fully
in book XIX.
29 Rom. xiii. 1-2.
30 This is not entirely true: "In an early passage Augustine remarks perfunctorily that if a people are committed to 
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Augustine argued that rulers themselves would be judged by God, and not only for their
personal actions, but "were accountable to God for the well-being of those in their care."31 How
far rulers should go in ensuring the "well-being of those in their care" is debated. He did not
support forced conversions of Pagans or Jews, but he did believe heretical Christians must be
"brought to sincere and orthodox conviction."32 Ultimately he argued that Christian rulers will
find true happiness "if they put their power at the service of God’s majesty, to extend his worship
far and wide" and "if they do not fail to offer to their true God, as a sacrifice for their sins, the
oblation  of  humility,  compassion,  and prayer."33 Thus,  it  was  only  by citizens  accepting  the
higher authority  of their  Christian  political  masters, and these political  masters accepting the
higher authority of the Christian God, that citizens of the City of Man could hope to escape to the
true city, the City of God. In this way, the realm of politics became subservient to the aims of the
Church, and thus the scope of action in this realm was limited: "all man’s use of temporal things
is related to the enjoyment of earthly peace in the earthly city; whereas in the Heavenly City it is
related to the enjoyment of eternal peace."34 This is because: 
[T]he earthly city,  whose life is not based on faith, aims at an earthly peace, and it limits the
harmonious  agreement  of  citizens  concerning  the  giving  and  obeying  of  orders  to  the
establishment of a kind of compromise between human wills about the things relevant to mortal
life.  In  contrast,  the  Heavenly City –  or  rather  that  part  of  it  which  is  on pilgrimage  in  this
condition of mortality, and which lives on the basis of faith – must needs make use of this peace
also, until this mortal state, for which this kind of peace is essential, passes away.35
That which was most important to mankind was to live a life in accordance with divine,  rather
than civil or man-made, law. The legislator was not a creative position, but a formal one: "As for
the common good they ought to be allowed to choose their own rulers. He does not give the matter further 
consideration" (P. Weithman, ‘Augustine’s Political Philosophy’, in E. Stump and N. Kretzmann [eds.], The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine [Cambridge, 2001], p. 237). There is room for a "better" or "worse" City of
Man, but these are not areas of investigation for him.
31 E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro, ‘Introduction’, in Augustine, Augustine: Political Writings (Cambridge, 2001), p. 
xviii.
32 P. Weithman, ‘Augustine’s Political Philosophy’, in E. Stump and N. Kretzmann (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Augustine (Cambridge, 2001), p. 246.
33 Augustine, City of God, v. 24 (ed. Bettenson).
34 Ibid., xix. 14 (ed. Bettenson).
35 Ibid., xix. 17 (ed. Bettenson).
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this mortal life, which ends after a few days’ course, what does it matter under whose rule a man
lives, being so soon to die, provided that the rulers do not force him to impious and wicked
acts?"36 And following that position, political philosophy became a subset of political theology.37 
This  approach became the  blueprint  for  the  Christian  account  of  political  philosophy
during the middle-ages.  Other  approaches to political  thought became "superfluous"  as "divine
Law provide[d] us with everything needed to conduct our lives and to promote our welfare both
in this world and in the next."38 With the fall of the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, and
therefore the Pope, claimed authority across Europe, a position which reached its peak during the
Investiture Controversy (1075-1122). The argument became one where man was not only sinful,
but  "the  only  thing  which  can  redeem human  government  from being  wholly  sinful  is  the
complete submission of earthly princes to the spiritual power: that is, to the guidance and censure
of  the  Church,  ruled  over  by  the  Supreme  Pontiff  in  Rome."39 Arguments  supporting  the
supremacy of the pope in both spiritual and temporal realms were taken up by the likes of Giles
of Rome (1243-1316) and John of Paris (1255-1306).40 The role of the legislator was dismissed,
and the  Pope  as the  political actor was the intellectual argument  de jure  amongst the strictly
theological minded.
36 Ibid., v. 17 (ed. Bettenson).
37 "[T]his earthly city has had some philosophers belonging to it whose theories are rejected by the teaching 
inspired by God" (Ibid., xix. 17 [ed. Bettenson]).
38 R. Lerner and M. Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Ithaca, 1972), p. 9. See also: A.S. Brett, 
‘Political Philosophy’, in A.S. McGrade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 
2003), p. 276.
39 R.W. Dyson, ‘Introduction’, in T. Aquinas, Aquinas: Political Writings (Cambridge, 2002), pp. xxiv–xxv.
40 Giles of Rome made this position very clear in On Ecclesiastical Power (1301): "[E]arthly power, because it 
rules over temporal matters, is rightly and properly subject to the spiritual power, so that from this we may be 
able to infer that the spiritual power rules not only over the temporal power but also over temporal matters, 
inasmuch as the ecclesiastical authority is shown to have dominion over both temporal matters and their rulers" 
(Giles of Rome, Ecclesiastical Power, ii. 6 [ed. Lerner and Mahdi, p. 392]).
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Aquinas
Now in all cases where things are directed towards some end but it is possible to proceed in more
than one way, it is necessary for there to be some guiding principle, so that the due end may be
properly achieved. For example, a ship is driven in different directions according to the force of
different winds, and it will not reach its final destination except by the industry of the steersman
who guides it into port. Now man has a certain end towards which the whole of his life and activity
is directed; for as a creature who acts by intelligence, it is clearly his nature to work towards some
end. But men can proceed towards that  end in different ways, as the very diversity of human
efforts and activities shows. Man therefore needs something to guide him towards his end.41
Although the political position of the Pope was largely unchallenged within the orthodox thought
of the Church, the relationship between the Church,  the ancients, and temporal  sovereigns  was
far from settled, and the clash between differing traditions and customs was never fully resolved.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), while in line with Papal interests, highlights how these problems
had not been overcome, and ultimately, how the political realm came to be re-conceptualized.
Aquinas'  break with the Christian heritage which preceded him can be located in the
'recovery' of Aristotle, and the interest the philosopher was shown by academics at the University
of Paris. The ideas of Aristotle from the Church's perspective were tainted. He was a pagan who
had been 'rediscovered'  only through the translations  and commentaries of  the  Arab scholars
Avicenna  (980-1037)  and  Averroes  (c.  1126-1198).  Aquinas,  however,  wanted  to reconcile
Aristotle with the teachings of the Church –  to unite revelation with Aristotle's philosophical
truths.42 That is to say, Aquinas was not attacking the Augustinian position, and there is never an
explicit disagreement between the two thinkers. In fact, on the surface there does not seem to be
much  of  a  chasm in  Aquinas'  position  and  the  Church's:  "[T]o  govern  is  to  guide  what  is
governed in a suitable fashion to its proper end. Thus a ship is said to be governed when it is
steered on its right course to port by the industry of the sailors." He continues:
[I]f man were not directed towards some good external to himself, the foregoing forms of care
would suffice. But there is a certain extraneous good which awaits man after he has lived this
mortal life: namely, the final blessedness to which he looks forward in the enjoyment of God after
41 Aquinas, De regno, i. i (ed. Dyson, p. 5).
42 R.W. Dyson, ‘Introduction’, in T. Aquinas, Aquinas: Political Writings (Cambridge, 2002), p. xxiv.
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death... The Christian man [...] has need of another, spiritual, care by which he is guided towards
the harbour of eternal salvation. And this is the kind of care shown to the faithful by the ministers
of the Church of Christ.43
He concludes: "Again, under the old law, priests were subject to kings. But under the new law
there is a higher priesthood, by which men are conducted towards heavenly goods; and so, under
the law of Christ, kings must be subject to priests."44 Aquinas, therefore, accepted the position of
the papacy as it had emerged post-Augustine with a caveat: "secular power is subject to spiritual
power insofar as this is ordered by God: that is, in those things which pertain to the salvation of
the soul." However, "in those things which pertain to the civil good, the secular power should be
obeyed before the spiritual."45 The important point here is  "the jurisdiction of kings is separate
from that of popes; that popes should not ordinarily interfere in temporal affairs; but that they
may judge and punish kings ‘by reason of sin.’"46 
By returning to  classical  areas of inspection, Aquinas accepted the legitimacy, lessons,
and authority (auctoritas) of ancient texts and scholars, and in returning to the political works of
Aristotle,  Aquinas  also  rehabilitated  the  temporal  world  as  an area  of  importance,  and even
betterment.  However, the political was not a realm of total  creativity.  Aquinas was explicit that
Kings rarely make the political regimes they are a part of, and instead "carry on the activity of
ruling in a kingdom or city which has been founded already."47 What is worse, the outcome of
this monarchical tradition is usually negative: "Not only do they make no attempt to repair the
evil that they have done, but by the authority of their actions they make shameless sinning into a
custom  which  they  then  transmit  to  their  posterity."48 However,  while  customs  can  be
problematic, they are not entirely insurmountable. At the very least, for Aquinas, it is possible to
43 Aquinas, De regno, i. xv (ed. Dyson, pp. 39-40).
44 Ibid., i. xv (ed. Dyson, p. 42).
45 Aquinas, Scripta II, Dist. 44, quaest. 3, articulus 4 (ed. Dyson, p. 278). Aquinas does add another caveat: 
"Unless perhaps the spiritual and secular powers are conjoined, as in the pope."
46 R.W. Dyson, ‘Introduction’, in T. Aquinas, Aquinas: Political Writings (Cambridge, 2002), p. xxxviii.
47 Aquinas, De regno, i. xiv (ed. Dyson, p. 37).
48 Ibid., i. xii (ed. Dyson, p. 35).
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improve the  City of  Man, so long as care is taken to not damage the  City of Heaven  in the
process: "provided that the former [is] directed towards the latter and the latter [is] not neglected
in favour of the former. The interests of this world and the next can coexist."49 Aquinas does offer
a theory on how the former can be directed towards the latter: "the end of human association is a
virtuous life" and "through virtuous living to attain to the enjoyment of the Divine."50 Later he
writes: "The king, therefore, being instructed in the Divine law, must strive with special care to
ensure that the community subject to him lives well; and this task may be divided into three parts.
First, he must establish the good life in the community subject to him; second, he must preserve
it once it is established; third, having preserved it, he must strive to improve it."51 Thus, the City
of Man can, and should, be made better. Although the first goal of a king is to provide a city in
which virtue can rein so that man may receive divine rewards in the afterlife, there is also a
secondary goal that is concerned with the material world itself.52 However, Aquinas' importance
to political  theory is  not  located in  any propositional  arguments  for  a  better  political  world,
although the second book of De regno offers many of these. Instead, it is his implicit acceptance
of an authority in addition to scripture that is worth noting. As Goodman has argued:
Once that position is accepted it becomes possible to consider theories of government, law and
associations of persons other than those deriving from or serving God. Thomas, by absorbing and
assimilating Aristotelian ideas to extant Christian theology, effected a rebirth and revitalisation of
ideas of governance which had lain virtually dormant since classical times.53 
Thus, although arguing in favour of the Church's supremacy, and accepting that the spiritual was
more important than the temporal, Aquinas also recognized the secular realm as separate sphere
of action, and thus an area in which its  own  conceptual and theoretical reflection  could take
49 R.W. Dyson, ‘Introduction’, in T. Aquinas, Aquinas: Political Writings (Cambridge, 2002), p. xxv.
50 Aquinas, De regno, i. xv (ed. Dyson, pp. 40-41).
51 Ibid., i. xvi (ed. Dyson, p. 43).
52 Ibid., i. xvi (ed. Dyson, pp. 43-44).




These Aristotelian intellectual investigations meant that,  by the late Middle Ages,  direct
challenges to the supremacy of the Catholic Church in political realms began to emerge. Not only
in Aquinas' works, but also in those of Marsilius of Padua (1275-1342) and William of Ockham
(1288-1347).  Marsilius, in fact, argued that the temporal  realm was not the  Pope's jurisdiction,
but instead, "only the legislator or someone else by its authority can give a dispensation from
human laws" and "by the authority of the legislator only he who exercises the office of prince has
coercive jurisdiction, in both goods and person, over every individual mortal person of whatever
condition they may be, and over every collective body of laypersons or clergy."55 These ideas
also found political  expression in France's Philip IV (1285-1314) who believed his position not
only made him independent from the Church, but actually gave him authority over the clergy in
France – a move which led to the papacy being relocated to Avignon.
The  Church  was  not  ignorant  of  these  potential  attacks,  and  as  early  as  1277  the
Condemnation of 219 Propositions by Bishop of Paris Étienne Tempier made it clear that the
Church would not tolerate  intellectuals  taking heretical  (that  is,  Aristotelian)  positions  at  the
University of Paris; the first two errors enumerated by Tempier were "there is no more excellent
state than to study philosophy" and that "the only wise men in the world are the philosophers."56
Thus, these arguments themselves did not become dominant, but remained, as Lerner and Mahdi
have argued, "heterogeneous approaches to the study of political things."57 Christianity remained
a necessary part  of the political,  and  these were not  secular  arguments  as  understood  today.
Nonetheless, by returning to the ancients the Renaissance was made possible.
54 J.K. Schulman, The Rise of the Medieval World, 500-1300: A Biographical Dictionary (Westport, Connecticut, 
2002), pp. 412–413. 
55 Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, iii. 2. 8; 15 (ed. Brett, pp. 547; 549). 
56 Tempier, Condemnation, I. 1; I. 2 (ed. Lerner and Mahdi, p. 338).
57 R. Lerner and M. Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Ithaca, 1972), p. 11.
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Erasmus
On board ship, we do not give the helm to the one who has the noblest ancestry of the company,
the greatest wealth, or the best looks, but to him who is most skilled in steering, most alert, and
most reliable. Similarly, a kingdom is best entrusted to someone who is better endowed than the
rest with the qualities of a king: namely wisdom, a sense of justice, personal restraint, foresight,
and  a  concern  for  public  well-being.  Family trees,  gold,  and  jewels  are  no  more  relevant  to
governing a state than they are pertinent to a sea-captain in steering his ship.58 
In  the  two  centuries  following  Aquinas,  secular  powers continued  to  increase,  and  by  the
sixteenth century great  autocrats  had  emerged.  Francis  I,  Charles V, and Henry VIII had  all
secured large swaths of Europe, and looked to expand their respective empires, and although
political action was disentangled from the religious powers of the Church, Renaissance thinkers
nonetheless  faced other customs  as  a barrier to reform. This problem was  faced by Desiderius
Erasmus (c. 1466-1536). 
Erasmus was a keen political thinker who was in the service of less astute rulers.59 This
meant, on the one hand, he would chastise those who chased power, while at the same time he
wrote panegyrics in honour of them. While some have seen this as a difficulty which the reader
of humanist texts needs to confront, in the political context facing writers like Erasmus, it is
simply the reality of the political situation.60 As Quentin Skinner has argued, humanists "tended
to  see  themselves  essentially  as  political  advisers  –  as  writers  of  political  handbooks  and
purveyors  of  sage  counsels  to  kings,  princes  and  magistrates."61 This  was  a  position  which
required particular political tact; as Erasmus wrote, customs dictated that "kings and fools are
born, not made."62 In reference to a work he wrote for Prince Charles I of Spain, soon-to-be Holy
Roman Emperor Charles V (1500-1558), he argued that he was only following the pattern set by
58 Erasmus, Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince with the Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria 
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 5.
59 Erasmus wrote for, and dedicated works to, Emperor Charles V, England's Henry VIII, Ferdinand of Spain, 
Veree's Prince Adolph, Prince Philip of Austria, amongst others.
60 R.F. Hardin, ‘The Literary Conventions of Erasmus’ Education of a Christian Prince: Advice and Aphorism’, 
Renaissance Quarterly 35.2 (1982), p. 152.
61 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1: The Renaissance (Cambridge, 1978), p. 216.
62 Erasmus, Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince with the Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria 
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 45.
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Callisthenes, Lysias, Isocrates, St. Paul, Pliny, and Augustine, and that:
[T]hose who believe panegyrics are nothing but flattery seem to be unaware of the purpose and
aim of the extremely far-sighted men who invented this kind of composition, which consists in
presenting princes with a pattern of goodness, in such a way as to reform bad rulers, improve the
good, educate the boorish, reprove the erring, arouse the indolent, and cause even the hopelessly
vicious to feel some inward stirring of shame... Do you really believe that one could present kings,
born in purple and brought up as they are, with the repellent teachings of Stoicism and the barking
of the Cynics? Just to make them laugh, I suppose: or even to increase their irritation!63
The text being defended in the above quote is Erasmus' Education of a Christian Prince
(1516). A 'mirror for princes,' the text has been compared with Seneca's De clementia. Erasmus
was, in fact, more than willing to embrace Seneca's work for Nero when drafting his won work:
"The Institutio systematically ransacks the Roman theory of monarchy for its description of the
ruler... Erasmus openly refers his reader to the arguments of De clementia."64 What is more:
From the beginning,  the  Institutio  embodies  the rhetorical  idea which had been central  to  the
function of the speculum since Seneca: Charles is taken already to be the bonus princeps which the
Institutio aims to produce. Erasmus knows that 'his highness had no need of any man's advice,
least of all mine'; but he nevertheless lays out the image of the optimus princeps 'in your name' so
that 'through you' and 'from you', other rulers 'might take their example'.65
However,  Erasmus  set himself apart from  the  ancients who produced similar texts, dismissing
them as sophists instructing tyrants, and pagans instructing pagans. Instead, he wrote: "I am a
theologian addressing a renowned and upright prince, Christians both of us."66 Thus, he accepts
the tradition of Catholicism, and recognizes an upshot to it: just as stoicism provided Seneca with
a  set  of  universal  laws,  the  word  of  God could  temper  the  monarchy,  and the  tutor’s  duty,
therefore, is to encourage Christian virtue above all else: "the various qualities necessary for the
good prince are wisdom and integrity, continence and clemency, devotion (pietas) to his people,
self-restraint, interest in truth and freedom, freedom from the vices of cruelty and pride, and the
63 Letter to Jean Desmarez, 1504, letter 180 (D. Erasmus, The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 142-297 
(1501-1514) [Toronto, 1975], p. 81).
64 P. Stacey, Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince (Cambridge, 2007), p. 202.
65 Ibid., p. 200.
66 Erasmus, Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince with the Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria 
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 4.
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careful avoidance of flatterers."67 Elsewhere he writes:  "Whenever you think of yourself as a
prince, always remember the fact that you are a Christian prince! You should be different from
even the noble pagan princes as a Christian is from a pagan. Do not think, indeed, that the life of
a professing Christian is carefree and elegant, unless, of course, you think nothing of the oath
which you, along with everyone else, swore at your baptism."68 He argues that if a prince only
take their religious beliefs and duties seriously they will be worthy of their title – although they
rarely do.69 
The importance of the tutor's task in this is returned to using the ship-of-state metaphor,
when it is asked why a pilot is chosen because of their skill, yet the pilots of states are not; "most
naturally the power should be entrusted to him who excels all in the requisite kingly qualities of
wisdom, justice, moderation, foresight, and zeal for the public welfare." It is because of this that
the education of young royals  must be a chief concern: "Where there is no power to select the
prince, the man who is to educate the future prince must be selected with comparable care."70
That is to say, because tradition dictates who will lead a people, the educator of the prince is as
important  to society as the legislator – and as with Seneca, the legitimacy of a king comes not
from their office, but their actions: "Seneca was right in what he said, the difference between a
tyrant and a king is in their actions, not in their title."71 Ultimately, traditions and customs were a
concern  for  Erasmus,  and  with regard  to  both  monarchy and Christianity,  Erasmus  was  not
entirely convinced of their utility. Nonetheless, he had to work within the existing constraints. As
67 L.K. Born, ‘The Political Theories of Erasmus’, in D. Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince (New York,
1968), pp. 229–230; Erasmus, Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince with the Panegyric for Archduke 
Philip of Austria (Cambridge, 1997), p. 149.
68 Erasmus, Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince with the Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria 
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 17.
69 Erasmus offers another discussion on religion in The Praise of Folly (1511), in which he also recognizes its 
power, and laments at its abuse (D. Erasmus, The Praise of Folly [Newton, MA, 2008], p. 29). Erasmus’ satirical
tone should not be taken as impious, however.
70 Erasmus, Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince with the Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria 
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 6. 
71 Ibid., p. 25.
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Born argues: "He really faced two directions: by all his training and humanistic learning, his
heart was of the Middle Ages; but his mind was of the modern world. By drawing upon his vast
resources, Erasmus brought to bear on the critical problems of his day many a timely truth that
foreshadowed theories and principles that were to be formulated and elaborated at a later date"72 
Erasmus' inability to break with tradition fully manifested itself in his  explicit  political
thought as well.  When it comes to propositional teachings for Charles,  he devotes most of his
attention to "Enacting and Emending Laws,"  where  he urges that  Charles  pass few laws,  and
recognize those  already  in existence as sacred.  He goes  further  to  argue that  harsh laws  are
necessary when a pressing issue needs to be resolved, and that "young men should not be allowed
to argue [at  all]  on the justice of the laws, and the older men but sparingly." 73 Whimsy and
invention should not be qualities  of law-giving,  just  as they should be avoided by doctors.74
Ultimately, Erasmus was a conservative,  arguing for few changes. There was no room for the
classical legislator discussed by Plutarch or Plato, and custom was a problem which required that
one work within the system. Again using the ship-of-state metaphor, he wrote:  "The people are
unruly by nature, and magistrates are easily corrupted by avarice or ambition. The blameless
character of the prince remains, as it were, the sheet-anchor for the ship of state. If he, too, is
overcome by depraved desires and foolish ideas, what last hope is there fore that ship?"75 Who
should pilot is not Erasmus' concern, as kings are a given. Instead, he hopes that by defining the
ideal pilot, and by being the pilot's educator, the ship will be in better hands.76 However, there is
more than one manipulate the system, and Thomas More offers a second Renaissance example.
72 L.K. Born, ‘The Political Theories of Erasmus’, in D. Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince (New York,
1968), p. 3.
73 Erasmus, Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince with the Panegyric for Archduke Philip of Austria 
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 224.
74 Ibid., p. 229.
75 Ibid., p. 23.
76 For a discussion of this ideal, see: L.K. Born, ‘The Political Theories of Erasmus’, in D. Erasmus, The 
Education of a Christian Prince (New York, 1968), pp. 13–14.
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More
If you cannot pluck up bad ideas by the root, or cure longstanding evils to your heart's content, you
must not therefore abandon the commonwealth. Don't give up the ship in a storm because you
cannot hold back the winds.77
The Renaissance court was one of self-interest, of "faction, of courtly affluence and conspicuous
consumption,  of  greed  among  courtly  advisers  and  the  vested  interests  of  tax  farmers  and
monopolists, and of the problems of appointing magistrates and distributing princely favours."78
It was also a problem explicitly identified by, friend of  Erasmus and fellow humanist, Thomas
More (c. 1478-1535). As a lawyer and successful politician, More was familiar with the workings
of the Renaissance court, and it was not simply the courtiers who he feared – More also criticized
contemporary monarchs  in his  Epigrammata:79 "You will  scarcely find one among the many
kings for whom one kingdom is enough, if you find even one. You will scarcely find one among
the many kings who rules one kingdom well, if you find even one."80 More feared that political
courts functioned in such a way as to be at odds with the public good, and risked degenerating
into tyrannies. However, like Erasmus, More often addressed his works to these very political
actors  (the  above  quote  comes  from a  collection  in  honour  of  Henry  VIII).  So  again,  like
Erasmus, one can may see More as a thinker lamenting the power held by monarchs, but aware
of the reality that they alone held it. Thus, while clearly sceptical of political institutions and
actors, he did not refrain from attempting to redress what he saw as problems. However, unlike
Erasmus, he was also sceptical of the power of panegyrics. In a latter to Erasmus congratulating
him on the  Education of a Christian Prince he wrote:  "You have done well in writing on the
instruction of a Christian prince. How I wish Christian princes would follow good instructions.
77 T. More, More: Utopia, eds. G.M. Logan and R.M. Adams (Cambridge, 2002), p. 35.
78 R.W. Scribner, ‘The Social Thought of Erasmus’, Journal of Religious History 6.1 (2007), p. 17.
79 Written between 1509 and 1519, More's Epigammata were first published in 1518.
80 Quoted in R.F. Hardin, ‘The Literary Conventions of Erasmus’ Education of a Christian Prince: Advice and 
Aphorism’, Renaissance Quarterly 35.2 (1982), pp. 151–152.
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Everything is upset by their mad follies."81
More addresses the problematic relationship between legislators and tradition explicitly in
Utopia  (published in  1516,  the same year as Erasmus' educational treatise).  The text has been
read in various ways, perhaps most often in the vein its name has come to be understood – that is,
utopian and an attempt "to picture the best state that reason can hope to establish in the absence
of revelation" or "to portray a perfectly virtuous commonwealth." Others  readings  have been
more sceptical, seeing it as an example of futility, or at least, purposefully problematic and a
challenge to his readers "to consider seriously whether Utopia may not represent the best state of
a commonwealth."82 In the context of this thesis, however, the propositional aspects of the work
are of less interest than the debate between two of the book's characters: Hythloday Raphael and
Thomas  More himself.  Hythloday  is  a  sailor,  but one  who travelled not  for  the reasons "of
Palinurus,  but  more  that  of  Ulysses,  or  rather  of  Plato."83 That  is  to  say,  he does  not  travel
because it is his job, but  does so as a philosopher  – to come to know the world.  More, on the
other hand, is "a good but ineffective man, obedient to his king, loving to his family, generous to
his friends, and concerned about the fate of the state." That is, he is "the public self More."84 In
some ways he also resembles the character Hythloday dresses down: In Book I, More begins by
praising Henry VIII as the "most invincible King of England...  [A] prince adorned with royal
accomplishments  beyond  any  other."85 It  is  in  Hythloday, rather  than  More, that  one  may
recognize the spokesman of the would-be reform-minded Renaissance counselor, and in this way,
81 Quoted in: L.K. Born, ‘The Political Theories of Erasmus’, in D. Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince 
(New York, 1968), p. 27.
82 Q. Skinner, ‘Sir Thomas More’s Utopia and the language of Renaissance humanism’, in A. Pagden (ed.), The 
Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 123–124.
83 T. More, More: Utopia, eds. G.M. Logan and R.M. Adams (Cambridge, 2002), p. 10. The physical description of
Hythloday supports this description: "a man of quite advanced years, with a sunburned face, a long beard, and a 
cloak hanging loosely from his shoulders" (Ibid., p. 9).
84 A.D. Weiner, ‘Taking More Seriously: Humanism, Cultural Criticism, and the Possibility of a Past’, in T. 
Hoenselaars and A.F. Kinney (eds.), Challenging Humanism: Essays in Honor of Dominic Baker-Smith 
(Newark, 2005), p. 66; 56.
85 T. More, More: Utopia, eds. G.M. Logan and R.M. Adams (Cambridge, 2002), p. 8.
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the book which is often read for its description of a perfect political society,  is also a historical
lamentation  on  the  futility  of  proposing  political change. In  fact,  Shklar  compares  More  to
Rousseau in this way: neither, she argues, were "visionary reformers," but instead they wanted to
show their audiences the "awful distance between the possible and the probable by showing in
great detail how men  could  live."86 Adams and Logan  agree that  Utopia  was not a plan, but
instead argue that More "understands that the problem of counsel cannot be solved by sending a
few wise men to court,  because, in the existing structure of society,  most of the people they
would  encounter  there  –  including  especially  the  rulers  –  are  motivated  by  blinkered  self-
interest."87 This complaint is seen most clearly when Hythloday is urged by his interlocutors to
put his worldly knowledge to the service of governing and become counsel to a court. The bulk
of this discussion is found over ten pages – although aspects of it are touched on throughout the
first  book – in which Hythloday presents two broad arguments:  First, that  princes have little
concern for peace and are instead interested in wealth, expansion, and war, and second, a prince's
ministers are just as unlikely to accept good advice, recognizing that their position is threatened
by anyone more clever than themselves. Instead, they will take recourse in tradition, arguing:
"'The way we're doing it was good enough for our ancestors, and I only wish we were as wise as
they were.'  [...] implying, of course, that it would be a very  dangerous matter if anyone were
found to be wiser on any point than his ancestors."88
Custom was not only an issue of political  manoeuvring. When describing Utopos, the
founder  of the island  of Utopia,  More offers  a "composite  of Lycurgus,  Plato,  Romulus and
Numa."89 However,  a character  capable of  achieving similar ends in Europe was  dismissed –
86 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 1–2.
87 R.M. Adams and G.M. Logan, ‘Introduction’, in T. More, More: Utopia (Cambridge, 2002), p. xix.
88 Ibid., pp. 14; 28-29.
89 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 26.
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customs  were too powerful: "if you allow young folk to be abominably brought up and their
characters corrupted, little by little, from childhood; and if then you punish them as grown-ups
for committing the crimes to which their training has consistently inclined them, what is is that, I
ask, but first making them thieves and then punishing them for it?"90 Individuals, like states, must
have a good initial foundation, and in response,  More  argues that one should not give up on
reform, but instead embrace a more pragmatic approach: 
Don't give up the ship in a storm because you cannot hold back the winds. You must not deliver
strange and out-of-the-way speeches to people with whom they will carry no weight because they
are firmly persuaded the other way. Instead, by an indirect approach, you must strive and struggle
as best you can to handle everything tactfully – and thus what you cannot turn to good, you may at
least make as little bad as possible. For it is impossible to make everything good unless all men are
good, and that I don't expect to see for quite a few years. 
Hythloday responds, firstly,  by dismissing the idea of an indirect approach: "Whether it's the
business of philosophers to tell lies, I don't know, but it certainly isn't mine." 91 He then describes
the risk posed to those who would attempt reform:
You wouldn't stand a chance of changing anything for the better by that "indirect approach." This
is why Plato in a very fine comparison declares that wise men are right in keeping away from
public business. They see the people swarming through the streets and getting soaked with rain;
they cannot persuade them to go indoors and get out of the wet. If they go out themselves, they
know they will do no good, but only get drenched with the others. So they stay indoors and are
content to keep themselves dry, since they cannot remedy the folly of others.92
Adams and Logan note that "More portrays Hythloday and himself as taking opposite positions,
with  Hythloday opposing involvement  and More favouring  it.  Both  positions  are  powerfully
argued, and they are never bridged: in the closing pages of Book I, the disputants drop the topic
and go on to another."93 However, there may be more room for interpretation. In fact,  with the
ship-of-state metaphor More had already shown himself to be taking a pessimistic position, and
although he does not concede Hythloday's argument as a character in the book, as the author he
does give  him the last  word –  in fact,  the  last  four paragraphs.  As a humanist,  well-read in
90 T. More, More: Utopia, eds. G.M. Logan and R.M. Adams (Cambridge, 2002), p. 20.
91 Ibid., p. 35.
92 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
93 R.M. Adams and G.M. Logan, ‘Introduction’, in T. More, More: Utopia (Cambridge, 2002), p. xx.
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classical  rhetoric,  and  aware  of  the  power  of  a peroration,  this  cannot  be  ignored.  Instead,
Hythloday's lamentations are a lesson for More-the-author's readers, and Hythloday's criticisms
are More's  criticisms,  offered  through an "indirect  approach."94 Both accepted  that  there  are
factors which are beyond the control of the pilot,  just as there are factors which the counselor
cannot ultimately overcome. More accepted that one must not attempt to institute a Utopia, and
explicitly argued that instead, if one wanted to make the world a better place, they must accept
the state of things as they are. And while Hythloday argued that the customs of the state were too
powerful  to reform,  More  argued that  if  one take an  "indirect" approach  they may be able to
make the world "as little bad as possible." That is, by embracing the very tricks that Hythloday
laments. 
In this context, More's flattery of contemporary monarchs makes perfect sense and, in
fact, he was explicit about this issue in a letter to Guillaume Budé in 1520. In the letter he asks
Budé not to publish his "remarks upon peace and war, upon morality, marriage, the clergy, the
people etc., perhaps what I have written has not always been so cautious and guarded."95 As
Adams and Logan put it: "That 'More' closely resembles the author is clear. Yet it is equally clear
that this cautious, practical lawyer and family man is More without his passion and vision – a
More who could not have written Utopia, nor ever have chosen martyrdom."96 Having said that,
More's life also may demonstrate that in the debate between the two characters, Hythloday was
correct.
94 There is more to read here: Hythloday's reference is to Socrates in Book VI of The Republic, where the 
description is largely as Hythloday recounts it. However, Hythloday fails to recount the entire passage: Socrates 
continues, and states: "but how much greater it might be in a suitable society, where they could develop more 
fully, to their own salvation and that of the community" (Plato, The Republic, 496b-497a [ed. Lee, p. 292]).
95 Quoted in: D. Grace, ‘Thomas More’s Epigrammata: political theory in a poetic idiom’, Parergon 3.1 (1985), p. 
119.
96 R.M. Adams and G.M. Logan, ‘Introduction’, in T. More, More: Utopia (Cambridge, 2002), p. xx.
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Machiavelli
What makes [the prince] despised is being considered changeable, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly,
and irresolute. From these qualities, a prince must guard himself as if from a reef, and he must
strive to make everyone recognize in his actions greatness, spirit, dignity, and strength.97
While autocratic rulers wrestled power away from the Church to reinforce and strengthen their
own claims over large geographical territories across Europe, Italy had maintained a tradition of
cities holding political power. City-states such as Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence were distinct
from other urban communes – they maintained power over their own foreign policy, were centres
of  international  trade,  and  lived  under  republican  governance. These particular  political
arrangements allowed for, and required,  distinct  intellectual  inquiries into questions of politics;
the nature of self-rule and the desire to maintain it meant these city-states found themselves in,
what S. R. Epstein referred to as, a state of "permanent revolution."98 That is, the very nature of
being  able  to  manipulate  their  own political  regimes  meant  for  the  sake  of  stability  it was
necessary to come to understand and structure these regimes  successfully.  Understanding one's
regime, of course, includes knowing one's tradition: 
Political and cultural continuity with the real  and imaginary past was upheld by the continued
importance of the bishop as the main focus of political authority and by institutions like the public
forum inherited from Antiquity. The communes' aristocratic leaders called themselves consules in a
self-conscious appeal to, and continuity with, the cities' Roman heritage.99 
International trade also meant a proliferation in intellectual works enquiring into politics which
led to new ways of doing things. This includes not only the transmission of classic texts from the
Arab world,  but  the emergence of  solutions  to  practical  political  concerns,  such as  property
rights, arbitration and dispute settlement for trade, naval and military training, and the securing of
commercial and economic rights in general. Over time, and with constant mercantile interaction,
97 Machiavelli, Prince, XIX (ed. Bondanella, p. 63). This particular reference to The Prince is to Peter Bondanella's
2008 translation for Oxford University Press, as the nautical nature of Machiavelli comes out clearer than in 
Mansfield’s translation.
98 S.R. Epstein, ‘The Rise and Fall of Italian City-States’, in M.H. Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty 
City-State Cultures (Copenhagen, 2000), p. 277.
99 Ibid., p. 280.
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the Italian city-states began to share and embrace each other's improvements, and instituted new
communal  associations.100 Although  these  city-states  remained  firmly  within  the  Christian
community,  their  political  self-confidence and  ability to find their  own solutions to problems
allowed for both reflection on the past, and critical  judgment when looking towards the future.
Thus, and most importantly for this thesis, as room for intellectual speculation grew, correction
became  a  possibility,  and while  Erasmus  and  More  saw  customs  and  traditions  as  being
something difficult to overcome,  Niccolò Machiavelli  (1469-1527),  the Florentine  citizen  and
one-time political  actor,  broke with  their pessimism  and legitimized the  classical  idea of  the
lawgiver as a primary political actor capable of resolving political problems.101 
In imagining good political societies, Machiavelli returned to the ancient lawgivers, and
explicitly named Moses,  Lycurgus,  and Solon in  the  Discourses  on Livy  (1531),  and Moses,
Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus in The Prince (1532).102 With these ancient ideals he developed a
way of overcoming the problem of contemporary politics that Erasmus and More described. That
is, if hereditary monarchs and established courts were political dead-ends for reform, the answer
was to do away with them. Instead, Machiavelli argued that it  is possible for a single person to
"contrive  to  have  authority  alone"  and lead  peoples  –  even  those who  were  naturally
unaccustomed to accepting new political rulers.103 Ancient lawgivers, unlike modern kings, were
100 Ibid., pp. 283–284.
101 Machiavelli, Discourses i. ix. ii (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 29). Florence, by 1434, had lost its republican 
government to the Medici family, who ruled as monarchs until 1494. From 1494 until 1498 the city was largely 
ruled by Dominican preacher Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498) as a quasi-theocratic Christian commonwealth, 
before he was executed for heresy. Between 1498 and 1512 the second Republic flourished, and Machiavelli 
held political office (as second chancery and secretary of war). In 1512 the Medici, with Spanish troops, 
returned to Florence. In the aftermath Machiavelli first lost his position in the city's government, and was later 
arrested and tortured for conspiracy against the Medici (which he denied, and was ultimately released). He 
retired to his estate outside of the city soon after, but continued to write.
102 The two texts (The Prince and Discoures) are in many ways quite different. While the Discourses shows a 
particular preference for republican forms of government (and thus focuses on institutions), The Prince allows 
for the successful management of the polis by an individual. The particular sets of ideal lawgivers arguably 
reflect this distinction with the former being those who instituted long-lasting and robust states, and the latter 
being heroes who, although coming to power themselves, failed to meaningfully establish new regimes which 
outlasted themselves (with the exception of Moses, who was both a heroic founder and successful lawgiver).
103 Machiavelli, Discourses i. ix. ii (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 29); Prince ii; vi (ed. Mansfield, pp. 6-7; 21-25).
 67
men of great  abilities,  unique histories,  and natural  talent  – legislators  with virtù  capable of
overcoming the problems before them.  This  virtù,  in the most simple of  interpretations, is an
amoral quality of character which allows for the accomplishment of great actions. That is, it is an
ability  to  judge what  the  correct  action  to  take  in  particular  moments  is.104 Its amorality  is
important –  while morality  traditionally  found its source in one's societal norms,  Machiavelli
argued that the wise do not "reprove anyone for any extraordinary action that he uses to order a
kingdom or constitute a republic. It is very suitable that when the deed accuses him, the effect
excuses him; and the effect is good."105 Since the founding moments of a state are primary to
future  success  and  longevity  there  should  be  no  hesitation  in  taking  any actions that are
necessary. 
Machiavelli went further than simply pointing to a potential political actor, however. The
other half of the equation in political ruling is the people, and ensuring that they are politically
indoctrinated correctly was of the upmost importance. No action, Machiavelli argued, should be
taken by a potential legislator  if there was a risk of further  reforms being needed in the future.
One must act decisively, and correctly, from the beginning – which was made possible by virtù.
The importance  of  this  point is  made  clear with the  Discourses' tripartite  typology  of  the
foundations of states:  there is the happy state which was "by one alone and at a stroke" made
perfect in its laws; there is the less happy state which had laws "by chance and at many different
times"; and there is the "still more unhappy [state …] which is the farthest from order, and that
[...] is altogether off the right road that might lead it to the perfect and true end."106 The reason for
this is familiar:  foundational laws result in populations which will either flourish or flounder.107
Great cities were only able to achieve greatness through a virtù "possessed by the citizen body as
104 Not entirely unlike the idea of tuchē in Plato's Laws.
105 Machiavelli, Discourses i. ix. ii (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 29).
106 Ibid., i. ii. i (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 10).
107 Rousseau makes a similar argument (Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 364).
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a whole," a good which was directly the product of the laws instituted by the lawgiver.108 It is the
importance of these  initial foundational moments which  allowed  Machiavelli  to  excuse deeds
which others may consider evil in The Prince.109 
Unlike Rousseau, Machiavelli does not go into explicit detail as to what a correct people
ready for legislation looks like. Instead, he argues that one should draft laws which assume men
are, by their nature, competitive, and "use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free
opportunity for it."110 Just as  virtù allows for seemingly-evil actions if the ends are good, laws
which accept,  and perhaps even encourage,  man's  natural inclination towards strife and civil
conflict can maintain harmony if cast correctly. Machiavelli uses Rome as an example: 
[T]o me it appears that those who damn the tumults between the nobles and the plebs blame those
things that were the first cause of keeping Rome free... They do not consider that in every republic
are two diverse humors, that of the people and that of the great, and that all laws that are made in
favour of  freedom arise from their  disunion...  [No one can] in any mode,  with reason,  call  a
republic disordered where there are so many examples of virtue; for good examples  arise from
good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from those tumults that many
inconsiderably damn.111 
Virtù  could fade  however. With time even good republics  could  lose touch with foundational
principles.  For those cities which were founded correctly,  however, a renewal was possible.  By
returning to the ancient virtues a city was established with, one could overcome a people's natural
distaste towards new political rulers and overcome the problem of custom in the Renaissance.112
Importantly,  this  argument  had a  pragmatic  aspect  to it  as  well  –  chapter  twenty-five of  the
Discourses makes this clear with its title:  "He Who Wishes to Reform an Antiquated Sate in a
Free City May Retain at Least the Shadow of Its Ancient Modes."  By twisting the problem of
custom, Machiavelli saw tradition as a tool which could in fact overcome itself – the appearance
108 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1: The Renaissance (Cambridge, 1978), p. 54.
109 Machiavelli, Prince vii (ed. Mansfield, pp. 25-33).
110 Machiavelli, Discourses i. iii. i (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 15).
111 Ibid., i. iv. i (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 16). This recognition of the utility of class distinction is a position 
Rousseau will also come to hold.
112 Ibid., iii. i. i; vi (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 209; 212).
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of a renewal had more meaning to men than reality,  and ironically, he argued that  this  point
should be observed by "all those who wish to suppress an ancient way of life."113 
Ultimately  for Machiavelli,  if one wish to pilot the ship-of-state they must contrive to
make it  appear that they  naturally  should be the pilot.  Having succeeded in this  is enough to
demonstrate  that  one has the  virtù  to  bear  the position –  as was the case with the ancients,
legitimacy was established first and foremost by the deeds or the ruler. Thus, for Machiavelli it
was possible to overcome history and custom through intelligent political action.114 As Bertrand
Russell put it, political disorder "found expression in Machiavelli's Prince. In the absence of any
guiding principle, politics becomes a naked struggle for power."115 After Machiavelli, the source
of a political system's legitimacy became an open question with a variety of potential answers,
many of which found their fullest articulation during the Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment
Fénelon
In  preparation  for  an  examination  which  looks  more  broadly  at  thought  during  the
Enlightenment, one writer above others offers insights into the inter-connection between the use
of customs, recourse to the ancients, and subterfuge; demonstrates the problems which faced
political  reforms and reformers;  draws out a distinction between mercantilism and "Christian
agrarianism";116 and was a direct influence on Rousseau's own thought: François de Salignac de
113 Ibid., iii. xxv. i (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 61).
114 A contemporary and friend of Machiavelli recognized the break between founding and re-founding, and 
disagreed. The Florentine Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) drew attention to the futility of founding a people
who had already been touched by corruption: "it is illegitimate to hope or even desire to do the legislator's work;
we must recognize ourselves for what we are, beings so far corrupted that only marginal adjustments of our 
moral character can be performed... [I]t would be the legislator who stirred the whole materia of the city 
together, in the manner of the man making pasta, and imposed form on it anew... But this means that [now] the 
materia on which he operates is already inherently unstable; he is exposed to the unpredictabilities of fortune" 
(J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
[Princeton, NJ, 2003], p. 137).
115 B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London, 2004), p. 6.
116 R.L. Colie and L. Rothkrug, ‘Opposition to Louis XIV. The Political and Social Origins of the French 
Enlightenment.’, History and Theory 6.2 (1967), p. 270.
 70
la Mothe-Fénelon (1651–1715).117
Fénelon  made  his  name  as  a  Catholic  priest,  a  critic  of  Malebranche's  Cartesian
Augustinianism,  and  as  a  proselytizer  converting  Huguenots  in  northern  France.  For  these
services he was named royal  tutor  to the grandson of Louis XIV, the Duke of Bourgogne –
although he did not remain in the court's favour.  By the beginning of eighteenth century his
works had been placed on the Index, he had been banished by Louis XIV to his Cambrai diocese,
had lost his royal tutorage, and was ultimately condemned by Rome.  Importantly, this rise and
fall are directly related to his writings on lawgiving.
While tutoring the young Duke, Fénelon wrote Les aventures de Télémaque, the story of
Ulysses'  son  Telemachus,  and his  education  by Mentor  (secretly  Minerva).  The work  had a
singular intention:
[A] fabulous narration in the form of an heroic poem like those of Homer and of Virgil, into which
I have put the main instructions which are suitable for a young prince whose birth destines him to
rule... In these adventures I have put all the truths necessary to government, and all the faults that
one can find in sovereign power.118
The work touches on three themes already examined: the ancient myths of lawgivers, works on
educating princes, and attempted political acts of would-be reformers.
Fénelon describes true legislators as those who do not govern for the sake of self-interest,
but because they  recognize  a good political  order as being above themselves.119 The topic is
discussed a number of times as the two characters travel throughout the Mediterranean, but it is
made explicit in Book X, where Mentor re-orders the state of Salente. The goal of the reforms
were ambitious: "Mentor semblable à un habile Jardinier qui retranche dans les arbres fruitiers le
bois inutile, tâchait ainsi de retrancher le faste inutile qui corrompait les mœurs: il ramenait toute
117 Rousseau referred to him as "vertueux Fénelon" and identified him as having had a "projet de réchauffer les 
cœurs de vos compatriotes par l'image des antiques vertus de leurs pères" (CC 6671, vol. xxxvii).
118 Fénelon in a letter to Father Letellier (1710), quoted in P. Riley, ‘Introduction’, in F. de Fénelon, Fénelon: 
Telemachus (Cambridge, 1994), p. xviii. The work was never intended to be published (although an 
unauthorised edition was released in 1699).
119 Ibid., p. xxi.
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chose à une noble & frugale simplicité."120 He did this, first, by enacting a census and auditing
the labour and produce of the land to discover what was necessary for self-sufficiency. He then
studied the the people – in particular, their commerce, where they travelled, what they sold, and
what they brought back. These two tasks made up one of the key lessons offered by Fénelon –
know your people – "le  point  essentiel  du gouvernement  est  de bien discerner  les  différents
caractères d'esprits, pour les choisir & les appliquer selon leurs talents."121 Mentor continues:
Il faut étudier les hommes pour les connaître;  & pour les connaître, il en faut voir & traiter avec
eux. Les Rois doivent converser avec leurs sujets, les faire parler, les consulter, les éprouver par de
petits emplois dont ils  leur fassent rendre compte,  pour voir s'ils  sont capables de plus hautes
fonctions… Comment peut-on espérer de bien gouverner les hommes, si on ne les connaît pas [la
nature de l'homme]? & comment les connaîtra-t-on si on ne vit pas avec eux? Ce n'est pas vivre
avec eux que de les voir en public, où l'on ne dit de part & d'autre que des choses indifférentes &
préparées avec art: il est question de les voir en particulier, de tirer du fond de leur cœur toutes les
ressources secrètes  qui y sont,  de les tâter de tous côtés, de les  soulager pour découvrir leurs
maximes. Mais, pour bien juger des hommes, il faut commencer par savoir ce qu'ils doivent être; il
faut savoir ce que c'est que le vrai & solide mérite, pour discerner ceux qui en ont, d'avec ceux qui
n'en ont pas.122
In addition, Mentor argues that one must know what is naturally good for a people, and make that
the end of governing:
On ne cesse de parler de vertu & de mérite, sans savoir ce que c'est précisément que le mérite & la
vertu. Ce ne sont que de beaux noms, que des termes vagues, pour la plupart des hommes, qui se
font honneur d'en parler à toute heure. Il faut avoir des principes certains de justice, de raison, &
de vertu, pour connaître ceux qui sont raisonnables & vertueux. Il faut savoir les maximes d'un bon
& sage gouvernement pour connaître les hommes qui les ont,  & ceux qui s'en éloignent par une
fausse subtilité... Il faut savoir précisément quel est le but de la vie humaine, & quelle fin on doit
se proposer en gouvernant les hommes: ce but unique & essentiel est de ne vouloir jamais l'autorité
& la grandeur pour soi; car cette recherche ambitieuse n'irait qu'à satisfaire un orgueil tyrannique:
mais on doit se sacrifier dans les peines infinies du gouvernement pour rendre les hommes bons &
heureux; autrement on marche à tâtons & au hasard pendant toute la vie: on va comme un navire
en pleine mer, qui n'a point de  Pilote, qui ne consulte point les astres,  & à qui toutes les côtes
voisines sont inconnues, il ne peut faire que naufrage.123
His census accomplished this first part of this task, preparing for the institution of reforms. 
Mentor  began  with  laws  on  commerce,  banning those foreign  goods  which  could
120 F. de Fénelon, Les avantures de Telemaque fils d’Ulysse, i (Paris, 1717), p. 255. References are to the 1717 
edition which, based on the unauthorized 1699 edition, was posthumously prepared using corrections from 
Fénelon's own copy.
121 Ibid., p. 499.
122 Ibid., pp. 499–501.
123 Ibid., p. 501.
 72
encourage  "le  luxe  & la  mollesse."124 Artisans  who would  be  put  out  of  work were  to  find
employment in approved commercial fields or agriculture – although not all types of agriculture,
as even diet was to be regulated to encourage a simple way of life. Husbandry and farming were
to  be  made  respected  professions  to  create  a  country  "peuplé  de  familles  vigoureuses,  &
adonnées à l'agriculture."125 By having close, productive, and large families, he argued, one could
create happiness in home and state.  To  achieve  all of this he travelled throughout the country
encouraging improved and renewed cultivation of land, and invited foreigners to the island who
were willing to settle on farms. Ranks and classes were instituted which would be distinguished
by regulated clothing. One would be given rank by birth, but to redress envy amongst classes and
encourage  civic  deeds,  Mentor  suggested  that  it  would  be  appropriate  to  allow  some  class
mobility by promoting the families of those who had done a great service to the state. The arts
were also reformed – music was censored  so as not to  corrupt the youth,  and was only to be
played in temples and during festivals  to honour  the gods and heroes.  Grand buildings were
limited to temples, and paintings and sculptures were only to be used to create memorials to great
men and events. Similarly, spectacles that honoured and encouraged exercise, such as wrestling
and races, were to be instituted, and the military was to be renewed and strengthened.
Of course, none of these proposals are striking when read alongside the tales of ancient
lawgivers.  In  fact,  Mentor's  re-founding  of  Salente  seems  almost  stereotypical.  Austerity,
strength, independence, simplicity, frugality, reform of commerce, and instilling of civic pride are
recurring themes found amongst legislators – including those developed by Rousseau for Corsica
and  Poland.  The  character  of  Mentor  itself  is  part  of  the  genre:  a  foreign  lawgiver  with
knowledge of the world who is invited to give a people laws and leaves once his work is done.
124 Ibid., p. 253.
125 Ibid., p. 260.
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One also sees the influence of the  Renaissance: on the one hand,  the book was  a mirror-for-
princes,  and  addresses  some  of  the  issues  first  raised  by  Erasmus.  However,  it  also  shares
similarities  with  More's  Utopia.  For  example,  Hythloday's  repeated  lamentations against
flatterers, and his frustration with kings is returned to when Mentor addresses King Idomeneus in
Salente; although Mentor, unlike Hythloday, is willing to at least attempt to propose changes:
C'est avec douleur que je me vois contraint de vous dire des choses dures; mais puis-je vous trahir
en vous cachant la vérité? Mettez-vous en ma place,  si vous avez été trompé jusqu'ici, c'est que
vous avez bien voulu l'être.  C'est que vous avez craint des conseillers trop sincères. Avez-vous
cherché les gens les plus désintéressés,  & les plus propres à vous contredire? […] Quand vous
avez trouvé des flatteurs, les avez-vous écartés? […] Voyons si vous aurez maintenant le courage
de vous laisser humilier par la vérité qui vous condamne.126
Importantly, this is more than an imagined situation for Fénelon – in 1694 he wrote a remarkably
similar letter to Louis XIV. It begins with a request for patience from the king in what he was
about to read, warning him:
Si elle vous parle fortement, n'en soyez pas étonné, c'est que la vérité est libre et forte. Vous n'êtes
guère accoutumé à l'entendre. Les gens accoutumés à être flattés prennent aisément pour chagrin,
pour âpreté et pour excès, ce qui n'est que la vérité toute pure. C'est la trahir, que de ne vous la
montrer pas dans toute son étendue.127
He then moves on to correct the monarch:
Depuis environ trente ans, vos principaux ministres ont ébranlé et renversé toutes les anciennes
maximes de l'État, pour faire monter jusqu'au comble votre autorité qui était devenue la leur parce
qu'elle était dans leurs mains. On n'a plus parlé de l'État ni des règles; on n'a parlé que du Roi et de
son bon plaisir. On a poussé vos revenus et vos dépenses à l'infini. On vous a élevé jusqu'au ciel,
pour avoir effacé, disait-on, la grandeur de tous vos prédécesseurs ensemble, c'est-à-dire pour avoir
appauvri la France entière, afin d'introduire à la cour un luxe monstrueux et incurable.128
This, of course, did not result in the ends he had hoped for; although  Fénelon avoided being
exiled  (for  three  more  years),  Louis  XIV did  not  accept  the  critique.  However,  the direct
approach was not the only method of reform attempted by Fénelon.
In educating the future king, and instilling his own political thoughts and ideals, Fénelon
was himself a political actor; unlike The Education of a Christian Prince or Utopia, there was an
126 Ibid., p. 237.
127 F. Fénelon, ‘Fénelon to Louis XIV’ (1694), p. 10.
128 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
 74
actual plan to reform France with Télémaque, and he did not attempt to achieve these ends solely
through his tutoring, but, as Alfred Adler has claimed, he also wanted to influence the young man
through "the use of literary devices the purpose of which was to produce moral effect in complete
accordance with his moral intention."129 Just as ancient lawgivers are reported to have used music
or ceremony to modify public sentiment, Fénelon as a tutor attempted to use his art to influence
his tutee (a teaching Rousseau would come to embrace). However, it was this method of political
action that also ended his career. After Louis XIV read the unauthorized edition of the work, the
king lost his patience; as Voltaire later wrote: "on ne peut guère parler à un tyran qu'en paraboles,
encore ce détour même est-il dangereux."130 
However, even after he was banished from Versailles,  Fénelon maintained hope that his
early work would bring about a new era of politics in France, and he even went as far as drafting
a set of reforms for, who was by this time, the  Dauphin.131 Interestingly, this document offers
insights into Fénelon as the prudent re-founder. In contrast to the ideals proposed for the kingdom
of Salente,  when it came to France, Fénelon did not  hope to create a perfect, or even "good,"
state; instead, like Solon and More, he argued for the less bad. He had to work with the materials
available – a people he, unlike Louis XIV, knew well. Instead of an end to the absolutist regime,
he aimed towards a pragmatic merging of  republicanism and the monarchy. However,  with the
death of the Duc de Bourgogne before he claimed the throne,  Fénelon's hopes came to an end.
The self-assured belief in one's own abilities to change society, however, did not.
129 A. Adler, ‘Fénelon’s "Télémaque": Intention and Effect’, Studies in Philology 55.4 (1958), p. 591.
130 Voltaire, Questions sur l’encyclopédie, vi (Geneva, 1771), ‘Fable’, p. 1.
131 F. de Fénelon, Oeuvres de Fénelon, iii (Paris, 1835), pp. 446–452.
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The Legislator in French Enlightenment Thought
The idea of a "philosopher king," and its history stretching back to Plato, had almost entirely
disappeared by the end of the Renaissance,  and this is reflected in the secondary literature: the
concept is not mentioned in the post-Renaissance sections of The Cambridge History of Political
Thought:  1450-1700.  Derek Beales argues that it  was only with Hobbes and Leibniz that the
concept  began  to  return,  albeit  as  an  entirely  different  conceptual  beast.132 This  is  perhaps
partially due to the seemingly incongruent nature of the term to thinkers in a world of  already
existing  absolute  monarchs:   "In  the  metaphor  of  absolutism,  the  ruler  is  presented  as  the
protector of his subjects, as the 'captain in the ship' (of state), but he servers also as a model in the
art of politeness and gallantry."133 That is,  the excesses of courtly life were tied to the absolute
monarch, not philosophy. What is more, the conceptual source of the philosopher-king – Plato –
had also made it unappealing: "What distinguished Plato’s philosopher more than anything else
was his supposed ability to see behind the evidence of the senses and the superficial realities of
life and politics to a deeper reality of ideal ‘forms’. This was an example of the metaphysical,
quasi-theological thinking that Hobbes regarded as ‘vain philosophy.’"134 The philosopher-kings
that  emerged  during  the  Enlightenment  were  much  less  concerned  with  these  vanities,  and
instead turned to politics from a pragmatic and scientific perspective.
Following Louis XIV's reign  there was a desire to see  France  reform, and those  who
wanted such things faced a fundamental problem in reconciling absolutism after the death of the
Sun King with legitimate governing:
Theorists  and  publicists  of  all  stripes  sought  [...] new  means  of  legitimating  the  lawmaking
process, thereby, and often unwittingly, challenging a basic element of royal sovereignty as it had
132 D. Beales, ‘Philosophical Kingship and Enlightened Despotism’, in M. Goldie and R. Wokler (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 497–499.
133 T. Tikanoja, Transgressing Boundaries: Worldly Conversation, Politeness and Sociability in Ancien Régime 
France, 1660-1789 (Helsinki, 2013), p. 93.
134 D. Beales, Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe (London, 2005), p. 498.
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developed since the end of the sixteenth century… Public opinion had been galvanised to such an
extent as a result of the intransigence of both the king and the courts that many of the Lumieres felt
inclined  or  impelled  to  propose  conceptual  alternatives  to  royal  absolutism and  parlementaire
constitutionalism alike.135
However, historical circumstance meant that many of the reforms imagined remained related to
seventeenth century theories of absolutism. The conceptual framework available in the eighteenth
century  thinkers, as is true of any time, made it difficult to imagine anything else.136 Keohane
argues that this led to  Rousseau's work  being "steeped in absolutist arguments and images."137
Even those who turned to the realm of imagination, like Louis-Sébastien Mercier (1740-1814)
and his utopian work L'An 2440 (1770), saw the individual as the key to change: 
Le croiriez-vous? La révolution s'est opérée sans efforts, et par l'héroïsme d'un grand homme. Un
roi philosophe, digne du trône puisqu'il le dédaignait, plus jaloux du bonheur des hommes que de
ce fantôme de pouvoir, redoutant sa postérité et se redoutant lui-même.138
And the  more  pragmatic  turned to  monarchs  across  Europe as  potential  conduits  of  reform,
dedicating works and plans to those who would come to be called "enlightened despots."139 Thus,
the solution turned – or returned – to was l'héroïsme d'un grand homme. The legislator emerged
once again  as  a  conceptual  tool, born from "a tradition of  inquiry and debate encompassing
Greek  philosophy,  Roman  law,  medieval  theology,  Renaissance  political  theory  and  various
forms of Protestant theologising" while also being a "direct response to the declining fortunes of
the  Bourbon  monarchy"  and  embracing  recent  intellectual  movements,  in  particular,  the
135 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 3.
136 Perhaps the most important contribution to this framework is Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet's (1627-1704) Politique 
tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture sainte (written between 1679 and 1704, published posthumously in 1709).
The text was written, like Fénelon's Télémaque, for the Dauphin, but takes an absolutist position, arguing that: 
"De l'autorité: que la royale et l'héréditaire est la plus propre au gouvernement," "L'autorité royale est sacrée," 
and "L'autorité royale est absolue" (J.B. Bossuet, Politique tirée des propres paroles de l’écriture sainte à Mgr 
le dauphin [Paris, 1709], ii. i; iii. i; iv. i).
137 N.O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment (Princeton, 1980), 
pp. 442–443.
138 L.S. Mercier, L’ An Deux Mille Quatre Cent Quarante: Rêve S’Il En Fût Jamais (London, 1772), p. 69.
139 D. Beales, ‘Philosophical Kingship and Enlightened Despotism’, in M. Goldie and R. Wokler (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge, 2006), p. 503.
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pragmatism of the scientific revolution and English political theory.140
This confluence of ideas made the eighteenth century legislator quite different from the
Platonic philosopher-king of the past. In fact, Derek Beales has argued that what appears to be a
misattribution in the Encyclopédie article on the philosopher – the line "life will be good when
philosophers  are  kings"  is  attributed  to  Marcus  Aurelius  –  is  an  attempt  to  divorce  the
philosopher-king from the metaphysical: "As Voltaire said, Plato 'was almost made a father of the
Church on account of his trinitarian ideas, which no one has ever understood.' Marcus Aurelius,
on  the  other  hand,  had  been  hostile  to  Christianity  and  professed  a  Stoic  scepticism about
metaphysical reasoning."141 Beales continues to argue that it was not simply religion that irked the
philosophes,  but  any deductive  system  of philosophy  –  like  those  of  Plato,  Descartes,  and
Aquinas. Instead, knowledge needed to be scientific, and could "only be gained by induction, by
observation and experiment, and on this basis is necessarily incomplete."142 The upshot is that
this legitimized the idea of an all-powerful lawgiver for some – so long as it imposed civil laws
which were in accordance with this ever growing experimental and empirical knowledge. If there
were  universal  natural  laws  from which  human  or  civil  laws  can  be  extracted,  as  Grotius,
Pufendorf,  and Hobbes had argued in the seventeenth century, then the executor of those laws
was  of  less  importance  than  their  successful  application  in  accordance  with  a  true  political
science. When taken into account with Locke's work on contractual political theory, it was then
possible to, intellectually, break with France's absolutist hereditary monarchy and the divine right
of kings. Popular sovereignty or support could legitimize dissent and true knowledge (science)
allowed for a new legislator.143 The acceptance of the legislator as a legitimate political concept
140 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 4.
141 D. Beales, ‘Philosophical Kingship and Enlightened Despotism’, in M. Goldie and R. Wokler (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge, 2006), p. 499.
142 Ibid., pp. 499–500.
143 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
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can be recognized in its inclusion in the Encyclopédie. 
The  article,  although  written  circa 1759,  was  published in  1765 by Jean-François de
Saint-Lambert (1716-1803), a military man and poet remembered more for his caddish ways than
his intellectual output.144 His thought was neither particularly important nor ground-breaking;
Wisner describes  the article as "a rather bland mixture of legalistic idiom and historical  topos
with  a  dash  of  Montesquieu  added  in  for  spice."145 Nonetheless,  both  its inclusion  and  its
blandness  demonstrate a level of  familiarity and acceptance with the topic.  And it was not just
Saint-Lambert  who wrote  on  legislators –  Montesquieu  discussed the character,  including its
qualities and limits, in De l'esprit des lois (1748), and in many ways initiated the re-emergence of
the topic during the Enlightenment (Vaughan wrote that Montesquieu’s influence on Rousseau is
seen "nowhere more clearly than in the [Contat social's] chapters which define the task and the
methods of the Lawgiver").146 This was followed by Étienne-Gabriel Morelly's Code de la nature
in  1755,  which was critical of the character historically,  and in 1758 Claude Adrien Helvétius'
response  to  Montesquieu in  De l'esprit, in  which  the  character  is  treated  more  favourably.
Discussions  dealing  with  the  existence of  such  characters in  the  contemporary  world  were
initiated by Friedrich Melchior Grimm when he first used the concept of the "enlightened despot"
in  the 15 March,  1758,  edition of  his  Correspondance littéraire (whose audience was, in fact,
made up of nobles and monarchs). With this began, what Beales has described as, "a private or
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 14; 27–28. Brockliss develops a historical sketch of the relationship between 
science and the court highlighting a movement away from Aristotelian natural philosophy towards a mechanical 
philosophy which gave "the court culture of self-control" a "scientific underpinning" in harmony with "the ethic 
of civility" (L. Brockliss, ‘Civility and Science: From Self-control to Control of Nature, 1500-1650’, Sartoniana 
10 [1997], p. 59).
144 Saint-Lambert and Rousseau were friends, and at one point competed for the same woman (L. Damrosch, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau: Restless Genius [Boston, 2005], p. 267; 271).
145 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 46.
146 C.E. Vaughan, ‘Rousseau as Political Philosopher’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Political Writings of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, 1, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1915), p. 37.
 79
very restricted dialogue between  philosophes and rulers."147 What is more, this dialogue  added
political credence to the législateurs du goût – in particular Voltaire, Diderot, and d'Alembert, all
three of which had entered into direct conversations with Europe's Enlightened monarchs. These
largely private relationships would occasionally flare up in the public sphere, with texts such as
Voltaire's two-part Histoire de l'Empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand (1759 and 1763), which
defended the modernization project being continued by Catherine the Great.  More importantly,
though, these relationships were  important to the thinkers' understanding of themselves as  the
correctors and educators of the public – with the emergence of the enlightened despot, they were
able  to legitimately  turn  their  gaze  towards  existing  sovereigns.  Having  said  that,  these
relationships cannot be overstated – there were very few that fully and truly embraced the idea of
the enlightened despot, and general benevolence towards the idea declined during the 1760s and
early  1770s.148 For  example,  while  Holbach  was  still  penning  works  aimed  at enlightening
Catherine the Great in 1773, he abandoned hope  for such a project  in 1774 after having been
rebuffed  by  both  her  and  Frederick  the  Great,  and  following  Louis  XV's  dismissal  of  the
Parlement in 1771, Denis Diderot came out publically against the concept in Guillaume Thomas
François  Raynal's  (1713-1796) L'Histoire philosophique et  politique des établissements et  du
commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes (1774).149 It was in the middle of this key period
(from roughly  1748  to  1774)  that  Rousseau  published  his  most  explicit  contribution  to  the
discussion – the Contrat social (1762).  However, before examining his writings on the topic, a
closer examination into the context in which it emerged is necessary.
147 D. Beales, Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe (London, 2005), p. 50.
148 P. Gay, ‘The Enlightenment in the History of Political Theory’, Political Science Quarterly 69.3 (1954), p. 385. 
Those who did embrace the idea include Mirabeau (1749-1791) and Giuseppe Gorani (1740-1819) (specifically 
his 1770 Il vero dispotismo). Beales calls Gorani a "second-rank thinker" who "makes an elaborate case for what
amounts to Enlightened despotism as normally understood, quite explicitly glorifying the despotic element" (D. 
Beales, Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe [London, 2005], p. 51). Another version of the
idea can be found amongst the Physiocrats, whose defense of enlightened despotism was based on universal 
legalistic principles (see Le Mercier's 1767 L'ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques).
149 Ibid., p. 51.
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Saint-Lambert's Encyclopédie article begins with a legalistic definition – the législateur is
described as  one who can give and repeal laws.  However, he goes on to argue that  these laws
have two ends – "la sécurité de l'état  & le bonheur des citoyens" –  and that  it  was with the
people's  original consent (consentir) that the position of  législateur came into existence.  The
person  capable  of  achieving  these  goals  is,  in  Saint-Lambert's  thought,  someone of  extreme
benevolence; an enlightened despot.150 This is also true for Montesquieu: "l'esprit de modération
doit être celui du  législateur; le bien politique, comme le bien moral, se trouve toujours entre
deux limites."151 In regard to the latter, however, the legislator, by being moderate, is a republican
concept  –  not  despotic.152 Montesquieu  accepts  that  the  legislator  decides  what  form  of
government is best for a particular people, based on geographical and historical realities, but
nonetheless sees moderation as a key part in doing this.  To complicate things,  Montesquieu's
argument for moderation is also found in his argument for a balance of political powers, like that
seen in England's parliament. This limited, and moderate, role for the legislator was dismissed by
his contemporaries.
Helvétius disagreed  with  Montesquieu: "vos  combinaisons  de  pouvoirs  ne  font  que
séparer & compliquer les intérêts individuels au lieu de les unir."153 Instead,  the legislator is a
creative force which manipulates the pain and pleasure of a population so as to mould society
into an enlightened whole.154 Although a democrat at heart, Helvétius argued that an all-powerful
legislator was necessary to draft a new constitution, immune to previous customs and beliefs, and
guided  by  the  light  of  philosophy. Voltaire  also  questioned  Montesquieu's  English
150 Saint-Lambert, ‘Législateur’, Paris Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers 
ix (1751), p. 357-359.
151 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des loix, i (Geneva, 1748), bk. xxxix. i. (p. 387). 
152 R.A. Leigh, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Myth of Antiquity’, in R.R. Bolgar (ed.), Classical Influences on 
Western Thought A.D. 1650-1870 (Cambridge, 1979), p. 160.
153 Helvétius, Correspondance générale d’Helvétius, v (Toronto, 2005), pp. 84–88.
154 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
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 81
parliamentarianism, dismissing the possibility of it  being  successfully transplanted,  and instead
embraced the enlightened despot.155 It was in order to achieve this that he, and a number of other
thinkers, moved to influence one of Europe's friendlier absolute monarchs (for which a number
of them received patronage). In fact, with Voltaire and the philosophes one finds a philosophic
self-confidence (or what Peter Gay described as a "recovery of nerve")156 to create a new order
themselves;  the necessity of  a  mysterious  great  individual  disappears,  as does  the reluctance
towards advising princes –  any prince can be turned into an enlightened despot if  given the
correct education.  Thus, there was a move to use intellect to gain positions of power  so as to
influence those in ever higher positions, and this move to manipulate European political powers
through intellectual culture was the final dismissal of customs as a barrier to change. 
Customs did remain an issue  for others,  however. As Saint-Lambert wrote: "Partout les
hommes  sont  susceptibles  des  mêmes  passions,  mais  ils  peuvent  les  recevoir  par  différentes
causes & en différentes  manières."157 As Fénelon noted,  it  was a case  of  knowing one's people
intimately so as to both know the causes and therefore the solutions. And as Montesquieu argued,
laws should be born from human reason (that is, discovered with reason in the lois de la nature),
but this reason must be applied to particular peoples (as  lois positives). The particularities of a
people require a prudent legislator who can direct natural law appropriately: 
Elles doivent être relatives au physique du Pays; au Climat glacé, brûlant ou tempéré; à la qualité
du  Terrain, à sa situation, à sa grandeur, au genre de vie des peuples, laboureurs, chasseurs ou
pasteurs;  elles  doivent se rapporter  au degré de  Liberté  que la  Constitution peut  souffrir;  à la
155 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 47. Weather Montesquieu himself believed English parliamentarism could be 
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Design in Montesquieu and Rousseau’, American Journal of Political Science 54.2 [2010], p. 525).
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humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom, above all, freedom in its many forms – freedom from arbitrary power,
freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realise one's talents, freedom aesthetic response, freedom, in a 
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of Modern Paganism [New York, 1966], p. 3).
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Religion des habitants, à leurs inclinations, à leurs richesses, à leur nombre, à leur commerce, à
leurs  mœurs,  à  leurs  manières.  Enfin elles  ont  des  rapports  entre  elles,  elles  en ont  avec leur
origine, avec l'objet du Législateur, avec l'ordre des choses sur lesquelles elles sont établies; c'est
dans toutes ces vues qu'il faut les considérer.158
Interestingly,  he  warned  would-be  legislators  that  if  natural  law  dictates  customs  to  be
challenged, it should not be done with laws, as this has an air of tyranny to it. Instead, changes
should to be implemented through customs themselves –  although he did write,  as Rousseau
would, that the origin of customs is often laws.159
Voltaire,  however,  had  a  much  stricter  theory  of  natural  law,  made  clear  in  his
Dictionnaire philosophique,  arguing that there  is "une loi naturelle indépendante de toutes les
conventions  humaines" which,  born  out  of  a  universal  sentiment,  should be  followed by all
men.160 He added to this position in the entry for "Autorité" in the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie:
Misérables humains, soit  en robe verte, soit en turban, soit en robe noire, ou en surplis, soit en
manteau & en rabat; ne cherchez jamais à employer l'autorité là où il ne s'agit que de raison, ou
consentez à être bafoués dans tous les siècles comme les plus impertinents de tous les hommes, &
à subir la haine publique comme les plus injustes.161
Voltaire saw it as the legislator's duty to do away with customary powers, replacing them with a
perfect  political  science.  As noted  above,  he  believed  one could come to  understand human
nature the same way Newton studied natural science and the physical universe. If this was indeed
the case,  laws could "lead to a purely rational and unified  science de l'homme, which in turn
would be translated into a set of general positive laws applied for social reform."162 For Voltaire,
the legislator was a cultural authority who "was expected to correct political and moral vice, to
restore human conduct to its natural moral standard. His laws must echo natural law, which he
must interpret armed with the new critical tools of the scientific revolution."163
158 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des loix, i (Geneva, 1748), bk. i. xxx. (p. 10). 
159 Ibid., bk. xix. xiv; xxvii. (pp. 492–494; 508–522).
160 Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, portatif (London, 1764), ‘Des loix’, p. 252.
161 Voltaire, Questions sur l’encyclopédie, vi (Geneva, 1771), ‘Autorité’, p. 380.
162 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
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One proposed  method of accomplishing this was  with  a reformed education system; a
secularized pedagogy which aimed to instil "a universally applicable rationality and virtue" in the
populace, and therefore, was capable of creating good citizens:164
L'éducation des enfans sera pour le  législateur un moyen efficace pour attacher les peuples à la
patrie, pour leur inspirer l'esprit de communauté, l'humanité, la bienveillance, les vertus publiques,
les vertus privées, l'amour de l'honnête, les passions utiles à l'état, enfin pour leur donner, pour leur
conserver la sorte de caractere, de génie qui convient à la nation.165
Education needed to be secularized as it must be in the hands of the legislator, not the Church. As
Montesquieu wrote: "Les loix de l'éducation sont les premières que nous recevons; & comme
elles nous préparent à être citoyens, chaque famille particulière doit être gouvernée sur le plan de
la  grande  famille  qui  les  comprend  toutes."166 Helvétius'  radical  egalitarianism went  further,
arguing that intellectual differences amongst men were born out of their  upbringing. He saw
education  as  the  ultimate  tool  in  legislation,  something which  could  be  used  to  create  an
enlightened and equal populace. Education was also  seen as a method of preparation; just as
Lycurgus sent Thales to Sparta to prepare the population for legislation, the good taste being
disseminated  by the  Republic  of  Letters  was  a  type  of  preparation  for  Europe.  Voltaire  and
d'Alembert, in particular, saw themselves as cultural legislators and "set the tone by calling for
the  philosophes, those erstwhile advisers to the crowned heads of Europe and Asia, to start by
dictating the laws of taste," thus hoping to "inaugurate a new world order in which temporal and
spiritual authority would be the domain of the republic of letters… Their avowed mission was the
dissemination  of  the  gospel  of  human  progress  and  perfectibility  through  the  dual  arms  of
education  and  legislation."167 This  was  a  break  from the  historical  sources  of  morality  and
164 J.J. Popiel, ‘Education’, Oxford Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment (2005).
165 Saint-Lambert, ‘Législateur’, Paris Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers 
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education – customs and religion – and the emergence of new, rational, ones.168 The upshot of this
being,  however, many  of  the  philosophes were  unwilling to  embrace  the  tactics of  ancient
legislators.  The works of Lycurgus and Numa  were more akin to charlatanry  than forming the
basis  of  political  foundations.  That  is, although useful  (and perhaps prudent)  at  the time,  to
embrace  similar  religious  tricks  would  be  illegitimate,  as  Voltaire  made  clear.169 However,
divorcing  religion  from  politics entirely  was  not  a  universally  held position.  Montesquieu,
starting with  his "Dissertation sur la politique des Romains dans la religion" (1716), took the
Erastian position and argued that religion was too important to the state to be left in the hands of
the Church:
Ce ne fut ni la crainte ni la piété qui établit la religion chez les Romains, mais la nécessité où sont
toutes les sociétés d'en avoir une. Les premiers rois ne furent pas moins attentifs à régler le culte et
les  cérémonies  qu'à  donner des  lois et  bâtir  des  murailles.  Je trouve cette  différence entre les
législateurs romains et ceux des autres peuples, que les premiers firent la religion pour l'état, et les
autres, l'état pour la religion. Romulus, Tatius et Numa asservirent les dieux à la politique.170
And Saint-Lambert wrote:
Si le  législateur fait de la religion un ressort principal de l'état, il donne nécessairement trop de
crédit aux prêtres, qui prendront bientôt de l'ambition. Dans les pays où le législateur a pour ainsi
dire amalgamé la religion avec le gouvernement, on a vu les prêtres devenus importants, favoriser
le despotisme pour augmenter leur propre autorité, & cette autorité une fois établie, menacer le
despotisme & lui  disputer  la  servitude des  peuples.  Enfin la  religion  serait un ressort  dont  le
législateur ne  pourrait jamais prévoir  tous les effets,  et dont  rien ne peut  l'assurer  qu'il  serait
toujours le maître.171
Nonetheless,  both  groups  recognized  that  religion  had  a  power  to  access  and  influence  a
population's passions, and, depending on their perspective, this could be used to strengthen the
state or was something which needed to be overcome. That is to say, some recognized it as a truth
which could not be manipulated, while others saw it as a "trick" which should not be.172
There were other ways of engaging a population's passions, however, and one recurring
168 J.J. Popiel, ‘Education’, Oxford Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment (2005).
169 Voltaire, Questions sur l’encyclopédie, vi (Geneva, 1771), ‘Charlatan’, p. 311.
170 Montesquieu, Oeuvres complètes de Montesquieu (Paris, 1838), p. 554.
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method was patriotic love:
L'amour de la patrie est le seul objet de passion qui unisse les rivaux; il éteint les divisions; chaque
citoyen ne voit dans un citoyen qu'un membre utile à l'état; tous marchent ensemble  et contents
vers le bien commun; l'amour de la patrie donne le plus noble de tous les courages: on se sacrifie à
ce qu'on aime.173
However, methods of enraging one's love of the patrie differed. Montesquieu argued that when
one matched laws with the spirit of the people, the people would come to love the state as they
loved themselves,  and Saint-Lambert argued that public ceremony and games could be used to
this end.174 Voltaire also recognized that ceremony (and class distinctions) could be used by the
legislator,  although,  like with  religion,  saw  these  as  methods  of corrupted political  societies:
"Plus  un  peuple  est  libre,  moins  il  a  de  cérémonies;  moins  de  titres  fastueux;  moins  de
démonstrations d'anéantissement devant son supérieur."175 And just as ceremony and games were
addressed by both ancient legislators and the philosophes, the manipulation of public commerce
was also  touched on as a potential  tool to be embraced or abandoned. Saint-Lambert looked
towards it hopefully, noting that with the internationalisation of the economy, "chaque nation a
intérêt aujourd'hui qu'une autre nation conserve ses richesses, son industrie, ses banques, son luxe
& son agriculture."176 This approach was embraced by the doux commerce theorists, epitomized
in Mandeville, but was also seen in Montesquieu, who argued that in addition to matching laws
with people, one can temper society through a politeness born from commerce. That is to say, the
more commercial interactions men had with each other, the more vain and polite they become,
and in this way people could be made "gentle by commerce."177 On the other hand, the Abbé
Mably, Helvétius, Morelly, and Rousseau, all questioned commerce and mercantilism. This group
173 Saint-Lambert, ‘Législateur’, Paris Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers 
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of thinkers, picking up on some of the themes raised by Fénelon, looked at the world around
them as sick and inherently corrupt. Mably believed that inequality was born out of property,
which itself  was a result  of man's fall.  To correct this he argued for asceticism and attacked
entrepreneurs and bankers. Helvétius, although a tax farmer by trade, did not believe in a natural
right to property, and accepted that with democracy the majority were likely to redistribute the
wealth of the rich. He also envisioned a re-division of land where every family would be given a
parcel of their own. Morelly went further, arguing that man's suffering could be traced directly to
past lawgivers' assumption that human nature was bad, rather than good, and went on to attack all
forms of private property,  proposing instead  a form of agrarian communism as the solution to
inequality. Thus, he argued that enlightenment progress was not a way to correct the problems of
modernity, but instead a return to "l'empire de la nature."178
It seems possible, then, to recognize at least three approaches to legislating more broadly:
Voltaire  and  Helvétius' envisioned  a  universal  and  largely  rational  legislator. Education  and
reason, transmitted both through a European cultural milieu and a reformed education system,
could  achieve  their ends. Montesquieu,  on the other hand, developed  a Lockean constitutional
parliamentarianism  which  demanded one  take  note  of  the  particularities  of  a  given  people.
Although not propositional (he did not see Westminster as a blueprint), this was an aspect of his
intellectual investigations  of the time. Finally, we may witness another approach in  Rousseau's
republicanism.  By the middle of the eighteenth century, as Franco Venturi argued, "republican
ideas seemed to have lost their hold on a political level. They no longer offered an alternative to
the ideas and practice of an absolutism which was then beginning to take on the characteristics of
the nascent Enlightenment."179 However, and discussed in detail in the next chapter, inspired by a
178 Ibid., pp. 150–151.
179 F. Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1970), p. 70.
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combination of the tales of ancient lawgivers and cities, the protestant theology he was immersed
in  as  a  child,  Machiavelli's  humanism,  and  Fénelon's  criticisms  of  commerce  and  luxury,
Rousseau broke this mold.  He dismisses the potentiality of universal progress embraced by the
philosophes, as  well  as  Montesquieu's  legislative  moderation  –  although  he  does  recognize
something in  Montesquieu's cultural relativism. He also  turns to  the powerful, and politically
independent, character – the legislator – to found his republican polities. How he envisions this
unique concept to function in his political system is the subject of the rest of this thesis.
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Chapter III: Rousseau's Législateur
Unsurprisingly for a thinker who made the legislator an essential concept in his political thought,
studies of the character are abundant. This is perhaps largely due to  its  ambiguity –  as Wisner
described it: "a legalistic abstraction, an incarnation of Reason and of Nature, a semi-divine first
cause and a purely human efficient cause."1 Similarily, Christopher Kelly wrote:
It seems odd to appeal to such an authoritative figure in a theory based on the consent of equal
individuals. Accordingly, Rousseau's use of the legislator has struck commentators as a puzzle that
needs  to  be  explained,  and  some  have  considered  the  legislator  as  one  of  Rousseau's  least-
successful portraits.2 
Thus,  while  most  readers  acknowledge the importance of  the character,  there has been little
agreement on much else. Many argue that Rousseau turned to it to overcome insufficient aspects
of his political thought, questioning whether "the principles grounding and animating Rousseau's
republic  [have]  been  sacrificed  at  the  altar  of  expediency?"3 Others  have  been  even  less
reflective, arguing that "we have a deux ex machina wheeled out onto the stage in order there to
work the unfortunately essential miracle."4 These interpretations, however, ignore the long and
important heritage of the character. As Feinberg has argued, Rousseau's use of the legislator is
consciously part of this longer tradition, used as both "a principle of historical explanation and as
a principle of legitimacy."5 When recognized in this context the importance of the previous two
1 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 54.
2 C. Kelly, ‘"To Persuade without Convincing": The Language of Rousseau’s Legislator’, American Journal of 
Political Science 31.2 (1987), p. 322.
3 S. Johnston, Encountering Tragedy: Rousseau and the Project of Democratic Order (Ithaca, 1999), p. 66. See 
also: J. Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA, 2009), p. 241; Z. Trachtenberg,
‘Rousseau’s Platonic Rejection of Politics’, in R. Grant and P. Stewart (eds.), Rousseau and the Ancients / 
Rousseau et les Anciens, Pensée libre 8 (Montreal, 2001), p. 183; G. Beck, Fichte and Kant on Freedom, Rights,
and Law (Lanham, 2008), p. 165.
4 A. Flew, Equality in Liberty and Justice (Piscataway, NJ, 2001), p. 66.
5 B.S. Feinberg, ‘Creativity and the Political Community’, Political Research Quarterly 23.3 (1970), p. 473. Not 
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Rosenberg, ‘Rousseau the Legislator’, Études sur le Contrat social / Studies on the Social Contract Pensée libre 
2 (1989).
 89
chapters, and the goal of the current, becomes clear. Rousseau did not turn to the legislator to
overcome  insufficiencies  in  his  own  work,  but  to  attack  those  he  found  in  others.  The
"illegitimate"  legislator  provided a  legitimacy that  natural  law could  not.  While  the  likes  of
Grotius  turned to  already established states  and tried  to  rationally legitimize  their  existence,
Rousseau looked to historical moments of governing and imagined ways of instituting legitimate
states  from  the  beginning.  As  he  explicitly  wrote  at  the  beginning  of  the  Contrat  social:
"L'homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers. Tel se croit le maître des autres, qui ne laisse
pas d'être plus esclave qu'eux. Comment ce changement s'est-il fait? Je l'ignore. Qu’est-ce qui
peut le rendre légitime? Je crois pouvoir résoudre cette question."6 Legitimacy, for Rousseau, is
man  made  and  enshrined  through  political  action,  not  through  ex  post  facto philosophical
reflection. The actions of one person – the legislator – can unite a people so that it can come to
agree to accept its own chains. Legitimacy, again, was not achieved by retroactively attaching
philosophical arguments to historical institutions, which more often than not benefit the few over
the many; legitimacy came from a social contract brokered by a third party. 
The legislator was not only a conceptual tool, however. The tales of historical lawgivers
provided Rousseau with examples of how third-parties had,  and could,  successfully establish
states, and provided Rousseau with the intellectual framework on which he could develop his
own theory. As Byron Wells has argued, Rousseau looked to the ancient lawgiver because they
knew how to "make citizens of [a people], how to transform private self-interest into passional
energy for the 'public thing,' how to impose rule, discipline, and order to guarantee freedom, how
to reshape human nature."7 These were the lessons available to the reader of Plutarch, and if one
6 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 351.
7 B. Wells, ‘Rousseau’s Legislators and the Exemplar of Sparta’, in R. Grant and P. Stewart (eds.), Rousseau and 
the Ancients / Rousseau et les Anciens, Pensée libre 8 (Montreal, 2001), p. 212. Wells argued that Rousseau 
looked to Lycurgus as a character who could "denature" men. This, however, ignores Rousseau's own argument 
that Lycurgus came to power over "un peuple deja degrade." (Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 957).
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wants  to  come  to  understand  what  Rousseau  imagined  was  possible  when  describing  the
legislator, one must keep these ancient ideals in mind.8 Of course, one must  also  look beyond
Plutarch  to  come  to  understand  the  depth  of  Rousseau's  influences.  In  fact,  the  number of
thinkers he engaged with is impressive. Marguerite Richebourg's 1932 "La Bibliothèque de Jean-
Jacques Rousseau" contains a list of works owned, mentioned, or referenced by Rousseau which
is a who's-who of intellectual history and numbers 664 individuals.9 It is not surprising, then, that
one also finds the ideas examined in the previous chapter in Rousseau's own writings.10 However,
it  should be noted that  while there is a conceptual  link,  Rousseau was not rehashing already
existing ideas,  but instead developed his own system. This can perhaps be made clear by once
again turning to the ship-of-state metaphor.
Just as it is a certainty that Rousseau was aware of the thinkers and characters mentioned
in the previous two chapters,  so too  must  it  be true of  the  ship-of-state metaphor. However,
Rousseau stands  apart  from  those  who  came  before, and  avoids  the metaphor.11 This  is
8 Rousseau often turned to the reports of ancient lawgivers to strengthen his own arguments. An exhaustive list of 
examples would be unwieldy, but a few notes demonstrate the relationship to the lawgiver as examined in the 
first chapter: Rousseau embraced the tradition of entrusting the establishment and maintenance of laws to a 
foreigner who ultimately abdicates the throne (Contrat social, OC iii, p. 385). To gain the types of knowledge 
necessary to do this, Rousseau returns to the idea of philosophical travel as seen in Plato, Thales, and Pythagoras
– travel which overcame national prejudices, allowing one to know men as they are everywhere (Second 
Discourse, OC iii, p. 213). Rousseau also agreed with Plato that one cannot give laws to any people – the 
legislator must work with the correct material (Contrat social, OC iii, p. 386). Examples of this are offered in 
Lycurgus' educational system, which dismissed cultivation of the mind and focused on duties and morality, an 
education that almost made laws unnecessary by giving people a common will (First Discourse, OC iii. pp. 24-
25), as well as Moses religious teachings (Contrat social, OC iii, p. 460-461). On the other hand, Rousseau 
criticized Cyrus' failure to protect his people from luxury (First Discourse, OC iii, p. 20) are to overcome such 
problems, Rousseau pointed to Numa, who, through the proliferation of partial associations, was able to 
encourage and maintain equality through balanced disorder (Contrat social, OC iii, p. 371-372).
9 M. Richebourg, ‘La Bibliothèque de Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, Annales de la société Jean-Jacques Rousseau 21 
(1932), pp. 181–250.
10 Again, to touch on only a few in preparation for the arguments to come: many of the essentially republican 
arguments found in Rousseau can be traced back to Cicero and Machiavelli; his critique of courtly monarchy is 
similar to that raised by Erasmus and More (Contrat social, OC iii, p. 413); his conceptions of amour-propre and
amour-de-soi have been traced to both Augustinianism and Stoic Oikeiosis (C. Brooke, ‘Rousseau’s Political 
Philosophy: Stoic and Augustinian Origins’, in P. Riley (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Rousseau 
[Cambridge, 2001], pp. 94–123); his propositional thoughts on political reform are indebted Fénelon; and his 
scepticism of reform shares as much with Machiavelli as Plato (Second Discourse, OC iii, p. 180).
11 Rousseau does use aspects of the metaphor – describing political upheaval as potential storms, for example – but
never develops the full analogy.
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interesting,  as one  may  initially suspect  that  it  is  a metaphor particularly well-suited  for the
author who  "best explored the logical potential" of the legislator.12 It is, after all, a metaphor
which places emphasis on the skill of an individual in protecting and guiding a multitude. What is
more,  Rousseau  embraced metaphors  more  generally in  his  work.  The  legislator  itself  is
described as  the  head of the body-politic,  as  an architect,  a doctor,  a mechanic – even a god.13
Nonetheless, Rousseau never describes the legislator as the pilot of a ship. There are perhaps two
reasons for this. First,  Rousseau may have purposefully avoided the metaphor because it had
become conceptually tied to absolute monarchs in French writing during the seventeenth and
eighteenth  centuries.14 Second,  the  lack  of  reference  may  say something  about  the
inappropriateness  of  the metaphor  structurally. That  is,  as  a  metaphor for  the  necessity of  a
skilled captain or politician to protect a crew or population, it succeeds. When attempting to use
it with a character who is mysterious and fleeting, and  a people  who are united but disparate,
completely lacking in the skills necessary to sail, yet are expected to take the helm themselves, it
becomes less straight forward.15 Thus, using the metaphor may, at best, be inappropriate, and at
worst, trivialize the complexity of the character and system. In fact, the metaphors Rousseau does
use are descriptive, rather than systematic – they say something about the character, but they do
not say what it is that character should do. That is, the legislator may be like an architect, but that
12 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 4.
13 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 381-384.
14 T. Tikanoja, Transgressing Boundaries: Worldly Conversation, Politeness and Sociability in Ancien Régime 
France, 1660-1789 (Helsinki, 2013), p. 93 ff. 35.
15 The metaphor has three constituent parts: the ship as state, the crew as people, and the pilot as political master. 
To force the metaphor one can begin by taking Rousseau's description of the ideal législateur and develop an 
image of the ship's pilot. Such a captain would have no relation to the crew, but know them intimately. They 
would have already assembled before the captain emerges, but share no traditions, have had no previous captain,
nor function as a team. The captain would then transform this disparate crew's nature from individuals into a 
united body. The crew would be strong, yet docile; willing to take orders and capable of carrying them out. The 
ship itself would not be at risk of pirates, but would nonetheless be capable of repelling foes. It would be 
burdened by neither treasure, nor lack the necessary rations. It's aim, beyond existing, remains unclear; its harbor
is a mystery. To put it simply, the metaphor fails if one tries to make it Rousseauvian.
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does not tell us what his building should look like. To come to understand this one must locate
the character more fully within his system. 
This  chapter  uses Rousseau's  writings  – specifically the  Discours  sur  l'origine et  les
fondements de l'inégalité parmi les homes, the Contrat social, the Discours sur la vertu du héros,
and  Émile –  to  locate this  character  within  his  philosophical  system, while  using pertinent
references  to  previous thinkers and tales  to inform the developed description. This is done  by
looking at his most famous discussion  on the  legislator, as found in the  Contrat social.  Other
texts  are then used to  highlight  and expand on many of the particulars which are less  fully
developed in his political treatise. The chapter then turns to the idea of the "corporate metaphor"
– a recurring theme in Rousseau's work  which demonstrates the ways in which giving  laws is
directly related to the historical circumstances and particularities of peoples. In doing this a more
robust understanding is developed in regard to both who can be given laws, and by whom. This is
followed by a brief examination of Rousseau himself within the genre of the lawgiver – both
through biography and as a literary character (the tutor in Émile). Finally, the chapter concludes
by demonstrating  that  Rousseau himself  was  both  aware  of,  and clear  about,  the  distinction
between founding and re-founding populations.
The Législateur in the Contrat social
Chapter seven in the second book of the Contract Social is titled "Du Législateur," and it is here
that  Rousseau  describes  the  character  who  takes  a  prime  position  in  the  political  treatise.
Unfortunately,  for such a key concept,  it  says very little (covering less than four out of 120
pages), and even less decisively. The chapter begins with a description of the législateur:
Pour  découvrir  les  meilleures  règles  de  société  qui  conviennent  aux  nations,  il  faudrait  une
intelligence supérieure qui vît toutes les passions des hommes, et qui n'en éprouvât aucune; qui
n'eût aucun rapport avec notre nature, et qui la connût à fond; dont le bonheur fût indépendant de
nous, et  qui  pourtant  voulût  bien s'occuper du nôtre;  enfin,  qui,  dans le  progrès des temps se
ménageant une gloire éloignée, pût travailler dans un siècle et jouir dans un autre. Il faudrait des
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dieux pour donner des lois aux hommes.… Celui-ci est le mécanicien qui invente la machine,
celui-là n'est que l'ouvrier qui la monte et la fait marcher.16
What should first be noticed is the similarities shared between this concept and the ancient hero-
founders  examined in  chapter  one  of  this  thesis.  As  Bonnie  Honig  wrote:  "When Rousseau
introduces the foreign-founder to the  Contrat social, he reiterates the classic script familiar to
readers of founding myths from Greece to Rome to the Hebrew Bible."17 Rousseau develops a
législateur who is an outsider, and thus independent from the people legislated for. The character
is  able to recognize what is  essential  in  a  people's particular  nature,  but  shares none of  that
nature. This political position is extra-ordinary; the législateur is neither part of the government,
nor sovereign, nor is it a constitutional office. The ends which are proposed must not be directed
towards bettering  the legislator's own life,  but do allow for  future glory.  Thus, the legislator  is
judged on the success of the legislation, and a lawgiver who is concerned with the present – with
the glory of  being the lawgiver – is a threat to the people  the laws are given to.  And like the
ancient exemplars, Rousseau's législateur is tasked with changing the very nature of the people
he is legislating for – "qui par lui-même est un tout parfait et solitaire, en partie d'un plus grand
tout dont cet individu reçoive en quelque sorte sa vie et son être."18 That is, the individuals that
the législateur works with, upon being founded, no longer exist as they had; he creates a people
out of individuals by taking them out of their nascent pre-constitutional state and giving them an
entirely new, and social, nature.19 This is, in fact, the true end of the Contrat social – as Hilail
Gildin has argued, these are the "principles of Political Right" – the subtitle Rousseau gave to the
treatise:  "By the  principles  of  political  right  Rousseau means  what  we today might  call  the
principles of constitutional law, although in doing so we should remember such principles are not
16 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 381.
17 B. Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton, 2001), p. 18.
18 Ibid., p. 381.
19 Pre-constitutional in the sense of being without a constitution, but more importantly, by not constituting a 
people.
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necessarily embodied in written laws. Not even all constitutions are written."20
Giving a people these principles (or constitution) is not a simple task; even Rousseau
highlights two seemingly paradoxical aspects of the législateur's job: first he is a human, but has
a nature completely different from, and advanced beyond, the people he is to legislate for. This is
made  more  complicated  when  one realizes that  he  must  therefore,  somehow,  transmit  this
superior knowledge to a people who do not have the faculties – the nature – to understand it. The
second problem facing a législateur is that in attempting to achieve these political ends, there is
no recourse to legitimate political authority. These  issues led Rousseau to  a trick used by  the
ancients  –  "l'intervention  du  ciel  et  d'honorer  les  dieux  de  leur  propre  sagesse."21 Thus,  the
challenges facing such a person are immense. However, in explaining what it is that makes this
unique person capable, Rousseau only refers to "La grande ame du Législateur."22 To understand
what this great soul is one must look elsewhere in Rousseau's works.
In his short treatise on the virtue of heroes, written eleven years before the Contrat social
was  published,23 Rousseau  attacks  the  standards  of  the  time,  dismissing  the  virtues most
commonly  associated  heroism,  such  as  the  "vulgar"  prejudices  such  as  valour  in  war  (or
courage),  or  the  cardinal  virtues  of  prudence,  justice,  and moderation.  Instead,  according  to
Rousseau, the true heroic quality is fortitude – a quality of soul ("une âme forte") which makes
ruling  over  ourselves,  and  thus  other  men  possible.24 Fortitude  is  special  because  it  allows
mastery over our passions – while some virtues can be found in men naturally, it is only through
fortitude that one can acquire others. That is to say, while the naturally generous man is generous,
he has not chosen to be so – it is only through fortitude that one chooses to do good in spite of
20 H. Gildin, Rousseau’s Social Contract: The Design of the Argument (Chicago, 1983), pp. 2–3.
21 Ibid., p. 383.
22 Ibid., p. 384.
23 Although only three years before it is claimed he began thinking about the text.
24 Rousseau, Heroes, OC ii, p. 1273.
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oneself, and therefore, demonstrates true freedom. As he states at the beginning of the discourse
the hero is a natural man, who through a mixture of fortune and fortitude is able to become
something more than his contemporaries.25 And as Philip Stewart has pointed out, this conception
of heroism is a constant throughout Rousseau's works – in reference to the characters in Julie he
wrote: "Virtue itself is not a gift of nature: it requires will, it is a kind of heroism that overcomes
obstacles."26
One can see how fortitude is a legislative quality more clearly when its resemblance to
Machiavelli's  virtù is  noted  – a  connection Rousseau himself  makes  in  the  Contrat  social.27
Fortitude, like virtù, allows the hero to act decisively when necessary to overcome fortuna. More
importantly, these actions cannot be represented as "just" or "unjust." Like Hobbes, Rousseau
argued  that  justice only came  to be  with the generation of law.28 Thus,  only the outcomes of
actions are of concern to the législateur as it is only when these are successful – with the creation
of laws – that conceptions of justice emerge. This is the irony of heroism for Rousseau (and the
point of infamy in Machiavelli): "Mais dirons-nous que la justice soit cette base, tandis que c'est
sur l'injustice même que la plupart des grands hommes ont fondé le monument de leur gloire?"29
Legislation is a pragmatic art:
[O]n ne les rend heureux qu'en les contraignant à l'être, & il faut leur faire éprouver le bonheur
pour le leur faire aimer: voilà l'occupation et les talents du Héros; c'est souvent la force à la main
qu'il se met en état de recevoir les bénédictions des hommes qu'il contraint d'abord à porter le joug
des lois pour les soumettre enfin à l'autorité de la raison.30
It is this ability to force people to be happy before they know what true happiness is which leads
25 Rousseau, Heroes, OC ii, p. 1262. Neither the hero, nor the legislator, are divine as others have argued (A. 
Rosenberg, ‘Rousseau the Legislator’, Études sur le Contrat social / Studies on the Social Contract Pensée libre 
2 [1989]).
26 P. Stewart, ‘Introduction’, in J.-J. Rousseau, Julie, or the New Heloise (Hanover, New Hampsire, 1997), pp. ix–
x.
27 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 384.
28 T. Hobbes, Hobbes: Leviathan (Cambridge, 1996) i. xiii. p. 90; Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, OC iii, p. 328.
29 Rousseau, Heroes, OC ii, p. 1270.
30 Ibid., pp. 1263-1264.
 96
Rousseau to argue: "L'Héroïsme est donc, de toutes les qualités de l'âme, celle dont il importe le
plus aux peuples que ceux qui les gouvernent soient revêtus."31 It is  this, amongst other things,
which legitimizes  a  législateur speaking  for  the  gods  – it  is  another  trick  available  to  the
lawgiver; a method of encouraging the acceptance of social and moral rules.32
The necessity of this forceful method is further understood when Rousseau's writings on
public morality are addressed in the  "Geneva Manuscript" of the  Contrat social.33 It is there,
spoken by the imagined voice of a would-be citizen, that two problems facing the législateur are
highlighted. First, man naturally loves himself above others. That is to say, self-love is such that,
if a man is given the choice between making himself miserable, or everyone else, he will choose
everyone else.  Inconveniencing  others  in exercising  one's own natural liberty is not enough  in
itself to encourage one to refrain, let alone give up their natural freedom. Thus the "greater good"
on its own is not an argument. This leads to the second problem: even if a citizen were to accept
that it is best that all men live according to a set of shared moral rules, what is there to assure him
that he is not the only one who observes these laws in turn? The problem is that man is not only
naturally inclined to act selfishly, but that in many cases it is rational to do so. It is here that we,
perhaps, find the genesis of Rousseau's scepticism of reason in relation to politics, and why he
believed it was necessary to have a forceful législateur.
There are at least four identifiable parts to Rousseau's critique of reason: First, reason has
historically been politically divisive. Enlightenment requires knowledge, and knowledge requires
leisure – one man's leisure  requires another man to do  twice his share of work and the loss of
universal self-sufficiency.34 Second, reason can overcome naturally good and social passions,
31 Ibid., p. 1264.
32 In contrast to Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses (1737), Rousseau argued politics and religion are not aimed
towards a common end, but instead religion strengthens political foundations.
33 Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, OC iii, pp. 284-285.
34 Rousseau, First Discourse, OC iii, pp. 19-20.
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such as pity.  For example, it is reason that allows someone, upon hearing another person being
attacked outside of their window, to say to themself: "there but for the grace of God go I," and
ignore the plight of this fellow human.35 Third, and following Montaigne, Rousseau argued that
although reason is treated as a universal it is no such thing: "Quand un homme ne peut croire ce
qu'il trouve absurde, ce n'est pas sa faute, c'est celle de sa raison," and he continues in a footnote:
"la raison humaine n'a pas de mesure commune bien déterminée, & qu'il est injuste à tout homme
de donner la sienne pour règle à celle des autres."36 This leads to the fourth problem: if reason is
not universal,  it  can lead to conflict.  As he wrote in his reply to the former King of Poland
Stanisław Leszczyński's observations on the  Second Discourse, whenever reason is an issue of
contention between men, they are returned to their natural equality and the freedoms given to all
men by the right of nature.37 This makes it incredibly difficult for wisdom and reason to lead to
consensus over issues – especially those of great importance. 
In many ways this was an epistemological problem for Rousseau: "Les sages qui veulent
parler au vulgaire leur langage au lieu du sien n'en sauraient être entendus."38 It  is a recurring
topic in Rousseau's work: those who would gain from arguments for the rationality and utility of
moral laws (i.e.,  Grotius'  natural law – or what Rousseau calls "la loi de raison") need to have
already achieved a level of rationality which would allow them to understand the proofs, and if
they already have this level of rationality, surely it would have led them to the same conclusions
on their own.39 If they are capable of this level of rationality, and have already failed to embrace
35 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, p. 156.
36 Rousseau, d'Alembert, OC v, p. 11. Rousseau's scepticism is indebted to Montaigne (Rousseau, Heroes, OC ii, p.
1271), who argued that the main problem facing the emergence of rational governance was the interaction 
between custom and reason, and arguing that any attempt to modify an established population's laws is an attack 
their conception of themselves (M. de Montaigne, Les essais de Michel seigneur de Montaigne [Paris, 1652], p. 
66). This is why, he argued, many ancient lawgivers went to extremes to enshrine their laws. He did, however, 
recognize one method of influencing politics, and like Machiavelli, it was amoral. In "De l'utile et de l'honneste"
he accepted that honour and expediency are not always compatible (Ibid., p. 584).
37 Rousseau, Observations, OC iii, p. 35.
38 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 383.
39 This is why the legislator must be an outsider.
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these conclusions, it is likely that their reason has already been corrupted by their own (natural)
selfishness.  That is to say, someone  can tell a people that they will be happier once living in
accordance with a set  of universal moral rules,  but reason tells  that same people that this  is
unlikely to happen, or worse, that they will be even happier if everyone  but them obeys these
rules. This is what led Rousseau to write: "le  législateur ne pouvant employer ni la force ni le
raisonnement, c'est une nécessité qu'il recoure à une autorité d'un autre ordre, qui puisse entraîner
sans violence et persuader sans convaincre."40 He must instead find a non-rational method of idea
transmission, or as it is described in the Contrat social, force men to be free.41 To return to the
imaginary interlocutor in the Geneva manuscript: "Il ne s'agit pas de m'apprendre ce que c'est que
justice; il s'agit de me montrer quel intérêt j'ai d'être juste."42
When  reflecting  on  this  problem one  may be  reminded  of  Glaucon's  questioning  of
Socrates at the beginning of Book II of the Republic: "Socrates, is it your desire to seem to have
persuaded us or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be just than unjust?"43 It
is this, persuasion  rather than convincing ("persuader sans convaincre"),  that is the key to the
législateur's task. It is not an issue of simply getting people to consent to the proposed moral laws
and political system – it is a matter of giving them the strength to consent  and to achieve the
same  self-mastery  and  freedom  that  the  législateur demonstrates.  Just  as  Socrates  failed  in
rationally persuading his interlocutors in Book I of  The Republic, and  was therefore forced to
show them why justice is better than injustice by creating an imagined city, Rousseau argues that
40 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 383.
41 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 364.
42 Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, OC iii, p. 286.
43 Plato, Republic, 357a-b (ed. Lee, p. 102). The translation here is not always the same – one can find both 
"persuade" and "convince" in English. The original Greek is πείθω, which can mean "make to believe," 
"convince," "persuade," and "prevail." Rousseau, however, used a Latin translation – specifically, Marsilio 
Ficino's 1550 edition (we know this because his copy – with marginal notes – is held at the British Library). In 
this translation we find persuadere, which in the eighteenth century would more likely have been translated into 
French as persuader, rather than convaincre (which, one finds translated into Latin as convincere in an 1833 
Lexique Français-Latin). Thus, it is consistent with Rousseau's own formulation of "persuader sans convaincre."
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the législateur needs to demonstrate the truth of his position without recourse to reason; as Kelly
puts it: "While the art of the 'true political theorist' may be philosophic, that of the legislator must
also be, in Rousseau's terms, 'imitative.'" Truths must be wrapped in sensible and agreeable forms
which can be easily grasped and accepted – "A blind multitude must be made to sense the things
it cannot see, and these things must be made agreeable to win consent."44 Again, as Rousseau
wrote in Émile:
Je sais que toutes ces vertus par imitation sont des vertus de singe, et que nulle bonne action n'est
moralement bonne que quand on la fait comme telle, et non parce que d'autres la font. Mais, dans
un âge où le cœur ne sent rien encore, il faut bien faire imiter aux enfants les actes dont on veut
leur donner l'habitude, en attendant qu'ils les puissent faire par discernement et par amour du bien.
L'homme est imitateur.45
In this light – especially when the word imitative has been used – it is useful to reflect on what
Rousseau wrote about the theatre.
For Rousseau, creating raw sentiment in the imagination differs from using theatre to
display  moral  acts  with  the  hope  of  transmitting  those  good  morals  to  an  audience.  The
interpretation required by the spectator  requires  reason to  make a judgment in  regard to  the
imitation being watched – it needs to be interpreted and rationalized. If one recognizes vice on
stage,  and  cheers  for  the  virtuous  protagonist,  one  can  recognize  morality  –  and  may even
congratulate  themselves  for  it.  However,  there  is  no  stipulation  that  recognition  engenders
practice – while one gains nothing from the deceitful ways of a character on stage, and thus has
no vested interest, this is not true if one lives as such a character. What is more, these immoral
acts  could  even  offer lessons.46 Although  the  theatre  may  have  at  one  point  been  seen  by
Rousseau as  a  useful  institution  –  he  himself  was  both  a  successful  playwright  and regular
attendee of the theatre – he came to argue that:
44 C. Kelly, ‘"To Persuade without Convincing": The Language of Rousseau’s Legislator’, American Journal of 
Political Science 31.2 (1987), p. 324.
45 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, pp. 339-240.
46 See Rousseau's discussion on the fable "The Crow in the Fox" in Émile (OC iv, pp. 353-355).
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[L]e Théâtre, qui peut rien pour corriger les mœurs, beaucoup pour les altérer. En favorisant tous
nos penchants, il donne un nouvel ascendant à ceux qui nous dominent; les continuelles émotions
qu'on y ressent  nous énervent, nous  affaiblissent, nous rendent plus incapables de résister à nos
passions; et le stérile intérêt qu'on prend à la vertu ne sert qu'a contenter notre amour propre, sans
nous contraindre à la pratiquer.47
That is,  examples of moral  behaviour  are unlikely to overcome one's own passions in the real
world. Instead, Rousseau felt raw sentiment should, and could, be used; one must bypass reason
or interpretation in the mind of the recipient.
This was a radical break with the political thought of the time. As Wisner has stated, "the
language of  lawmaking in  the  ancien  régime"  was  different:  "The Bourbon king commands
(ordonner) and the law courts verify (verifier), Rousseau's legislator persuades (persuader), in
order ultimately to restore political liberty through the revival of an ancient libertarian rhetorical
tradition."48 To understand how this could be accomplished one needs to turn to Rousseau's Essai
sur l'origine des langues, where Rousseau tells his reader: "On ne commença pas par raisonner,
mais par sentir."49 Reason lacks power when it comes to moving the  cœur and inflaming the
passions, so if one does not want to enter a state where the equality of wisdom allows for the
absolute dismissal of any argument – or worse, insincere acceptance – one must turn to a form of
communication  which  relies  on  forming raw sentimentality  within  ones  interlocutor  through
persuasion.50 That is, the use of non-rational techniques and tools to induce behaviour in a people.
Rousseau offers a number of descriptions of this being done, such as the experiential lessons
offered to his pupil Émile,  his description of melodic Italian music, and his theory of Southern
languages.51 In the Contrat social, however, the tool used for polity formation is religion.52 It is in
47 Rousseau, d'Alembert, OC v, pp. 52-53. Rousseau's thought on the theatre may not have changed – instead, Paris
and Geneva were very different political landscapes.
48 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 54.
49 Rousseau, Langues, OC v, p. 380.
50 Ibid., p. 377.
51 In each of these examples Rousseau also offers a negative, reason based, counter example: using reason to 
educate children, French music, and northern languages.
52 Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, OC iii, p. 284; Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 383-384.
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this way that moral weight can be added to the emerging legal and social rules which reason
cannot afford. In this way non-rational encouragement of virtue can result in a people able to
achieve political harmony amongst themselves. However, the task of the législateur is only one
half of understanding Rousseau's theory of political foundations – the  other half is the people
themselves.
The Législateur's Place in Rousseau's Corporate Metaphor
Earlier  this  thesis  used the  ship-of-state  metaphor  to  trace  conceptions  of  political  authority
throughout  history.  It  has  also  been  noted  that  this  well  known  trope  was  not  Rousseau's
metaphor of choice. Instead, to understand the relationship between the législateur and a given
people in Rousseau's system one should start  by examining his metaphor of the body-politic
instead. This distinction is worth noting, as Martin notes one structural distinction: "one who sees
the political unit as a 'body politic' may have a different procedure than he who regards it as 'the
ship of state'; if the nation is a body and the monarch its head, then it follows if one cuts off the
head the body will die; on a ship of state, however, mutiny against an incompetent captain is not
only possible but necessary."53 Metaphors can tell us much more than an initial  reading may
imagine, and in Rousseau's writings, one need not look far to be furnished with examples of his
chosen metaphor:
[C]oncevons le genre humain comme une personne morale ayant avec un sentiment d'existence qui
lui donne l'individualité et la constitue une, un mobile universel qui fasse agir chaque partie pour
une fin générale et relative au tout. Concevons que ce sentiment commun soit celui de l'humanité,
et que la loi naturelle soit le principe actif de toute la machine. Cette raison sublime, qui s'élève au-
dessus de la portée des hommes vulgaires, est celle dont le  législateur met les décisions dans la
bouche  des  immortels,  pour  entraîner  par  l'autorité  divine  ceux  que  ne  pourrait  ébranler  la
prudence humaine.54
53 J. Martin, ‘Metaphor amongst tropes’, Religious Studies 17.01 (1981), p. 63.
54 Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, OC iii, pp. 283-284; for more see: First Discourse, OC iii, p. 10; Contract 
social, OC iii, pp. 368; 372-373; 378; 424. Rousseau was not the only political theorist to develop this metaphor 
– Shklar referred to it as "the oldest and the most tradition-ridden of all Rousseau's metaphors" (J.N. Shklar, 
Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory [Cambridge, 1985], p. 169).
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Shklar wrote that this was Rousseau's most consistent metaphor: "Sometimes he mentioned it
quite casually simply to refer to civil society. Occasionally, however, he went into full anatomical
detail  and  then  he  had  very  specific  purposes  in  mind."55 Even  when  the  body-politic  is
corrupted, the metaphor is of use, as one can see when Rousseau discusses the state of Poland.56
The example above highlights Shklar's second case – the very nature of these metaphors unites a
multiplicity into a singularity;  political  societies and individuals;  aspects of his  philosophical
system and his literary characters. For example, Shklar notes: 
Rousseau  spoke  of  'the  people'  as  if  it  were  Émile.  That,  indeed,  was  only  one  of  his
personifications. The sovereign, the public happiness, the general will and the body politic are all
personifying metaphors... Together they form the main subject of Rousseau's political thought.57 
Just as Plato made the soul into a city so as to examine justice, Rousseau made the multiplicity a
unity. By examining these more elaborate metaphors one can see the workings of the législateur
and the people from a different perspective and move beyond the short description offered in the
Contrat social.
Geoffrey Gershenson has examined this rhetorical technique, as found in the Discours sur
l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes,  and  drawn out the "metaphorical
comparison of the history of the species to an individual  life."58 In  the study  he identifies a
narrative  life-pattern  which,  when  taken  beyond  the  Discourse,  is  strikingly  similar  to  the
narratives in some of Rousseau's other texts (specifically the Contrat social and Émile).59 In fact,
the original draft of Émile offers an interesting starting point by dividing and titling the ages of
Émile's  life  into the ages  of  nature,  reason,  force,  and wisdom.60 Although in the final  draft
55 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. 197.
56 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, pp. 953-954.
57 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. 165.
58 G. Gershenson, ‘The Rise and Fall of Species-Life Rousseau’s Critique of Liberalism’, European Journal of 
Political Theory 5.3 (2006), p. 281.
59 Gershenson does not draw comparisons between these texts himself, instead writing@ "a close reading of the 
later texts must be left for elsewhere" (Ibid., p. 283).
60 Rousseau, Favre, OC iv, 60.
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Rousseau had given up on these titles, and went on to divide the first part (the age of nature) into
two books,  one can  take these two systems of  division (one five parted and one titled)  and
recognize a life-pattern much like the one Gershenson later picked up on.
The first age is  birth (or nature), and is located in the  Second Discourse's dedicatory,
preface, and exordium. In these sections Rousseau introduces his text by raising the issue of one's
birth-place and describing what  he  is  offering  his  reader  as  a  true  history of  the  species  in
comparison to the philosophical failures which came before him – those who failed to turn their
gaze far enough back to witness the real birth of society.61 The same theme is  raised at  the
beginning  of  Émile,  and  again  in  the  Contrat  social with  its famous  introductory  words
("L'homme  est  né  libre")  and  initial  discussion  on  "Premières Sociétés"  (which  is  literally
initiated when the first child is born).62
The second stage is  infancy or childhood63 (and a continuation of nature) – a stage of
humanity which Rousseau himself has been credited for inventing, a time in which "all young
people  have  a  right  to  a  period  of  education  and  carefree  happiness."64 Before  this  point
childhood was Dionysian:  children were  corrupt, self-serving, and in need  of moral correction
and training. However, with Rousseau  one recognizes the emergence of the Apollonian image:
innocent, untainted, and in need of protection – naturally good and without original sin.65 This is
also  a  stage in  Rousseau's  conjectural  history found in Part  I  of  the  Second Discourse:  "les
Siècles s'écoulaient dans  toute  la  grossièreté des  premiers  âges,  l'espèce était déjà  vieille,  et
l'homme restait toujours enfant."66 Child-like innocence is seen in naiveté: "il ne soit effrayé par
61 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, pp. 114; 132-133.
62 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 245; Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 351; 352; 360-362.
63 Gershenson and Duschinsky have labeled this era as "childhood," but as this thesis will show, infancy is a more 
accurate description.
64 R. Duschinsky, ‘Augustine, Rousseau, and the Idea of Childhood’, The Heythrop Journal 54.1 (2013), p. 77.
65 C. Jenks, Thought as a System (London, 1996), p. 79.
66 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, p. 160.
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tous les nouveaux spectacles qui s'offrent à lui." Rousseau tells us that man at this stage is so
completely void of prudence, reason, and experience, that he would sell his bed in the morning
only to weep at its loss at night.67 Even speech is beyond the capabilities of the savage man-child,
who, while still being a metaphorical individual as the species-life, is only a mute schizophrenic
at  this  point.68 As  Gildin  – who also  recognized a  recurring  structure  between a number  of
Rousseau's texts – pointed out, this is the section discussing the natural freedoms which must be
overcome before one can enter a political society.69 It is the "primitive" stage of man – when "the
human race attains its moral peak, or at any rate its peak as regards to goodness."70
The third stage is youth (and reason). As Rousseau writes in Émile: "C'est ici le second
terme de la vie, et celui auquel proprement finit l'enfance; car les mots infans et puer ne sont pas
synonymes. Le premier est compris dans l'autre, et signifie qui ne peut parler."71 With this stage,
logos – both speech and reason – emerges, and with it the era of revolutions and man's eventual
corruption;72 it  is  the  separation  from (mother)  nature  and the  beginning  of  the  non-natural
education of the species-life.  Gildin  argues that this  stage "is a peak not of goodness but of
happiness."73 The "Geneva Manuscript"  of the  Contrat social highlights the importance of this
stage: 
La jeunesse n'est  pas  l'enfance.  Il  est  pour les  nations comme pour les hommes un temps de
67 Ibid., pp. 136; 144.
68 G. Gershenson, ‘The Rise and Fall of Species-Life Rousseau’s Critique of Liberalism’, European Journal of 
Political Theory 5.3 (2006), p. 288; Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, pp. 143-148.
69 H. Gildin, Rousseau’s Social Contract: The Design of the Argument (Chicago, 1983), p. 9.
70 Ibid., p. 11. This is also the era of natural man which Voltaire mocked Rousseau for speaking so highly of, 
sarcastically writing that he was taken by the desire to walk on all fours after having read the Second Discourse 
(CC 317, vol. iii). Of course, beasts are not the only things which walk on four legs, and one may find a 
response to Voltaire in Émile: "On se plaint de l'état de l'enfance! [O]n ne voit pas que la race humaine eût péri, 
si l'homme n'eût commencé par être enfant" (OC iv, pp. 246-247). That is, it is not an ideal stage that Rousseau 
was describing, but a necessary one: "l'éducation commence avec la vie, en naissant l'enfant est déjà disciple, 
non du gouverneur, mais de la nature" (Ibid., p. 279). This is an important point for Rousseau: "Je le répète, 
l'éducation de l'homme commence à sa naissance; avant de parler, avant que d'entendre, il s'instruit déjà. 
L'expérience prévient les leçons" (Ibid., p. 281).
71 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 299; italics in the original.
72 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, pp. 167; 171.
73 H. Gildin, Rousseau’s Social Contract: The Design of the Argument (Chicago, 1983), p. 11.
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jeunesse, ou, si l'on veut, de maturité, qu'il faut attendre avant de les soumettre à des lois. Mais la
maturité  d'un  peuple  n'est  pas  toujours  facile  à  connaître;  et  si  on  la  prévient,  l'ouvrage  est
manqué.74 
This is also the moment of divergence between the failed  species-life in the Second Discourse
(that is, the history of Europe as Rousseau saw it) and the ideal histories of the species offered in
Émile and the  Contrat  social.75 The  potentiality of  failure  stems from  the  weakness  of  both
children and peoples at this stage – both need some form of rearing, and it is this rearer who
decides their fate. In the latter case, bad laws imposed from the particular will of a lawgiver can
reinforce this weakness, ensuring an artificial state of childhood and a lasting reliance on laws.
However, Rousseau is clear that things do not have to turn out this way:
Ces considérations sont importantes, & servent a résoudre toutes les contradictions du système
social. Il y a deux sortes de dépendances: celle des choses, qui est de la nature; celle des hommes,
qui est de la société. La dépendance des choses, n'ayant aucune moralité, ne nuit point à la liberté,
et n'engendre point de vices: la dépendance des hommes étant désordonnée les engendre tous, &
c'est par elle que le maître & l'esclave se dépravent mutuellement.  S'il  y a quelque moyen de
remédier à ce mal dans la société, c'est  de substituer la loi à l'homme, & d'armer les volontés
générales  d'une force  réelle,  supérieure  à  l'action de toute volonté particulière.  Si  les  lois  des
nations pouvaient  avoir,  comme celles  de  la  nature,  une  inflexibilité  que  jamais  aucune force
humaine  ne  put  vaincre,  la  dépendance  des  hommes  redeviendrait alors  celle  des  choses;  on
réunirait dans la république tous les avantages de l'état naturel à ceux de l'état civil; on joindrait à
la liberté qui maintient l'homme exempt de vices, la moralité qui l'élève a la vertu.76
As he wrote elsewhere:  "C'est à cet âge aussi que commence, dans l'habile maître, la véritable
fonction de l'observateur & du philosophe, qui sait l'art de sonder les cœurs en travaillant à les
former."77 The Contrat social has the législateur, Julie has Wolmar, and Émile has Rousseau the
tutor – heroes capable of protecting their pupils from corruption. However, the Second Discourse
is missing this ideal, and man's nature is corrupted because of it: "Like Émile at adolescence the
people needs instruction and examples. Interest brings men together, but to become all that they
might be as a people requires more."78 Unfortunately, the people of the Second Discourse receive
74 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 1466.
75 This was the stage Corsica was at, and Poland had moved beyond.
76 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 311.
77 Ibid., p. 511.
78 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. 170.
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not a father-figure but a deadbeat dad. Again, the "first lawgivers turn out to be not the virtuous
father-figures of Rousseau's later texts, but, more problematically, the selfish rich."79 It is from
this one tragedy – the triumph of particular wills  – that Rousseau deduces the rest  of man's
corruption in the Second Discourse.
Importantly,  the  timing  of  this  intervention  is  imperative.  Rousseau  makes  it  clear  a
number of times in his writings that  the people who the legislator can give laws to "must in
principle be in a primitive state where the memory of individual freedom is still strong, where
basic human virtues have not yet been supplanted by subservience."80 Rousseau makes this point
in a warning to would-be father-figures:
Si vous faites qu'en passant dans un nouvel âge les jeunes gens ne prennent point en mépris celui
qui l'a précédé; qu'en contractant de nouvelles habitudes ils n'abandonnent point les anciennes et
qu'ils aiment toujours à faire ce qui est bien, sans égard au temps où ils ont commencé, alors
seulement vous aurez sauvé votre ouvrage, et vous serez sûrs d'eux jusqu'à la fin de leurs jours; car
la révolution la plus à craindre est celle de l'âge sur lequel vous veillez maintenant.81
It is not until  this point that a guided education can begin. The evils of childhood are easily
remediable in comparison to those made after this point. Just as Solon made lawgiving difficult
for Theseus with his initial founding, the corrupted father-figures in the Second Discourse gave
constitutions to eighteenth century Europe.
This leads  to  the fourth stage of  the species-life:  society and maturity (or the age of
force). This is the section of the Second Discourse and Émile in which Rousseau discusses the
rights of kings, natural freedom, social contracts, and civil religion – topics which could not be
discussed, or even understood fully by the metaphorical individual, before this moment. This age
brings about the complete abandonment of the mother (nature) and prepares for the absence of
79 G. Gershenson, ‘The Rise and Fall of Species-Life Rousseau’s Critique of Liberalism’, European Journal of 
Political Theory 5.3 (2006), p. 298.
80 D.A. Wisner, The Cult of the Legislator in France 1750-1830: A Study in the Political Theology of the French 
Enlightenment. (Oxford, 1997), p. 54.
81 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 800. Note the similarity of the language (i.e. révolution) to the Second Discourse.
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the father-figure who, having prepared a person or people, exits.82 Of course, in the real world the
father  does  not  leave,  and  in  drawing  comparisons  to  the  family  as  the  basis  for  political
societies, Rousseau, like Locke, accepts that fathers  remain superior. However,  once  children
have achieved maturity the father remains superior to the family, not because of some natural
superiority,  but instead due to the children  accepting the father-figure's position.83 This is the
point of legitimization – it is here that the actions of the father or legislator are retroactively
approved (and thus completed). Again, Rousseau makes this point clear while using the corporate
metaphor in the Contrat social: "La famille est donc, si l'on veut, le premier modèle des sociétés
politiques: le chef est l'image du père, le peuple est l'image des enfants; et tous, étant nés égaux et
libres,  n'aliènent  leur  liberté  que  pour  leur  utilité."84 However,  in  the  Second Discourse, the
failure of the mature species-life was guaranteed as one sees in the final stage: old age.
Gershenson argues that the  Second Discourse diverges at  this  age – while other texts
"depict  courageous  resistance  to  the  onset  of  invertible  decay,  the  concluding  pages  of  the
Second Discourse imply something closer to the opposite. Corruption accelerates, and the species
does nothing to stop it."85 Gershenson also states that the "Second Discourse does not explicitly
liken the present age to an old age, but one can infer the metaphor."86 This seems forced, however
– especially when one recognizes that Rousseau did not think of his own time as l'âge d'or, but
diseased. Again, this divergence is caused by the lack of an ideal father-figure, something which
had made corruption and sickness inevitable.  Just as Machiavelli argued that some cities have
such a poor foundation they can never be made good, so to was the case in the Second Discourse.
82 G. Gershenson, ‘The Rise and Fall of Species-Life Rousseau’s Critique of Liberalism’, European Journal of 
Political Theory 5.3 (2006), p. 293.
83 H. Gildin, Rousseau’s Social Contract: The Design of the Argument (Chicago, 1983), p. 17.
84 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 352.
85 G. Gershenson, ‘The Rise and Fall of Species-Life Rousseau’s Critique of Liberalism’, European Journal of 
Political Theory 5.3 (2006), pp. 294–295.
86 Ibid., pp. 283–284.
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However,  in  Rousseau's  ideal  examples  – the  Contrat  social and  Émile –  this  is  the age of
wisdom, a time when the body politic begins to reflect the father-figure –  when imitation is
complete.
Although interesting in itself, this chronological narrative also allows one to understand
the relationship between the people and the législateur more precisely within Rousseau's system.
That  is  to  say,  there is  more to  Rousseau's  use of  the body-politic  metaphor than a  stylistic
choice; recognizing the connection between individuals and societies is necessary to understand
his political thought and the role of the législateur: "Il faut étudier la société par les hommes, et
les  hommes  par  la  société:  ceux  qui  voudront  traiter  séparément  la  politique  et  la  morale
n'entendront jamais rien à  aucune des deux."87 In addition to groups of individuals having a
metaphorical  unity,  Rousseau  believed  that  these  collective  multitudes  would  also  have  a
sentiment of common existence and a universal motivation which could allow for a corporate
body that was metaphysically, in addition to metaphorically, united. Let us turn to this topic.
The Législateur and the Peuple
If  one  can  see  the  role  of  the  législateur in  Rousseau's  metaphorical  argument,  it  is  in  the
metaphysical  argument  that  one can see the goal,  as well  as  an answer to  one of the prime
problems posed by Rousseau's  législateur: how does one encourage individuals to act morally
when they cannot recognize that it is in their interest to do so. As has already been demonstrated,
according to Rousseau: "[t]he principles of political right are only binding in character if one can
rely on widespread compliance with them by one's fellow citizens."88 To address this issue one
must once again look at its causes, and while it has been addressed from the perspective of reason
87 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 524.
88 H. Gildin, Rousseau’s Social Contract: The Design of the Argument (Chicago, 1983), p. 5.
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above,  with  the narrative of progress  it is possible to go one step further in recognizing why
reason fails to unite society.
While individuals in nature, during the era of "birth" and "infancy," need to worry only
about themselves, in society this self-interest becomes counterproductive. As Rousseau wrote: 
Tant que sa sensibilité reste bornée à son individu il n'y a rien de moral dans ses actions: ce n'est
que quand elle commence à s'étendre hors de lui qu'il prend d'abord les sentiments et ensuite les
notions du bien  et du mal  qui le  constituent véritablement  homme  et partie  intégrante de son
espèce.89 
This is the problem of amour-propre. In nature self-love (amour-de-soi) is satisfied by fulfilling
one's natural needs and simply maintaining one's existence – it is a good thing in itself with no
moral  component  (again,  justice does  not  exist  before laws). Amour-propre,  however,  is  that
which amour-de-soi mutates into when man enters society. Instead of requiring the simple needs
of nature  to be satisfied,  amour-propre  worries itself with comparisons between people. While
amour-de-soi is not bothered by another human's goods or actions so long as they have their own
goods and are able to survive, amour-propre begins to question why someone else should have
more of something, or not show deference. Thus, while one is concerned with individual and
inward-facing needs, the other faces outward and adds social needs and desires. It places oneself
above all others in an order of preference, and sees insult when others show the same preference
for themselves.
Again,  natural  laws are only awakened in man after  he exits  the state  of nature.  Yet
without  a  proper  education  to  encourage  the  realization  of these  laws,  passions  continue  to
control  individuals.  This  results,  in  the  best  case  scenario,  with  man  ignoring  natural  law's
existence  and continuing to chase personal desires,  or in a worst case scenario, with one using
these new found faculties for personal gain (i.e. the selfish rich in the Second Discourse). This is
why Rousseau saw little hope for the truly good political system emerging from a people on their
89 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 501.
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own. Instead, notions of natural law must be implemented from the outside before reason takes
hold, and in the Contrat social Rousseau argues that one method of adding this moral compulsion
is through religion.90 This method, however, is not a universal. It was just one tool which could
be used to achieve the true goal: to cause one to think about others in society in the same way one
thinks of oneself in nature; to impose a metaphysical shift that can overcome amour-propre.
Amour-propre, as a natural but uncivil sentiment, must be replaced with a socially moral
one. This is Rousseau's – and the  législateur's  – goal:  "C'est alors seulement que, la voix du
devoir  succédant  à l'impulsion physique et  le droit  à l'appétit,  l'homme,  qui jusque-là  n'avait
regardé que lui-même, se voit forcé d'agir sur d'autres principes, et de consulter sa raison avant
d'écouter, ses penchants."91 The aim is to have the social duty one has to the body-politic override
the natural duty one has to their own body, while at the same time the body-politics's duty must
be made general  and therefore,  look after every individual  equally (thus satisfying the natural
needs they forgo). A social individual's self-love can then be satisfied by making social  justice
not a concept but an instinct in man, allowing moral civility to become a new natural instinct that
overcomes particular interest. This is the metaphysical shift in man. As Rousseau wrote: "Nous
entrons enfin dans l'ordre moral: nous venons de faire un second pas d'homme."92
This is the only way, according to Rousseau, that the problems of rational choice can be
overcome:
Le précepte même d'agir avec autrui  comme nous voulons qu'on agisse avec nous n'a  de vrai
fondement que la conscience et le sentiment; car où est la raison précise d'agir, étant moi, comme
si j'étais un autre, surtout quand je suis moralement sûr de ne jamais me trouver dans le même cas
il  et qui me répondra qu'en suivant bien fidèlement cette maxime, j'obtiendrai qu'on la suive de
même avec moi? Le méchant tire avantage de la probité du juste et de sa propre injustice; il est
bien aise que tout le monde soit juste, excepté lui. Cet accord-là, quoi qu'on en dise, n'est pas fort
avantageux aux gens de bien. Mais quand la force d'une âme expansive m'identifie  avec mon
semblable,  et que je me sens pour ainsi dire en lui, c'est pour ne pas souffrir que je ne veux pas
qu'il souffre; je m'intéresse à lui pour l'amour de moi,  et la raison du précepte est dans la nature
90 Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, OC iii, pp. 285-286.
91 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 364.
92 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 522.
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elle-même qui m'inspire le désir de mon bien-être en quelque lieu que je me sente exister. D'où je
conclus qu'il n'est pas vrai que les préceptes de la loi naturelle soient fondés sur la raison seule, ils
ont une base plus solide et plus sûre. L'amour des hommes dérivé de l'amour de soi est le principe
de la justice humaine.93
It is in this way that one makes a singular whole out of the multiplicity, and thus creates a shared
general will – a singular and universal will of the body-politic which people could, if willing (or
if persuaded by the  législateur), place over their particular wills.94 Without  accomplishing this
citizens find themselves conflicted and in conflict – they are part of a society which they (should)
have an interest in, but they retain particular desires which are at odds with the greater good.
Therefore man must have his natural instincts – those which become harmful once they have left
nature – killed; only  in this way can this mixed morality be corrected. Again, in this way the
Contrat social can metaphysically in addition to metaphorically create a social individual with a
common identity as part of a collective body.95 This metaphysical unity relieves the problems of a
divided individual by recalibrating what an individual is; there would no longer be a citizen and
an  individual,  "but  an  undivided  self  […]  being  tormented  by  neither  amour-propre nor
oppression, [he] finds that his duty is also his inclination."96 As Rousseau explains:
Étendons l'amour-propre sur les autres êtres, nous le transformerons en vertu, et il n'y a point de
cœur  d'homme  dans  lequel  cette  vertu  n'ait  sa  racine.  Moins  l'objet  de  nos  soins  tient
immédiatement  à  nous-mêmes,  moins  l'illusion  de  l'intérêt  particulier  est  à  craindre,  plus  on
généralise cet intérêt, plus il devient équitable; et l'amour du genre humain n'est autre chose en
nous que l'amour de la justice.97
And this individual and public sentiment would be a recreation of natural man's sentiment:
L'homme naturel est tout pour lui; il est l'unité numérique, l'entier absolu, qui n'a de rapport qu'à
lui-même  ou  à  son  semblable.  L'homme  civil  n'est  qu'une  unité  fractionnaire  qui  tient  au
dénominateur,  et dont la valeur est  dans son rapport  avec l'entier,  qui  est  le corps  social.  Les
bonnes  institutions  sociales  sont  celles  qui  savent  le  mieux  dénaturer  l'homme,  lui  ôter  son
existence absolue pour lui en donner une relative,  et transporter le moi ans l'unité commune; en
sorte que chaque particulier ne se croie plus un, mais partie de l'unité, et ne soit plus sensible que
dans le tout.98
93 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 523.
94 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 381.
95 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 427.
96 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. 182.
97 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 547.
98 Ibid., p. 249.
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In this way,  man's reliance on others in society can be used to make society both  stronger and
legitimate; an intra-species  appreciation  could  be  instilled  through  awareness  of  a shared
weaknesses which could encourage people to become attached to one another.
This psychic unity, however, needs to be instilled by an outside force: "a people must be
given a character by the Legislator. It must be moulded for strength and survival."99 A people
need to be encouraged to take on the correct particular political nature for their own natural
condition – someone needs to "make men what they ought to be."100 Again, Rousseau's proposed
method  of  doing  this  is  to  use  sentiment  to  encourage  morality;  one  must  create personal
realizations within the population that  particular actions are good and necessary for their own
sake – this is also the method embraced by the likes of Numa, Lycurgus, and Moses – legislators
who communicated and convinced the multitude sans force and reasoning. And again, the actual
tool used in the Contrat social is religion: "Que répondre de solide [...] si l'on ne veut amener la
religion à l'aide de la morale, et faire intervenir immédiatement la volonté de Dieu pour lier la
société des hommes?"101 Religion is clearly a method which can be, and has been, used in polity
formation. However, the particulars involved in achieving these ends – the tactics and methods
Rousseau  imagined were  available  to  manipulate  amour-propre  correctly  – are  only  tacitly
addressed in the Contrat social. One needs to turn to Émile to find a more thorough description.
The Législateur as Rousseau
Having examined Rousseau's description of the legislator and its role in his political works, the
actual actions and techniques utilized need to be examined. One is able to decipher that the end
goal of legislating for a social group is to, without making recourse to rational arguments, create
99 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. 174.
100 P. Riley, ‘Rousseau’s General Will’, in P. Riley (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Rousseau (Cambridge, 2001), p. 
126.
101 Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, OC iii, p. 285; Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 383-384.
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political harmony through the instilment of a mutual identification as a people, and to encourage
them to continue to act virtuously in regard to each other at all times. This is where one of the
main problems facing  the legislator can be found: how does one achieve these ends without
making rational arguments? Although civil religion is mentioned in the Contrat social, Rousseau
is noticeably mute when it comes to detailing how this is achieved; he says very little as to what
this infamous philosophical character actually does.  However, one of the key sources available
on this topic is in fact not one of his politic writings at all. Instead, one needs to look to Rousseau
himself – that is, the character Rousseau that is drawn out in his nominal treatise on education,
Émile.  However,  to make this argument  one need first explain why  Émile  can be viewed as a
companion piece to the Contrat social, by highlighting how a number of the arguments which are
less-than-ideally rationally argued in the Contrat social are re-explored through a different genre,
and showing that Émile is a fable more akin to the tales or morality offered by Plutarch than an
actual  treatise  on  education.  A  brief  examination  of  Rousseau  himself  is  then offered,
highlighting why  one may draw this connection between him and the  législateur. This section
concludes with a comparison between Rousseau, as the character in Émile, and the législateur, as
described in the Contrat social, highlighting areas which may be used to come to understand the
législateur's task more fully.
On Émile and its Relationship to the Contrat social
Émile is a fable disguised as a philosophical treatise on education. Rousseau himself claims it is
the history of peoples who are thriving; a history which he complained did not exist.102 This
history is necessary, he explains, because: "L'histoire en général est défectueuse, en ce qu'elle ne
tient registre que de faits sensibles & marqués, qu'on peut fixer par des noms, des lieux, des
dates;  mais les causes lentes & progressives de ces faits,  lesquelles ne peuvent s'assigner de
102 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 526.
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même, restent toujours inconnues." Émile, therefore, offers the facts of man, nature, and of the
natural life process. It is an imitative history offering moral truth whereas others "n'expose que
l'homme public qui s'est arrangé pour être vu: elle ne le suit point dans sa maison, dans son
cabinet, dans sa famille, au milieu de ses amis; elle ne le peint que quand il représente: c'est bien
plus son habit que sa personne qu'elle peint."103 While a standard history fails to demonstrate the
great soul of the législateur,  and instead only the public acts and facts of legislation, Émile is a
history which depicts the "true" nature of the subject by focusing on the details of nature and
humanity rather than battles and political intrigue.
However, in making this claim, one is also stating that Émile is a lie of sorts (it is, after
all,  subtitled "ou  de  l'éducation"). This, however,  is a perfectly acceptable position to hold –
firstly, because Rousseau himself invites a questioning of the work. In a 1764 letter to Philibert
Cramer he wrote: "Vous dites très bien qu'il est impossible de faire un Émile. Mais je ne puis
croire que vous preniez le  Livre qui porte  ce nom pour un vrai  traitté  d'Education.  C'est  un
ouvrage assez philosophique Sur ce principe avancé par l'Auteur dans d'autres ecrits que l'homme
est naturellement bon."104 Secondly, Rousseau, in his Reveries, admits to creating lies and fables
in order to demonstrate truths.105 It was a technique he took from his literary hero Plutarch: "il est
si heureux dans le choix de ses traits, que souvent un mot, un sourire, un geste lui suffit pour
caractériser son héros." He likens this skill and task to painting a portrait, and in fact calls it the
true art of painting – subtle details, which although not historically factual, demonstrate truth and
humanity,  such as Hannibal telling jokes before battle, Alexander swallowing medicine without
103 Ibid., p. 530.
104 CC 3564, vol. xxi. He explains that his goal was to dismiss the argument that men are naturally evil, and to do 
this it was necessary to write a history of the human heart and identify the origin of vices. He argues that if one 
wants to "boucher" vices they must first begin by finding them, a claim reminiscent of Rousseau's warning to 
would-be-legislators in the Contrat social that they must, like an architect, know the ground they plan to build 
upon (Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 385).
105 Rousseau, Rêveries, OC i, p. 1033.
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complaint, and Philopoemen chopping wood in the kitchen of his host.106 This is also the method
Rousseau admitted to using in Julie,  arguing that it is irrelevant whether his epistolary novel is
fiction. The novels truths are found with one's heart; it is with the coeur that one reads Julie, not
the mind.107 It  is  in this  way that the "true" facts  of humanity  were to be glimpsed, and,  as
Rousseau demands of his student, in this way one is able to guide another person,  not through
rational  argument,  but  by  guiding  the  heart.108 The  upshot  of  this  method,  with  Émile  in
particular,  is that one should not expect Rousseau to produce 'reasonings' for his reader, just as
Émile's tutor would not do for his student (they are, after all, the same thing). There is no explicit
moral or formulaic system stated for us at the end of Émile; instead, he argues: "Ce qui me rend
plus affirmatif,  et, je crois, plus excusable de l'être, c'est qu'au lieu de me livrer à l'esprit de
système, je donne le moins qu'il est possible au raisonnement et ne me fie qu'à l'observation."109
Just as he gives Émile a copy of Fénelon's Telemachus to educate his student – as Fénelon did for
his own – Rousseau gives us a tale of a great man reminiscent of Plutarch's ancient heroes. It is in
witnessing these characters that one is able to come to understand the legislator and the art of
legislating in more detail.
In some ways this argument is made most apparent when one looks at  Émile's political
education  in  book  five.  This section appears strikingly familiar  to any reader of the  Contrat
social110 – it is, in fact, almost identical in content and structure with the exception of two key
aspects: he left out the sections on the legislator and civil religion.111 On page 413 one can see
106 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 531.
107 Rousseau, Julie, OC ii, p. 11. This is not a new way of reading Rousseau. In 1896 John Lord wrote: "Rousseau 
was a disguised seducer, a poisoner of the moral sentiments, a foe to what is most sacred; and he was the more 
dangerous from his irresistible eloquence. His sophistries in regard to political and social rights may be met by 
reason, but not his attacks on the heart, with his imaginary sorrows and joys, his painting of raptures which can 
never be found" (A.S.T. John Lord, Beacon Lights of History (New York, 1896), pp. 57–58). 
108 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 532.
109 Ibid., p. 550.
110 Rousseau himself admits that much of this section was taken from the Contrat social (Ibid., p. 842).
111 This omission is recognized by Bloom (J.-J. Rousseau, Emile: or, On education [New York, 1979], p. 494) and 
Gildin as well (H. Gildin, Rousseau’s Social Contract: The Design of the Argument [Chicago, 1983], p. 2).
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Rousseau skip from the discussion entitled "De La Loi" in the Contrat social (Book II, chapter
six) to a discussion on the appropriate size of cities (the subject of  chapter nine).112 That is, he
skips  chapter  seven  ("Du  Législateur") and  eight  ("Du  Peuple" – a  discussion  on  who  the
appropriate people to be given laws are). However, appearances can be deceiving and it could be
argued that these important sections, rather than being absent, are given more attention than any
of the others in Émile;  they are embodied in the characters of Rousseau and Émile. That is, the
rational argument for a législateur is substituted with a personification of this specific aspect of
his political philosophy.
To understand why this would be done, it first must be remembered how baffling the
législateur was (and is) as a concept. Although an essential aspect of Rousseau's argument in the
Contrat social,  it is given barely four pages – it is a character who is described as having no
relation to his peoples' nature, yet is able to know it thoroughly; someone who uses neither force
nor reason to create moral actions in others; a character who, without violence, is able encourage
right actions; someone who is able to persuade without convincing.113 While these arguments and
claims  are  certainly  not  un-Rousseauvian  in  nature,  they  differ  from  many  of  the  other
propositions in the  Contrat social, a book which at times goes to extremes to logically  (even
mathematically) demonstrate proofs.114 One conclusion which can be drawn from this seeming
incongruence  (that  is,  between  the  arguments  for  the  législateur and  other  concepts)  is  that
Rousseau was at a loss when it came to rationally demonstrating the need for, and legitimacy of,
the  législateur – something which should seem even more striking coming from a man who
conflated popular government and legitimate to mean the same thing.115 However, it should also
112 The paragraph on laws is directly followed by a discussion on populations and size (Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 
843).
113 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 381; 383-384.
114 Ibid., p. 396-398.
115 Rousseau, Économie politique, OC iii, pp. 247; 261.
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be noted that even if the législateur could be addressed rationally with ease, Rousseau would still
remain sceptical of doing so; as has been shown, "Rousseau denies that a rational calculation can
inspire  a  whole  people  to  comply  with  justice."116 Instead,  if  he  did  have  a  propositional
philosophy about the frailty of logic and reason in the face of legislation and the transmission of
morality, a treatise using this very system of philosophical reasoning (which would require a
critique of exactly this philosophical reasoning) was unlikely to be an ideal (or at the very least,
the only) format to disseminate it. In fact, the epigraph of the Contrat social itself can be read as
a critique of the possibility of the political project being proposed. 
On the title page of the book containing his presumed political ideals one finds a quote
from Virgil's  Aeneid:  "Fœderis  æquas Dicamus leges."  The quote  itself  comes  from Latinus
addressing Aeneas and his Trojan army after having defeated them. He tells the Trojans: "Let us
declare the fair laws of the compact" and offers them, rather than continued war and aggression, a
portion of his land to call their own and the opportunity to enter  into  a political union. This
statement may at first seem entirely fitting as an epigraph for Rousseau's own treatise on "fair
laws" and the social  "compact." However, in  Aeneid, the Trojans reject the offer.  A reasoned
argument has little chance of overcoming passions, and perhaps Rousseau expected a similar
response from his own audience – an expectation which seems to ring true; as Shklar pointed out:
"Rousseau realized with some bitterness, few readers were able to understand the Contrat social.
Its elusiveness has become notorious."117 
Rousseau-the-tutor,  then,  is  perhaps  a  character  which,  born  out  of  "untruthful  talk,"
represents "moral truths." Émile is a metaphor and parable offering lessons to those who would
want to encourage morality in society. The task of Rousseau-the-tutor and the  législateur are
116 C. Kelly, ‘"To Persuade without Convincing": The Language of Rousseau’s Legislator’, American Journal of 
Political Science 31.2 (1987), p. 321.
117 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. 165.
 118
similar in this way – that is, perhaps Rousseau himself is attempting to "persuade" his audience
without  "convincing"  them.  He  may  have  taken  recourse  to  engaging  with  his  reader  with
sentiments to create a sense of the "true," a truth which can only be discovered if one is able or
willing to "feel" them – like Rousseau argued Plutarch was able to do with his characters. That is,
he  may have  been  using some  other  form of  idea-transmission,  one  that  valued  force  over
clarity.118 However, this level of abstraction must be taken one step further: Rousseau-the-tutor,
like Raphael in Thomas More's Utopia, is on one hand a legislator without a people, and on the
other hand, a representation of the author and written with particular ends in mind.
More used his text to bemoan the problems facing contemporary political advisors as well
as to veil support for particular political programs (for example, religious toleration). Rousseau,
who sees no hope of,  or perhaps has no interest  in,  finding a  people to  legislate for,  and is
sceptical of reforms, is instead offering strictly theoretical arguments. He uses the tutor as an
abstract example of legislating both in the actions found in the book, as well as in the ends he had
hoped to bring about in the reader. That is to say, what is of interest to us is found not only in
what these characters know (of Utopia, in the case of Raphael, and how to educate, in the case of
Rousseau-the-tutor), but also in the authors' desired ends (to influence contemporary politics in
the case of More, and to encourage an understanding of morality through a novel method of idea
transmission in the case of Rousseau-the-author). Therefore, the character teaching Émile also
acts as, and perhaps embodies, Rousseau-the-author's own understanding of the task he has as a
teacher  for  the  reader  of  his  book.  Thus,  the  distinction  between  Rousseau-the-tutor  and
Rousseau-the-author begins to blur.
Again, in Émile Rousseau often points to the power of experience (imagined or real) as a
method  of  forming  his  student.  That  is,  persuasion  rather  than  education  as  a  non-rational
118 Rousseau, Langues, OC v, p. 392.
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technique to induce behaviour in a people which is deemed appropriate (by a tutor or législateur).
For example, when it comes to teaching a child about the dangers every human faces in daily life,
Rousseau wrote: 
Surtout n'allez pas lui dire tout cela froidement comme son catéchisme; qu'il voie, qu'il sente les
calamités humaines: ébranlez, effrayez son imagination des périls dont tout homme est sans cesse
environné; qu'il voie autour de lui tous ces abîmes, & qu'à vous les entendre décrire, il se presse
contre vous de peur d'y tomber.119
The point  being,  if  Rousseau thought  it  was  possible  to  use  imagination  to  create  emotions
through  identification  (with  pity  for  example),  and  this  method  was  ideal  for  his  imagined
student, would it not also be available to Rousseau-the-author.
The Tutor, the Législateur, and Rousseau
To begin  explaining  why  one may be  tempted  to  see  Rousseau  as  an  example  of  an  ideal
législateur, it is worth recalling what was written in the tales of ancient lawgivers: men, often of
noble families, who led extraordinary lives as children and young men, often growing up without
their parents and leaving home at a young age.  Well traveled and educated  in and by  foreign
cultures, these would-be heroes are often invited,  solely based upon reputation, to give laws to
foreign cities in periods of distress. They would use their great soul and a number of recurring
techniques (education, ceremonies, religion, games, art) to create the correct institutions for the
people they were presented with. As Rousseau wrote about Lycurgus:
Lycurgue entreprit d'instituer un peuple déjà dégradé par la servitude et par les vices qui en sont
l'effet. Il lui imposa un joug de fer, tel qu'aucun autre peuple n'en porta jamais un semblable; mais
il l'attacha, l'identifia pour ainsi dire à ce joug, en l'occupant toujours. Il lui montra sans cesse la
patrie dans ses lois, dans ses jeux, dans sa maison, dans ses amours, dans ses festins. Il ne lui laissa
pas un instant de relâche pour être à lui seul; et de cette continuelle contrainte, anoblie par son
objet, naquit en lui cet ardent amour de la patrie qui fut toujours la plus forte ou plutôt l'unique
passion des Spartiates, et qui en fit des êtres au-dessus de l'humanité.120
Similarily, the législateur in the Contrat social is an outsider, independent yet able to recognize
the nature of a people who he is not a part of, and disconnected from the success or failure of the
119 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 508.
120 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 957.
 120
laws  he  proposes.121 And  then,  Rousseau  himself: born  in  1712  into  Geneva's  upper-class,
Rousseau spent only a short time amongst the city's elite; it seems that the loss of his mother only
two  days  after  his  birth,  and  the  combination  of  the  financial  ineptitude  and  possible
politicization of his father, resulted in a change of fortunes.122 At the age of five, like Socrates in
The Republic,  Rousseau descended  from the fashionable hills  of Geneva to live amongst the
politically agitated artisans of the Saint Gervais district. His education at this point was formed
by the works of Plutarch, Grotius, and Ovid, and the spiritual guidance offered by the reformed
church. Like the ancient lawgivers, Rousseau was abandoned at a young age (ten), after which he
was  sent  to  live  with  a  pastor  outside  Geneva.  When  he  turned  thirteen  he  was  made  an
engraver's  apprentice,  which lasted three years before the abuse from his master became too
much and he fled Geneva. He spent the next ten years travelling and taking on whatever work he
could find (being employed as a servant, secretary, music instructor, tutor, and  ambassadorial
aid). By the time he was thirty he had lived in Piedmont,  Chambéry,  Montpellier, Lyon, Paris,
and Venice – travelling for the most part, like Theseus, on foot. His austere life and writings won
him a reputation worthy of the ancients: "So much so that certain court circles recommended that
he should be deported as a bad example. Detractors called him Diogenes; admirers, Socrates."123
When  he  fled  arrest  in  Paris  in  1762  his  reputation  was  only  further  enhanced  –  French
authorities postponed the production of a tragedy telling the tale of Socrates "because they feared
that  Paris  audiences  would  pounce  on  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  their  sympathy  for
Rousseau."124 What is more, Rousseau was invited, on three occasions, to intervene and aid in the
development of constitutions. It is not difficult to draw similarities between Rousseau and the
121 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 382.
122 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 31.
123 R.A. Leigh, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Myth of Antiquity’, in R.R. Bolgar (ed.), Classical Influences on 
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124 Ibid., p. 167.
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hero-founders he read about as a child, and it would hardly be surprising for the man who wrote
three autobiographical works and spent his entire life reading Plutarch's Lives to also recognize
these similarities in himself. It is not shocking, then, that Rousseau's prime personification of the
législateur would perhaps be seen in himself as the tutor in Émile.
To  develop this connection between the  législateur  and Rousseau-the-tutor  further, one
can look at  Christopher Kelly's description of the  législateur's task, and  note the similarities.
Kelly breaks the legislator's task into three parts: "First, he must understand the principles of
political right. Second, he must discover or invent institutions which embody these principles in a
manner that suits the conditions of a particular society. Finally, he must gain the consent of his
people  to  follow these  institutions."125 The  principles  of  political  right,  which,  again,  is  the
subtitle of the Contrat social, are akin to an understanding of natural law; they are the legitimate
and natural orders for a particular social group to be organized under.  The outcome of these
principles  is  the  recreation  of  nature  through the  metaphysical  transformation  of  individuals
outlined in the Contrat social: "[L]a simplicité de la nature jointe aux besoins de la société."126
Again, it is the ability to transform a group of individuals, and their particular egos, in such a way
as to have them recognize, in the collective body-politic, their goals and desires, and in this way
recast  amour-propre into  a  social  good.  The  problem highlighted  by Rousseau  (and  Kelly),
however,  is the rareness of someone having insights into these principles. Thus, point one is
simply stating that this person must be capable of knowing what needs to be known. As Rousseau
described  it  in  the  Contrat  social:  "Pour  découvrir  les  meilleures  règles  de  société  qui
conviennent aux nations, il faudrait une intelligence supérieure qui vît toutes les passions des
hommes, et qui n'en éprouvât aucune; qui n'eût aucun rapport avec notre nature, et qui la connût à
125 C. Kelly, ‘"To Persuade without Convincing": The Language of Rousseau’s Legislator’, American Journal of 
Political Science 31.2 (1987), p. 322.
126 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 391.
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fond."127
Who are the rare people able to recognize these principles and see their enactment as their
task?  In  the  ancient  world  these  great  individuals  are  the  heroic  founders.  In  the  Second
Discourse it  is the Socrates ("Quoiqu'il puisse appartenir à Socrate, et aux esprits de sa trempe,
d'acquérir  de la  vertu par  raison, il  y a longtemps que le genre humain ne serait  plus,  si  sa
conservation n'eût dépendu que des raisonnements de ceux qui le composent.")128 and in Émile it
is Rousseau-the-tutor: A character who, once again, has the archetypical mysterious heritage with
no relation to Émile, but is instead dropped in as an outsider with the task of raising the child. He
is  literally  the  figure  of  the  father,  the  outsider  who  initiates  the  social  contract  turning
individuals into a people, or a child into a man, and who has no relation to Émile's nature, yet
knows it thoroughly. Rousseau makes this explicit: "[C]'est moi qui suis le vrai père d'Émile, c'est
moi qui l'ai fait homme."129 And why does he do this? "Il n'y a que le plaisir de faire un heureux
qui puisse payer ce qu'il en coûte pour mettre un homme en état de le devenir."130 Or, as Rousseau
puts it in the Contrat social: "qui, dans le progrès des temps se ménageant une gloire éloignée,
pût travailler dans un siècle et jouir dans un autre."131
Although not founding a political regime  in Émile, Rousseau-the-tutor is arranging his
student's life in a similar manner; political right can be understood as natural right in this case,
and Rousseau-the-tutor needs to understand the nature of Émile so as to raise him in such a way
as to merge these natural principles with his unique constitution; "Quel est ce but? [C]'est celui
même de la nature."132 That is to say, in Émile one is not witnessing the education of the citizen of
the Contrat social (as has been argued by Shklar) but instead, the citizens of the Contrat social
127 Ibid., p. 381.
128 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, pp. 156-157.
129 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 765.
130 Ibid., p. 765.
131 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 381.
132 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 247.
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are meant to become Émile through their metaphysical transformation from natural individuals
into  the  natural  body-politic.  His  good  nature  would  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  correctly
constituted body-politic. This, then, is the end of the knowledge one needs to be the legislator,
and the first point in Kelly's description.
This leads to the second clause: the discovery or invention of methods which can be used
to impose these political rights. As Kelly points out, the legislator of the Contrat social already
"understands the principles of political right and the institutions which embody these principles,
but his people, 'a blind multitude,' lack knowledge of either."133 As seen elsewhere in Rousseau's
works, reason is useless in this situation, and the same is true in Émile: "De toutes les facultés de
l'homme, la raison, qui n'est, pour ainsi dire, qu'un composé de toutes les autres, est celle qui se
développe le  plus  difficilement  et  le  plus  tard;  et  c'est  de  celle-là  qu'on  veut  se  servir  pour
développer les premières!"134 He argues that  one should never  reason with their  pupil  in  the
attempt to instil virtues, instead, "[l]a première éducation doit donc être purement négative. Elle
consiste, non point à enseigner la vertu ni la vérité, mais à garantir le cœur du vice et l'esprit de
l'erreur."135 The goal, then, is not to give reasonable laws or arguments which a people or child
can  come  to  understand  as  being  good in  themselves  –  again,  it  is  "un  des  contresens  des
éducations communes, que, parlant d'abord aux enfants de leurs devoirs, jamais de leurs droits,
on commence par leur dire le contraire de ce qu'il faut, ce qu'ils ne sauraient entendre, et ce qui
ne peut les intéresser."136 It is this negative education which Rousseau focuses on – experiences
are constructed and tricks embraced to mould the child (or people) into the desired end. This is
the real art of the  législateur, and  these were  the many tools and tricks examined in the first
chapter  of  this  thesis.  The  imposition  of  classes,  politicizing  of  commerce,  the  use  of  art,
133 C. Kelly, ‘Rousseau’s Case for and against Heroes’, Polity 30.2 (1997), p. 322.
134 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 317.
135 Ibid., p. 323.
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ceremony, and games; these are all methods of transforming the public from a simple collective
into a society living according to a united political right. Examples of the actualization of these
methods are lacking in the Contrat social, but a number of examples are to be found in Émile and
the  artificial creation of "experiences" for his tutee; examples reminiscent of the actions of the
ancient lawgiver: "L'art du maître est de ne laisser jamais appesantir ses observations sur des
minuties qui ne tiennent à rien, mais de le rapprocher sans cesse des grandes relations qu'il doit
connaître un jour pour bien juger du bon et du mauvais ordre de la société civile."137 Every lesson
has an end that is planned: teachings on independence and suffering; overcoming the "caprices"
of a "petit tyran" and lessons on respecting others; on vanity and pride, and the use of shame to
overcome  them;  punishment,  sociability,  and  contracts;  on  censorship  and  self-sufficiency;
property and contracts; the value of money; the positive and negative aspects of art and the role
of public opinion138 – the goal of every one of these  lessons  is  clear: "C'est par ces moyens et
d'autres semblables que, durant le peu de temps que je fus avec lui, je vins à bout de lui faire faire
tout  ce  que  je  voulais  sans  lui  rien  prescrire,  sans  lui  rien  défendre,  sans  sermons,  sans
exhortations, sans l'ennuyer de leçons inutiles."139  
The ends of these lessons are not "true" in any logical or rational sense – they are quite
often developed around sophisticated lies involving planted characters and an ending which had
been known from the beginning. What is more, it is possible that the same method could be used
to create almost any type of individual. This is where method and the legislator's virtue come
together – to create the correct type of person requires the tutor or legislator to "understand the
principles of political right." The method alone is not enough – one must have "[l]a grande ame
du  Législateur" before  they can  "discover  or  invent  institutions  which  embody  these
137 Ibid., pp. 462-463.
138 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, pp. 366-367; 536-539; 333-334; 455-456; 331-332; 464; 456-457.
139 Ibid., pp. 368-369.
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principles."140 Or to put it another way, the first goal of the legislator is not to develop a legal
framework for a people to obey – the goal is to create a people capable of obeying it, and the
only way to finish this task is to "commencez par vous faire aimer, afin que chacun cherche à
vous complaire."141 It is only by doing this that one can succeed in satisfying Kelly's third clause:
"Finally, he must gain the consent of his people to follow these institutions." 
As  a people  are  unable  to  judge  for  themselves  while  being  educated  whether  an
education is good, legitimation cannot be given at the start. However, preparations can be made
to encourage acceptance, and thus, legitimation at some future date. As Rousseau wrote: "Notre
élève  n'avait  d'abord  que  des  sensations,  maintenant  il  a  des  idées:  il  ne  faisait  que  sentir,
maintenant il juge."142 It is through this manipulation, by creating these lessons, that legitimation
through acceptance is possible. This is made transparent in Émile, when near the end of the work
Rousseau asks his student:
Alors je lui dis: Eh bien! mon ami, vous vous souvenez du principal objet de nos voyages; vous
avez vu, vous avez observé: quel est enfin le résultat de vos observations? À quoi vous fixez-vous?
Ou je me suis trompé dans ma méthode, ou il doit me répondre à peu près ainsi:  'À quoi je me
fixe? à rester tel que vous m'avez fait être, et à n'ajouter volontairement aucune autre chaîne à celle
dont me chargent la nature et les lois.'143
In coming to understand this post-facto legitimization one must turn again to the Contrat social
and its  infamous opening: "L'homme est né libre,  et  partout il  est  dans les fers."  It  must be
remembered  that the goal  of the  Contrat  social was not to  remove these chains,  but  instead
discover "[q]u'est-ce qui peut le rendre légitime? Je croîs pouvoir résoudre cette question."144 In
Émile one sees this legitimization –  the student happily accepts the chains which  he had been
given. Of course, in some cases this is impossible.
140 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 384; C. Kelly, ‘"To Persuade without Convincing": The Language of 
Rousseau’s Legislator’, American Journal of Political Science 31.2 (1987), p. 322.
141 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 325.
142 Ibid., p. 481.
143 Ibid., p. 855.
144 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 351.
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Founding and Re-Founding in Rousseau's Philosophical Thought
The first chapter of this thesis identified a few "true" heroic founders (Moses, Lycurgus, Numa,
and  Socrates in Plato's  Republic) and contrasted  them with the less heroic re-founders (Solon,
and Kleinias  and  Megillus  in  Plato's  Laws).  Importantly,  this  distinction  is  also  made  by
Rousseau  –  and  perhaps  nowhere  more  clearly  than  in  the  chapter  directly  following  "Du
Législateur": "Du Peuple."  There he distinguishes between the people who should (or can) be
legislated  for,  and  those  who  cannot.  At  the  core  of  this  problem  is  his  understanding  of
"peuples." Rousseau wrote: "Les Peuples ainsi que  les hommes ne sont dociles que dans leur
jeunesse, ils deviennent incorrigibles en vieillissant; quand une fois les coutumes sont établies et
les préjugés enracinés, c'est une entreprise dangereuse et vaine de vouloir les réformer."145 The
point  being,  those  people  who  already  have  mœurs and  laws  are  not  capable  of  being  a
législateur's raw material, and lawgivers must be aware of this: 
Comme, avant d'élever un grand édifice, l'architecte observe et sonde le sol, pour voir s'il en peut
soutenir le poids, le sage instituteur ne commence pas par rédiger de bonnes loix en elles-mêmes,
mais il examine auparavant si le peuple auquel il les destine est propre à les supporter.146
Again, amongst his three ideal lawgivers there is no mention of reformers. This is because the
reforming of laws is a very different task. In fact, when working for a people who already have a
constitution and national  character,  Rousseau explains,  even the rare  man who is  capable of
legislation should be prepared to fail. Customs and prejudices are inherently linked to the laws of
a people; the constitution of a state is the morals imbued in a people when founded:
[Le constitution], la plus importante [loi] de toutes; qui ne se grave ni sur le marbre ni sur l'airain,
mais dans les cœurs des citoyens; qui fait la véritable constitution de l'État; qui prend tous les jours
de  nouvelles  forces;  qui,  lorsque  les  autres  lois  vieillissent  ou  s'éteignent,  les  ranime  ou  les
supplée, conserve un peuple dans l'esprit de son institution, et substitue insensiblement la force de
l'habitude à celle de l'autorité. Je parle des mœurs, des coutumes, et surtout de l'opinion; partie
inconnue à nos politiques, mais de laquelle dépend le succès de toutes les autres; partie dont le
grand Législateur s'occupe en secret, tandis qu'il parait se borner à des règlements particuliers qui
ne sont que le cintre de la voûte, dont les mœurs, plus lentes à naître, forment enfin l'inébranlable
145 Ibid., p. 385.
146 Ibid., pp. 384-385.
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Clef.147
A similar point is made in the Économie politique, where he writes: "l'autorité la plus absolue est
celle qui pénètre jusqu'à l'intérieur de l'homme, et ne s'exerce pas moins sur la volonté que sur les
actions. Il est certain que les peuples sont à la longue ce que le gouvernement les fait être."148 It is
the  legislator's  prime  task  to  unite  morality  with  the  will  of  a  people  through  the  laws  he
proposes. In taking this step, however, the original natural potential for sociability in man is lost.
This is Rousseau's point when he wrote:
Celui qui ose entreprendre d'instituer un peuple doit se sentir en état de changer, pour ainsi dire, la
nature humaine; de transformer chaque individu, qui par lui-même est un tout parfait et solitaire,
en partie d'un plus grand tout dont cet individu reçoive en quelque sorte sa vie et son être; d'altérer
la  constitution de l'homme pour la  renforcer;  de substituer  une existence partielle  et  morale à
l'existence physique et indépendante que nous avons reçue de la nature. Il faut, en un mot, qu'il ôte
à l'homme ses forces propres pour lui en donner qui lui soient étrangères et dont il ne puisse faire
usage sans le secours d'autrui. Plus ces forces naturelles sont mortes et anéanties, plus les acquises
sont grandes et durables, plus aussi l'institution est solide et parfaite.149
It is here that the danger of re-founding becomes clear: "Les opinions d'un peuple naissent de sa
constitution; quoique la loi ne réglé pas les mœurs, c'est la législation qui les fait naître; quand la
législation s'affaiblit les mœurs dégénèrent."150 This includes customs, as Rousseau makes clear
in his preface to Narcisse. There he argues that customs are the source of morality in a people,
and once they are modified or done away with there is no longer any moral constraint against a
people's passions,  only laws – and while laws may be a deterrent they can hardly be seen as  a
motivational force for morality. To do away with and replace the laws, customs, and mœurs of a
people is to destroy that which makes a multitude of individuals a singular people, and since the
natural independence all humans are born with is gone post-founding, the move is also an attack
on the very thing what makes one a social person. Thus, the would-be législateur who does try to
147 Ibid., p. 394. Rousseau does not only mean a state's constitution. That would be just one aspect of the law he is 
discussing. Rousseau also makes this point in his Confessions (OC i, p. 404) and the preface to Narcisse (OC ii, 
p. 969).
148 Rousseau, Économie politique, OC ii, p. 251.
149 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 381-382.
150 Ibid., p. 459.
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give new laws succeeds only in dominating a people under an alien will.151
To draw this out further, let us turn briefly to Melissa Lane's recent work on ancient laws
and the distinction she finds between Plutarch's Lycurgus, The Republic, and The Laws, and the
distinction between written and unwritten laws. She argues that in Lycurgus,  Plutarch places an
emphasis on the unwritten,  while Plato's Republic  fails to mention written laws, and The Laws
places  an emphasis on the written.152 She argues that this distinction can be understood in the
active reflection needed for an unwritten law – that is, it is necessary to reflect and internalize its
meaning and argument.  To be  a lawful  citizen  is  almost to  be a philosopher  and a lawgiver
oneself,  requiring reflection on the situation one is in and an understanding of the relation they
find themselves in with regard to laws before acting. On the other hand, memorization of what is
written  is passive, requiring little self-reflection and thus little moral compulsion.  While Lane
argues that this distinction, and the lack of written laws in Plutarch's  Lycurgus,  was a Platonic
move,  one can also see a pragmatic necessity for this from a Rousseauvian perspective. Sparta
was a city ready to be founded – the people were of the right metaphorical age to be given laws.
In The Republic  a similar situation is manufactured by founding a city populated by children –
that is, people literally and metaphorically the correct age. However, in the case of The Laws, the
Stranger was working with an established people. Although they were in the process of receiving
new laws, it was to a colony of adults with their own unique heritage. They were the incorrect
age, and thus a true founding was impossible. They were to be given a mnemonic tool – written
laws –  rather than a set of laws that would be part of them. That is to say, they had already
internalized one set of rules, and the cognitive dissonance facing them were they to be given a
new set, would, as Rousseau has argued, only lead to failure.
151 What is more, if one could simply rewrite a constitution, the original social pact would have no substance (Ibid., 
p. 360).
152 M. Lane, ‘Platonising the Spartan Politeia in Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus.’, in ‘Platonising the Spartan Politeia in
Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus.’, History of Political Ideas (, Institute of Historical Research, London, 2012).
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Again, the would-be citizen in Rousseau's Geneva Manuscript is without the intellectual
qualities to truly see what is good for himself, thus the législateur must find some other method
of encouraging sociability, those who have already been given laws and customs do not have the
inner strength to overcome themselves. This problem is highlighted by Rousseau: 
Aristote avait raison, mais il prenait l'effet pour la cause. Tout homme né dans l'esclavage naît pour
l'esclavage, rien n'est plus certain. Les esclaves perdent tout dans leurs fers, jusqu'au désir d'en
sortir; ils aiment leur servitude comme les compagnons d'Ulysse aimaient leur abrutissement.153 
This, then, raises the question: what is to be done with a people who need to be reformed?
On the one hand, Rousseau argues that to give them a new set of laws, a new social life, is to
enslave them.  Yet, on the other hand, they may already be enslaved by their former ways, and
unwilling to change. The answer, then, in some ways is nothing. The re-founder's task is to re-
form the political system. Instead of giving a people a constitution, this distinct character must
work with the already formed materials they have been given. The task is not to found laws for
this people, but witness what it is about that people that is essential  and good,  and use  these
qualities to re-found them. In  these circumstance  prudence is  the key  virtue. It is the quality
found in the great re-founder Solon,  and why, when asked whether he "had composed the best
possible laws for the Athenians," he responded by saying he had given them the "best that they
would endure."154 As Rousseau wrote, it is the virtue of the politician, not the hero.
These are  Rousseau's philosophic  and written  descriptions of the art of legislating. The
goal  of  this  thesis,  however, is  to  recognize  how  these ideas  can  be  compared  with  his
propositional  works. That is to say,  to  examine how Rousseau himself  acted when given the
chance to actualize his political thought and demonstrate that this interpretation of his system is
153 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 353. Rousseau is referring to Ulysses' crew, transformed into harmless 
beasts by Circe in The Odyssey. See also: Plutarch and W.W. Goodwin, Plutarch’s Morals [London, 1874], pp. 
218–233.
154 This was Solon's approach highlighted in chapter one – when asked whether he had given the best laws he 
responded: "The best they would receive."
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consistent with those actions. To do this one must begin by examining Geneva.
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Chapter IV: Founding and Re-Founding Geneva
Eighteenth-century  Geneva was  recognized  by contemporaries  as  a  modern  day exemplar  of
ancient republicanism; an intellectual hub of the Protestant world and the Athens of its time. Its
modest population produced a disproportionate number of scientists, scholars, jurists, doctors and
theologians – and they were found not  strictly amongst  the intellectual and political  classes;
Rousseau boasted: "Un horloger de Genève est un homme à présenter par tout; un horloger de
Paris n'est bon qu'à parler de montres."1 Like Rome, however, Geneva was also an independent
city-state and a republic which suffered from deep political fragmentation leading to one section
of the population seeing itself as heroic plebeians needing to fight for their political rights. It is
not surprising, then, to read that Geneva, and the founding of the Genevan Republic, was a topic
of great importance to Rousseau. Having said that, Geneva and the intellectual influence the city
had on Rousseau, is a debated topic in Rousseau scholarship. Some have argued, based largely on
his heterodox religious views,  that  he had abandoned the teachings of his childhood when he
abandoned the city itself.2 Some see the city as little more than a biographical factoid.3 While
others see Geneva as essential to understanding his political thought.4 It is necessary, therefore, to
explore some of these competing perspectives briefly.
Gaspard Vallette's Rousseau Genevois (1911) was amongst the last studies which treated
Geneva as a serious influence on Rousseau's thought before the topic disappeared as an area of
1 CC 743, vol. v.
2 See: B.R. Barber, ‘How Swiss Is Rousseau?’, Political Theory 13.4 (1985), pp. 475–95.
3 Hendel gives one of the chapters in his work the title "The Philosopher of Geneva," but, as has already been 
touched on, explicitly ignores both Rousseau's own life and experiences with the city. And as Rosenblatt 
highlighted, "the Dictionnaire des philosophes refers to Rousseau as a 'French writer, born in Geneva'" (H. 
Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva [Cambridge, 2007], p. 3).
4 F. Brunetiere wrote in 1898 that "pour bien entendre le Contrat social, il faut se souvenir que Rousseau est un 
plébéien, un protestant et enfin un Genevois. En concevant son système politique, il s'est inspiré de la 
Constitution genevoise, et même, en se la représentant d'une manière idéale, il se l'est représentée plus 
tyrannique encore qu'elle n'était." (Quoted in G. Vallette, Jean Jacques Rousseau Genevois [Geneva, 1911], p. 
xii).
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scholarship. The treatise  begins  by stating:  "Parmi les  grands écrivains  français,  la  première
originalité de Rousseau, et la plus essentielle, c'est de n'être pas Français, mais Genevois."5 At
one point he argues that: "Le Contrat social esquisse un système politique idéal de l'état, base sur
la constitution genevoise élargie et développée dans le sens des revendications théoriques de la
bourgeoisie."6 However, although he acknowledged the role of Geneva in Rousseau's thought, he
remained a "French" writer, albeit one who had been imbued with a Genevan flair: "Si Rousseau
resta toujours foncièrement genevois, il n'est pas rien que  Genevois. Il faut faire la part de la
Savoie  dans  la  formation  de  l'homme  et  la  part  de  Paris  dans  la  formation  de  l'écrivain."7
Rosenblatt argues that it  was  Spink's 1934 doctoral dissertation  which initiated  Rousseau and
Geneva's intellectual divorce by claiming that Rousseau had very little understanding of Geneva's
history  and  political  constitution  before writing  of  the  Contrat  social.8 Spink accepted  that
Rousseau's morality may have been born in Geneva, but  the  Contrat social  was his own and
incompatible. It should be noted, however, that Spink spoke of the Contrat social's relationship
with Geneva, and notes that Rousseau did discuss Geneva in the Lettres and Geneva.9 Others who
followed,  such  as  Hendel  and  Hall,  went  further  however,  and  explicitly  chose  to  avoid
Rousseau's relationship with Geneva.10 Hendel viewed the Contrat social as both independent of
the  city,  and containing the complete  form of  Rousseau's  political  thought.11 Robert  Derathé
accepted this thesis when arguing:
On a pu sans doute signaler quelques rapprochements entre la constitution de Genève et le Contrat
social,  mais  soutenir  que  l'une  a  servi  de  modèle  à  l'autre  est  une  vue simpliste  que  se  sont
empressés d'adopter les adversaires de Rousseau avec l'intention manifeste de diminuer par là la
portée de son œuvre politique. Car si Rousseau n'a écrit que d'après Genève et pour Genève, n'est-
5 Ibid., p. i.
6 Ibid., p. 184.
7 Ibid., p. 38.
8 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva [Cambridge, 2007], p. 4.
9 J.S. Spink, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et Genève (Paris, 1934), p. 87.
10 C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), pp. xiv–xv; J.C. Hall, Rousseau: An 
Introduction to his Political Philosophy (London, 1973), p. 8.
11 C.W. Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Indianapolis, 1962), p. 320; 330.
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il pas évident que le Contrat social n'a pas eu dans l'esprit de l'auteur, la portée universelle que ses
admirateurs veulent lui donner?12
Rosenblatt has highlighted the ways in which even Rousseau's biographers failed to recognize the
importance of the city, many of whom argued that the Geneva which Rousseau wrote about was
little more than an imagined  place, having "had the unfortunate consequence of appearing to
minimize the need for serious and scholarly treatment of the Genevan connection."13 As has
already  been  shown,  this  was  Cranston  and  Kirk's approach.14 And those  scholars  who  did
address the connection – such as Michel  Launay  (1971),  R. Fralin  (1978),  and Hilail  Gildin
(1983) – only gave it  a  tertiary glance,  or worse,  saw  this  history as having  had  a negative
influence, hindering Rousseau from being able to fully develop and express his own thought.15 In
fact, The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau contains only four indexed references to the city –
three fewer than Sparta.
That being said, there were those who did recognize the importance, such as Peter Gay in
his 1954 introduction to Ernst Cassirer's The Question of Jean Jacques Rousseau, which argues
that there is an important relationship between the struggles within Geneva and Rousseau's own
writings – although he tells his reader to look at Vallette and Spink for more detail.16 O'Mara's
1958 piece on "The petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau's thought" offers a useful  investigation
into  the  economic,  class,  and  political  situation  in  Rousseau's  own  neighbourhood  of  Saint
Gervais in the early eighteenth century.  Masters also highlighted the importance of examining
Rousseau's work on Geneva (as well as Corsica and Poland) and compare it with ideal political
12 R. Derathé, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps (Paris, 1988), p. 9.
13 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 6.
14 M. Cranston, Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754 (New York, 1983), 
p. 16; L. Kirk, ‘Genevan Republicanism’, in D. Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 
1649-1776 (Stanford, 1994), p. 288.
15 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 6–7.
16 P. Gay, ‘Introduction’, in E. Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Bloomington, 1963), p. 29. 
Cassirer himself does not mention the city. As Bruce Mazlish recently wrote, Cassirer's intellectual history was 
conceived philosophically, rather than historically (B. Mazlish, ‘Ernst Cassirer’s Enlightenment: An Exchange 
with Robert Wokler’, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 29 [2000], p. 349).
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thought  –  although  he  does  not  do so himself.17 Franco Venturi's  Utopia and Reform in the
Enlightenment  (1971), although not dedicated to the topic,  notes its importance,  and places the
city within Rousseau's propositional thought as a whole: 
It is useful to read the  Contrat social  with Geneva in mind. Of course one would not do so to
achieve an identification between Rousseau’s political vision and the reality of the city of Calvin,
but rather to see how a closer rapport between ideals and fact, between hopes and reality, was
being established. Naturally, it is even more interesting to read the Lettres écrites de la montagne
and  observe  how  Jean-Jacques  tried  to  interpret  and  solve  the  struggle  within  the  Genevan
republic.18
In more recent  decades there has been a push to  fully understand the historical context from
which Rousseau's thoughts were born, seen in works such as Helena Rosenblatt's 1997 Rousseau
and Geneva which aims to "illuminate the historical meaning of Rousseau's political works […]
using Geneva as an interpretive key."19 These also include Benjamin Barber's 1985 "How Swiss
was Rousseau?"20; Pamela Mason's two 1993 examinations of Geneva's Calvinist and republican
influence  on  Rousseau;  Richard  Whatmore's  2006  article  questioning  the  influence  of  the
Représentants on Rousseau's Lettres; Gabriella Silvestrini's 2007 article which offers a historical
study  "à la  lumière du  contexte  genevois,  afin  de  souligner  non  seulement  les  traits
indiscutablement  'genevois'  du  républicanisme  de  Rousseau,  mais  également  pour  marquer,
contre un contextualisme réducteur, les points où la pensée de Rousseau échappe à son contexte
genevois"21; and Robin Douglass' 2011 "Rousseau's Debt to Burlamaqui: The Ideal of Nature and
the Nature of Things" which, building on Rosenblatt, examines the influence Genevan natural
law theorist Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui held over Rousseau.22 Thus, there has been a recent move
towards understanding Rousseau's relationship to Geneva as "a framework for understanding his
17 R.D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 1976), pp. 410–411.
18 F. Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1970), p. 83.
19 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 2.
20 Although Barber argued that Rousseau was more "Swiss" than Genevan.
21 G. Silvestrini, ‘Le républicanisme de Rousseau mis en contexte: le cas de Genève’, Les Études philosophiques 
4.83 (2008), p. 520.
22 R. Douglass, ‘Rousseau’s Debt to Burlamaqui: The Ideal of Nature and the Nature of Things’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas 72.2 (2011), pp. 209–30.
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meaning."23 However,  the  conclusions  of  these  studies  have  not  always  been  compatible.
Amongst  those  who  have  turned  to  Geneva  as  an  "interpretive  key,"  there  are  at  least  two
identifiable approaches: those that  believe Rousseau developed a democratic republican system
with goals akin to, and in support of, Geneva's democratic agitators, the Représentants, and those
who argue that his writings were less partisan, and even perhaps oppositional in some ways to the
Représentants. Importantly, this diverging interpretation is not at all new – Venturi pointed to the
issue in 1971, and  O'Mara asked this very question in 1954: "Was Rousseau's influence really
exerted on behalf of democratic egalitarianism as the later Revolution would believe, or was it
essentially conservative and subtly in favor of an authoritarian Old Regime?"24 
In some sense, this chapter aims to answer this very question.25 To begin, however, it must
be noted that Rousseau was both influenced by, and involved with, Geneva. Along with Plutarch,
it is noted as being one of his prime political influences and his "model republic."26 The city and
its history  deeply impacted  his own political  thought.  However, it did not exist outside of his
political  system. The problem of founding and re-founding – of historical  realities and ideal
systems – existed for it, just as it will for Corsica and Poland. To demonstrate this, this chapter is
broken  into  two sections:  an  examination  of  the  history of  Geneva,  and  an  investigation  of
Rousseau's political writings for Geneva. The history briefly explores the rise of Geneva, while
highlighting the historical situations and conditions which made it particularly interesting for the
political theorist and citizen. This includes the roles of the city's lawgivers and founders, Bishop
23 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 7.
24 P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau’s thought’, ‐ Historian 20.2 
(1958), p. 149.
25 This section owes much to the works by, and debate between, Rosenblatt and Whatmore. Although the historical 
work by Rosenblatt is used heavily in the discussion, the conclusions which this thesis comes to are not the 
same. Instead, the position taken by Whatmore is accepted as being correct. However, this thesis places his work
into the larger analytical framework being developed in this thesis. That is to say, it moves beyond the confines 
of the influence of Geneva. In doing this, it highlights the areas in which Rousseau broke with Geneva's ruling 
classes and the Représentants.
26 D. Miller et al., The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford, 1991), p. 168.
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Fabri and John Calvin; the city's break with strict Calvinism, and the rise of natural law and doux
commerce; the political tensions between the city's labouring classes and aristocratic political
leaders;  and  Rousseau's  own  historical  relationship  with  the  city.  The  chapter  then  turns  to
Rousseau's own engagement with these issues  on a political level,  and  examines his proposed
solutions. In doing this, it divides Rousseau's thoughts on the city into three categories: Liberty,
Virtue, and Equality. In each subsection the debate between the Représentants and ruling classes
is examined, and Rousseau's particular and unique response is offered.  It concludes by arguing
that  Rousseau  suggest  to  the  Genevans  that  if  they  wanted  to  avoid  civil  war  and  being
swallowed  by  more  powerful  neighbours,  a  political  re-founding  was  necessary.  This  re-
founding,  however,  is  distinct  from  both  the  status-quo  and the  political  agitations  of  the
Représentants.
Geneva, History, and Rousseau
Geneva (121 BCE-1509 CE)
Historical records  for Geneva begin in 121 BCE when the Romans  began using  the region as
Northern Gaulish military post  and in 58 BCE it became Caesar's base of operations for the
Helvetii conquests. This initiated rapid growth with the settlement becoming a vicus in the first
century BCE, a civitas by the third century CE, and receiving its first bishop, Isaac, in the fourth.
With the fall of Rome the city became a sought after possession, exchanged between competing
sovereigns until 1162, when the bishop of Geneva was made "bishop-prince." This remained the
case until, in 1290, the House of Savoy successfully forced the Bishop, William of Conflans, to
legally recognize his position within Geneva, with the aid of the people of Geneva themselves.
With a level of prosperity owed to trade brought to the city by its four annual trade fairs (events
important enough for the Medici to open a branch of their bank there) the Genevan population
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had begun to look towards the Italian city-states as inspiration.27 An emancipation project led the
Genevans  to  recognize  the  House  of  Savoy  as  a  protector  in exchange  for  increased  and
legitimate political influence through the establishment of popular syndics. 
These four syndics were directly elected by the adult male population during an annual
general assembly and had power over communal affairs which did not encroach on ecclesiastical
territory.  This  time  of  quasi-independence  would  later  be  reflected  upon  fondly;  François
d'Ivernois wrote in the eighteenth century that: "Under the prelate's jurisdiction, the Genevese
already possessed many attributes of sovereignty; they elected their chiefs, enacted laws, granted
subsidies, contracted alliances and levied troops." However, this was not seen as the genesis of
Genevan independence – d'Ivernois continues by arguing that it  was only with "the prelate's
retreat [that] the rights of the city were further increased by those which were exercised by him
as a temporal prince, and the sovereignty of Geneva became complete and independent."28 This is
of particular importance because, although Calvin is often named as Geneva's lawgiver, it was in
fact Bishop Adhémar Fabri who made this possible.
Fabri ruled the city for only three years (1385-1388), and seems to have only visited it
once, but he left a lasting mark on the Genevan political landscape; one which made possible
Calvin's Reformation republic and played an important role in the civil strife of which Rousseau
was to become a part.29 Specifically, in 1387 Fabri presented the Libertés, franchises, immunités,
us et coutumes de la ville de Genève, a document which assured in perpetuity a level of popular
sovereignty and communal governing, and which came to be seen as Geneva's  magna carta
27 A.E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture (Hoboken, 1993), p. 86.
28 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell (London, 1784), p. 3.
29 Fabri shares a number of similarities with the lawgiver seen in chapter one: An outsider of mysterious heritage 
enters a city in a state of civil strife and orders its laws, touching on the common themes of trade, the use of 
religion, divides citizens into political classes. He attempted to ensure the laws remained supreme and left the 
city when done.
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(including by Rousseau).30 The document itself is seventy-nine articles  and can be divided into
three  sections:  public  justice  and the  judicial  system;31 economic  and trade  issues;32 and  the
powers which are divided between the community and the church. Articles 78 and 79 together
guaranteed that these rights never be repelled and that all officers of the city swear to them.
However, over the following century the House of Savoy continued to  make  political
claims, and in response, the people of Geneva continued to organize themselves.33 In addition to
elected syndics,  the  petit  conseil was established  in 1437, at  this time made up of twelve to
twenty-five members (of which the four syndics were included).  This body  acted as  assessors
during the syndics administration, and eventually managed tasks which were either not important
enough for  a  general  assembly or  needed to be  dealt  with in  haste.34 A second council  was
established  in  1457,  made  up of  "fifty  or  sixty"  elected  members,  and  quickly  began  work
checking the  Savoy's  power  by  seeking  protectors in their  Swiss  neighbours.35 The  duke
responded by invading Geneva, suspending the council, and executing instigators. The Genevans
found  themselves  split  between  the  Eiguenot confederate  party  and  the  Duke-supporting
Mammelukes until 1526 when a pro-independence council voted to break from Savoy and form a
treaty with Fribourg and Bern. In 1530 Geneva's Swiss allies sent an army to protect the city and
30 R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the Représentants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern 
Intellectual History 3.03 (2006), p. 410.
31 The rules and procedures in civil and criminal justice, measures for the city's security, guarantees against torture,
the right of property, the statement that syndics will be elected by, and made up of, "[l]es citoyens, bourgeois et 
jurés," and the guarantee that syndics have full authority and power over organizing the defences of the city.
32 Establishing the legal rules and regulations attached to certain professions, and the right to citizen consent to 
taxation.
33 In 1394 the House of Geneva's line ended and in 1401 the House of Savoy to purchased the title. In 1416 the 
emperor made Savoy an independent duchy.
34 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell (London, 1784), p. 7; A.E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the 
Shaping of Western Culture (Hoboken, 1993), p. 87.
35 Aligning with the Swiss was a decision forced upon the Genevans. Following a short lived economic alliance 
with Fribourg, the Duke had his son-in-law, Louis XI, banned French merchants from attending Genevan fairs, 
and rescheduled the Lyon fairs to coincide. The move paved the way for a treaty of combourgeoisie in 1519 with
Fribourg (A.E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture [Hoboken, 1993], p. 
87).
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forced the Duke to renounce any claim to Geneva, less Fribourg and Bern take his territory in
Vaud.
1526 also marked the beginning of the establishment of the Genevan political system as it
would, more or less, remain until the end of the eighteenth century.  In addition to the small
council  of  twenty-four  members,  and the council  of sixty,  the elected grand council  of  two-
hundred was established to replace the general council which, with the growth in population, had
become unwieldly. The general council was not disbanded, however its links to legislation were
cut and it became a method of electing the smaller councils. By the sixteenth century, however,
d'Ivernois tells us that: "the general council suffered itself to be deprived of the election of the
councellors, and it was decreed that the petty  and grand councils should be elected one by the
other […] that each may declare whom he will leave in office, and whom he will divest thereof ."
D'Ivernois  continues:  "In  effect,  they  began  expelling  only  those  who  had  committed  some
grievous fault, and ended in never excluding anyone." The result was a body with perpetual and
ultimate authority.36 In addition, the city established three classes of citizen: the  citoyens, who
were born in the city to citoyen parents; the bourgeois, foreigners who had obtained the right to
vote for, and be elected to, the council of sixty and two-hundred (but were unable to join the Petit
conseil); and the habitants, foreigners without legal right to vote, hold office, or carry weapons.
The children of the habitants who were born in Geneva (known as natifs, although not forming a
legal class of their own) were also left without political rights.37
During this period Geneva remained a part of the Roman Church – the importance being
political  independence  did  not  follow  the  Reformation.  In  fact,  it  was political  rather  than
spiritual considerations which played a major role in the Genevan Reformation.38 Specifically, in
36 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell (London, 1784), p. 8.
37 M. Piguet, ‘Natifs’, Berne (2007).
38 A.E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture (Hoboken, 1993), pp. 80–83; 
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1531 Zwinglian Bern and Catholic Fribourg called on Geneva to take part in the Reformation of
Zurich (and the Second War of Kappel), but on opposing sides. Tension continued to mount over
the subsequent years – in 1532 Lutheran pamphlets began to be distributed in Geneva by German
merchants,  and in 1533  Guillaume Farel (1489-1565)  arrived, leading to the  establishment of
reformed services. In May 1533 religious riots broke out  and  the  Bishop was forced to flee,
leading to demands from Fribourg that the Genevan council either stop Lutheran preaching in the
city, or end their treaty, and encouragement from Bern that they embrace the Reformation (and to
this end they sent Pierre Viret [1511-1571] to aid Farel in his mission). In response, and fearing
domestic  repercussions,  inaction  was the  council's  response.  Although  public  debates  were
organized, these resulted in street fights and riots; Catholics and Protestants in the 1530s replaced
the Mammelukes and Eiguenots of the 1520s, and by spring of the following year Fribourg ended
its treaty with Geneva, and with this, the last connection Geneva had to the Roman Church was
cut. Farel and his companions were able to push towards Protestantism more swiftly and in 1535
the Catholic mass was banned (for which the entire city was excommunicated and much of the
remaining Catholic clergy and supporters fled to Annecy). 
The final push came when the House of Savoy once again attempted to play a role  in
Genevan politics – this time as a defender of the faith. In response Geneva called for the aid of
Bern who saw the situation as an opportunity to seize Savoy land. In the aftermath Geneva found
herself financially ruined, needing to repay Bern  for her aid, make much needed repairs  to the
city's infrastructure, and hire an army of its own. Once again political circumstances encouraged
religious change as ecclesiastical property was seized to generate funds, and fines were imposed
on those (mostly Catholic) citizens who fled between 1534 and 1536. In addition, by officially
embracing the Reformation, evangelical sources of finance began to flow into the city. For these
90.
 141
reasons the Petit conseil turned to the general council and asked whether Geneva should abandon
Catholicism on 21 May 1536. The result was affirmative and Geneva officially announced itself
as reformed,  as well  as an independent republic.  However,  things were not  that simple – as
McGrath has noted, voting to create a church is far from establishing one.39
John Calvin (1509–1564)
Following the reformation the city had "lost most of the wealthiest and best-educated people in
town… [T]hose who supplied it with religious services [… and] almost all of its educators and
administrators of charity."40 Thus, to aid in his mission Farel invited Calvin to the city to help fill
Geneva's ecclesiastical hole.41 His initial position was that of "reader," tasked with educating the
populace in Reformation thought and the meaning of a protestant republic, but by the end of his
first year in Geneva he had been promoted to preacher and pastor.
Although during the initial stages of the Reformation the goal was simply to establish a
"church community" – that is a spiritually united polity that shared morals through a religious
education42 – by 1537 Farel felt he had made strong enough connections within the government
(all four syndics at the time were personal friends) that he presented the  Articles  concernant
l'organisation de l'église et du culte à Genève. Written by Calvin with Farel and the French ex-
Augustinian Elie Corauld, the  Articles are made up of four points: the first calls  for frequent
public  celebrations  of the Holy Supper (ideally every Sunday,  but  at  least  monthly)  and the
39 Ibid., pp. 94–95.
40 R.M. Kingdon, ‘The Calvinist Reformation in Geneva’, in R.P. Hsia (ed.), Cambridge History of Christianity 
(Cambridge, 2007), pp. 90–91.
41 Born in Noyon, France, on 10 July 1509, John Calvin's mother died after giving birth. He is reported to have 
been a precocious child, the censor of morals amongst his peers, and a dedicated student of the Church – 
characteristics which won him the favour of a family who sponsored his studies in Paris, which he began during 
a time of intense religious tension. From 1528 he studied law at the University of Orléans before moving to 
Bourges in 1530. During this time that Calvin became interested in humanist studies of the bible. These interests 
ultimately invited attacks from within France, and Calvin fled to Basle in 1534 where he wrote L'Institution de 
la religion Chrestienne.
42 A.E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture (Hoboken, 1993), p. 97.
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necessity  of  excommunication  "par  laquelle soient corrigés ceux qui  ne  se  veulent ranger
amiablement et en  toute obéissance à la sainte parole de Dieu." Importantly, and distinct from
other Swiss polities at the time, the right to excommunicate was to be held by the church, rather
than the council.  The second article called for public acts of devotion through the singing of
psalms  "afin que les cœurs de tous soient émus et incités à former pareilles  oraisons et rendre
pareilles louanges et grâces à Dieu d'une même affection."43 The third highlighted the necessity
of a public education  so as to  offer young Genevans the tools to understand their own beliefs.
The  fourth  was  a  set  of  rules  and  regulations  for  marriage  (to  correct  those  of  the  Roman
Church). These Articles  were accepted with few changes (the celebration of the Lord's Supper
was  cut  to  four  times  yearly).  This  gave the  reformers  the  confidence  to  continue  with  the
Instruction et confession de la foy  (1536).44 This document was to be Geneva's catechism and
confession of faith, but its strictness led many in the community to refuse it. However, following
the Articles, ministers were able to excommunicate those who refused. Outrage followed and the
civil authorities, ceding to public pressure, banished the two reformers on 23 April, 1538.
Calvin relocated to Strasbourg where he returned to studying, teaching, and bettering his
own skills as a reformer – a period which allowed for his self-confidence to flourish, and he came
to believe that he was chosen by God in his task.45 Importantly, while away a number of the
proposals he originally drafted for Geneva were accepted, although overall the Reformation came
to a halt.46 With this, public unity faded, religious confidence dissipated, and religious riots broke
out  once more.  Issues came to a head when Cardinal  Jacopo Sadolet (1477-1547), Bishop of
43 ‘Articles de 1537’, in J. Calvin, Calvin, homme d’Eglise (Geneva, 1971).
44 Authorship of the Confession de la foy is contested. Many attribute it to Calvin, but there are some who credit 
Farel (W.D. Greef, The writings of John Calvin: An Introductory Guide [Louisville, 2008], p. 109).
45 A. Ganoczy, ‘Calvin’s Life’, in D.K. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin (Cambridge, 
2004), pp. 14–15.
46 Including the public singing of psalms, compulsory instruction in the catechism, and restriction of commune to 
the faithful (A.E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture (Hoboken, 1993), 
p. 101; A. Ganoczy, ‘Calvin’s Life’, in D.K. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin 
[Cambridge, 2004], p. 15).
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Carpentras, wrote a letter to Geneva urging the city to return to Catholicism. Unable to come to a
meaningful conclusion themselves, the Genevans forwarded the letter to Calvin, asking for his
response – which he wrote with such persuasion that the council came to be convinced that,
although  the  imposition  of  public  morality  was  not  entirely  pleasing,  it  was  a  necessity  to
maintain political unity and independence. Calvin was invited back to continue his work.
Much has been written about Calvin's return and the political terror that he brought back
with  him,47 but  recent  scholarship  argues  that  the  contrary  is  more  likely;  upon  his  return
"Calvin's attitude may be described as sober and without illusions, but also without rancor or
revenge. He made it clear to the council that he wanted only to serve the common good, but to do
that it was necessary to achieve unity about a clearly formulated church order."48 It was only
through piecemeal changes towards the consolidation of religious power that political changes
began to take place. In fact, Calvin remained an habitant for a number of years after his return,
and therefore officially outside the political structure of Geneva (it was not until 1559 that he was
invited to  join the rank of  bourgeois).  It  was  only  through his  position as a  member of the
"Company of Pastors" (and its de facto leader) that he was able to interact with the councils.
That being said,  in1543 he was tasked, due to his legal background, with revising the
city's edicts (while working on this codification, it is reported, he had a copy of the Corpus Juris
Civilis in  one  hand, and scripture in the other).49 These laws defined the offices of the secular
47 A.E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture (Hoboken, 1993), pp. 105–106; 
109.
48 A. Ganoczy, ‘Calvin’s Life’, in D.K. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin (Cambridge, 
2004), p. 15; L. Kirk, ‘Genevan Republicanism’, in D. Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, liberty, and commercial 
society, 1649-1776 (Stanford, 1994), p. 272.
49 H. Höpfl, The Christian Polity of John Calvin (Cambridge, 1985), p. 6. Calvin's secular work is not entirely out 
of character. As a young man he studied the thought of Guillaume Budé (1467-1540), a man who Erasmus called
"the marvel of France" (C. Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy 1977 [Leiden, 1977], pp. 9–10). Budé's 
humanism "attempted to return to the pure foundations of Roman law unsullied by glosses, and inclined to see it 
as a crystallization, so to say, of the mores, institutions and wisdom of the ancients" (H. Höpfl, The Christian 
Polity of John Calvin [Cambridge, 1985], p. 6). This influenced Calvin's own work – he saw philosophy as a 
"matter of teaching men how to live by exercising the arts of persuasion" – a topic which relates directly to his 
first published work, a commentary of Seneca's De Clementia (Ibid., p. 9).
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government and became a type of civic constitution, and importantly, continued to enshrine the
power of the smaller councils.50 In addition, an edict in 1568 stated that before a council could
debate a government act it must have been first debated by its  superior council – meaning the
general council could not act without the other two councils  having done  the same first, thus
giving them veto over any potential issue the general council may have wished to raise. Finally,
revisions made in 1568 and 1570 gave judicial authority over criminal matters and the right to
raise taxes to the smaller councils. These edicts had the effect of both maintaining peace until the
late eighteenth century while also planting the seeds of the instability which would bring about
the end of Geneva's constitution.51
In  addition  to  his  civil  work,  Calvin  wrote  the  Ecclesiastical  Ordinances (1541) –  a
document which outlined the shape and powers of the Church of Geneva. Like the 1543 edicts, it
has been described as a constitution – although for the reformed church. The ordinances outline
the four church offices of pastors, doctors, elders and deacons, and instituted the Consistory, an
ecclesiastical  court  made up of  elders and pastors  which could,  if  necessary,  report  cases  of
extreme deviance to the council.52 Importantly, by making the church a quasi-judicial branch of
the Genevan political structure it became difficult to separate the ecclesiastical  from the civil –
even oaths of citizenship were a part of the confession of faith,  and Calvin had written in the
Institutes  that civil government was a divine institution  and thus  religious belief was linked to
50 R.M. Kingdon, ‘The Calvinist Reformation in Geneva’, in R.P. Hsia (ed.), Cambridge History of Christianity 
(Cambridge, 2007), p. 93. The four syndics, who were voted in by the general council, would come from a list of
eight potential candidates chosen by the smaller councils. The syndics would reconfirm or reject members of the
council of twenty-five (and those replaced would be chosen from a list submitted by the council of two 
hundred). The same process was followed for the council of two hundred (R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the 
Représentants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern Intellectual History 3.03 [2006], p. 
395).
51 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell (London, 1784), p. 15.
52 R.M. Kingdon, ‘The Calvinist Reformation in Geneva’, in R.P. Hsia (ed.), Cambridge History of Christianity 
(Cambridge, 2007), pp. 92–93.
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law.53 The upshot of this being public education became a necessity; if one could be executed for
expressing thoughts which were in opposition to the state-church's dogma – as Michael Servetus
was  in  1553  –  disseminating  this  dogma  to  the  population  was  vital.  To  this  end,  Calvin
developed a rigorous education system –  one which became both prized and a future point of
contention.54
In the  end the church  was more  than an  institution of  salvation – it  was part  of  the
government, and thus also played a role in political socialization and creating a united Genevan
identity. To this end Calvin established daily (or more) sermons, weekly catechism classes, bible
study groups, and theological debates. In 1559 it was made a legal requirement to be a member of
the  Calvinist  church  and  education  was  made  compulsory  from the  age  of  six.  The  church
became the  government's  public  voice,  giving  the  state  religious  legitimacy,  and the  church
political  legitimacy.  Religious and civil  identities became inherently linked – it  was through
sermons and prayers, discipline and sanctification, and collective memories of persecution, that
one became a strong citizen and a people.55 The Genevan identity had become not that of a group
of individuals, but as members of a common body.
Calvin as Lawgiver
Before touching on post-Calvin Geneva, it is important to address the makeup of the Genevan
"people" in a Rousseauvian sense. That is to say, it must be explained why Calvin is a founder
and not a re-founder. The answer comes from Rousseau himself: the Swiss were unique, and
Geneva was neither unified nor homogenous – but the collective memory of struggle was strong.
There was an influx of those fleeing religious prosecution in France mixing with a city whose
53 Calvin, Institutes, iv. xx. i (ed. Beveridge, pp. 651-652).
54 A. Ganoczy, ‘Calvin’s Life’, in D.K. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin (Cambridge, 
2004), p. 17. In addition to teaching Genevans themselves, these new academies attracted students from across 
Europe (Ibid., p. 19; G.W. Naphy, ‘Calvin’s Geneva’, in K.D. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John
Calvin [Cambridge, 2004], p. 35).
55 Calvin, Institutes, iv. i. iii (ed. Beveridge, pp 282-283).
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memories of struggle for independence were still fresh. Fear remained that independence could
be snatched  away at any point (and this was one of the reasons Calvin was viewed with such
suspicion). The city had a history of sectarianism: there was a split between supporters of the
Duke, the Bishop, and those in favour of independence; there had been the attempted coup d'etat
in  1540;  there were threats  of  invasion  from the  House  of  Savoy,  former  allies  such as  the
Bernese,  and  the  French;  there  was  a push  by  some  to  align  themselves  within  the  Swiss
confederacy;  and the natifs  and newcomers formed their own outsider class who were opposed
by a group who called themselves the Children of Geneva.  All  of this had taken  a toll  and,
importantly, made the Genevans special  in the same way civil war had made Sparta unique.56
Divided and with no common heritage – not even Christianity – it was not a case of re-founding
Geneva. That is not to say they were a blank-slate – as Rousseau wrote: "Quel peuple est donc
propre à la législation? Celui qui, se trouvant déjà lié par quelque union d'origine, d'intérêt ou de
convention, n'a point encore porté le vrai joug des lois; celui qui n'a ni coutumes, ni superstitions
bien enracinées."57 Calvin still developed institutions which suited a particular people and place,
and was aware that what he had done was appropriate only for Geneva – just as what Lycurgus
had done was appropriate for Sparta, Numa for Rome, and Moses for the Jews.58 In a 1552 letter
Calvin was  asked to  resolve  an  issue  raised  in  a  reformed  church  in  London  –  part  of  the
congregation  disagreed  with  a  teaching  because  Calvin  himself  had  disagreed  with  it.  His
response was not to "make an idol of me, and Jerusalem of Geneva."59 Calvin  did not  aim to
create a protestant identity, but a Genevan one.
There  are  a  number  of  ways in  which  Calvin  may  remind  one  of  the  genre  of  the
56 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 385.
57 Ibid., p. 390.
58 G.W. Naphy, ‘Calvin’s Geneva’, in K.D. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin (Cambridge, 
2004), p. 35.
59 Quoted in A. Pettegree, ‘The Spread of Calvin’s Thought’, in D.K. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
John Calvin (Cambridge, 2004), p. 207.
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lawgiver: Calvin himself was a foreigner and a Picardian, a people famed for being "intelligent,
logical, sensibly diligent, morally serious, and devoted to freedom and order – as well as overly
sensitive, self-confident, and irritable."60 He was well-travelled, highly educated (having studied
with a number of great thinkers), invited by the Genevans to give laws, and like many lawgivers
before him, initially reluctant.61 He was half  lawyer,  half  theologian,  as well  as a student of
rhetoric (like Solon and Lycurgus, he was aware of the power of emotion). He had a touch of the
divine about him, believing himself to be ordained by God in his position – something which
"calls to mind the fundamental experience of the Old Testament prophets and their extraordinary
commission for the renewal of the people according to the word and will of Yahweh"62 – and like
other Lawgivers, he faced initial opposition from those he attempted to legislate for. Once firmly
in power,  luxuries were banned, theatres closed, and public gatherings and ceremonies which
encouraged reformed teachings  were established.  He often turned to deception in  his  works;
misquoting or taking biblical passages and lessons out of context to make a point.63 Even at the
end of his life Calvin followed the path of the lawgiver; before dying he met with the community
of pastors and made them swear that they would not change anything he had done. His laws were
to be maintained for all time. Although he remained in Geneva until his death, he had no funeral
service and his place of burial remains unknown. In the end Calvin went beyond instituting a
reformed church – he worked towards structuring the entire city's traditions, morals, and laws –
and in doing this, he founded a new city.
60 A. Ganoczy, ‘Calvin’s Life’, in D.K. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin (Cambridge, 
2004), p. 3.
61 He, like Numa and Lycurgus, initially refused the position, and was only convinced by a divine argument (Farel 
argued that by not accepting, Calvin would be cursed by God) (Ibid., p. 10; A.E. McGrath, A Life of John 
Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture [Hoboken, 1993], pp. 95–96).
62 A. Ganoczy, ‘Calvin’s Life’, in D.K. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin (Cambridge, 
2004), p. 14.
63 A.E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture (Hoboken, 1993), pp. 96–97.
 148
Post-Calvin and Civil Struggle (1564–1712)
Calvin's Geneva was remarkably stable. The seventeenth century was a period political calm and
d'Ivernois  wrote  that  Calvinism was  to  thank  as  it  was  "favourable  to  power,  obedience  in
religious matters naturally disposed the people to obedience to their magistrates."64 With time,
however, religiosity began to soften. There was a movement away from the protestant obsession
with original sin and predestination as interests shifted towards a "greater concern for ethics," as
seen in the works of Jean La Placette (1639-1718) and Jacques Abbadie (1658-1727).65 The latter
developed a belief  in the goodness of man and the pitiable state of society,  claiming that to
discover this goodness it was necessary to retrace man's history and find him before sin.66 These
ideas were picked up by Benedict Picetet (1655-1724) and used to temper predestination, arguing
that  man is  free  to  act  morally,  and therefore,  it  is  his  duty to  try to  be  so.  Jean-Alphonse
Turrettini  (1671-1737)  and  Jacob  Vernet  (1698-1789)  took  these  ideas  further,  arguing  that
Christianity and reason conformed.  Vernet  wrote  that  morality was engraved in  man's  heart,
giving him a second compulsion on top of reason. All of these ideas may be familiar to the reader
of Rousseau, while also allowing one to make sense of d'Alembert's description of the city in the
Encyclopédie:
[P]lusieurs pasteurs de Genève n'ont d'autre religion qu'un socinianisme parfait,  rejetant tout ce
qu'on appelle  mystères,  et s'imaginant que le premier principe d'une religion véritable, est de ne
rien  proposer  à  croire  qui  heurte  la  raison:  aussi  quand  on  les  presse  sur  la  nécessité  de  la
révélation, ce dogme si essentiel du Christianisme, plusieurs y substituent le terme d'utilité, qui
leur parait plus doux: en cela s'ils ne sont pas orthodoxes, ils sont au - moins conséquents à leurs
principes… [L]a religion y est presque réduite à l'adoration d'un seul Dieu, du moins chez presque
tout ce qui n'est pas peuple: le respect pour J. C. et pour les Écritures, sont peut-être la seule chose
qui distingue d'un pur déisme le christianisme de Genève. Les ecclésiastiques font encore mieux à
Genève que d'être  tolérants; ils se renferment uniquement dans leurs fonctions, en donnant les
premiers aux citoyens l'exemple de la soumission aux lois.67
64 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell (London, 1784), p. 19.
65 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 12. Abbadie was an influence on Rousseau, and 
Masson claims a model for the Savoyard Vicar (P.-M. Masson, La religion de J.J. Rousseau: La formation 
religieuse de Rousseau [Paris, 1916], p. 108).
66 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 13–14.
67 J. le R. d’ Alembert, ‘Genève’, Chicago Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
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Emphasis  in  Geneva shifted  towards  ideas  of  "being"  Christian;  what  Cranston  describes  as
"austere,  virtuous,  candid,  industrious,  simple,  clean  and plain."68 Rosenblatt  has  argued that
these  "approaches  to  religion  were  widely  accepted,  and  became  those  propagated  by  the
establishment" and that "this anthropologically optimistic, 'reasonable,' and moralistic brand of
Calvinism was integral to the culture of eighteenth-century Geneva, and constituted a language
in  which  all  Genevans  were  brought  up."69 However,  as  religion  softened,  political  conflict
returned. 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century only 1,500 men out of 18,500 enjoyed full
political rights. And those who were neither  citoyens  nor  bourgeois  (i.e.,  natifs  and  habitants)
faced other injustices beyond being excluded from the political process – Geneva's moral laws
were less than universal in their application, being directed to "artisans and other people of low
condition", "middling people", or "people of quality" (that is,  luxuries were readily available to
the upper classes,  but restrictions were imposed on others).70 Class also prevented people from
taking up particular professions, and the lower classes were required to deposit money with the
hospital when they had children in case they "should produce children who might be a charge on
public  charity."71 In  addition,  d'Ivernois  pointed  to  the  influx  of  foreigners  as  one  of  the
"regenerating causes of the love of liberty" – having escaped from religious prosecution in their
previous homes they turned their "spirit of disqualification" towards new political interests.72
métiers vii (1757). According to Grimm, d'Alembert's article caused "beaucoup de bruit," and although it may 
have been possible to make these claims, they were not appreciated (D. Diderot and F.M. von Grimm, 
Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique de Grimm et de Diderot, depuis 1753 jusqu’en 1790, ii 
[Paris, 1829], p. 197).
68 M. Cranston, Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754 (New York, 1983), 
p. 27.
69 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 15; 17.
70 Ibid., pp. 18; 25–26.
71 L. Kirk, ‘Genevan Republicanism’, in D. Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1649-
1776 (Stanford, 1994), p. 273.
72 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell (London, 1784), pp. 22–23.
 150
Even those who had access to the General Council began to question its legitimacy. It did
little beyond confirming pre-approved syndics chosen by the petit conseil, which had become a
quasi-oligarchical institution with the same families being "elected" time and again.73 This was
also  true  of  the  larger  councils  –  by 1734,  the  council  of  two hundred represented  only 94
families.74 What is more, as there was no birth requirement for the company of pastors or general
council many citoyens and, ironically, natifs viewed the city as being increasingly foreign-run (by
the  early  eighteenth-century  around  one  thousand  of  the  general  council's  members  were
bourgeois, while there were only three to four hundred citoyens).75
Interestingly,  this  political  turmoil  was not a class struggle,  but a push for egalitarian
principles which would allow the less well-off to imitate the upper echelon. At the time it was not
unusual for craftsmen and shopkeepers to be involved in capital investment, accumulate libraries,
or buy small landed estates – all "in avid imitation of the cultural pattern of the patrician upper
bourgeoisie."76 Damrosch reports that the "artisan class was particularly proud of its intellectual
abilities" and mentions reports from William Coxe  (1747-1828)  and John Moore  (1729-1802),
with the former claiming that "[e]ven the lower class of people are exceedingly well informed,
and there is perhaps no city in Europe where learning is more universally diffused," and the latter
commenting  that  "Genevan  workmen  were  fond  of  reading  the  works  of  Locke  and
Montesquieu."77 This combination of  a declining importance or Calvinism, the growth of  class
imitation,  and  the dissemination  of knowledge,  resulted in what O'Mara has called the great
paradox of  the golden age of  Geneva:  "spiritual  malaise  in  the  midst  of  increasing material
73 L. Mottu-Weber, ‘Genève (canton)’, Berne Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse (2011).
74 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 18.
75 P.A. Mason, ‘The Genevan republican background to Rousseaus Social Contract’, History of Political Thought 
14.4 (1993), p. 554.
76 P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau’s thought’, ‐ Historian 20.2 
(1958), p. 131.
77 L. Damrosch, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Restless Genius (Boston, 2005), p. 14.
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security, social discord in the midst of social advancement."78 This set the stage for what would
come to be a century of revolt. 
One of the key areas of protestation was the lack of political power found in the General
Council. From the perspective of the bourgeois, they were entitled to a number of powers which
were enshrined in Fabri's Franchises. In particular, they argued that the document guaranteed the
free election of syndics and the right to consent to taxation.79 They felt that the small councils
needed to have their powers restrained and sovereignty returned to the people (as embodied in
the grand council). In 1707 an attack was led by Pierre Fatio (1662-1707), a lawyer who was
himself a member of the council of two-hundred. He helped draft a set of demands in support of
the bourgeois which called for a limit on family members in the smaller councils, a revision of
the legal code, and for voting in the General Council to be counted by secret ballot.80 The syndic
Jean-Robert Chouet (1639-1720) argued that the general council was indeed sovereign, but the
citizens  of  Geneva "had ceded the  'exercise'  of  their  sovereignty to  the  restrictive  councils"
arguing that "the people knew it could not safely use the sovereign power."81 Fatio responded by
arguing that "'chimerical and metaphysical' sovereignty, for 'a sovereign who never performs an
act of sovereignty is an imaginary being'" and that, rather than giving the power to make laws to
the small councils, the general council had "ceded the 'administration of public and particular
affairs.'  This, he claimed, was 'a revocable deposit.'"82 The agitators asked the magistrates  to
prove – with historical records – that they had the right to sovereign power and that the people
78 P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau’s thought’, ‐ Historian 20.2 
(1958), p. 132.
79 Ibid., p. 137. The magistrates argued that the General Council had given the right to taxation in the 1570 edict 
(H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva [Cambridge, 2007], p. 110).
80 L. Kirk, ‘Genevan Republicanism’, in D. Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1649-
1776 (Stanford, 1994), p. 275.
81 P.A. Mason, ‘The Genevan republican background to Rousseaus Social Contract’, History of Political Thought 
14.4 (1993), p. 556. Chouet went further, claiming frequent assemblies would create unnecessary division and 
distract from commerce (H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva [Cambridge, 2007], p. 102).
82 P.A. Mason, ‘The Genevan republican background to Rousseaus Social Contract’, History of Political Thought 
14.4 (1993), p. 556; H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 104.
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had  "confided  its  exercise  to  the  small  councils."  Unable  to  easily  resolve  the  issue,  the
magistrates called upon Bern and Zurich – a move which resulted in  riots,  violence, and the
defeat and execution of the worst of the agitators (including Fatio).  This was followed in 1712
with the suspension of the yearly general council meetings, and a move to have the church preach
lessons of submission and obedience to the laws of the state.83
Debate returned in 1718 when the two Lettres Anonymes were published (assumed now to
have been penned by Pastor Antoine Leger [1652-1719]).84 The first letter argued, using natural
law  (the  magistrates  philosophical  language of  choice),  that denying  the  right  of  refusal  of
taxation  was  an  act  of  tyranny.  The  author  also  proposed  the  transformation  of  the  general
council  into the deliberative and executive body of Geneva and for the independence of the
church in its public role as teacher, decrying the encroachment of the small councils in this area.
The second letter demanded that all issues of taxation and defence be deliberated in the general
council. Although the level of conflict did not reach the same pitch as 1707 (Kirk argues that
"pragmatic money-making" held the day),85 it formed a plan of action which would become the
template for future agitators. 
In the 1720s  the small councils began planning for an upgraded defence system. When
these  plans  were  criticized for  being  too small  and too expensive  by aristocrat  and military
engineer  Jacques-Barthélemy Micheli du Crest (1690-1766) the councils asked him to put his
thoughts in writing. In 1728 he had fifty copies of his critique published, for which the small
council  banished  him from Geneva for  sharing  military  secrets.86 Again,  it  was  argued  that
83 L. Kirk, ‘Genevan Republicanism’, in D. Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1649-
1776 (Stanford, 1994), pp. 276; 279.
84 P.A. Mason, ‘The Genevan republican background to Rousseaus Social Contract’, History of Political Thought 
14.4 (1993), p. 558.
85 L. Kirk, ‘Genevan Republicanism’, in D. Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1649-
1776 (Stanford, 1994), p. 281.
86 Ibid., p. 281.
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taxation and matters of defence were being addressed without the consent of the general council,
while a new issue was added: the legality of the council of two hundred banishing Micheli.87
Although banished and never to return,  Micheli continued to agitate from afar and earned an
important  following  (some  of  whom,  such  as  Toussaint  Pierre  Lenieps  [1661-1741],  would
become close friends of Rousseau). His writings sparked a new wave of intellectual debate and a
period of dramatic agitation – Rosenblatt has shown that a proliferation of "political pamphlets,
journals, letters, and other texts testify the fact the heated debates were taking place on a wide
range of issues and many Genevans were ill at ease with the direction in which their city was
evolving."88 Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) stepped in, using traditional critiques of democracy to
dismiss the General Council as a group of ignorant trouble makers who were easily manipulated.
He  went  on  to  argue  that  Geneva  had a  mixed  political  system:  democracy  tempered  by
aristocracy. Not everyone was convinced by Barbeyrac, however, and Micheli and his ilk turned
away from natural law theory and began to study "without respite all the ancient Greek and Latin
authors  and  even  the  Bible,  in  order  to  disentangle  from them  the  real  principles  of  civil
government" – in particular Cicero, Plutarch, Livy, and, although not an ancient, Machiavelli.89 It
is from this new intellectual movement that, in 1734, the Représentants emerged.
A representation was  a  formal  list  of  grievances  submitted  to  the  magistrates  which
highlighted areas of contention which the  Représentants wanted to be officially addressed.90 In
response to this remonstration the magistrates, emphasizing lessons from natural law and social
contract theory, made note of the threat posed by the general council (or any group) attempting to
87 Micheli himself was not a democrat, but saw the council as an important check (R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and 
the Representants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern Intellectual History 3.03 
[2006], p. 397).
88 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 8.
89 Ibid., p. 130; 142.
90 Authorship of the representation has been given to Michel Leger, son of Antoine, author of the anonymous 
letters.
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change  Geneva's  agreed  upon  social  contract.  Responses  were  formed  by  Jean-Jacques
Burlamaqui (1694-1748), Pierre Mussard (1702-1789), and Jacob de Chapeaurouge (1669-1744),
who denied that the bourgeois were pushing for a restoration of historical rights, but instead that
their  claims were an invention and, again,  an attempt to overturn the constitutional edicts of
1568. In response, exiled Micheli put his research in classical republicans to use and attacked the
magistrates  claim  that  the  edicts  of  1568  were  the  basis  of  Geneva's  social  contract  and
constitution, arguing that surely a constitution existed before this date – just as Geneva had. He
went on to argue that liberty cannot exist without sovereignty, that it was the General Council's
right to appoint ministers, and finally, he embraced Machiavelli and argued that republics need to
take periodic steps back to their original formation – in this case, to a time before the edicts.91
Things escalated further and the bourgeois became suspicious of the magistrates' control
of the city's mercenaries,  while  the magistrates were unsure of the  citizen  militias – there was
fear on both sides of civil war breaking out, with a number of close calls in the 1730s (including
one such occasion, 21 August 1737, in which Rousseau was visiting Geneva, allowing him to
witness  his  patria's  instability  first-hand  when  eleven  people,  including  the  captain  of  the
mercenaries,  were  killed).92 The  fear  of the  seemingly inevitable  outbreak of  conflict  led  to
France, Bern, and Zurich being invited to act as mediators, the result of which was the Règlement
de l'Illustre Médiation Pour La Pacification Des Troubles de La République de Genève (1738).
The document was initially seen as acceptable by both sides (although Micheli continued
his campaign, claiming the Mediation had overthrown Geneva's constitution). From the General
Council's perspective it confirmed much of what it had demanded: that the general council was
sovereign  and that it had the right to agree to or reject proposed laws  (in whole or part); the
91 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 133–135; 142–144; 146.
92 Rousseau, Confessions, OC i, p. 216.
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proposed four syndics; prices for wine; tax rates; subsidies; treaties with foreign governments;
declarations of war and peace; and changes to the city's fortifications. Articles three, seven, and
ten guaranteed the rights of the citizens and bourgeois to make representations, and limited the
number of members of the same family in the small council. On the other hand, the very first
article perpetually enshrined the legitimacy of the five-part government (i.e.,  the syndics, the
smaller councils, and the General Council),  making the General Council only one part of the
governing order rather than the smaller councils derivatives.  What is more, article six limited
what could be taken to the general council to that which had already been seen, and passed, by
the smaller councils – this became known as the  droit negatif – and the General Council was
limited to having these votes only when it was called by the smaller councils. Finally, elections to
smaller councils were to "continuera de se faire comme par le passé,  &  suivant les Edits."93
Nonetheless, a majority of the bourgeois accepted the mediation and Geneva remained in relative
peace until the 1750s when, once again, problems surfaced. Importantly though, this next round
of debates included Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Geneva and Rousseau (1712-1778)
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born in 1712 to an aristocrat mother (Suzanne Bernard [1673-1712])
and artisan father (Isaac Rousseau  [1672-1747]) – both of  whom were citizens. Rousseau was
literally born into the upper echelon of society – the hills climbing away from Lake Geneva
where the wealthy and powerful made their homes. However, following the death of his mother,
and the apparent financial ineptitude of his father, Rousseau's fortunes changed. At the age of five
his family was forced to descend and live amongst the artisans of the St Gervais district. 
Rousseau  reports  that  his  own  education  began  by reading  ancient  classics  with  his
93 Reglement de l’illustre mediation pour la pacification des troubles de la republique de Geneve (Geneva, 1738).
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father.94 The impact of the ancients cannot be glossed over – while much has been made in recent
scholarship  of  Rousseau's  connection  to  Geneva,  less  has  been  said  of  his,  and  Geneva's,
connection to the ancients.  Jacques-Henri  Bernardin de Saint-Pierre  (1737-1814)  wrote of that
time: 
[I]l n'y avait pas à Genève un citoyen bien élevé qui ne sût son Plutarque par cœur. Rousseau m'a
dit qu'il a été un temps où il connaissait mieux les rues d'Athènes que celle de Genève. Les jeunes
gens ne parlaient dans leurs conversations que de législation, des moyens d'établir ou de réformer
la société.95 
Rousseau himself  wrote  that  he  was  introduced to  the  ancient  lawgivers  as  a  child  through
Plutarch, and "[a] Six Ans Plutarque me tomba Sous La main, à huit je Le Savais par Cœur" and
"A douze ans, j'étais un Romain."96 He wrote in his Confessions:
Sans cesse occupé de Rome et d'Athènes, vivant pour ainsi dire avec leurs grands hommes, né
moi-même Citoyen d'une République, et fils d'un père dont l'amour de la patrie était la plus forte
passion,  je  m'en  enflammais  à  son  exemple,  je  me  croyais  Grec  ou  Romain;  je  devenais  le
personnage dont je lisais la vie: le récit des traits de constance et d'intrépidité qui m'avaient frappé
me rendait  les yeux étincelants et  la voix forte.  Un jour que je racontais à table l'aventure de
Scevola, on fut effrayé de me voir avancer et tenir la main sur un réchaud pour représenter son
action.97
Although Rousseau's formal education was less than robust, he emphasized the strength of his
republican  schooling in a letter to Tronchin: "J'y ai  reçu cette éducation publique, non pas une
institution formelle, mais par des traditions et des maximes qui, se transmettant d'âge en age,
donnaient de bonne heure à la jeunesse les lumières qui lui conviennent, et les sentiments qu'elle
doit avoir."98 Even the event which resulted in his father fleeing Geneva –  the  striking  of  an
aristocrat who Isaac had felt disrespected by – was seen by Rousseau through a republican lens,
arguing that his father would rather leave the city, remaining abroad for the rest of his life, than
94 L. Damrosch, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Restless Genius (Boston, 2005), p. 16.
95 J.-H.-B. de Saint-Pierre, Œuvres comlètes de Jacques-Henri-Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, mises en ordre et 
précédées de la vie de l’auteur, ii (Brussels, 1820), p. 31. Note the distinction between "moyens d'établir ou de 
reformer."
96 CC 1633, vol. v.
97 Rousseau, Confessions, OC i, p. 9.
98 CC 743, vol. v.
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forgo his  liberty and honour.99 It  was  not  simply  a  literary imagination  which  spawned this
worldview, however.
There has been disagreement as to how much the young Rousseau was aware of Geneva's
political tensions. Being born after the 1708 settlement and leaving before the 1730s led Cranston
to argue that "Rousseau grew up at a period of political peace […] and in his recollections of his
childhood, he speaks of nothing but patriotic harmony prevailing in Geneva."100 Similarly, Linda
Kirk argued that Rousseau "had run away from Geneva without learning anything more of its
politics  than  the  idealized  republican  myth  fed  to  him  by  his  father."101 This  may  be  an
overstatement,  however;  if  Rousseau's  father  did indeed have "idealized  republican"  feelings
towards his patria, it is unlikely he would have been ignorant of the political tensions lying just
beneath the surface. In fact, Rosenblatt has argued that Isaac's move Saint Gervais, rather than
being strictly  a  financial necessity, was also politically motivated. Isaac had been absent from
Geneva during the 1705 to 1711 conflict – a period during which Isaac's father, David Rousseau,
acted as spokesman for the movement,  a  position which cost  him  official  office.  It  was this
absence which may have pushed Isaac to Saint Gervais – "the driving force behind the political
opposition at this time."102 The quartier in 1717 (the year Rousseau relocated) was the centre of
political tension and discussion leading to the publishing of the 1718 Lettres anonymes. Rousseau
himself claimed that "men talked of nothing in their conversations but legislation, the means of
establishing or reforming societies,"103 a claim not difficult to believe, as the homes surrounding
Rousseau's own were occupied by a who's-who of Genevan political agitation:
99 Rousseau, Confessions, OC i, p. 12.
100 M. Cranston, Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754 (New York, 1983), 
p. 16.
101 L. Kirk, ‘Genevan Republicanism’, in D. Wootton (ed.), Republicanism, liberty, and commercial society, 1649-
1776 (Stanford, 1994), p. 288.
102 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 31–32; 10.
103 P.A. Mason, ‘The Genevan republican background to Rousseaus Social Contract’, History of Political Thought 
14.4 (1993), p. 561.
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Abraham Cassin,  Jean  Pernessin,  Guillaume Dufour,  Isaac  Soret,  Antoine  Mussard,  and  Paul
Argand, all of them important spokesmen or participants in the political movements of 1718 and
1734… Claude Thommegueux, active in the popular tumults of 1707 and brother of the Franqois
Thommegueux who was exiled for his violent activities in that same year… Sebastien and Fransois
Mestral, nephews of Suzanne Mestral, one of the fiery revolutionary spirits among the women of
the quarter, imprisoned in 1707.104
And the Rousseaus were physically in the heart of Genevan politics: Francois Terroux, the owner
and cohabiter of the apartment the Rousseau's made home, was "one of the two principal leaders
of the Saint Gervais quarter during the years leading up to and including 1718. Government
records take note of Terroux as 'having distinguished himself for his errors and violence in 1707
and 1716.'"105 Also cohabiting with them were Daniel (thought to have been Isaac's closest friend)
and Jean Badollet,  relatives  of  some of  the  more prominent  agitators  of  the time,  including
Francois Badollet,  a "die-hard and violent revolutionary" who had also been a housemate of
Rousseau's grandfather David, as well as a close friend of Pierre Fatio. O'Mara wrote: "we may
fairly conclude that the house in which Rousseau spent five formative years of his life was one of
the principal foyers of democratic ideas and agitation in the republican but oligarchical Geneva
of that day – a hotbed of secret preparations and propaganda for the agitation of 1718."106
Importantly, children were not oblivious to the politics of the time, as seen in a report
from 1707:
On  one  notable  occasion  during  the  political  disturbances  of  1707  when  their  menfolk  had
appeared cowed by the formal appearance of the magistrate Trembley with his aides to impose
order, the women and children resorted to hoots and cries to send the government leaders back on
their heels: "The children pursued them as far as the wheat scales, shouting 'Mamelukes' … The
children came as far as the bottom of the Citadel, shouting the same phrase, but there they were
beaten  off  with  rods.'  The  popular  flavor  of  the  plebeian  quarter  where  Rousseau  passed  his
childhood is unmistakable.107
How thoroughly young Jean-Jacques  was able  to  follow these political  issues  himself  is  not
certain, but the idea that Rousseau's time in Geneva was one of "political peace" seems unlikely.
104 P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau’s thought’, ‐ Historian 20.2 
(1958), p. 135.
105 Ibid., p. 140.
106 Ibid., pp. 139–141.
107 Ibid., p. 136.
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What is certain, however, is that within the midst of this bubbling dissent Rousseau developed a
deep love for his patria. 
Rousseau's Genevan education took a different turn  in 1722  when he  was  taken out of
Saint Gervais and sent to Bossey, a few kilometers outside of Geneva. There the politics of the
watchmaker's quarter was replaced by the Calvinist education of pastor Jean-Jacques Lambercier
(1676-1738) – teachings  which  encouraged political  support  for  the  Genevan  government,
arguing that the city was blessed to be governed by laws, rather than the will of a ruler, and that it
was only through obeying these laws that liberty existed: "Only he is truly free who is a slave to
wisdom."108 The  church  also  offered  Rousseau  something  else:  a  sense  of  membership  to
something larger than himself. Rousseau remained in Bossey for three years, after which he was
sent back to Geneva to become an engraver's apprentice – although this too was short-lived. After
suffering  regular beatings from his master  he  fled Geneva two years  later (only months away
from obtaining full citizenship – something which Rousseau regretted later in his life).
Geneva's  influence  on  Rousseau  after  having  left  the  city  is  debated. O'Mara  has
suggested that one "may pass over the long middle period of Rousseau's life, spent for the most
part  outside  of  Geneva,  while  his  thought  took definite  form in  a  distinctive  set  of  popular
books."109 There are, however, some clear exceptions. For example, Rousseau had relatives who
remained politically active (in particular, his father's first cousin was a member of the group who
presented  the  first  representations in  1734-38), and,  as  already  noted, on  21  August  1737
Rousseau  visited Geneva  and witnessed  the  intensity  of  the  Genevan  troubles  first-hand.
Cranston  reports  that Rousseau  was  "more  shocked  than  thrilled  by  […]  events,  and  what
shocked  him  most  was  seeing  Jacques Barrillot  and  his  son  Jacques-François (1709-1750)
108 Lambercier quoted in H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 34–35.
109 P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau’s thought’, ‐ Historian 20.2 
(1958), p. 142.
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coming out of the same house armed to fight on opposite sides in the civil war."110 Rousseau
admits that this event left a lasting remark on him in his Confessions.111
It was not only while in Geneva that the city could influence Rousseau. In Paris – a city
which  had become a hotbed of Genevan resistance112 – he made a number of connections  with
conspirators  (many  who  became  friends),  including  Toussaint  Pierre  Lenieps  (1697-1774),
Francois Mussard (1691-1755), and Jean-Vincent Capperonnier de Gauffecourt (1692-1766).113
In addition, Isaac-Ami Marcet de Mezieres (1695-1763), who was still living in Geneva  at the
time,  began  corresponding  with  Rousseau.114 This  was  also  when Rousseau  wrote  the  First
Discourse,  and although his  questioning of  the ideas of the  Enlightenment  can be seen as a
response to Paris, a city he had come to despise (while also being one of its cause celebre), the
arguments were also influenced by his fellow Genevans – in particular those who had embraced
"Calvinist  moral  theology  and  the  language  of  classical  republicanism"  in  the  face  of  the
Genevan  magistrates  who  were  supporting  and  supported  by  ideas  akin  to  "enlightenment
progress."115 
The influence of Geneva becomes more explicit as the 1750s continued. This is clear in
Rousseau's  epistle dedicatory to Geneva in the  Second Discourse and  his new habit of signing
himself  off  as "citoyen de Genève."116 Rosenblatt  has argued that these writings  demonstrate
"how very well informed Rousseau was of the political situation and of some rather subtle points
of contention in Geneva even before his return to the city in 1754."117 Thus, Rousseau's absence
110 M. Cranston, Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754 [New York, 1983], 
p. 124–126.
111 Rousseau, Confessions, OC i, p. 216.
112 In 1734 Isaac Thellusson, the Genevan minister in Paris, descried it as a "center of conspiracy" (H. Rosenblatt, 
Rousseau and Geneva [Cambridge, 2007], p. 50).
113 Ibid., p. 48.
114 Mezieres, in addition to being a key agitator, was a good friend of Rousseau's father (Ibid., p. 181).
115 Ibid., p. 66.
116 Although technically Rousseau was not a citizen.
117 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 163.
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from Geneva did not prevent him from reflecting on the city, nor becoming a key player  in  its
political turmoil. When he did return to Geneva (with the goal of legally gaining citizenship) he
did not  ingratiate himself with those in power.  D'Ivernois wrote this about Rousseau's political
affiliations:
During a residence of some months at Geneva, he preferred the society of private citizens to that of
men of power, whose pomp and principles he held in detestation. His attachment to the people, the
value he set on the title of citizen of Geneva, the esteem of his countrymen, his connection with the
quondam  Deluc,  his  fondness  for  political  equality,  and  his  contempt  for  the  rich,  which  he
sometimes carried too far, drew on him the hatred of the partisans of aristocracy, who have been
without doubt the real authors of all his misfortunes.118
The Deluc mentioned is Jacques-Francois Deluc, a man who saw Rousseau as a potential aid to
the bourgeois cause.119 In addition, Rousseau befriended a number of men who would become his
defenders, including Jacob Vernes (1728-1791), future leader of the Représentants, Paul-Claude
Moultou  (1731-1797),  and  Antoine-Jacques  Roustan  (1734-1808).  It  was  in  this  charged
atmosphere that Rousseau began contemplating the Contrat social.120
Rousseau's time in Geneva was brief.  He left in late  1754,  but by this time  Geneva's
political agitators had fully embraced him as one of their own – a relationship which appeared to
be confirmed in 1762 when the Contrat social and Émile were banned and a warrant was issued
for  Rousseau's  arrest.  As  Whatmore  has  argued:  "The  assertion  in  these  works  on  their
publication in  1762 that  the  sovereignty of  all  the members  of  a  state  was the fundamental
principle of political right, and needed to be continuously reaffirmed in order to maintain liberty,
frightened the ruling magistrates at Geneva."121 To counter Rousseau's arguments the magistrates
called on Procureur General Jean-Robert Tronchin  (1710-1793)  to write a  justification of their
118 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell (London, 1784), pp. 160–161.
119 In a 1762 letter Rousseau wrote that Deluc was "c'est le plus honnête et le plus ennuyeux des hommes" (CC 
2245, vol. xiii).
120 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 183–185.
121 R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the Representants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern 
Intellectual History 3.03 (2006), pp. 37–38.
 162
attack on Rousseau, the outcome of which was the Lettres écrites de la campagne (1765), which
argued that Rousseau's crime was of a religious, rather than political, nature. As d'Ivernois would
write, however, this position was seen dismissed by most: "the men who burnt in Geneva the
writings of Rousseau, publicly tolerated within the walls of the same city, the impression and sale
of Voltaire's works, in which the Christian religion is attacked at its very root; whilst Rousseau
was for lopping off some branches only, to give more vigour to the trunk."122 Rousseau responded
with his Lettres  écrites de la  montagne  and,  for the first time, entered into a direct and public
conversation with Geneva. In the end, however, it was in vein:
En passant à Genève je n'allai voir personne, mais je fus prêt à me trouver mal sur les ponts.
Jamais je n'ai vu les murs de cette heureuse ville, jamais je n'y suis entré, sans sentir une certaine
défaillance de cœur qui venait d'un excès d'attendrissement. En même temps que la noble image de
la liberté m'élevait l'âme, celles de l'égalité, de l'union, de la douceur des mœurs me touchaient
jusqu'aux larmes, et m'inspiraient un vif regret d'avoir perdu tous ces biens. Dans quelle erreur
j'étais, mais qu'elle était naturelle! Je croyais voir tout cela dans ma patrie, parce que je le portais
dans mon cœur.123
Rousseau's  heart  had  been  formed  in  Geneva  –  its  constitution  was  his.  He  carried  liberty,
equality, and "la douceur des mœurs" within him because they were also a part of Geneva. And
although in a letter he wrote to Malesherbes he makes it clear that by 1762 he had little hope of
returning to Geneva, he did not abandon his patria:
Si  j'eusse  vécu  dans  Genève,  je  n'aurais pu  ni  publier  l'épître  dédicatoire  du  Discours  sur
l'inégalité, ni parler même contre l'établissement de la  Comédie, du ton que je l'ai fait. Je  serais
beaucoup plus  inutile  à  mes  compatriotes,  vivant  au  milieu  d'eux,  que  je  ne  puis  l'être,  dans
l'occasion, de ma retraite.124
122 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell [London, 1784], p. 163.
123 Rousseau, Confessions, OC i, p. 144.
124 CC 1654, vol. x.
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Geneva and Rousseau's Political Thought
The problem in understanding Rousseau's own position is visible in the ambiguity of his response
to  Théodore  Tronchin's  (1709-1781)  criticism  of  his 1762  works:  "J'ai  donc  pris  votre
constitution, que je trouvais belle, pour modèle des institutions politiques, et vous proposant en
exemple à l'Europe, loin de chercher à vous détruire j'exposais les moyens de vous conserver."125
The confusion arises  when  one  attempts  to  place  this  quote in  either  camp  –  he  may  be
expressing support for the magistrates, and their position within Geneva's constitutional history,
or subtly attacking them by stating his own writings are in support of  a true constitution –  the
Représentants' position.  Or, it could be an entirely different argument, but if so, what?  Fabri's
franchises?  Calvin's  institutes?  Did  it  include  the  seventeenth  century  edicts?  The  imagined
democratic constitution which emerged from a historical contractual moment? The mediations?
Ultimately, however, the magistrates took him to be a supporter of the Représentants, believing
he called for "the involvement of sovereign citizens more directly in the making of law, and in
demanding  that  general  councils  become  a  more  assertive  check  on  the  executive  arm  of
government."126 However, the secondary literature has remained just as unsure about Rousseau's
position. J. Spink wrote of the procureur's conclusion: "Nous avons vu que cela n'est pas vrai,
que cela n'est pas possible."127 Helena Rosenblatt agreed with the magistrates, however, arguing
that the  Contrat social was both in agreement with bourgeois thought and in support of their
cause. That is, she argues that the Contrat social makes the point that the sovereign – that is, the
people – has absolute power and is capable of, and permitted to, modify and revoke any laws it
chooses, making it legitimate for the people of Geneva to revoke the sixteenth century edicts.
125 Rousseau, Lettres, OC iii, p. 810.
126 R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the Representants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern 
Intellectual History 3.03 (2006), p. 388.
127 J.S. Spink, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et Genève (Paris, 1934), p. 90.
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This is in opposition to the magistrates,  who believed that any manipulation of the constitution
would be its dissolution,  and that  the people had, at some past moment, agreed to submit in
exchange for the benefits provided by the constitution. Whatmore, on the other hand, has argued
that in Rousseau's later writings – specifically the Lettres écrites de la montagne – one finds a
more conservative attitude to  the expansion of  powers  and the general  council.  Although he
agrees that "Tronchin and his fellow magistrates were threatening to overturn the established
division of  power between citizens  and the executive,  by challenging the sovereignty of the
General Council,"  he also argues that the Représentants' move to radically reform the Genevan
state,  even  if  democratic,  was just  as  destabilizing.128 To  come  to  understand  what  exactly
Rousseau's positon was amongst these competing  approaches, the  Genevan  debate needs to be
reconstructed, and Rousseau's particular position examined.
To  do  this,  it  is  worth  first  noting  that  there  are  two  positions which  highlight  the
difficulty in coming to understand Rousseau's argument. First, the dialogue taking place on both
sides uses a shared intellectual language,  with many  terms being used without  distinguishing
differing conceptual meanings. This is a point recently made by Gabriella Silvestrini:
Si le XVIIIe siècle est pour Genève le siècle des conflits politiques, on peut néanmoins constater la
persistance d'un langage presque unanimement partagé, un langage qui pourrait être défini comme
la  rhétorique  spécifiquement  républicaine  de  Genève,  fixant  pour  ainsi  dire  les  bornes  et  les
impératifs de tout discours public sur les institutions politiques et religieuses de la ville.129
In  particular,  she  offers  three  conceptual  areas  in  which  the  political  debate  in  Geneva was
confused  by  both  parties  claiming  to  be  protecting  the  historical  constitution  and  the  city:
"liberté, vertu et égalité."130
The second difficulty comes from a tendency in Rousseau scholarship to see similarities
128 R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the Representants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern 
Intellectual History 3.03 (2006), pp. 391–392.
129 G. Silvestrini, ‘Le républicanisme de Rousseau mis en contexte: le cas de Genève’, Les Études philosophiques 
4.83 (2008), p. 520.
130 Ibid., p. 523.
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between two streams of thought as connections between the two groups politically; that is to say,
the thoughts and proposals seen in the  Représentants, in many cases, are intellectually akin to
Rousseau's own writings. In fact, many of the ideas he is credited with developing in the history
of political thought can also be found in Geneva's own intellectual debates. This has led people to
place Rousseau in the camp with which his ideas are shared – as Rosenblatt wrote, "[that] helping
the Genevan bourgeoisie regain their right was Rousseau's purpose in the  Social Contract  was
evident, at the time, both to the Genevan bourgeoisie and to the patrician government."131 This is
an  overstatement,  however  –  instead,  what  is  perhaps  more  likely is  that  the  bourgeois  and
magistrates would have agreed with Rosenblatt that this was Rousseau's purpose. Although many
Genevans at the time did see the Contrat social as a "panegyric on his country's constitution," it
is not certain that this was Rousseau's intention to see the proposals in these writings enacted in
Geneva.132 
To come to understand Rousseau's intentions this chapter will follow Silvestrini's division
between "liberté, vertu et égalité" as the three contested conceptual areas of debate.133 Instead, by
examining the magistrates', the Représentants', and Rousseau's writings on these concepts allows
one to recognize the unique position Rousseau inhabited in this debate – a call for the pragmatic
political  re-foundation  of  Geneva's  historical  constitution,  but  one  which  also  embraced and
accepted the mediations as a part of the city's political framework. It is in this way that one can
understand  Rousseau's writings  on Geneva,  and recognize how exactly he hoped to  "preserve"
their constitution: "Cette constitution, toute bonne qu'elle est, n'est pas sans défaut."134
131 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 269.
132 S.F. d’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View of the Vonstitution and Revolutions of Geneva: In the 
Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Farell (London, 1784), p. 161.
133 That is, Silvestrini's framework is used, but not her arguments themselves.
134 Rousseau, Lettres, OC iii, p. 810.
 166
Civil Liberty
When  coming to understand  liberty from a Genevan perspective one must recognize that,  as
Silvestrini has pointed out, "le premier trait républicain de Genève réside dans la double liberté,
spirituelle  et  temporelle."135 For  this  reason  both  conceptions of  liberty  must  be separately
addressed.  To begin: the problem of liberty  can be linked directly to the  institutional  division
between government and sovereignty, and the thought of Jean Bodin (1530-1596):
Dans ce but, ils appliquent aux institutions de leur ville la distinction d'abord utilisée par Bodin, et
ensuite reprise par Pufendorf, entre forme de l'État et forme du gouvernement, amorçant de cette
manière une première distinction, encore extrêmement floue, entre le concept de souveraineté et
celui de gouvernement.136
That is to say, Bodin attributed absolute political power to sovereignty, but allowed for these
absolute sovereigns (be them individuals or multitudes) to initiate  institutions which  exercised
their power.137 Thus, rights of jurisdiction are not attributes of sovereignty, but instead exercised
at the pleasure of the sovereign: 
Car il y a bien différence de l'état et du gouvernement: qui est une règle de police qui n'a point été
touchée  de  personne;  car  l'état  peut  être  en  Monarchie,  et  néanmoins  il  sera  gouverné
populairement si le Prince fait part des états, Magistrats, offices, et loyers également à tous sans
avoir égard à la noblesse, ni aux richesses, ni à la vertu... laquelle variété de gouverner a mis en
erreur ceux qui  ont  mêlé  les  Républiques,  sans  prendre  garde que l'état  d'une  République est
différent du gouvernement et administration [de celle-ci], mais nous toucherons ce point ici en son
lieu.138
According to Whatmore there was "near-universal agreement" with Bodin in this distinction, and
"Geneva had always been a popular state governed aristocratically... [The] fundamental problem
was  that  the  precise  division  of  governmental  powers  established  during  this  period  of  the
Reformation remained contested."139 In particular, the idea that civil liberty was directly equated
with sovereignty and the right to self-legislation by the bourgeois was problematic.
135 G. Silvestrini, ‘Le républicanisme de Rousseau mis en contexte: le cas de Genève’, Les Études philosophiques 
4.83 (2008), p. 521.
136 Ibid., p. 525.
137 Bodin, Six livres, i. i; viii; x (ed. Mairet, pp. 57-64; 103-110; 151-178).
138 Ibid., ii. ii (ed. Mairet, pp. 201-203).
139 R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the Representants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern 
Intellectual History 3.03 (2006), pp. 392–393.
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This argument was being expressed by at least 1707 when it was claimed that liberty for a
Genevan included "the right to revoke, change or amend old laws,"140 and the idea was returned
to throughout the eighteenth century –  first  in the anonymous letters of 1718,  at which point
political participation was also added to the concept of liberty, and again in 1734:
[T]he Representations reminded the magistrates that 'the People of Geneva is free and sovereign.'
Being 'born free,'  the people would soon be reduced to 'slavery' if it  did not have the right to
assemble periodically, and to approve taxes. The General Council retained the 'right to legislate'
and to 'create its magistrates'; moreover, it had reserved for itself the 'knowledge of all important
matters and of all difficult cases.' It was further clarified that 'the right to legislate' meant 'the right
to  make  appropriate  changes'  to  existing  laws  as  well  as  making  new ones.  Importantly,  the
movement was an attempt, in the eyes of the bourgeois, to restore legitimate rights rather than
introduce new ones.141
Freedom,  legislation,  and  sovereignty  were  therefore  closely  connected  in  the  minds  of  the
bourgeois – and, according to Pamela Mason, in Rousseau's thought.
Mason  has  argued  that  these  conceptual  aspects  of  liberty  were  also  embraced  by
Rousseau,  highlighting  three  areas  of  clear  conceptual  overlap  between  Leger  in  1718  and
Rousseau in 1762: they both highlight the right to legislate as the mark of sovereignty, and both
place this in the people as whole; they both argue that it is an ability of the sovereign to delegate
powers to a government, but these powers are only legitimized and maintained at the will of the
sovereign; and they both accept the need for periodic assemblies of the sovereign (as a general
council) which cannot be abolished or prorogued.142 The idea that these sovereign rights had been
abandoned or handed over to the smaller councils was dismissed by the Représentants: "we were
born free and sovereign, by some fatality our condition [has] fallen lower than [...] Peoples who
were born subjects" and Leger claimed "a people which is free and which renounces its liberty,
renounces its well-being, and forges its own chains."143 Importantly, these claims appear  quite
140 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 105.
141 Ibid., p. 132.
142 P.A. Mason, ‘The Genevan republican background to Rousseaus Social Contract’, History of Political Thought 
14.4 (1993), pp. 570–571.
143 Quoted in Ibid., p. 569.
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similar to Rousseau's: "L'homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers"; "il faut qu'il y en ait
de  fixes  et  de  périodiques  que  rien  ne  puisse  abolir  ni  proroger";  "les  taxes  [sommes]
dangereuses,  s'ils  ne  sont  établis  avec  l'exprès  consentement  du  peuple";144 "la  puissance
législative appartient au peuple, et ne peut appartenir qu'à lui"; 
Qu'est-ce donc que le gouvernement? Un corps intermédiaire établi entre les sujets et le souverain
pour leur mutuelle correspondance, chargé de l'exécution des lois et du maintien de la liberté tant
civile que politique. Les membres de ce corps s'appellent magistrats… Ce n 'est absolument qu'une
commission, un emploi, dans lequel, simples officiers du souverain, ils exercent en son nom le
pouvoir dont il les a faits dépositaires, et qu'il peut limiter, modifier et reprendre quand il lui plaît.
L'aliénation d'un tel droit, étant incompatible avec la nature du corps social, est contraire au but de
l'association.
And  finally:  "La  loi  d'hier  n'oblige  pas  aujourd'hui."145 Rousseau also  argued  that  when
sovereignty is usurped from the body-politic and placed in the hands of the few, the social pact is
dissolved,  and force  replaces  obligation  in  political  matters  –  and more  importantly,  natural
freedom  (and the power each member gave to the sovereign) is returned.146 A position which
would have been seen as threatening to the Genevan magistrates.
These similarities  cover  a fairly  substantial  part of  his  political  philosophy,  and  thus
Rousseau seems to easily fit into the traditional Genevan rhetoric of freedom. However, how far
can  one  conflate  liberty with  legislation  as  the  Représentants did?  In  Book  II,  Chapter  XI,
Rousseau writes: 
Si l'on recherche en quoi consiste précisément le plus grand bien de tous, qui doit être la fin de tout
système de législation, on trouvera qu'il se réduit à deux objets principaux, la liberté et l'égalité: la
liberté, parce que toute dépendance particulière est autant de force ôtée au corps de l'État.147 
What is more: "il faut bien distinguer la liberté naturelle, qui n'a pour bornes que les forces de
l'individu, de la liberté civile, qui est limitée par la volonté générale."148 This particular definition
of  liberty is  not  the same as the  Représentants. Instead, it  appears that Rousseau is identifying
144 Importantly, Rousseau adds "ou de ses représentants."
145 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 351; 426; Économie politique, OC iii, pp. 277-278; Contrat social, OC iii, 
pp. 432; 396; 424.
146 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 422-423; 360.
147 Ibid., p. 391.
148 Ibid., pp. 364-365.
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liberty as  not  being  "found in  the  exercise  of  legislative  authority,  but  the  submission  to  'a
lawfully constituted government.'"149 That is to say,  a conception more akin to the magistrates.
What is more, if legislation was also liberty, one could not describe one as the object of the other
as  Rousseau  did.  Instead,  civil  liberty  is  not  legislation  but  the  ability  to  live  morally  in
accordance with reason as dictated by the general will. An individual's natural liberty is the right
to everything desired and obtainable within a person's own power, whereas civil freedom is the
tempering of  this  natural freedom in a social situation. Although some extreme rights are lost,
they are replaced by new ones: the right to peace and property, and equal access to sovereignty
and legislation.150 It  is  civil  liberty which,  Rousseau argues,  allows  for  moral  liberty – "car
l'impulsion du seul appétit est esclavage, et l'obéissance à la loi qu'on s'est prescrite est liberté."151
So, although there is a link between sovereignty, liberty, and legislation, it is not the same as the
one being made by the bourgeois. For the bourgeois, sovereignty is the liberty to legislate; for
Rousseau, sovereignty gives one the right to legislate, the end of which is civil liberty – that is,
the ability to live in accordance with civil laws and general will.  However, this alone does not
overcome the claim that, as sovereign of Geneva, the General Council did have the liberty to
reform  the  state –  something which  Rosenblatt  has  argued  Rousseau  did  agree  with  the
Représentants on. 
The source of this debate was the magistrates  themselves. They agreed that the people
were  in fact  sovereign,  but  they had forgone their right to legislation in the  sixteenth-century
edicts, and instead transferred these rights to the smaller councils. The magistrates argued that
149 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 135. This is a type of liberty which Rousseau did 
argue existed, although he describes it as akin to the religious and moral freedom discussed by Leger ("To act 
virtuously, Leger explained, 'one must act freely'; therefore, while one seeks only one's particular utility, one 
cannot be virtuous" [Ibid., p. 120]).
150 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 364-365.
151 Ibid., p. 365.
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this  "improved  Geneva's  heretofore  'unstable'  and  'disorderly'  form  of  government."152 Yet,
Rousseau (like Bodin) also wrote that the sovereign cannot impose on itself a law which it cannot
break.153 In this way, it seems clear that Rousseau did link sovereignty and legislation (if not
liberty) and, therefore, supported the bourgeois cause. As Rosenblatt argues, Rousseau "defined
government as a type of administration, changeable at any time by the popular sovereign." 154
Importantly, this is a position which even the Genevans themselves did not hold – they accepted
the sanctity of their constitution, whatever it may be. In this light, Rousseau appears to be a
sovereign absolutist supporting the right (and perhaps the cause) of radical reformation of the
Genevan political system. However, this perspective ignores other aspects of Rousseau's political
theory  – in  particular  the  fact  that Rousseau  did  not  believe  one  could simply  revoke  a
constitution as it is more than a simple legal framework. Returning to the metaphor of the body-
politic, one cannot deny a state's ability to reform its constitution and political infrastructure, just
as one cannot deny a person's ability to cut off a limb – or more aptly, commit suicide – but that
does not mean in either case they should, and from Rousseau's perspective this is what one would
be doing  in dismantling a constitution.  Or, to return to liberty and legislation, the section "Du
peuple" in the Contrat social offers an interesting note for the people of Geneva: "Peuples libres,
souvenez-vous de cette maxime: 'On peut acquérir la liberté, mais en ne la recouvre jamais.'"155 It
is in fact in response to the Représentants which one can imagine Rousseau wrote "j'aurais désiré
que pour arrêter les projets intéressés et mal conçus, et les innovations dangereuses qui perdirent
enfin les Athéniens, chacun n'eût pas le pouvoir de proposer de nouvelles lois à sa fantaisie; que
ce droit  appartînt  aux seuls magistrats."156 Again: "La liberté,  n'étant pas un fruit  de tous les
152 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 124.
153 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 362.
154 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 250; 254.
155 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 385.
156 Rousseau, First Discourse, OC iii, p. 114.
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climats, n'est  pas à la portée de tous les peuples."157 People will  continue to live in political
societies, and liberty will always be an ideal, but it is neither a right nor even a possibility at
times. And, of course, when the possibility has slipped away it does not mean one should not
meditate on it, but when one does  do so it should not be assumed  that  these meditations are
proposals  which  could  be enacted  in  reality  –  just  as  Plato  warned  his  interlocutors  in  The
Republic.
It  should be remembered that  Rousseau  argued that  ancient  laws  deserve  the highest
regard as the the most lasting, and thus  most succesful, regulations (and there were few laws
which had been as lasting and succesful as the edicts of the sixteenth century) – something which
the Représentants were failing to recognize. What is more, Rousseau argued that silence from the
sovereign  is  tacit  consent  –  so  for  the  generations  during  which  there  was  no  debate,  the
sovereign  was  continually  acknowledging  the  legitimacy  of  the  edicts.158 Finally,  although
Rousseau did argue that assemblies should be fixed and periodic, he also wrote that at all other
times  they must be convoked by the magistrates or  be declared illegitimate – legitimate  laws
cannot be born out of actions in conflict with a state's own constitution.159 Taken in total, it seems
difficult to clearly identify Rousseau as a bourgeois agitator. Instead, it seems that his goal was to
safeguard what civil liberty remained in Geneva, and the method of achieving this can be found
in his Lettres écrites de la montagne.
In  the  eighth  letter  Rousseau  takes  a  position  which  is  in  clear  opposition  with the
magistrates: "La liberté consiste moins à faire sa volonté qu'à n'être pas soumis à celle d'autrui."
However,  he continues  by scolding  the agitators:  "elle consiste encore à ne pas soumettre la
volonté d'autrui à la nôtre."160 Instead, the truth for everyone is: 
157 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 414.
158 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 369.
159 Ibid., p. 426.
160 Rousseau, Lettres, OC iii, pp. 841-842.
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Depuis que la constitution clé votre État a pris une forme fixe et stable, vos fonctions de législateur
sont finies. La sûreté de l'édifice veut qu'on trouve à présent autant d'obstacles pour y toucher qu'il
fallait  d'abord de facilités pour le construire.  Le  droit  négatif des Conseils pris en ce sens est
l'appui de la république.161 
As  seen earlier  in this chapter, the  droit negatif  was an institutional protocol  born out of  the
mediations; a veto the smaller councils held over anything the general council would want to
legislate.  Rousseau  embraced  the  mediations –  he  wrote  in  his  Lettres:  "loin  d'imputer  aux
médiateurs d'avoir voulu vous réduire en servitude, je prouverais aisément au contraire qu'ils ont
rendu  votre  situation  meilleure  à  plusieurs  égards  qu'elle  n'était  avant  les  troubles  qui  vous
forcèrent d'accepter leurs bons offices."162 He saw them as a fortification rather than reformation,
having set out rules which prevented parties from manipulating the constitution. He did see some
room for improvement however – specifically, he argued that the droit negatif needed to be taken
further  and be used to protect the constitution from the magistrates themselves: "L'ouvrage est
consommé, il ne s'agit plus que de le rendre inaltérable. Or l'ouvrage du législateur ne s'altère et
ne se détruit jamais que d'une manière; c'est quand les dépositaires de cet ouvrage abusent de leur
dépôt."163 He  continues  by  stating  this  problem  can  be  corrected  by  making  the  bodies  of
government checks on each other – "balancent dans un parfait équilibre."164 What is more, by
expanding the droit negatif to the General Council (by using of the "Right of Remonstrance" as a
method of preventing constitutional reform) Rousseau also offered a method of maintaining the
link  between  sovereignty and  legislation  without  radically  transforming  the  government  and
constitution.  Thus, it  seems he was being sincere when he wrote,  in reference to the  Contrat
social:
J'ai donc pris votre constitution, que je trouvais belle, pour modèle des institutions politiques, et
vous proposant en exemple à l'Europe, loin de chercher à vous détruire j'exposais les moyens de
vous conserver.  [...] C'était  par  mon attachement  pour elle  que j'aurais  voulu que rien ne pût
161 Ibid., p. 843; italics mine.
162 Ibid., p. 836.
163 Ibid., p. 843.
164 Ibid., p. 843.
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l'altérer. Voilà tout mon crime.165
Rousseau's conception of civil liberty was not that of the Représentants; it was not found in the
right to create one's own laws, but the right to live under one's own laws – in particular, in the
face of those who would attempt to manipulate them. Geneva had already been founded and
Rousseau's  goal  was  to  maintain  this  foundation.  However,  this  is  not  the  only  contested
conception of liberty – one must also address religious liberty.
Religious Liberty
Liberty had another connotation in Geneva: "spirituelle." The importance of spiritual freedom to
Calvin's Geneva should not be surprising. However, the relationship between freedom and the
city's own particular brand of Christianity is perhaps less obvious. Calvin  had directly linked
religion with government aiming to create a Christian commonwealth; it was a tool of unity – the
Articles are almost entirely devoted to creating a single body out of a disunited whole. The Holy
Supper, which was initially one of the causes of his exile, was necessary because it "ordonnée et
instituée pour conjoindre les membres de notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ avec leur chef, et entre eux-
mêmes en un corps et un esprit."166 Those who would not be part of this unified body were to be
excommunicated from the community – it was to be all or nothing. What is more, just as citizens
were to submit to the magistrates, the magistrates were to submit to God: "it has pleased [God]to
appoint kings over kingdoms, and senates or burgomasters over free states, whatever be the form
which he has appointed in the places in which we live, our duty is to obey and submit," however,
"all have confessed that no polity can be successfully established unless piety be its first care, and
that those laws are absurd which disregard the rights of God, and consult only for men."167 Thus,
the Church formed the community's communal voice; the state worked to ensure the Church had
165 Ibid., p. 810.
166 ‘Articles de 1537’, in J. Calvin, Calvin, homme d’Eglise (Geneva, 1971), sec. iv.
167 Calvin, Institutes, iv. xx. viii-ix (ed. Beveridge, pp. 657-658).
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spiritual authority, and the church legitimized the state  by giving it a "purpose larger than its
own."168 It was a mixture of republican and divine history which made Geneva special – it was
through the grace of God that the individuals who made up the reformed church became a people
in  Geneva,  and  these  religious  and republican  identities  came together  to  create  a  common
Genevan identity. This was the church described in Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion –
a practical and a metaphysical institution in which all the members formed a single body of
believers – a "particular set of institutions and an abstract unity."169 
Locating spiritual freedom  in this unity, therefore,  is  somewhat difficult, and like with
civil liberty, contested. Although leading up to the eighteenth century religious fervour decreased,
the  Représentants saw a  powerful and independent Consistory as an ally,  and not simply in a
pragmatic  and  irreligious  way.  There  was  a  heavily  egalitarian  and  participatory  aspect  of
Calvinism which, on the one hand had aims akin to bourgeois political ideals, and on the other
hand, was a  powerful  source of those goals. This is clear in Micheli's argument that: "the civil
and ecclesiastical branches of government were meant to wield a 'balanced' power" and Genevan
Calvinism "demanded man's  participation in  civil  life as well  as in his own salvation."170 M.
Leger made this clear in his reflections on the Mediations, writing that he feared that abdicating
aspects  of  the  General  Council's  "liberty"  and  its  right  to  political  power  was equivalent  to
avoiding responsibility in an area which God demanded man act.171 Politics and religion were
intertwined for the Calvinist, and abandoning the right to this area of action was a slight on God.
In this sense, spiritual liberty was closely connected to political action for the bourgeois.
Nonetheless, in times of political turmoil the magistrates turned to the pulpit to preach a
168 P.A. Mason, ‘The Communion of Citizens: Calvinist Themes in Rousseau’s Theory of the State’, Polity 26.1 
(1993), pp. 28–29.
169 Ibid., p. 30.
170 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 144; 141.
171 Ibid., p. 151.
 175
religion of submission, "speaking only of the respect and obedience owed to the magistrate."172 In
this way, the magistrates attempted to link spiritual liberty with morality rather than sovereignty
or political participation. In Jean-Alphonse Turrettini's sermon "On the Law of Liberty" (1734) it
was argued that "it  is  only the submission to  wise laws, it  is  only the obedience to  a  well-
regulated government, that allows us to enjoy a really reasonable, really advantageous liberty."173
This argument came straight from Turrettini's theological system in which "reason, not the Holy
Spirit;  man, not God, certifies the truth of the claims of revelation."174 Although he believed
firmly in the reformed church, he worked to develop a natural theology, rather than dogmatic
one; one based on rational proofs – "a system of natural theology that he considered a form of
knowledge about God independent from Scripture that any true seeker would find compelling."175
That is, he "virtually eliminated the role of the Holy Spirit and reduced the faith to a set of basic
beliefs that one needs to know for salvation."176 Turrettini's political and theological perspective
was shared by others in Geneva. After his death his work was continued by his disciple Jacob
Vernet and, professor of ecclesiastical history, Ami Lullin (1748-1816). The common end of the
theology proposed by these ministers, it is argued, was "to placate, depoliticize, and humble the
bourgeoisie."177 In a clear break from the Représentants'  position, religion and the church were
not  areas  of  politics,  and  spiritual  freedom was  divorced  from  both  the public  sphere  and
scripture.
Here too Rousseau had a distinct perspective. He agreed with the Représentants on one
count – that is, he felt that this political de-politicization from the pulpit was unhelpful. Yet he
172 Ibid., p. 136.
173 Quoted in Ibid., p. 136.
174 M. Klauber, ‘Jean-Alphonse Turrettini (1671–1737) on Natural Theology: The Triumph of Reason Over 
Revelation at the Academy of Geneva’, Scottish Journal of Theology 47.03 (1994), p. 304.
175 Ibid., p. 313.
176 Ibid., p. 323.
177 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 138.
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opposed moves to embrace a dogmatic and powerful Consistory. In his opinion it was too much
like the imposition of the dogmas of the Catholic Church. In fact, after  Émile  and the  Contrat
social were banned in Geneva, he lashed out against the bourgeois: "Et ces imbecilles Bourgeois
qui regardent tout cela du haut de leur gloire comme si cela ne les interessoit point, et au lieu de
réclamer  hautement  contre  la  violation  des  loix  S'amusent  à  vouloir  me  faire  dire  mon
cathechisme."178 Again, from the Lettres and directed to Geneva specifically: "Ceux donc qui ont
voulu faire du christianisme une religion nationale et l'introduire comme partie constitutive dans
le système de la législation, ont fait par là deux fautes, nuisibles, l'une à la religion, et l'autre à
l'État."179 However, the attacks against Rousseau in 1762 came from the Genevan magistrates and
not  the  bourgeois;  and  these  were  not  nominally  political  attacks  but  claims  against his
irreligiosity. To understand this more fully his theory of civil religion, and the place "spirituelle"
liberty fits into it, needs to be examined.
In  the  Contrat social Rousseau  describes three types of religion,  the  first of which was
"sans temples, sans autels, sans rites, bornée au culte purement intérieur du Dieu suprême et aux
devoirs éternels de la morale, est la pure et simple religion de l'Évangile, le vrai théisme, et ce
qu'on peut appeler le droit divin naturel."180 This is an apolitical religion –  rather than uniting
citizens with state through spirituality, it dismisses the temporal and imposes a new, and primary,
master over a people; as Rousseau says: "Je ne connais rien de plus contraire à l'esprit social."181
The second sort of religion is the true civil religion of the ancients: "inscrite dans un seul pays,
lui  donne ses dieux, ses patrons propres et  tutélaires.  Elle  a ses dogmes,  ses rites,  son culte
extérieur prescrit par des lois: hors la seule nation qui la suit, tout est pour elle infidèle, étranger,
178 CC 2512, vol. xv.
179 Rousseau, Lettres, OC iii, pp. 703-704.
180 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 464.
181 Ibid., p. 465.
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barbare."182 However,  what  is  very  good  for  the  political  body,  is  bad  for  the  souls  of  its
inhabitants and the world as whole – it encourages the worst type of conflict: holy war. The third
is the "plus bizarre, qui, donnant aux hommes deux législations, deux chefs, deux patries, les
soumet à des devoirs contradictoires, et les empêche de pouvoir être à la fois dévots et citoyens."
It is the religion of Catholicism, and Rousseau argues, so manifestly bad not worth considering.
There is only one religion which resembled Geneva's in Rousseau's division – "cette religion
sainte,  sublime,  véritable,  les  hommes,  enfants  du  même Dieu,  se  reconnaissaient  tous  pour
frères, et la société qui les unit ne se dissout pas même à la mort."183 However, like the Genevan
political system, this type of religion wandered with time and its downfall was an essential part
of it. 
Rousseau does offer advice on how best to maintain such a religion: tolerance. He argues
that the sovereign has no right, nor competence, to offer "true" dogmas of religion in this case.
The eternal fate of one's citizens is not the business of the temporal leader – instead it is only that
they be good citizens. To this end, Rousseau argues for a "profession de foi purement civile." Not
a set of dogmas, but sentiments of sociability –  simple, few, precise, without commentary, and
most importantly, tolerant.184 The historical source of this  idea was Calvinism itself.  Rousseau
feared the dogma of Calvin's church had created a less free Geneva than that under Catholicism –
a Catholicism, he argued, which was never a real source of political repression.185 To correct this
Rousseau offers two options for Christians in the Lettres, the first being: 
[D]'établir une religion purement civile,  dans laquelle renfermant les dogmes fondamentaux de
toute bonne religion, tous les dogmes vraiment utiles à la société, soit universelle soit particulière,
il omette tous les autres qui peuvent importer à la foi, mais nullement au bien terrestre, unique
objet de la législation.186 
182 Ibid., p. 464.
183 Ibid., p. 465.
184 Ibid., pp. 468-469.
185 Rousseau, History, OC v, p. 526.
186 Rousseau, Lettres, OC iii, p. 705.
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The second option:
[Il] est de laisser le christianisme tel qu'il est dans son véritable esprit, libre, dégagé de tout lien de
chair, sans autre obligation que celle de la conscience, sans autre  gêne dans les dogmes que les
mœurs et les lois. La religion chrétienne est, par la pureté de sa morale, toujours bonne et saine
dans l'État, pourvu qu'on n'en fasse pas une partie de sa constitution, pourvu qu'elle y soit admise
uniquement  comme  religion,  sentiment,  opinion,  croyance;  mais  comme  loi  politique,  le
christianisme dogmatique est un mauvais établissement.187
The former is an impossibility in Geneva – it would require the city as a whole to renounce and
re-establish a new belief system. The latter, however, is achievable as it does not require any
reforming  of  religious  beliefs.  Instead,  Rousseau  argues  for  a  cut  between  civil  power  and
spiritual belief – a clear separation of church and state  which does away with the likes of the
Consistory, religious tribunals, and political sermons. One's beliefs would continue to function as
before, but their weight in the public realm would dissipate.  Just as Rousseau argued for a re-
founding of the political regime in Geneva, so too did he argue for a religious re-founding which
would allow for the maintenance of the current beliefs in Geneva, while insulating them from the
political.
Of course, this  was an unthinkable position for many of the  Représentants. They were
orthodox Calvinists,  believers in  the confessional state: "[T]he relationship between the church
and the state was the cornerstone of the ideology of the Deluc circle, for whom the threat to
liberty  came  from the  magistrates  and  not  the  Consistory."188 In  fact,  so  offensive  was  this
position that it resulted in a split between Rousseau and Deluc, and the abandoning of Rousseau's
Lettres.  However,  Rousseau  was  not  trying  to  weaken  the  church,  but  save  it  from the
magistrates. He was trying to stop the political manipulation of religion which had come to play a
large, and negative, role in Geneva. It was a re-foundation, or a re-Reformation – a return to the
Gospel and each person's relationship with it – true spiritual liberty.
187 Ibid., pp. 705-706.
188 R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the Representants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern 
Intellectual History 3.03 (2006), p. 404.
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Virtue as a Concept
The second intellectually contested area highlighted by Silvestrini is vertu: "la vertu en tant que
discipline  chrétienne  est  considérée  comme  étant  fondamentale  pour  le  maintien  de
l'indépendance politique."189 Rousseau's own definition of public virtue is available in the Geneva
manuscript of the Contrat social: "Tout ce qu'on voit concourir à ce plus grand bien, mais que les
lois n'ont point spécifié, constitue les actes de civilité, de bienfaisance, et l'habitude qui nous
dispose à pratiquer ces actes mêmes à notre préjudice est ce qu'on nomme force ou vertu."190 That
is  to  say,  being  virtuous  is  the  ability  to  actualize one's  moral  freedom –  the  ability  to  do
something which one knows has an external good as its aim, rather than,  and often in contrast
with, one's own personal good or particular will. Again, as he described it in his Discours sur la
vertu  du  héros: "C'est  au-dedans  de  nous-mêmes  que  sont  nos  plus  redoutables  ennemis;  &
quiconque aura su les combattre & les vaincre aura plus fait pour la gloire, au jugement des
Sages, que s'il eût conquis l'Univers."191 A similar understanding is found amongst Représentant
thinkers. Isaac-Ami Marcet wrote in 1734 that a virtuous man can be seen "in harmony with all
that is just, even at the expense of his individual interest; such [is] a Republican, & such is, in
effect, the Genevan, good & wise Citizen." However, he  also  questioned the existence of such
virtue in Geneva: "We would be happy, Magnifiques Seigneurs, if in a State as small as this one,
all  who  are  concerned  with  it  agree  as  to  its  greatest  good;  we  want  to  believe  that  each
Individual strives toward this end, but often individual opinions & passions turn this intention to
naught."192 
According to Rousseau, the social contract itself is what makes public virtue possible; it
189 G. Silvestrini, ‘Le républicanisme de Rousseau mis en contexte: le cas de Genève’, Les Études philosophiques 
4.83 (2008), p. 522.
190 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 328-329.
191 Rousseau, Heroes, OC ii, p. 1273.
192 Quoted in P.A. Mason, ‘The Genevan republican background to Rousseaus Social Contract’, History of Political
Thought 14.4 (1993), p. 566.
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requires "l'aliénation totale de chaque associé avec tous ses droits à toute la communauté: car,
premièrement,  chacun se donnant tout entier,  la condition est égale pour tous" – a condition
which "produit un corps moral et collectif, composé d'autant de membres que l'assemblée a de
voix, lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son moi commun, sa vie et sa volonté."193 The end
is the same in, and for,  Émile; instead of there being a multitude of citizens in which "le  moi
relatif se met en jeu sans cesse, et que jamais le jeune homme n'observe les autres sans revenir
sur lui-même et se comparer avec eux," the goal is to  "[é]tendons l'amour-propre sur les autres
êtres, nous le transformerons en vertu, et il n'y a point de cœur d'homme dans lequel cette vertu
n'ait  sa racine."194 Through the social  contract  each individual  becomes  equal  as  subject  and
sovereign and by being both, citizens find that their personal inclinations as sovereign (although
not necessarily as individuals) begin to conflate. That is, as everyone realizes the successful end
of the state is in all of their interest as equal shareholders, a general will emerges. What is more,
they are free by both choosing their own laws, and choosing to obey these general laws rather
than their own personal inclinations. Thus, the contract achieves a metaphysical reorganization of
the individual, making this type of virtue possible – "substituant dans sa conduite la justice à
l'instinct, et donnant à ses actions la moralité qui leur manquait auparavant."195 
This was not an entirely novel idea – in fact, in many ways it is reminiscent of Calvin and
the Genevan church,  where it was understood that "[n]o member has its function for itself, or
applies it for its own private use, but transfers it to its fellow-members; nor does it derive any
other advantage from it than that which it receives in common with the whole body."196 And just
as Rousseau saw  man entering  society as  a step away from natural goodness, these Calvinist
ideas were born out of the contemplation of the fall, and the recognition that one is nothing as an
193 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 360-361.
194 Rousseau, Émile, OC iv, p. 534; 547.
195 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 364.
196 Calvin, Institutes, iii. vii. v (ed. Beveridge, p. 11).
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individual  having left Eden. Instead, it is only in joining the church  that one can one hope to
escape damnation.197 It is in recognizing one's own weaknesses (as a sinner or a potential member
of society) that one can then see that becoming a member of something larger than oneself allows
them to overcome individual  fallibility.  As Calvin put it: "The rule which permits us not to go
astray in the study of righteousness, requires two things-viz. that man, abandoning his own will,
devote himself entirely to the service of God; whence it follows, that we must seek not our own
things, but the things of God."198
Again, the key to being virtuous is to will oneself not to follow one's own instinctual or
particular will,  while recognizing that  this secondary will is  also  one's will.  This is where the
intellectual  debate  between  the  magistrates  and  bourgeois  emerges.  Although  superficially
similar,  one can find a distinction in Turrettini's "Law of Liberty."  Mason wrote that he argued
"individual believers, while they shared in the possession of the Law of the Gospel as members
of the church, also subjected themselves to the Law of the Gospel in order to achieve personal
spiritual freedom and so not fall back into spiritual bondage."199 However, she fails to see that he
goes further to argue: "As long as we submit ourselves to this Law, we are not the less free for it:
On the contrary,  it  is  that Law itself  which renders us free,  because it  liberates  us from the
tyranny of our Passions."200 This subtle distinction is essential to understanding the debate in
Geneva. It is easy to see where the language and concepts of Rousseau, the Représentants, and
the magistrates blend together. Sacrifice for the greater good, and acceptance of this good as
one's own, is a part of all their arguments. However, for Turrettini and the magistrates it is simply
necessary to follow the will  of others  to be virtuous and free.  For the others,  however,  it  is
197 Or, in the case of Calvinists, at least be sure that they cannot be sure that they are damned.
198 Ibid., iii. vii (ed. Beveridge, p. 6).
199 P.A. Mason, ‘The Communion of Citizens: Calvinist Themes in Rousseau’s Theory of the State’, Polity 26.1 
(1993), p. 46.
200 Quoted in Ibid., p. 46.
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through  action – willing –  that  one becomes  a  part of the body-politic and gains access to the
general  will,  and  through  communion  that  one  becomes  one  with  the  body  of  Christ,  and
according to Calvin, has access to God's will.  Rather than offering a philosophy of achieving
virtue,  the magistrates were using this, once again, as a method of de-politicization. Rousseau
argued that establishing a community is not enough. Active participation in assemblies – which
cannot be prorogued – is necessary as well.201 Again, one must  will their portion of the general
will, just as through communion one becomes one with the body of Christ. Both in politics and
religion one cannot simply submit, but instead, one must  come together and choose.  Obeying
laws is inherently different to choosing to make and obey virtuous laws. In this way freedom, as
discussed above, and virtue are inherently linked as both are related to being able to choose to act
morally, in accordance with the general will, and potentially in contrast to the particular will.202 
This is a point which the Représentants would have recognized. Again, regular access to
the General Council was an aspect of their own concept of freedom – it was tied to the right to
elect their own government, establish their own laws, and be dependent on no one.  It was the
perceived loss of this sovereign power that was the source of Geneva's domestic problems. It
seems, therefore, fairly certain that Rousseau agreed with the Représentants in this case – regular
assemblies were necessary for Geneva. This however,  and returning to the overall argument of
this thesis, was not a new proposal, and therefore, not a modification of the constitution (although
Représentant proposals to link sovereignty with governing were). Instead, the real problem for
both Geneva and in the Contrat social was how one maintains this virtue – this obedience to the
general will – in citizens when not assembled – how to "make virtue reign."203
201 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 426.
202 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 365.
203 Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, OC iii, p. 252.
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Virtue in Practice
The socialization of virtuous action in Geneva was initially accomplished through the Church
and public  education.  During Rousseau's  own time in Geneva there were "weekly children's
church  services  and  catechisms,  four  lay  catechists,  and  twenty-five  dizaine-schools  for  the
socialization  of  their  children  into  the  church."204 Attendance  was  mandatory,  and inspectors
would patrol the streets during services. Pastors would maintain records of student attendance
and make yearly home-visits to ensure partents were also playing a role. Pastors would also write
reports on each other which would be submitted to the Consistory. This was the Consistory that
the Représentants were supporters of – a body whose concern was the virtue and education of the
citizenry under attack from the magistracy.
The Reformation had introduced obligatory public education for the first time in Europe.
Calvin's  goal  was,  on  the  one  hand,  to  break  away  from the  medieval  pedagogical  system
supported by the Catholic church, and on the other, to create good Christians and citizens. This
project was maintained following Calvin – Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui  (1694-1748) (Barbeyrac's
successor and member of the council of twenty-five) wrote that laws alone were not capable of
making  good  citizens,  but  the  formation  of  their  "hearts  and  minds"  was  also  necessary.205
However,  by the eighteenth century the  accepted  method of forming "hearts and minds"  had
weakened, and a gap developed between the public education which was available to the wealthy
and the poor – a problem which became, according to Rosenblatt, "a sub-theme in the political
disputes."206 There seem to have been two causes of this: the ideological and the pragmatic.
Rosenblatt  has argued that "a rather peculiar ideological situation occurred in Geneva
during  the  eighteenth  century:  'enlightenment  progress'  became  the  ally  of  the  oligarchical
204 P.A. Mason, ‘The Communion of Citizens: Calvinist Themes in Rousseau’s Theory of the State’, Polity 26.1 
(1993), pp. 43–44.
205 Quoted in H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 203.
206 Ibid., p. 205.
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reaction while the opposition armed itself with both Calvinist moral theology and the language of
classical  republicanism."207 Doux  commerce  was  the  theory  embraced  by  the  magistrates,
believing that with increased commerce  there was  a softening of society – that is,  economic
interdependence  had a  moralizing  effect  which  made  people  sweet,  mild,  soft,  gentle,  and
peaceful.  These  were  the  ideas  of  Mandeville,  Jean-François  Melon,  Montesquieu,  Voltaire,
Hume,  and in particular  Burlamaqui  (who argued that natural law and sociability included a
"natural inclination" to establish a "commerce of goods and services").208 On the other hand, this
was a theory which Rousseau and a number of bourgeois Genevans opposed, arguing that, rather
than benefitting society,  these ideas perpetuated a moral decline.209 Instead the bourgeois  saw
education as  the real  source of virtue in the citizenry.  It  was in ancient  republics  that these
Genevans recognized "the love of work, firmness in misfortune, sobriety, disinterestedness, the
contempt for riches, the respect for laws, an unbelievable zeal for procuring the public good were
common virtues" whereas in Geneva, "softness," "luxury," and "licentiousness" were the lessons
of the day.210 
This  decline,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Représentants,  was  compounded  by  the  magistrates
control over the church – the source of  public education  in Geneva –  and  "[a]s a consequence
[…] the Genevan Academy was secularized and parochialized so that by 1725 it had turned into a
mainly local institution specialized in the education of Geneva's political and economic elite."211
Overtime attendance to college dropped and those who did go would often only attend for one or
two  years,  gaining basic  reading  and  writing  skills  before  being  put  to  work.  This  was  a
beneficial system for the magistrates – the degraded state of the educational system meant the
207 Ibid., p. 66.
208 Ibid., pp. 96–97.
209 See Deluc's 1747 letter criticizing Mandeville.
210 Quoted in H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 208. Like Rousseau, they argued that as 
science and arts became more important and pervasive, morality and virtue suffered.
211 Ibid., p. 205.
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magistrates,  who were also the providers of  this system, could attack the population for being
intellectually unequipped to self-govern. What is more, in 1752 they cut the first class of college
from public curriculum – the class in which basic reading skills were taught to those unable to
afford private tutoring. Although the bourgeoisie reacted fiercly and it was soon restored, it was
clear that the patriarchs' interests were not lined up with those of the bourgeois.212
This issue was raised again in 1738 when a theatre was temporarily established in the city.
Although many magistrates were in favour of it,  their  reasonings do not seem to be entirely
cultural. Jean Louis Dupan (1698-1775) addressed the council of two-hundred by arguing:
[T]hese kinds of distractions are completely incompatible with the sadness of angry passions and
the seriousness of politics. The pains et circenses of the Greeks and Romans were the most certain
way, according to their legislators, of turning the people away from the criticism of government.213 
This was the degeneration of Genevan culture as Rousseau saw it, and it is in this light that one
can understand Rousseau's Lettre d'Alembert. As Silvestrini wrote:
Voltaire  par  contre,  et  d'Alembert  aussi  en  partie,  en  s'appuyant  sur  l'idée  de  la  république
démocratique et vertueuse, voulaient s'en servir pour réaliser une universalisation égale et contraire
à  celle  de  Rousseau,  à  savoir,  soumettre  la  république  même  aux  valeurs  de  la  société
commerçante – la tolérance, les Lumières,  le théâtre – effaçant ainsi de ce point  de vue toute
différence entre république et monarchie. Rien de surprenant, donc, dans l'acharnement avec lequel
Rousseau et Voltaire se sont affrontés dans la querelle du théâtre, qui était pour tous deux de la
plus haute importance théorique et pratique dans leur conception du modèle genevois: signifiant
perte des mœurs, de l'identité nationale et de la liberté pour le premier, le théâtre représentait pour
le second la possibilité de troquer une république-couvent pour une république polie et éclairée.214
It  is  not surprising,  then,  that  the  Représentants  assumed Rousseau to  be on their  side – he
attacked the  theatre  and commerce  while  arguing that  "L'éducation publique sous  des  règles
prescrites par le gouvernement, et sous des magistrats établis par le souverain, est donc une des
212 Ibid., p. 206; 210. Rousseau is surprisingly quiet on "public education" in the Contrat social although it is 
discussed in other texts (in particular, Économie politique). One possible explanation is that its role is taken on 
by the church (Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 464-465).
213 Ibid., p. 221. Although attributed to the procureur-général Jean Dupan (1665-1721) in Rosenblatt, the elder 
Dupan died almost two decades before the theatre debate emerged in Geneva. Thus, it more likely to have been 
his son, who was also politically active and a member of the Petit Conseil.
214 G. Silvestrini, ‘Le républicanisme de Rousseau mis en contexte: le cas de Genève’, Les Études philosophiques 
4.83 (2008), pp. 540–541.
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maximes  fondamentales  du  gouvernement  populaire  ou  légitime."215 However,  Rousseau's
solution was to halt change, rather than embrace reform. Again, just because Rousseau's enemy is
also the  Représentants'  enemy,  one  should not assume Rousseau and the  Représentants  shared
ends. 
While the  Représentants  continued to see the Calvinist church and the Consistory as a
legitimate enforcer of public virtue, Rousseau took a religious position more akin to the natural
law theorists and patriarchs at the time (in particular, Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui,
Tillotson).216 His proposals attempted to break with the dogmatic quarrels and strict imposition of
scripturally based  moral rules. However, while many of the magistrates embraced natural law,
reason, and  doux commerce as sources of virtue themselves, Rousseau also refused  to accept
these sources of virtue.  Instead,  he developed a third way of tempering politics and instilling
civic virtue by looking towards London and the works of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele in
the  Spectator; that is, he proposed a coffeehouse culture for the Genevan public as seen in the
already established cercles.217
Rousseau identifies  a link between the  cercles  and English coffeehouses in his  Lettre
d'Alembert, where he  classifies  both as examples of practices in well-constituted states which
reflect and preserve the state itself.218 Coffeehouses in England were more than cafés are today –
they were spheres of social interaction and political reflection. After the English Civil War they
were treated as "new and dangerous forms of association," but by the end of the seventeenth
century they were "potential sites of rational discussion."219 The coffeehouse patron saw himself
215 Rousseau, Économie politique, OC iii, pp. 260-261.
216 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), p. 94.
217 Rousseau himself enjoyed The Spectator ("Le Spectateur surtout me plut beaucoup et me fit du bien" 
[Confessions, OC i, p. 109]) and the periodical played a role in Émile's education (OC iv, p. 825).
218 Rousseau, d'Alembert, OC v, p. 90.
219 L.E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early 
Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1994), p. 12.
 187
as taking part in meaningful and relevant conversation; one sees Addison – in the persona of Mr.
Spectator, the fictional protagonist of The Spectator – announce in issue ten that:
It was said of Socrates, that he brought Philosophy down from Heaven, to inhabit among Men; and
I shall be ambitious to have it  said of me, that I  have brought Philosophy out of Closets and
Libraries, Schools and Colleges, to dwell in Clubs and Assemblies, at Tea-tables, and in Coffee
houses.220 
The  emergence  of  this  contemplative  public  realm  was  important,  according  to  Habermas:
"Forces endeavouring to influence the decisions of state authority appealed to the critical public
in order to legitimate demands before this new forum."221 They were also similar to the salons
Rousseau became familiar with in Paris, except  that coffeehouses "made access to the relevant
circles less formal and easier… [They] embraced the wider strata of the middle class, including
craftsmen and shopkeepers."222
Cercles  were associations of twelve to fifteen members who rented meeting places at
which they would gamble, chat, read, drink, and smoke. Rousseau argued that from these "simple
and innocent" amusements one can develop a people who suit republican mœurs:223 "ces honnêtes
& innocentes  institutions  rassemblent  tout  ce  qui  peut  contribuer  à  former  dans  les  mêmes
hommes des amis, des citoyens, des soldats, & par conséquent tout ce qui convient le mieux à un
peuple libre."224 It is hardly surprising, then, that Rousseau was attracted to these institutions –
they were already existing fields of social interaction which functioned outside of the church and
political assemblies and which could be used to effectively encourage good sense and judgement
– sources of public virtue.225
220 J. Addison and G. Smith, The Spectator, i (London, 1711), pp. 31–32.
221 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society (Cambridge, MA, 1991), p. 57.
222 Ibid., p. 33.
223 Rousseau, d'Alembert, OC v, pp. 90-101. Just as with coffeehouses, women were prevented from taking part. 
Rousseau argued that the two sexes would be distracted by each other.
224 Ibid., p. 96.
225 One of Rousseau's most pressing fears with the establishment of a theatre in Geneva was that it would come to 
replace cercles, and thus replace republican activities with Parisian softness.
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The response Rousseau received from the Genevans after he proposed the use of cercles
reflects his intellectual break from both the magistrates and  bourgeois; his fellow countrymen
were "shocked" at this endorsement.226 On the side of the government, Tronchin wrote: "Cette
patrie, mon bon ami, n'est pas ce que vous imaginez." Instead, he argued the cercles caused only
degeneration, distraction, loss of time, and poor education. He continues: "Ne nous y trompons
pas, ce qui convenait aux Republiques Grecques, ne convient plus à la notre."227 From the church
he received letters  from Jean Perdriau and Jacob Vernet,  with  the  former telling him not  to
believe everything he wrote about the  cercles, as they  were a source of great abuses, and the
latter writing: "bien des gens doutent que l'institution des cercles soit politiquement utile; & nous
croyons certainement que ceux des jeunes gens (que l'on supprime aussi tant que l'on peut) sont
moralement tres mauvais."228
It is important to note, however, that public gatherings and interactions of this kind were
essential in Rousseau's thought (just as it was to the ancients and Calvin).229 It is worth turning to
a report Rousseau gave of a public gathering he witnessed as a child in Saint Gervais:
Je me souviens d'avoir été frappe dans mon enfance d'un spectacle assez simple, & dont pourtant
l'impression m'est toujours restée, malgré le temps & la diversité des objets. Le Régiment de St.
Gervais  avait fait l'exercice, &, selon la coutume, on avoit loupe par compagnies; la plupart de
ceux qui les composaient se rassemblèrent après le soupe dans la place de St. Gervais, & se mirent
à danser tous ensemble, officiers & soldats, autour de la fontaine, sur le bassin de laquelle étaient
montes les Tambours, les Fifres, & ceux qui portaient les flambeaux. Une danse de gens égayes par
un long repas semblerait n'offrir rien de fort intéressant à voir; cependant, l'accord de cinq ou six
cents hommes en uniforme, se tenant tous par la main, & formant. une longue bande qui serpentait
en cadence & sans confusion, avec mille tours & retours, mille  espèces d'évolutions figurées, le
choix des airs qui les animaient, le bruit des tambours, l'éclat des flambeaux, un certain appareil
militaire au sein du plaisir, tout cela formait une sensation très-vive qu'on ne pouvait supporter de
sang-froid. Il était tard, les femmes étaient couchées toutes se relevèrent. Bientôt les fenêtres furent
pleines de spectatrices qui donnaient un nouveau zèle aux acteurs; elles ne purent tenir long-temps
à  leurs  fenêtres,  elles  descendirent;  les  maîtresses  venaient voir  leurs  maris,  les  servantes
apportaient du vin, les enfants même éveilles par le bruit accoururent demi-vêtus entre les pères &
les mères. La danse fut suspendue; ce ne furent qu'embrassements, ris, santés, caresses. Il résulta
de  tout  cela  un  attendrissement  général  que  je  ne  saurais peindre,  mais  que,  dans  l'allégresse
universelle, on éprouve assez naturellement au milieu de tout ce qui nous est cher. Mon père, en
226 P. Coleman, Anger, Gratitude, and the Enlightenment Writer (Oxford, 2010), p. 136.
227 CC 734, vol. v.
228 CC 742, vol. v.
229 ‘Articles de 1537’, in J. Calvin, Calvin, homme d’Eglise (Geneva, 1971), sec. xi.
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m'embrassant, fut saisi d'un tressaillement que je crois sentir & partager encore. Jean-Jaques, me
disait - il, aime ton pays. Vois-tu ces bons Genevois; ils sont tous amis, ils sont tous frères; la joie
& la concorde  règne au milieu d'eux. Tu es Genevois: tu verras un jour d'autres peuples; mais,
quand tu voyagerais autant que ton père, tu ne trouveras jamais leur pareil.230
Here are examples of exercises which instil and bring about republican virtue  reminiscent of the
tales given of ancient lawgivers. Interestingly, and in contrast to the response Rousseau received
to his  cercles  proposal (which  comes from  the same document), attempts were made to bring
back  the practice  Rousseau described, and on 5 June 1761, a public feast was held.231 What is
important however, is that Rousseau's  take on public virtue differed from both the magistrates
and the Représentants (while the bourgeois embraced Calvinism and a Calvinist informed public
education, the magistrates looked towards the Enlightenment, natural law, and doux commerce).
Rousseau also attempted to remain true to Geneva itself. He did not propose new laws or create
new  forums  to  instill  these  virtues;  instead,  and  importantly,  he  looked  to  institutions  and
traditions  which were already a part of Geneva: the  cercles and public ceremonies were both
available and, he argued, capable of instilling civic virtue through informed discourse and love of
the patria.
Equality
The third area of conceptual debate in Geneva is equality. Silvestrini wrote: "Depuis l'époque de
Calvin  jusqu'à  la  fin  du XVIIIe  siècle,  les  Genevois  n'ont  cessé  de répéter  que  le  caractère
spécifique de leur république était l'égalité régnant parmi tous les citoyens, c'est-à-dire l'absence
de  toute  aristocratie  héréditaire."232 This  issue  was  also  highlighted by O'Mara,  arguing  that
political  agitation  aimed  towards  "the  removal  of  numerous  statutes  implying  their  social
inferiority… It was not so much that the realities of class distinctions were being eliminated. It
230 Rousseau, d'Alembert, OC v, 123-124.
231 Reports of the event demonstrate both the influence Rousseau had, and perhaps the power of his proposals. See 
David Chauvet's report (CC 1428, vol. ix) and Jean Louis Mollet's letter (CC 1429, vol. ix).
232 G. Silvestrini, ‘Le républicanisme de Rousseau mis en contexte: le cas de Genève’, Les Études philosophiques 
4.83 (2008), p. 523.
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was  rather  that  the  symbols  and  honors  characteristic  of  class  differentiation  were  being
attacked.233 This was not class struggle, but class jealousy.  The have-nots did not begrudge the
higher-classes for what they had, but instead demanded access to the same. What is perhaps most
surprising, however, is that it is not the position Rousseau took. 
On  the  one  hand,  one  can  read Rousseau's arguments for  popular  government  and
sovereignty  in the  Contrat social as statements of  support for  the bourgeois and the drive for
political equality. It is not hard to imagine him attacking the magistrates and their reliance on the
edicts of 1568 when he writes:
[L]a volonté particulière tend, par sa nature, aux préférences, et la volonté générale à l'égalité... Le
souverain peut bien dire: 'Je veux actuellement ce que veut un tel homme, ou du moins ce qu'il dit
vouloir,  'Mais  il  ne  peut  pas  dire;  'Ce  que  cet  homme voudra  demain,  je  le  voudrai  encore';
puisqu'il  est  absurde que la volonté se donne des chaînes pour l'avenir,  et  puisqu'il  ne dépend
d'aucune volonté de consentir à rien de contraire au bien de l'être qui veut. Si  donc le peuple
promet simplement d'obéir, il se dissout par cet acte, il perd sa qualité de peuple. À l'instant qu'il y
a un maître, il n'y a plus de souverain; et dès lors le Corps politique est détruit.234
One may see it as a position similar to that of Lenieps, and the idea of a constitution which went
back to a primitive republican equality and a democracy which had been illegitimately destroyed
by the  oligarchy.235 To correct  this,  a  method of  redistributing  powers  was  needed – and to
accomplish this  Lenieps argued for the  radical transformation of Geneva's political system by
merging sovereignty with popular government, thus reuniting equality and true sovereignty.
However, this is not the way Rousseau understood the relationship between equality and
government. Instead, he  saw Lenieps' argument as a direct attack on Geneva's constitution  and
the  separation  of  sovereignty  and  government.  Instead,  one  may see  Rousseau  siding  with
Burlamaqui  who believed in  a "shared  or  divided sovereignty,  which formed the basis  for  a
233 P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau’s thought’, ‐ Historian 20.2 
(1958), pp. 144–145.
234 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 368-369. It is worth noting that Rousseau followed this paragraph with a 
statement just as damning for the Représentants: "En pareil cas, du silence universel on doit présumer le 
consentement du peuple." 
235 H. Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 75–76.
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theory of balance of power."236 When Rousseau addressed the problem of inequality it was not
because he saw the Genevan political system as insufficient due to its denial of equal access to
government.  In fact,  Rousseau  felt  that sovereignty and government were not necessarily  the
same thing in a  popular government,  and  in giving executive power to  one particular group, a
people did not necessarily relinquish sovereignty. Like Machiavelli, Rousseau recognized that "in
every republic are two diverse humors, that of the people and that of the great, and that all laws
that are made in favor of freedom arise from their disunion."237 Of course, to ensure the Genevan
government continued to govern with the greatest good as its end, Rousseau turned to the droit
negatif, allowing the rest of the city to express displeasure without having a grasp on legislative
power themselves. 
This again points to Whatmore's thesis that, according to Rousseau, the greatest threat to
Geneva  came not from the magistrates, but the  Représentants. Were  they  to succeed  it would
simply be a case of replacing the power of one group (magisterial) with another (popular), while
all the while they injected instability and civil strife. This threat is made explicit in the Contrat
social where Rousseau argues that factions are one of the most dangerous threats to a republic.
However, Rousseau's proposed solution to this problem is clearly not the same as the bourgeois.
Instead,  he  criticizes  the  emergence  of  powerful  factions  concerned  with  only  their  own
particular will.238 The solution, he argues, is to do as  Solon, Numa, Servius did –  encourage  a
greater multiplicity of factions.239 Of these three, Servius would have had the most to teach the
Genevans (and importantly, he is the only non-founder listed). When founded, Rome was divided
into  three  tribes:  the  Sabines,  Albans,  and  foreigners.  This  division  soon became a  political
problem:  while  the  Albans  and  Sabines  remained  relatively  equal  in  size,  the  number  of
236 Ibid., p. 100.
237 Machiavelli, Discourses i. iv. i (ed. Mansfield and Tarcov, p. 16).
238 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 371-372.
239 Ibid., p. 372.
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foreigners continued to  grow – the result being two-thirds of the political power being held by
much  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  total  population  –  an  issue  Geneva  and  her  natifs were
experiencing. To overcome this problem Servius redistributed the population into four tribes of
equal size based on geographic location within the city, rather than familial or racial relations.240
In doing this power was redistributed more equally,  although it was not held equally.  Rousseau
was not pointing to a political system where power is shared equally amongst everyone, but in
which power is equally distributed in such a way that groups cannot have so much more power
than any other. For Geneva the lesson is clear: by allowing all parts of government to check each
other, and allowing everyone in Geneva access to at least one level of government, equality was
created and the constitution maintained. This was the power of the droit negatif, which checked
the powers of the magistrates as much as the Représentants: "Ce n'est point à dire que les ordres
des  chefs ne puissent  passer  pour  des volontés générales,  tant  que le  souverain,  libre  de s'y
opposer, ne le fait pas."241 While the magistrates could act on behalf of the population as a whole
– that is,  they could have an unequal share of this political power – the sovereign, as a whole,
must have an opportunity to express its opposition when needed. However, Rousseau was aware
that  the  droit  negatif  did  not  create  the feeling  of  equality  –  something  which was  just  as
important.  Again, access to political power was only one aspect of the class  issues at the time,
and  for  the average Genevan there was  also  a  concern as  to  "les  degrés  de puissance et  de
richesse."242 This is a more subtle issue, but just as important in Rousseau's works.  To come to
understand its importance, one can look at the symbolism of the épée in Geneva. 
Before the mid-sixteenth century the ceremonial sword was a symbol of honour and class
for the bearer, but following the revolt of 1536 the blade was appropriated by the citizens of the
240 See also: Ibid., pp. 444-453.
241 Ibid., p. 369.
242 Ibid., pp. 391-392.
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city as a whole – from artisan to patrician – and worn when attending important functions (the
most important of which was  the General Council).  Although access to it was granted to all,
O'Mara explains that:
[T]he blade remained peculiarly associated with the wealthy merchant oligarchy, and its use by the
lower citizens on non-symbolical  occasions was still  regarded at the opening of the eighteenth
century with some ill grace by the higher patrician rank. Perhaps for this very reason, the  épée
acquired important symbolical value for the most insecure and lowly of the town's inhabitants.243
Rousseau  was  very  much  aware  of  this subtle symbolic  value.  He  described  the  feeling  of
importance it gave him in his Confessions, but also reflected on the social difficulty attached to
the wearer – even  when simply buying  bread: "Un beau monsieur l'épée au côté aller chez un
boulanger acheter un morceau de pain, cela se pouvait-il?"244 It is clear that the symbolic value
was something he was proud of, but also a burden (importantly though,  the pride clearly made
the burden bearable). It was a symbol of inequality in many ways, yet because of this, the bearer
had particular responsibilities. Following this logic, Rousseau developed a political trick in which
amour-propre could be harnessed and used for the  public good.  If  vanity and  the  desire  for
recognition in Geneva could be fulfilled through political approval of public actions, inequality
would serve a function, and perhaps become bearable like an épée. That is, election to the smaller
councils could be, on the one hand, a reward for long-standing service, and on the other hand, a
place where those who have demonstrated professionalism in public service could be entrusted
with  power.  Although  a  number  of  families  had  become,  in  everything  but  name,  Genevan
aristocrats, it is the "but in name" that maintained their legitimacy.  It was not the existence of
distinct categories of citizen, or classes of people which was a problem for Rousseau – it  was
when laws gave, or took away, specific rights  from  particular peoples that illegitimacy would
243 P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The petty bourgeois milieu of Rousseau’s thought’, ‐ Historian 20.2 
(1958), p. 146.
244 Rousseau, Confessions, OC i, p. 269. With regard to Rousseau's right to the symbol, O'Mara makes the point 
that: "The épée was one of those symbols of rank to be clutched at by precisely those persons whose position in 
society was most dubious and insecure" (P.F. O’Mara, ‘Jean Jacques and Geneva The petty bourgeois milieu of ‐
Rousseau’s thought’, Historian 20.2 [1958], p. 147).
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show itself. Rousseau made this clear in the Contrat social in a quote which could have been a
warning to both the magistrates and the Représentants:
Ainsi, de même qu'une volonté particulière ne peut  réprésenter la volonté générale,  la volonté
générale à son tour change de nature,  ayant  un objet  particulier,  et  ne peut,  comme  générale.
Prononcer ni sur un homme ni sur un fait. Quand le peuple d'Athènes, par exemple, nommait ou
cassait ses chefs, décernait des honneurs à l'un, imposait des peins à l'autre, et par des multitudes
de décrets particuliers, exerçait indistinctement tous les actes du Gouvernement, le peuple alors
n'agissait plus comme souverain, mais comme magistrate.245 
Therefore,  the  actions  of  the  Représentants  concerning  the  magistrates  were  in  some  ways
contradictory: "On doit concevoir par là que ce qui généralise la volonté est moins le nombre des
voix que l'intérêt commun qui les unit."246 They could not claim to represent sovereignty and the
general will while, at the same time, lead attacks against particular families and groups. He goes
on to argue that the law can bestow privileges, powers, or classes, but not to particular people.247
That is to say, an institutional setup  that embraced classes which  were given particular powers
was entirely legitimate – and is something Rousseau would himself suggest in his proposals for
Corsica and Poland.
In the  end,  it  is  clear  that  the conceptual  debate taking place around the  problem of
equality was less of a problem for Rousseau. While the Représentants, and in particular Lenieps,
argued for  the merging of sovereignty and government  as a way of creating political equality,
Rousseau looked towards limiting both parties with the droit negatif. Ensuring equality was not
the  business  of  the  Genevan  government  –  especially  when  inequality  could  have its  own
political advantages.
245 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 374.
246 Ibid., p. 374.
247 Ibid., p. 379.
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Re-founding Geneva
It is worth returning to the infamous quote from the beginning of the Contrat social: "L'homme
est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers. Tel se croit le maître des autres, qui ne laisse pas d'être
plus esclave qu'eux. Comment ce changement s'est-il fait? Je l'ignore. Qu'est-ce qui peut le rendre
légitime? Je crois pouvoir résoudre cette question."248 Rousseau's goal was to "rendre légitime"
man's "fers"; not to free him. Once one has felt the weight of society, one cannot escape it, and
Rousseau's end was to offer a legitimate social order. This is important because Geneva was not a
community of solitary individuals; it was an old city in which its members felt an intense sense
of belonging. It was a society that had already affirmed itself  and thus had already chosen its
chains.249 Thus, the  Contrat social was for a very different kind of people –  in short, a people
almost  the  exact  opposite  of  eighteenth  century  Genevans.250 However,  the  constitution  of
Geneva was good and worth saving.251 In fact,  both the smaller councils and the Représentants
agreed on the goodness  of the  original founding of Geneva,  and it was this agreement  which
made a solution so difficult. The foundations of Geneva were strong, but "virtue" had ceased to
"reign"  –  decay had  set  in.  Rousseau  did  not  blame the  magistrates  entirely  for  this;  these
problems are born out of  any political society's constitution. Therefore, the goal was to correct
the morals of Geneva and postpone any further decay by preventing radical actions by either
party. As Silvestrini argued: "Rousseau estimait que sa ville natale était à un moment critique de
son histoire, où il fallait la préserver de la décadence par un double mouvement de conservation:
conservation des mœurs et conservation de la participation politique des citoyens."252
248 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 351.
249 Calvin, Institutes, iv. i. iii (ed. Beveridge, pp 282-283).
250 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 390-391.
251 Whatmore argues "Geneva's historic constitution was valuable because it provided an example of a workable 
distinction between sovereignty and government" (R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the Representants: The Politics 
of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern Intellectual History 3.03 [2006], p. 391).
252 G. Silvestrini, ‘Le républicanisme de Rousseau mis en contexte: le cas de Genève’, Les Études philosophiques 
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Although  Rousseau  shared  many  of  the  criticisms  of  the  government  held  by  the
Représentants,  he  sought  an  entirely different  solution  – a  re-founding.  For  this  reason  the
Contrat social is of less relevance than his Lettres. It is there that he developed his response to
the Représentants and the magistrates; it is there that he puts forward claims for an expansion of
the droit negatif and proposes a separation of the reformed church from the state – a theological
re-founding of Geneva; it is there that he makes it clear that equality is not simply equal access to
the reins of power.  When examined in this way, one can come to  understand both the  Contrat
social and Lettres in a more complete historical context which gives a more robust understanding
of  two distinct  perspectives  in  Rousseau's  political  thought:  a  historically  situated  pragmatic
response  in  the  Lettres,  as  seen  in his  description of Geneva's  constitutional  history and the
solutions he felt it allowed for, and a theoretically developed ideal system,  based on historical
Geneva and developed in the Contrat social. This division can be taken further, and used as an
interpretive tool for Rousseau's Constitutional Project for Corsica and the Considerations on the
Government of Poland.
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Chapter V: Founding Corsica
Corsica  is  a  topic  in  Rousseau  scholarship  which  has  received little  scholarly attention.
Rousseau's Corsican project, in 1959, had only one modern work dedicated to it, and by 1989 this
one work was still being referred to as "one of the few extended studies."1 This in itself should
not be that surprising – in truth there has been very little research  devoted to  the history of
Corsica itself. In Dorothy Carrington's 1973 work "The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli
(1755-1769)," one discovers that the "[s]tudy of the Corsican archives has been so neglected that
the  recent  discovery  of  the  original  constitutional  document  came  as  a  surprise,"  and  the
constitution  itself  was  not  published  in  French  until  1996.2 Returning  to  Rousseau,  the
Cambridge  Companion contains  only  two  references  to  the  island  in  the  index,  and  Leo
Damrosch's recent biography – which stretches over 500 pages – makes three (one of which is to
Boswell). As mentioned elsewhere, when the topic is addressed it is often treated in tandem (or as
a document which can be argued to be equivalent with) with Pologne.3 To distinguish between
the two is important – not least of all because as places and peoples they would have had as
radically divergent meanings to readers in the eighteenth century as they do to readers today. In
addition, Thadd E. Hall's two historical works for SVEC on the subject demonstrate a particular
and  intense public interest  with Corsica during the eighteenth century.4 Finally, a 2008 special
issue  of Études  Corse  is  hopefully  demonstrative  of  a  change  in  the  amount  and  types  of
1 E. Dedeck-Héry's J.-J. Rousseau et le Projet de constitution pour la Corse (F.G. Healey, ‘Rousseau, Voltaire and
Corsica: Some notes on an interesting enigma’, Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century 10 [1959], p. 
414).
2 D. Carrington, ‘The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769)’, The English Historical Review 
88.348 (1973), p. 482.
3 See: R.P. Hanley, ‘Enlightened Nation Building: The "Science of the Legislator" in Adam Smith and Rousseau’, 
American Journal of Political Science 52.2 (2008), pp. 219–34; E. Putterman, ‘Realism and Reform in 
Rousseau’s Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica’, Political Studies 49.3 (2001), pp. 481–94.
4 T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and 
the eighteenth century 64 (1968), pp. 165–85; T.E. Hall, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau: the Corsican connection’, 
Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century 267 (1989), pp. 199–215.
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literature available to the Rousseau scholar.5 Nonetheless,  Rousseau's  writings  on  Corsica  are
understudied. This fact is even more surprising when we note the importance Rousseau placed on
the island. 
Rousseau first discusses Corsica in the Contrat social, where he claims:
Il est encore en Europe un pays capable de législation; c'est l'île de Corse. La valeur et la constance
avec laquelle ce brave peuple a su recouvrer et défendre sa liberté mériteraient bien que quelque
homme sage lui apprit à la conserver. J'ai quelque pressentiment qu'un jour cette petite île étonnera
l'Europe.6
Although one may be tempted to recognize a remarkable foresight into the coming political sea-
change in Europe and the role the small  island would play in this  transformation,  this  is  an
obvious intellectual anachronism. Instead, when looking at Rousseau's 1765 Constitution pour la
Corse, a short and unpublished (during his life) treatise, one is able to contextualize the famous
note  and  recognize  that  Rousseau  was  not  concerned  with  the  Corsican  people  as  potential
leaders, but instead, how the Corsicans themselves were ready to be led: "il [le peuple corse] me
paraît le plus heureusement disposé par la nature pour recevoir une bonne administration;" "Le
peuple corse est dans l'heureux état qui rend une bonne institution possible… Plein de vigueur et
de santé il peut se donner un gouvernement qui le maintienne vigoureux et sain."7 When read in
conjunction with what Rousseau wrote about peoples who  were ready to receive a legislator's
laws,  the reason for his  interest  in Corsica becomes clear:  "Comme, avant d'élever un grand
édifice,  l'architecte  observe  et  sonde  le  sol  pour  voir  s'il  en  peut  soutenir  le  poids,  le  sage
instituteur  ne  commence  pas  par  rédiger  de  bonnes  lois  en  elles-mêmes,  mais  il  examine
5 The issue of Études Corse covers works from an October 2007 conference in Bastia. Although the title 
(Rousseau, la Corse et la Pologne) references both Corsica and Poland, the studies are largely devoted to the 
former, with works looking at the intellectual milieu of the island, the influence Rousseau had on the island, and 
Rousseau's proposals specifically. The most interesting for this study is Paule-Monique Vernes' "Le législateur 
piégé: la Corse, la Pologne et leurs fêtes," which looks at the problems Corsica posed the author of the Contrat 
social, and attempts to understand the differences between Corsica and Poland through their relative sizes.
6 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 391.
7 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, pp. 901; 902.
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auparavant si le peuple auquel il les destine est propre à les supporter."8 Rousseau continues:
Quel peuple est donc propre à la législation? Celui qui, se trouvant déjà lié par quelque union
d'origine, d'intérêt ou de convention, n'a point encore porté le vrai joug des lois; celui qui n'a ni
coutumes, ni superstitions bien enracinées; celui qui ne craint pas d'être accablé par une invasion
subite; qui,  sans entrer dans les querelles de ses voisins,  peut résister seul à chacun d'eux, ou
s'aider de l'un pour repousser l'autre; celui dont chaque membre peut être connu de tous, et où l'on
n'est point forcé de charger un homme d'un plus grand fardeau qu'un homme ne peut porter; celui
qui peut se passer des autres peuples, et dont tout autre peuple peut se passer; celui qui n'est ni
riche ni pauvre, et peut se suffire à lui-même; enfin, celui qui réunit la consistance d'un ancien
peuple avec la docilité d'un peuple nouveau. Ce qui rend pénible l'ouvrage de la législation est
moins  ce  qu'il  faut  établir  que  ce  qu'il  faut  détruire;  et  ce  qui  rend  le  succès  si  rare,  c'est
l'impossibilité de trouver la simplicité de la nature jointe aux besoins de la société. Toutes ces
conditions, il est vrai, se trouvent difficilement rassemblées.9
This was, as Rousseau makes clear, the condition of Corsica and the topic which  the footnote
alluded to. The island and its people were part of an exclusive club – members of which included
the Ancient Romans, Spartans, and Jews – rare peoples without a political history of their own,
and thus capable of receiving a constitution and the proposals found in the Contrat social.
To  make  this  argument  this  chapter  will first  touch  on  the  history  of  the  island,
highlighting what made it unique in Europe – in particular, its centuries of servitude to Genoa,
the emergence of Pasquale Paoli  (1725-1807),  and the  acceptance  of the island by Enlightened
Europe. This is followed by an examination of Rousseau's own relationship with Corsica, asking
what the actual task he was asked to complete was, and an examination of  his contemporaries'
responses.  Finally,  a  comparison  between  Corse  and  Rousseau's  other  texts  is  made  – in
particular, the similarity between Rousseau's descriptions of an appropriate people (including a
similarity to the ancient Swiss peoples) for legislation and the reports of the "savage" Corsicans.
8 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 384-385.
9 Ibid., pp. 390-391.
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History of Corsica
Corsica's history is  largely one of  war  and servitude. From at least 566 BCE Corsica had been
occupied  by,  or  faced  recurring  raids  from,  the  Ionians,  Etruscans,  Carthaginians,  Romans,
Vandals, Byzantines, Ostrogoths, Lombards, Saracens, Franks, Pisans, Moors, and the Genoese;
the last of which turned the island into an agricultural base in 1299 and a political dependency in
1347. It remained under the Italian city-state's control (albeit with occasional claims from others)
until the eighteenth century, a period of occupation which was profitable for Genoa, but brutal for
Corsica.10 Reports from  the fifteenth century  describe  Genoese control  as  corrupt,  and James
Boswell (1740-1795) claimed that the Genoese had been "eager to enjoy their power, and thought
they could not fully enjoy it, but by exercising the most severe dominion."11 L. H. Caird, in his
1899 The History of Corsica,  wrote: "The governors were systematic oppressors of the people,
and did not hesitate at any crime to rid themselves of real or suspected enemies." 12 It was an era
of  hardship,  but  stability  with  Genoa  methodically  oppressing  the  island  and  purposefully
preventing the condition of the island from improving.13 Attempts to establish a manufacturing
industry were put down, and the Genoese held a  monopoly on the most profitable ventures.
Boswell reports: "their system was not to render the Corsicans happier and better, but keep them
in ignorance, and under the most abject submission, to prevent their endeavoring to get free;
while Genoa drained the island of all she could possibly get."14 It was this state of things which
10 Genoese debt made maintenance of the unruly island impossible by 1453 and control was transferred to the 
Bank of Saint George, under which the island's population "found themselves subject to a power which only 
governed them to live upon the fruits of their industry" and all opponents to bank rule were treated as rebels and 
put to death (L.H. Caird, The History of Corsica [London, 1899], p. 48). The bank struggled to maintain peace, 
however, and by the middle of the sixteenth century it could no longer bear the costs. When sovereignty was 
returned to Genoa in 1566 the Genoese had a newfound righteous conviction which fed resentment towards the 
Corsicans, allowing for the island's unobstructed plundering.
11 J. Boswell, An account of Corsica: the journal of a tour to that island; and memoirs of Pascal Paoli (London, 
1768), p. 71.
12 L.H. Caird, The History of Corsica (London, 1899), p. 34. Caird's work is itself heavily influenced by Boswell's.
13 Ibid., p. 74.
14 J. Boswell, An account of Corsica: the journal of a tour to that island; and memoirs of Pascal Paoli (London, 
1768), p. 74.
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led to the island revoting in 1729.15
This revolt  brought Corsica  into  European consciousness –  before  this  point  the island
was  essentially  a  mystery,  being  "nearly  as  unknown  to  Europe  as  California  or  Japan."16
However, in April 1730 the Mercure de France began reporting on Corsican events, and although
this first revolt was pacified in 1733, interest amplified again when, on 12 March 1736, Baron
Theodore von Neuhoff – a "bizarre figure" who arrived "wearing a scarlet silk caftan, Moresque
breeches, yellow half-boots, and a Spanish hat topped by a peacock feather" – landed in Corsica
and had himself declared king.17 This strange relationship was born out of utility; the Baron had
arrived with enough cargo and gold to restock the rebels' arms and his presence reinvigorated the
rebellion against Genoa. However, his "reign" was short; after eight months, and having noticed
that  the "people  began to  cool  their  affections  towards  him,  and  did  not  act  with  the  same
resolution as before[, he] wisely determined to leave them for a little, and try his fortune again
upon the continent."18 While in Holland he was able to secure  some  loans, which he sent to
Corsica, but he never returned to the island himself – with war against the Genoese in full swing
he had a price placed on his head  which  encouraged him to  abdicate. He ended up in  London
where he spent some time in a debtors' prison, became an acquaintance of Horace Walpole (who
helped secure his release and wrote his epitaph), and passed away in 1756. 
It is reported that the short-lived Corsican monarch had no long term impact on the island
itself.19 However,  with  the  re-emergence  of  the  Corsican  independence  movement  (and
eventually their de facto leader Paoli) the revolt entered its next stage and news of Corsica truly
15 The revolt was a response to Genoa raising agricultural taxes after two failed harvests.
16 D. Carrington, ‘The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769)’, The English Historical Review 
88.348 (1973), p. 485.
17 T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and 
the eighteenth century 64 (1968), p. 167; 168–169.
18 Ibid., p. 104.
19 T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and 
the eighteenth century 64 (1968), p. 167. Although the current Corsican flag, the Moor's Head, was first 
officially used by Neuhoff – albeit with the eyes covered. It was Paoli who lifted the band.
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became "a la mode...  [A]lmost month by month the continent was kept up to date."20 Hall has
argued that this "curiosity about Corsican affairs  was natural for eighteenth-century educated
Europeans. They were intrigued by unknowns, and Corsica was unknown" – an "unusual people"
akin to the Turks, Siamese, Persians, Chinese, Africans, and American  Indians.  The Corsicans,
with their uncivilized customs (especially vendettas), were "gens non policés."21 In response to
this appetite for  Corsican  news  other  sources  soon  emerged,  including  reports from returning
Genoese,  French,  Hapsburg,  British,  and  Sardinian soldiers. The details  reported  crossed  the
spectrum from the mundane (the size of the island) to the extraordinary (Corsicans needing only
stones to fight), highlighting  both  Europe's  ignorance of the island and its  people,  as well as a
keen desire to correct this. Some recurring themes emerged, however, such as the primitive state
on the island. Hall offers a few examples:
Noel Jourda, comte de Vaux [reported:] 'Everything [in Corsica] must be created'… Corsica's first
intendant under French administration, Daniel-Marc-Antoine Chardon, said that Corsica was 'in
the cradle, and its infancy [would] surely be very long.' Corsica was, in the 1760s, considered a
child with great potential. But it had yet to be formed, and the product of this formative process
might be good because the Corsicans were not encumbered by so many burdens from the past.22
In Jacques Nicolas Bellin's 1769 Description géographique et historique de l'isle de Corse it is
reported: "Il  n'y a ni titres, ni  archives, ni  monuments dans ce pays-là, marques au coins de
l'antiquité."23 However, it was more than the state of the island's infrastructure that was seen as
underdeveloped; the people themselves were reported as: "treacherous and terrible"; "gens de
mauvais fois"; "gens sans foir"; "extremely vindictive"; "fierce, treacherous, and jealous";  and
devout believers of everything they were told by monks.24 Bellin again offers this description:
20 Ibid., p. 167.
21 Ibid., p. 167; 168.
22 T.E. Hall, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau: the Corsican connection’, Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century 267 
(1989), p. 208.
23 J.-N. Bellin, Fleurieu, and S. de G. de Lyon, Description géographique et historique de l’isle de Corse pour 
joindre aux cartes et plans de cette isle (Paris, 1769), p. 69.
24 T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and 
the eighteenth century 64 (1968), p. 170.
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Le Corse en général est fourbe, cherchant toujours à ruser & à tromper; c'est ce qui le rend défiant:
& si  l'on  veut  obtenir  quelque  chose  de  lui,  il  ne  faut  pas  lui  marquer  trop  d'empressement.
Opiniâtre comme il est, il n'abandonne jamais un dessein qu'il a formé: les difficultés, loin de le
rebuter, ne servent qu'à le rendre plus constant dans la poursuite. II est extrêmement prévenu en sa
faveur, & croit valoir & mériter beaucoup. Naturellement éloquent, il s'imagine devoir séduire par
ses discours ceux avec qui il traite. Pénétrant, il devine souvent les desseins de ceux qui lui parlent.
On ne peut être trop en garde sur les faits qu'il  raconte, les changeant & les fabriquant même
lorsqu'il les croit nécessaires à ses desseins. II offre, promet tout, & ne tient rien; manquant à sa
parole sans le moindre scrupule. II est rempli de superstitions, cependant charitable & hospitalier
pour les Moines & les étrangers; faisant scrupule de manger du beurre un jour maigre; tuant de
sang-froid son plus proche parent qui l'aura contredit: il volera cinq sols à celui dont il aura refusé
un louis offert par reconnaissance. Le Corse veut être écouté; il aime presque mieux être condamné
après avoir été entendu, que de gagner son procès sans être oui. II est rampant, souple & bas avec
celui dont il a besoin; insolent & fier avec ceux qui le recherchent, & qui ne peuvent se passer de
lui; avare, inconstant & paresseux. Sa passion favorite est la vengeance, rien ne lui coute alors
pour y réussir; elle le rend laborieux, patient & libéral.25
And:
On ne  saurait nier que tous les Corses ne soient fiers, arrogants, présomptueux, & extrêmement
vindicatifs; ils sont très disposés à la révolte. Leur esprit est naturellement léger & inconstant. La
paresse  est  un  de  leurs  vices  dominants:  ils  sont  si  fainéants,  qu'ils  ne  se  donnent  aucun
mouvement, soit pour la culture des terres, soit pour les sciences, les arts libéraux & mécaniques,
soit enfin pour le négoce.26
Hall  argues  that  it  was  exactly  these  characteristics  which  initially  prevented  Enlightenment
thinkers (in contrast to the general public) from becoming interested in the island – the Corsicans
were too violent, too superstitious, too savage, and simply not enlightened enough. In fact, for the
philosophes, it was not until the founding of the Democratic Republic of Corsica in 1755, care of
their very own lawgiver Pasquale Paoli, that the island became of any importance.27
Paoli, in many ways,  is reminiscent of the ancient lawgivers.  Although born in Corsica,
Paoli was, at the age of fourteen, brought to Naples by his father Giacinto Paoli (1681-1763), a
Corsican nationalist,  noble, and general  who fled the island  after the failed rebellion of 1729.
While in Naples, Pasquale studied at the Royal Academy under the philosopher and political
economist  Antonio  Genovesi  (1712-1769), and  – like  Jean-Jacques  – became fond  of  both
25 J.-N. Bellin, Fleurieu, and S. de G. de Lyon, Description géographique et historique de l’isle de Corse pour 
joindre aux cartes et plans de cette isle (Paris, 1769), pp. 47–48.
26 Ibid., p. 49.
27 Before this Corsica is only rarely mentioned in the writings of Enlightenment thinkers (T.E. Hall, ‘The 
development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth 
century 64 [1968], pp. 171–173).
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Plutarch and The Spectator.28 He was cultivated into a young enlightened gentleman, and took up
many of the  philosophes'  causes (such as ecclesiastical  reform).29 Following his education he
joined the Corsican regiment of the Neapolitan army, but in 1755 he quit and returned to Corsica
where he was appointed general of the nation and brought an end to the internal strife which had
been persistent amongst the Corsicans  for centuries, gaining the  consent  of the island  to rule,
while  also  successfully  pushing  the  Genoese  out  of  their  strongholds.  With  his  position
legitimized, he  worked towards instituting a republican form of government  while striving to
maintain consent.30 In a 1777 history it was reported that Paoli had been an excellent leader, able
to win the support of all those who were necessary for a given end by taking the time to learn
their characters, tastes, inclinations, and, in particular, their weaknesses.31 A number of years later
the English traveller Robert Benson wrote of Paoli's aims: "so admirably were checks interposed
to a corrupt exertion of political influence, that a member of the legislative assembly of the island
could only serve his own private interests by consulting the general good of the nation."32 
With the emergence of Paoli the manner in which the island was reported shifted. In 1766
the London Chronicle wrote:
The Island of Corsica is now become an important object in Europe; General De Paoli having
acted with so much wisdom and spirit, that the brave Corsicans are actually in possession of the
whole Island, except for five fortified towns on the sea-coast, which are still under the dominion of
the Genoese. The command which Corsica can have of the navigation in the Mediterranean must
render those Islanders very considerable now that they have thrown off a foreign yoke, and are at
last formed into a nation, having for so many years been so divided into opposite parties, that they
were looked upon by foreign powers as so many tribes of Savages.33
In  April  1767,  Gentleman's  Monthly published  a  complete  manifesto  by  Corsica's  Great
28 T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and 
the eighteenth century 64 (1968), p. 138.
29 Ibid., p. 173.
30 Ibid., p. 141.
31 R. Griffiths and G.E. Griffiths (eds.), The Monthly Review, Or, Literary Journal (London, 1777), p. 224.
32 R. Benson, Sketches of Corsica: or, A journal written during a visit to that island, in 1823. (London, 1825), p. 
99. It is worth noting that inspired by De l'esprit de lois, Paoli gave Corisca laws which he felt suited them (D. 
Carrington, ‘The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769)’, The English Historical Review 88.348 
[1973], p. 483).
33 London Chronicle, 7 January, 1766.
 205
Chancellor Giuseppe Maria Massesi (1716-1791)  which  made  it known to both the people of
Genoa, and "all the world," that the island was initiating a new and overdue project: 
From the long experience of thirty seven years, [Genoa] ought to be persuaded and convinced, that
she has not force sufficient to subject us again to her dominion; and that we are more than ever
firm and resolved, to maintain, whatever it may cost, the rights of our ancient liberty, which we
have recovered with the effusion of so much blood.34
It was at this point that the philosophes took an interest. 
When Enlightened thinkers across Europe recognized that one of their own was in power,
Corsica became "the focal point for European  pèlerins de la liberté" and Paoli  a  "hero of the
Enlightenment."35 Interest was "strongly influenced by an apparent similarity between lawgivers
of ancient times and Pasquale Paoli" – he was reported as a modern day Lycurgus or Numa,
"leading his barbarous people into the full light of the civilized world."36 The famously cynical
salonnière Marquise  Du  Deffand  (1697-1780)  saw  Paoli  as  the  lawgiver  who  possessed
goodness, truth, reason, and justice, comparing him to Horace Walpole; Voltaire complemented
him in his  Précis du siècle de Louis XV; and Grimm wrote that "all honourable Europeans are
interested in the fate of these brave people."37 Across Europe he was celebrated:
[O]n the domestic level journals like the  Journal  encyclopédique carried Paoli's name to every
quarter of the country, correspondents like Frédéric-Melchior Grimm made it familiar and famous
around the courts of Sweden, Poland and Russia. In Italy Parini and Alfieri [...] were among the
most illustrious of the generation of  writers  and poets who regarded Paoli  as  the Enlightened
hero...  Enlightened  despots  themselves  swelled  the  chorus  of  praise;  Joseph  of  Austria  [...]
frequently spoke of the General with admiration; so did Frederick the Great, whose admiration did
not stop at words, but who sent Paoli a sword of honour with the words, 'Patria, libertas' inscribed
on the blade.38
It was during this time (1765) that Boswell spent five weeks in Corsica (with the aid of a letter of
introduction  from,  and the  great  approval  of,  Rousseau)  and reported  his  experiences  in  the
hugely successful  Account of Corsica (which he dedicated to  Paoli,  writing that "Your virtues,
34 Gentleman's Monthly, April 1767.
35 K. Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance and the Law (Oxford, 2005), pp. 204–205.
36 T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and 
the eighteenth century 64 (1968), p. 173; 175.
37 Quoted in Ibid., p. 177.
38 P.A. Thrasher, Pasquale Paoli: An Enlightened Hero, 1725-1807 (London, 1970), pp. 97–98.
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Sir, are universally acclaimed").39 Hall offers a report of Boswell's "An Account of Pasquale de
Paoli"  which he argues is "pure panegyric."40 Boswell saw Paoli as an ideal exalted character
uniquely suited for philosophical and political speculation – and that was his prime concern in all
matters.  His  life  was dedicated to  giving his  people a  strong constitution  that  would outlast
himself. 
Thus,  for  all  of  their  struggles,  Corsica  finally  gained  the interest  of  the  continent's
philosophes. What is important, however,  is that  Enlightenment thinkers did not develop any
fundamental interest or concern for Corsica's fate until there were practical reasons for supposing
that  the  Corsican  character  could  be  altered  along  the  lines  proposed  by  the  philosophes
themselves. However, not all were of this opinion.
Rousseau and Corsica
While the  philosophes  were  interested in the man who would bring the Corsicans out of their
savagery and into  the Enlightenment, Rousseau was interested in the  savages,  and  methods of
maintaining  their  innocence.  As  Franco  Venturi  argued,  Rousseau's  political  concern  was  an
"aversion to civilisation brought by conquest."41 Thus, there is no mention of  the continentally
educated and lauded Paoli in his famous footnote in the Contrat social – instead, he writes of a
"brave people."42 In fact, the affinities between Rousseau's own conjectural history – in particular,
39 J. Boswell, An account of Corsica: the journal of a tour to that island; and memoirs of Pascal Paoli (London, 
1768), p. 264; vi–vii.
40 T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and 
the eighteenth century 64 (1968), p. 176.
41 K. Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance and the Law (Oxford, 2005), p. 185. The relationship 
between war and Rousseau's propositional political theory is under-explored. Much of what Rousseau calls to be
proscribed is not only to do away with vice, but prevent the emergence of things which other peoples would be 
jealous of, and become violent to gain themselves. As Venturi wrote: "virtue was changing at that time, under the
influence of economic life. It was no longer a time for ancient republican moderation, but for a new morality, 
born of an overriding desire for new profits... It was this very mixture of of ancient and new morality, of 
traditional and modern customs which was producing ever deeper and more violent reactions in an increasing 
number of people" (F. Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment [Cambridge, 1970], p. 82). See also I. 
Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-state in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
MA, 2005).
42 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 391.
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the state of mankind Rousseau refers to as the happiest and most durable epoch in his  Second
Discourse – and the character of the Corsicans is remarkable:
Sitôt que les hommes eurent commencé à s'apprécier mutuellement et que l'idée de la considération
fut formée dans leur esprit, chacun prétendit y avoir droit, et il ne fut plus possible d'en manquer
impunément pour personne. De là sortirent les premiers devoirs de la civilité, même parmi les
sauvages, et delà tout tort volontaire devint un outrage.43
In a similar passage from Corse, Rousseau addresses this same outrage while addressing what it
was that made the Corsicans odious. He identifies an indomitable and ferocious temper, and an
inclination to theft and murder –  vice which found their  source  in idleness and impunity  (the
endless family feuds and vendettas being caused by the former, and their very existence proof of
the latter).44 One finds a similar development of this odious character in the Second Discourse:
"C'est ainsi que chacun punissant le mépris qu'on lui avait témoigné d'une manière proportionnée
au cas qu'il faisait de lui-même, les vengeances devinrent terribles, et les hommes sanguinaires et
cruels."45 Nonetheless, Rousseau maintained that:
[C]ette période du développement des facultés humaines, tenant un juste milieu entre l'indolence
de l'état primitif et la pétulante activité de notre amour-propre, dut être l'époque la plus heureuse et
la plus durable. Plus on y réfléchit, plus on trouve que cet état était le moins sujet aux révolutions,
le meilleur à l'homme, et qu'il n'en a dû sortir que par quelque funeste hasard qui pour l'utilité
commune eût dû ne jamais arriver… L'exemple des sauvages qu'on a presque tous trouvés à ce
point semble confirmer que le genre humain était fait pour y rester toujours, que cet état est la
véritable jeunesse du monde, et que tous les progrès ultérieurs ont été en apparence autant de pas
vers la perfection de l'individu, et en effet vers la décrépitude de l'espèce.46
It  is  important  to recall  what  it  was  which took  mankind out  of  this  happy state  –  the  two
revolutions  of agriculture and metallurgy: "La métallurgie et  l'agriculture furent les deux arts
dont l'invention produisit cette grande révolution. Pour le poète, c'est l'or et l'argent, mais pour la
philosophie ce sont le fer et le blé qui ont civilisé les hommes et perdu le genre humain."47 
In Corsica attempts to establish a manufacturing industry were explicitly put down, while
43 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, p. 170.
44 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, p. 917.
45 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, p. 170.
46 Ibid., p. 171.
47 Ibid., pp. 171-172.
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the  Genoese  themselves  maintained  –  and  mismanaged  –  a  monopoly  over agricultural
ventures.48 Importantly,  even  if  the  Corsicans  could  be  accused  of  having  some  form  of
agricultural history, Rousseau wrote that: "les autres peuples semblent même être restés barbares
tant  qu'ils  ont  pratiqué  l'un  de  ces  arts  sans  l'autre."49 The  extraordinary  upshot  of  this  for
Rousseau, however, is that "[l]es Génois eux-mêmes ont préparé votre institution et par un soin
digne de la Providence, en croyant affermir la Tyrannie ils ont fondé la liberté."50 Liberty was
ensured for the Corsicans not through the paternal actions of Genoa, but instead by ensuring that
they remained  in  a  state  of  infancy –  and  thus  capable  of  being  given  laws.  Its history of
oppression is  exactly what  preserved Corsica,  and their  "savage" qualities  were exactly what
made them an ideal people to be given a political system. Genoa had prevented the emergence of
a modern commercial system, and therefore, protected the Corsicans from "les vices des autres
nations."51 
There seems to have been little to dissuade Rousseau from recognizing in the Corsicans
the ideally suited people for his project. Fortuitously, it was Rousseau of all the philosophes who
was contacted by Corsica:
Notre isle, comme vous le dite tres bien, monsieur, est capable de recevoir une bonne legislation;
mais il lui faut un legislateur: il lui faut un homme dans vos principes, un homme dont le bonheur
soit indépendant de nous; un homme qui, connoissant a fond la nature humaine, et qui dans les
progrés des temps se menageant une gloire eloignée, voulut travailler dans un sieclec, et jouir dans
l'autre. Daignerez-vous en traçant le plan du sisteme politique cooperer a la felicité de toute une
nation?52
Written  by Mattéo  Buttafoco,  a  Corsican  patriot  and  military  officer,  this  description  – and
invitation – was sent to Rousseau in 1764 on behalf of the Corsican people. Of course, Buttafoco
had read Rousseau, and would have written this description with Rousseau's ideals in mind (in
48 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, pp. 917-918.
49 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, pp. 171-172.
50 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, p. 908.
51 Ibid., p. 902.
52 CC 3475, vol. xxi.
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fact, had it not been written to Rousseau, one may mistake Buttafoco for plagiarizing). However,
the  accuracy of  his  description  is  of  less  importance  than  the  fact  that  it  is  the  description
Rousseau was given, and thus the description he had in mind when developing his own proposals
for Corsica.53
In addition to Buttafoco's letters, in the months following Rousseau also received reports
on the island from  his own  acquaintances.  In October 1764, George Keith,  the 10th Earl  of
Marischal (1662-1778), writing of his own experience, claimed that the Corsicans were the only
people still  capable of receiving a legislation that would be maintainable.54 And in November
1764 a report was sent by Jacques François Deluc (1698-1780):
Puisqu'il est vrai que les Corses vous souhaitenet pour leur Legislateur, je dois vous dire ce que je
tiens fortuitement d'un Natif de Geneve, soldat d'un regiment Alleman au service des Genois dans
l'Isle de Corse, qui fut pris prisonnier de guerre dans une rencontre par les habitans guerriers de
cette Isle, avec lesquels ce soldat a vêcu environ six mois, & qui est de retour depuis quatre ou
cinq. Quoi que ce Genevois leur avoua rondement sa Religion, les Corses ne le soliciterent jamais
de changer, parce qu'ils ne sont point cagots: Il se loue d'eux & dit qu'ils sont en general de braves
& d'honnêtes  gens,  qu'ils  aiment  leur  vaillant  Chef  Paoli,  qu'il  les  dirige  avec  douceur  & de
prudence, & il ajoute que leur païs abonde en tout ce qui peut être utile & agreable pour la vie.55
These reports  allowed Rousseau to envision a  Corsican character made up of equity, humanity,
and  good faith, and  he  agreed to  take on the  request.56 In fact, his approval of the  people was
made clear in his response to George Keith in December 1764 when he wrote: "En songeant à ce
que les hommes pourroient être je tâcherai d'oublier ce qu'ils sont. Les Corses sont comme vous
le  dites  fort  bien,  plus  près  de  cet  état  desirable  qu'aucun  autre  peuple."57 Rousseau  had
recognized something special about the Corsicans.
The request having come from Corsica itself, and being aimed at an outsider, would have
also  struck  Rousseau  as  being  both  idealistically  republican  and  fitting  within the  genre  of
53 Buttafoco seems to have known exactly what to say to both flatter and pique Rousseau's interest (CC 3475, vol. 
xxi), and Rousseau was not blind to this. He started his response with "Il est superflu, Monsieur, de chercher à 
exciter mon zèle pour l'entreprise que vous me proposez" (CC 3523, vol. xxi).
54 CC 3598, vol. xxi.
55 CC 3629, vol. xxii.
56 Rousseau, Corsica, OC iii, p. 914.
57 CC 3713, vol. xxii. 
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ancient lawgiver – a similarity noticed by others as well. Grimm wrote:
This is not a case for fine phrases; it is a case of showing the genius of Solon and Lycurgus in a
unique situation. To civilize a people such as the Corsicans, full of spirit and bravery, and of other
fine qualities, is without doubt to attempt the finest enterprise of the century. It is certain that all of
Europe will approve this project.58
In fact, the news of a philosopher being requested to aid and civilize the savages of Corsica only
helped to ignite interest from Enlightened society.59 Rousseau, however, remained nonchalant and
pragmatic about the entire situation. He requested more information on Corsica and its history to
be sent to him, and initially thought of visiting the island himself so as to come to know it and its
people first hand (although this idea was abandoned due to health concerns and, for a short while,
out of fear for encountering French troops).60
However, it must be noted that Corsica already had a constitution – the one provided by
Paoli in 1755  – one which is remarkable in its encompassment of Enlightenment thought and
democratic values. It announced itself as "légitimement maître de lui-même," and is remarkable
for  the  fact  that  "Nowhere  but  in  Corsica  did  the  people,  as  a  whole,  have  equal  rights  of
representation and participation in public affairs, except in the Swiss cantons still administered
by a system of 'pure', direct democracy."61 This raises, then, an important question: Why would
Rousseau be contacted nine years later?
There are at least three possibilities: First, there were elements within Corsica which were
58 Quoted in T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on 
Voltaire and the eighteenth century 64 (1968), p. 182. For more positive responses see: CC 3607, vol. xxi; CC 
3635, vol. ii.
59 Ibid., p. 177. Some were less flattering when it came to Rousseau's involvement. Voltaire felt Rousseau's ideas 
would be disastrous for the island and Alexandre Deleyre asked him whether he could act as a Lycurgus or Solon
without also taking recourse to their deception and cruelty, a move from "general" to "particular" which would 
bring about all types of problems (CC 3666, vol. xxii). What is more, rumours were spread that Helvétius and 
Diderot were also asked, and that Voltaire had faked the letters to Rousseau. Rousseau was soon made uneasy, 
and even reported a suspicious visit from a "Chevalier de Malte" who claimed to have been sent by Paoli but 
only interrogated Rousseau on his connection with Corsica (CC 4008, vol. xxiii; CC 3973, vol. xxiii; CC 4328, 
vol. xxv). It is possible, though not confirmed, that this was the mischief of Voltaire.
60 CC 3523, vol. xxi; CC 3741, vol. xxii; CC 3972, vol. xxiii.
61 D. Carrington, ‘The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769)’, The English Historical Review 
88.348 (1973), p. 496.
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unhappy with Paoli and his constitution. It has been shown that from 1755,  as Paoli moved to
consolidate  power,  opposition  grew:  "His  egalitarian  system left  vital  ambitions  unfulfilled,
among the notables, greedy for political prestige, and among the ruined nobles who had hoped,
by the rebellion, to recover their privileges, and had received so little satisfaction from Paoli."62
What is more, there remains uncertainty as to whether Paoli was aware of Buttafoco's move to
contact Rousseau. There is no evidence of any direct communication, although Buttafoco himself
claimed he was in contact with Paoli regarding their correspondences.63
However, it is reported that these rivalries were resolved in 1763, a year before the letter
from Buttafoco  was  sent.64 What  is  more,  Rousseau  himself  appears  to  be  confident  of  his
relationship with Paoli – later in life he claimed to have exchanged letters with him, and he did
write the letter of introduction for Boswell in May 1765.65 And finally, Boswell's book seems to
insinuate  that Paoli was aware  of Buttafoco  and supportive of Rousseau's work: he wrote that
Paoli  "expressed  a  high  admiration  of  M.  Rousseau,  whom Signor  Buttafoco had invited  to
Corsica, to aid in forming its laws."66
The second possibility,  offered in Leo Damrosch's recent biography of Rousseau, is that
Buttafoco  and  Paoli  "probably  had  no intention  anyway of  adopting  anything  drawn up by
Rousseau, meaning only to borrow his prestige."67 However, by this time  Corsica  had already
cemented  its  prestige  amongst  the  continent's  intellectual  classes,  and  Paoli  had  already
established control over the island and given it a constitution.  Thus, the necessity of borrowing
62 Ibid., p. 501.
63 CC 3542, vol. xxi.
64 D. Carrington, ‘The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769)’, The English Historical Review 
88.348 (1973), pp. 494–495.
65 The claim is made in the Confessions (OC i, pp. 648-649) and in letters to Henri François d'Ivernois (CC 4328, 
vol. xxv) and Boswell (CC 4451, vol. xxv).
66 J. Boswell, An account of Corsica: the journal of a tour to that island; and memoirs of Pascal Paoli (London, 
1768), p. 294. Unfortunately, the structure of the sentence makes it unclear as to whether Boswell or Paoli are 
describing Rousseau's invitation.
67 L. Damrosch, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Restless Genius (Boston, 2005), p. 387.
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his "prestige" is questionable, and although possible, difficult to confirm.
This leads us to a third possibility: Rousseau was never asked to be a "true" lawgiver, but
instead simply aid in the formation of the political institutions of Corsica. This is the opinion of
Hall, who argues that Rousseau was only invited to give "une institution politique," and not a
body of laws – that Rousseau's true task was to fit institutions to the laws which Paoli had already
established.68 Rousseau himself was confused by this point. In the post-script to his first reply to
Buttafoco he wrote:
En relisant votre lettre je vois, Monsieur, qu'à la premiére lecture j'ai pris le change Sur votre objet.
J'ai  cru  que  vous  demandiez  un  corps  complet  de  législation,  et  je  vois  que  vous  demandez
seulement une institution politique, ce qui me fait juger que vous avez déja un corps de loix civiles,
autre que le droit écrit, Sur lequel il s'agit de calquer une forme de gouvernement qui S'y rapporte.
La tâche est moins grande, Sans être petite, et il n'est pas Sûr qu'il en résulte un tout aussi parfait;
on n'en peut juger que Sur le recueil complet de vos loix.69
However, the letters from Buttafoco, Rousseau's own reports in his letters and the Confessions,
and  to  some  extent,  Boswell  in  the  quote  above,  all  seem  to  conflict with  this.  Reading
Buttafoco's response to Rousseau's query shows that, from Rousseau's perspective at least, the
task was rather open ended: 
Un corp complet de legislation seroit pour nous, Monsieur, le plus grand des bienfaits… Nous
avons, il est vray, un corp de loix civiles, c'est le statut de Corse. Mais je crois qu'il seroit beaucoup
mieux de le refondre, et de l'adapter au sisteme politique, que de former celui cy sur le statut.70
It  is  therefore difficult  to actually know what the outcome of the project was meant to be.71
Rousseau himself highlights the ambiguity of his task in the very first paragraph of the work:
On demande un Plan de Gouvernement bon pour la Corse. C'est demander plus que l'on ne croit. Il
y a des peuples qui de quelque manière qu'on s'y prenne ne sauraient être bien gouvernés parce que
chez eux la loi manque de prise et qu'un gouvernement sans loi ne peut être un bon gouvernement.
Yet, he follows this immediately with a more hopeful note: "Tout au contraire, il [le peuple corse]
68 T.E. Hall, ‘The development of Enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica’, Studies on Voltaire and 
the eighteenth century 64 (1968), p. 179.
69 CC 3523, vol. xxi. 
70 CC 3542, vol. xxi.
71 T.E. Hall, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau: the Corsican connection’, Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century 267 
(1989), pp. 208–209.
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me paraît le plus heureusement disposé par la nature pour recevoir une bonne administration."
And then again despair: "Mais ce n'est pas assez encore. Toutes choses ont leurs abus souvent
nécessaires et ceux des établissements politiques sont si voisins de leur institution que ce n'est
presque pas la peine de la faire pour la voir si vite dégénérer."72 The task, then, is not the same as
that found in the Lettres, or as will be made clear, with Pologne – in those cases "Les plus sages
[…] observant des rapports de convenance forment le gouvernement pour la nation." Instead,
with Corsica:
Il y a pourtant beaucoup mieux à faire, c'est de former la nation pour le gouvernement… dans le
second, tout change de pas égal et la nation entraînant le gouvernement par sa force, le maintient
quand elle se maintient et le fait décliner quand elle décline. L'un convient à l'autre dans tous les
temps. Le peuple corse est dans l'heureux état qui rend une bonne institution possible, il peut partir
du premier point et prendre des mesures pour ne pas dégénérer. Plein de vigueur et de santé il peut
se donner un gouvernement qui le maintienne vigoureux et sain. Cependant cet établissement doit
trouver déjà des obstacles. Les Corses n'ont pas pris encore les vices des autres nations mais ils ont
déjà pris leurs préjugés; ce sont ces préjugés qu'il faut combattre et détruire pour former un bon
établissement.73
In the end, however, Rousseau does write his political proposals for Corsica. Regardless of the
reason behind the request, one may still examine them and come to understand how Rousseau
proposes to form the nation to fit the government – that is, the giving of a good constitution – one
that can prevent  degeneration,  give health and vigour,  and overcome prejudices (before they
become vices).
Corse and the Contrat social: Contextually Similar Arguments and Historical 
Presidence
This  thesis has thus  far  looked  at  the  conjectural  historical  affinities  and  a  perceived
appropriateness between peoples, drawing out similarities between Corsica and the "correct" type
of people identified by Rousseau in the  Contrat social and elsewhere. However, the imagined
political system in the  Contrat social and that proposed constitution for Corsica also share a
72 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, p. 901.
73 Ibid., pp. 901-902.
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number  of  other  similarities,  and  highlighting  these  is  important  to  coming  to  understand
Rousseau's own thoughts on legislation. To begin, however, let us once more touch on the idea of
a correct people, starting with the idea of the correct state of maturity. 
In  the  Contrat  social Rousseau argued that:  "Il  est  pour les  Nations  comme pour les
hommes  un  temps de maturité  qu'il  faut  attendre avant  de les  soumettre  à  des  lois;  mais  la
maturité  d'un  peuple  n'est  pas  toujours  facile  à  connaître;  et  si  on  la  prévient  l'ouvrage  est
manqué."74 This metaphor is carried over to Corsica:
Il y a dans tous les États (peuples) un progrès, un développement naturel et nécessaire depuis leur
naissance  jusqu'à  leur  destruction.  Pour rendre leur  durée aussi  longue et  aussi  belle  qu'il  est
possible, il vaut mieux en marquer (reculer) le premier terme avant qu'après ce point de vigueur (et
de force). (Il vaut mieux que L'État ait encore à croître en force depuis le moment de l'institution
que de n'avoir plus qu'à décliner.) Il ne faut pas vouloir que la Corse soit tout d'un coup ce qu'elle
peut être (car elle ne se maintiendrait point dans un état), il vaut mieux qu'elle y parvienne et
qu'elle monte que d'y être à l'instant même et ne faire que décliner. Le dépérissement où elle est
ferait de son état de vigueur un état très faible, au lieu qu'en la disposant pour y atteindre cet état
sera dans la suite un état très bon.75
It is also worth remembering that Rousseau had argued that the Contrat social was a study of a
historical  Geneva  and her  ancient  constitution.76 Therefore,  in  drawing  out  these  similarities
between the  Contrat social and his proposals for Corsica it is worth noting that Rousseau also
draws out a number of favourable comparisons between Switzerland and the island:
L'île de Corse, dit Diodore, est montagneuse, pleine de bois, et arrosée par de grands fleuves. Ses
habitants  se  nourrissent  de  lait,  de  miel  et  de  viande,  que  le  pays  leur  fournit  largement.  Ils
observent entre eux les règles de la justice et de l'humanité avec plus d'exactitude que les autres
barbares; celui qui le premier trouve du miel dans les montagnes et dans les creux des arbres est
assuré que personne ne le lui disputera. Ils  sont toujours certains de retrouver leurs brebis sur
lesquelles  chacun met sa marque et  qu'ils  laissent paître ensuite dans les campagnes sans que
personne les garde: le même esprit d'équité paraît les conduire dans toutes les rencontres de la
vie… Des montagnes, des bois, des rivières, des pâturages. Ne croirait-on pas lire la description de
la Suisse? Aussi retrouvait-on jadis dans les Suisses le même caractère que Diodore donne aux
Corses: l'équité, l'humanité, la bonne foi.77
In regard to these people, he continues:
74 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 386.
75 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, pp. 1728-1729.
76 Rousseau, Lettres, OC iii, p. 809.
77 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, pp. 913-914. For Diodorus Siculus' report see: Diodorus, Bibliotheca historica, v. 14 
(ed. Oldfather, iii, pp. 133-135). The similarities between it and the Second Discourse should be noted.
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[C]'est de la nature du sol que naît le caractère primitif  des habitants. Un terrain rude, inégal,
difficile à cultiver, doit plus fournir à la nourriture des bêtes qu'à celle des hommes, les champs y
doivent être rares et les pâturages abondants. De là la multiplication du bétail et la vie pastorale.
Les troupeaux des particuliers errant dans les montagnes s'y mêlent, s'y confondent. Le miel n'a
d'autre clef que la marque du premier occupant; la propriété ne peut s'établir ni se conserver que
sous la foi publique et il faut bien que tout le monde soit juste sans quoi personne n'aurait rien et la
nation périrait.78
Thus, if the Contrat social was written with a historic Genevan people and character in mind, it
seems that the Corsicans also had, as Rousseau says,  the same fortunate natural qualities  (even
the vices they had were still remediable with wise legislation).79 
However, the comparisons with Switzerland are also a warning:
La Suisse en général est un pays pauvre et stérile. Son gouvernement est partout Républicain. Mais
dans les cantons plus fertiles que les autres tels que ceux de Berne, de Soleure et de Fribourg le
Gouvernement est Aristocratique.80 
With wealth comes  "progress," and  over time the Swiss were corrupted  by  luxury.  Even those
who found themselves in  the sterile  regions could not hold out – their natural character (much
like  the  Corsicans)  made  them ideal  mercenaries,  and  with  this  profitable  work came  their
downfall: "Le goût de l'argent leur fit sentir qu'ils étaient pauvres; le mépris de leur état a détruit
insensiblement les vertus qui en étaient l'ouvrage et les Suisses sont devenus des hommes à cinq
sols, comme les Français à quatre."81 Thus, although the Swiss' mountainous isolation resulted in
an independent and robust character, the emergence of commerce ended their simple and uniform
tastes, replacing them with the love of luxury which allowed for the corruption of their politics:
[L]'ambition des principaux leur fit changer de maxime; ils sentirent que pour mieux dominer le
peuple  il  fallait  lui  donner  des  goûts  plus  dépendants.  De  là  l'introduction  du  commerce  de
l'industrie et du luxe, qui liant les particuliers à l'autorité publique par leurs métiers et par leurs
besoins les fait dépendre de ceux qui gouvernent beaucoup plus qu'ils n'en dépendaient dans leur
état primitif.82
He concludes that the fall of the Swiss city-states should be taken as an important lesson for
78 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, pp. 913-914.
79 Ibid., p. 917. The evils of childhood are easily remediable in comparison to those made later in life.
80 Ibid., p. 906.
81 Ibid., pp. 915-916.
82 Ibid., p. 916.
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Corsica:
Votre seule constance a fait ce que l'argent n'aurait pu faire; pour vouloir conserver vos richesses
vous auriez perdu votre liberté. Il ne faut point conclure des autres nations à la vôtre. Les maximes
tirées de votre propre expérience sont les meilleures sur lesquelles vous puissiez vous gouverner. Il
s'agit moins de devenir autres que vous n'êtes, que de savoir vous conserver tels. Les Corses ont
beaucoup gagné depuis qu'ils sont libres, ils ont joint la prudence au courage, ils ont appris à obéir
à leurs égaux, ils ont acquis des vertus et des mœurs, et ils n'avaient point de lois, s'ils pouvaient
d'eux-mêmes rester ainsi, je ne verrais presque rien à faire.83
In the end, the Corsicans were lucky enough to still  have many of the characteristics of the
original Swiss people, and were thus capable of being given laws. However, the Swiss were not
the only example Rousseau used as inspiration for his Corsican proposals. He seems to have also
turned to the lessons offered by Fénelon. 
Much  of  what  Rousseau  wrote for  Corsica  can  also  be  recognized  in  the  actions  of
Mentor  for Salente  in Fénelon's  Telemachus. First, both  Rousseau and Mentor  shared a  similar
methodological approach to working with a foreign people:  one must  first  come to  know  that
people intimately. In doing this, they must identify what is naturally good about that people and
make the preservation of that natural goodness the  end of all proposals.84 To  this end Fénelon
developed "what might be called a 'republican' monarchy in which the key notions are simplicity,
labor, the virtues of agriculture, the absence of luxury and splendor, and the elevation of peace
over war and aggrandizement."85 Again, similar  notions  are also found in Rousseau's proposals
for Corsica. If Switzerland offered Corsica  a negative example, Salente offered  the  opposite.
However,  there  is  more  to  the  relationship  between  Fénelon  and  Rousseau than  similar
methodologies or proposed ends. Instead, the necessity of the proposals is also worth noting. That
is to say, the reforms proposed had an end beyond their own goodness: the avoidance of war.
83 Ibid., p. 903.
84 Both Mentor and Rousseau began their works by investigating the people they hoped to give laws to. In 
Mentor's case, through a census and audit of the land, in Rousseau's case, he requested as much information be 
forwarded by Buttafoco as possible, and contemplated travelling there himself.
85 P. Riley, ‘Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns’, in P. Riley (ed.), 
Cambridge Companion to Rousseau (Cambridge, 2001), p. 278.
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Although Rousseau dismissed Hobbes' conception of the state of nature, which Hobbes
himself wrote was in reality a state of war, he did not do so because he did not believe such a
state could exist. Instead, Rousseau's critique was simply that this was not the state of nature, but
the state which had only come about with human progress. That is, he argued that Hobbes' "ont
transporté  à  l’état  de  nature  des  idées  qu’ils  avaient  prises  dans  la  société.  Ils  parlaient  de
l’homme sauvage, et ils peignaient l’homme civil."86 What Hobbes had described was modern
man in a particular situation: living in a world without government. Of course, while in most
cases this is unusual, Rousseau did see one very important exception: the international realm.
This position is made clear in Rousseau's unpublished fragment L'état de guerre:
D'homme à homme, nous vivons dans l'état civil et soumis aux loix; de peuple à peuple, chacun
jouit de la liberté naturelle: ce qui rend au fond notre situation pire que si ces distinctions étaient
inconnues. Car vivant à la fois dans l'ordre social et dans l'état de nature, nous sommes assujettis
aux inconvénients de l'un et de l'autre, sans trouver la sûreté dans aucun des deux... Quant à ce
qu'on appelle communément le droit des gens, il est certain que, faute de sanction, ses lois ne sont
que des chimères plus faibles encore que la loi de nature.87
Thus,  to find a  world without government,  one need only look to the realm of international
politics. In fact, if one wanted to find a theory very similar to that of Hobbes' – in fact, much less
pessimistic  –  they need only turn  to  the  mercantilism of  Jean-Baptiste  Colbert  (1619-1683).
Colbert, as Louis XIV's Minister of Finances, manoeuvered France in a number ways so that it
could  come  to  be  the  economic  superpower  of  seventeenth  century  Europe.  These  policies
included everything from the support and proliferation of Frances industrial capabilities, to war
when necessary. Economics, for Colbert, were within the realm of raison d'etat.88 What is more,
as Istvan Hont has shown, war was as much about domestic policy as foreign: 
Colbert's  reforms  brought  the  demands  of  war  and  jealousy  of  trade  right  back  home,  with
momentous  consequences.  Jealousy  of  trade  ceased  to  be  a  matter  only  of  imperialism,
colonization, and sea trade, of taking hold of external resources by practically any means. Colbert
86 Rousseau, Second Discourse, OC iii, p. 132.
87 Rousseau, Guerre, OC iii, p. 610.
88 For more on Rousseau's economic beliefs, and specifically mercantilism, see: B. Fridén, Rousseau’s Economic 
Philosophy: Beyond the Market of Innocents (New York, 1998).
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made economic  preparation for  war  the  most  important  business  of  the domestic  economy as
well.89 
He continues by arguing that the most vocal critic of these policies was none other than Fénelon,
attacking Colbert  for corrupting the people of France,  and ignoring the state's real needs for
luxuries.  Fénelon's proposed corrections are examined in chapter two of this thesis.90 What is
important here, however, is that Rousseau accepted Fénelon's economic position, and saw the
policies applicable for Salente also applicable for Corsica.91 The banishment of luxuries were
necessary if the Corsicans were to escape not only corruption, but war. They should be made to
be neither a target, nor develop a domestic economic system – and morality – which would make
it possible for them to direct their own gaze outwards at some point in the future. That is, if
Corsica wanted to avoid being swallowed up by a superiour power it needed to make itself as
bitter a pill as possible.
This  leads  to  Rousseau's  first  maxim for  Corsica,  and one  also found  in the  Contrat
social:  the ideal state should function free from foreign influence so as to maintain its original
virtues.92 To accomplish this in Corsica, Rousseau argues that they: "tirer parti de leur peuple et
de leur pays toujours autant qu'il sera possible; cultiver et rassembler leurs propres forces, ne
89 I. Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-state in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge, MA, 2005), p. 24.
90 Returning to some of the proposals examined earlier in this thesis, we can identify a number of propositional 
affinities: Mentor calls for strict commerce laws, the banning of the production and import of goods which 
encourage "le luxe & la mollesse," and the reemployment of those involved in such activities (F. de Fénelon, Les
avantures de Telemaque fils d’Ulysse, i [Paris, 1717], p. 253). Specifically, husbandry and agriculture were to be 
encouraged with the aim of creating a country "peuplé de familles vigoureuses, & adonnées à l'agriculture" 
(Ibid., p. 260). These large families were to be a source of stability, and tying them to the land would encourage 
cultivation. Classes were instituted, with the goal of encouraging correct civic action through promotion. Arts 
were reformed, music was censored, grand buildings were limited to temples, and paintings and sculptures were 
only to be used to create memorials. Spectacles that honoured and encouraged exercise, such as wrestling and 
races, were to be instituted, and the military was to be renewed and strengthened.
91 Rousseau breaks with Fénelon over the proposals being of value elsewhere. The proposals in Telemachus are 
offered as reforms for the already existing Salente – a representation of France. Fénelon's desire "was to see 
essentially but not exclusively agricultural monarchy of France fitted comfortably into an international trading 
community based on peaceful and reciprocal exchange of useful commodities" (H.C. Clark, Compass of 
Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France [Lanham, 2006], p. 59). While Fénelon hoped to use 
absolute monarchy to achieve these ends, Rousseau saw the problems of tradition and custom as insurmountable.
Were this not the case, Rousseau would not have highlighted Corsica's unique position in the Contrat social.
92 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 390-391; Corse, OC iii, pp. 914; 927-928.
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s'appuyer  que  sur  elles,  et  ne  songer  pas  plus  aux  puissances  étrangères  que  s'il  en  existait
aucune."93 Corsica should be self-sufficient, maintain a population of such a size that it is able to
defend itself, and focus on agriculture. Although aware that local conditions dictate whether such
a system is possible, Rousseau does argue that this system is ideal in the  Contrat social: "[Si]
occupez-vous  de  riches  plaines  et  des  coteaux  fertiles?  Dans  un  bon  terrain,  manquez-vous
d'habitants?  Donnez  tous  vos  soins  à  l'agriculture,  qui  multiplie  les  hommes,  et  chassez  les
arts."94
The  upshot  of  this  agriculturally-centered system  is  that  it  is  naturally  suited  to
democracy – the best form of government, according to Rousseau in the Contrat social:95
La forme de Gouvernement que nous avons à choisir est d'un côté la moins coûteuse parce que la
Corse est pauvre, et de l'autre la plus favorable à l'agriculture parce que l'agriculture est quant à
présent la seule occupation qui puisse conserver au peuple corse l'indépendance qu'il s'est acquise
et lui donner la consistance dont il a besoin. L'administration la moins coûteuse est celle qui passe
par le moins de degrés et demande le moins de différents ordres, tel est en général l'état républicain
et en particulier le démocratique.96
Rousseau argues  that the burden of the state can be measured by the distance taxes travel to
circulate back into society: 
Quand cette circulation est prompte et bien établie, qu'on paye peu ou beaucoup, il n'importe, le
peuple est toujours riche, et les finances vont toujours bien... [La] plus la distance du peuple au
gouvernement  augmente,  et  plus  les  tributs  deviennent  onéreux:  ainsi,  dans  la  démocratie,  le
peuple est le moins chargé.97 
What is more, the very nature of administration is that:
Elle devient  aussi  plus onéreuse à mesure que les  degrés  se multiplient… [N]on seulement le
gouvernement  a  moins  de  vigueur  et  de  célérité  pour  faire  observer  les  lois,  empêcher  les
vexations, corriger les abus, prévenir les entreprises séditieuses qui peuvent se faire dans des lieux
éloignés; mais le peuple a moins d'affection pour ses chefs, qu'il ne voit jamais, pour la patrie, qui
est à ses yeux comme le monde, et pour ses concitoyens, dont la plupart lui sont étrangers. Les
mêmes lois ne peuvent convenir à tant de provinces; diverses qui ont des mœurs différentes, qui
93 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, p. 904.
94 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 392. One of the upshots of this seemingly modest plan is a cleansing of the 
vices which may have already been picked up by Corsicans. By attaching them to the land and making 
agriculture their primary goal, leisure, a major cause of vice, is avoided, while an increased bond between man, 
family, and land is created (Ibid., p. 420).
95 Ibid., p. 406.
96 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, p. 906.
97 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 415.
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vivent sous des climats opposés, et qui ne peuvent souffrir la même forme de gouvernement.98
Corsica, however, was too large for the democratic system described in the Contrat social. Again,
Rousseau  warned  in  that  work  that:  "l'administration  devient  plus  pénible  dans  les  grandes
distances, comme un poids devient plus lourd au bout d'un plus grand levier."99 However, to
overcome this problem, Rousseau proposed a democratic system in which the people (i.e., the
sovereign)  assembled at  different intervals in  different  places,  rather than all  at  once.100 This
slight divergence between proposals should not be seen as a break from the ideals in the Contrat
social, but one should instead remember that: "le sage instituteur ne commence pas par rédiger de
bonnes lois en elles-mêmes, mais il examine auparavant si le peuple auquel il les destine est
propre à les supporter."101 In the case of Corsica, the advantages of this form of democracy were
threefold: first, by avoiding a capital and the costs and travel it would necessitate, it would keep
the number of  men necessary to  administer  the state  to  a  minimum, saving public  finances;
second, it would allow for the distribution of the population across the country, rather than the
grouping of peoples into urban centres; and third, it would allow for the exercise of sovereignty –
a key to maintaining legitimacy according to the  Contrat social: "La souveraineté ne peut être
représentée, par la même raison qu'elle peut être aliénée; elle consiste essentiellement dans la
volonté générale, et la volonté ne se représente point: elle est la même, ou elle est autre; il n'y a
point de milieu."102 The problem of representation of sovereignty goes beyond legitimacy; it is a
direct threat to a people and their potential for proper progression. To claim representation is to,
in actuality, hold sovereignty – and even if a people were willing to accept such a condition,
Rousseau argues that it is a mistake for would-be-lawgivers to embrace this natural docility in an
98 Ibid., p. 387.
99 Ibid., p. 387.
100 This was a system first proposed in the Vescovado Report of 1764.
101 Ibid., pp. 384-385.
102 Ibid., p. 429.
 221
emerging people. Instead, they should encourage political confidence and action (to return to the
metaphor of age, one cannot be a student their entire life). What is more, Rousseau warns Corsica
that the creation of legislators and legislated, masters and slaves, would be ignoring the fact that a
true political body is united, and to separate it is to destroy it: "Tout cela vient de ce qu'on sépare
trop deux choses inséparables, savoir le corps qui gouverne et le corps qui est gouverné. Ces
deux  corps  n'en  font  qu'un  par  l'institution  primitive,  ils  ne  se  séparent  que  par  l'abus  de
l'institution."103 The government of the legitimate state must have a body which is sovereign, and
is able to make its  own (general) will  known. So although the details of the institutions may
differ between works, one can see that the outcomes are in agreement between Rousseau's Corse
and the Contrat social.104
A final upshot of Rousseau's democratic proposal for Corsica is linked to a key aspect of
his description and conception of democracy in general: that of membership. As discussed in
chapters three and four, an important aspect Rousseau's politics is the self-divided individual who
is a member of the state by being both sovereign and subject:
[L]'aliénation  totale  de  chaque  associé  avec  tous  ses  droits  à  toute  la  communauté:  car,
premièrement, chacun se donnant tout entier, la condition est égale pour tous; et la condition étant
égale pour tous, nul n'a intérêt de la rendre onéreuse aux autres... cet acte d'association produit un
corps moral et collectif, composé d'autant de membres que l'assemblée a de voix, lequel reçoit de
ce même acte son unité, son moi commun, sa vie et sa volonté.105
Instead  of  there  being  a  multitude  of  citizens  in  which  everyone  observes  and  compares
themselves with everyone else,  each individual is  equal in relation as subject  and sovereign.
What is more, it  is through the voluntary acceptance of this moral and social way of being that
freedom is achieved. The people of the Contrat social are free by both choosing their own laws
and choosing to obey them (that is,  following  the general will rather than their own personal
103 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, p. 901.
104 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 380.
105 Ibid., pp. 360-361.
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inclination). As Rousseau explains:
Ce passage de l'état de nature à l'état civil produit dans l'homme un changement très remarquable,
en substituant dans sa conduite la justice à l'instinct, et donnant à ses actions la moralité qui leur
manquait  auparavant.  C'est  alors  seulement  que,  la  voix  du  devoir  succédant  à  l'impulsion
physique et le droit à l'appétit, l'homme, qui jusque-là n'avait regardé que lui-même, se voit forcé
d'agir sur d'autres principes, et de consulter sa raison amant d'écoute, ses penchants.106
However, establishing a system of universal membership is  more  difficult  than simply
defining a relationship. At the heart of the problem is the need to "faites  régner la vertu." The
legislator needs to introduce a method of maintaining virtuous thought and action in the populace
while not assembled as sovereign. To do this, Rousseau argues for public education under rules
prescribed by the government – another necessary maxim of legitimate government.107 In the
Contrat social this task is entrusted to the church – albeit, as a civil religion – which has dogmas
beneficial to the state, making "la patrie l'objet de l'adoration des Citoyens," and making service
to the state the same as service to the "Dieu  tutélaire."108 Corsica, however, had an established
Catholic tradition.109 Rousseau, therefore, moves to establish a class system which encompasses,
reflects, and encourages patriotic action.
The goal of Corsica's class system was both to enshrine a sense of unity and membership
in the public sphere and encourage actions which always aimed towards the public good – that is,
in line with the general will. It included the further benefit of correcting the historical problem of
hereditary classes. To accomplish these goals Rousseau developed three classes which all right-
acting male Corsicans could progress through during their  lifetime.  Of course,  class systems
inherently rely on some form of inequality but to this, Rousseau responds:  "l'inégalité toujours
personnelle pouvait être heureusement substituée à l'inégalité de race ou d'habitation qui résulte
106 Ibid., p. 364.
107 Rousseau, Économie politique, OC iii, p. 252.
108 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 464-465.
109 Although Rousseau does insinuate it could be weakened – in particular by taking Church properties and 
imposing taxes (Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, pp. 931-932).
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du  système  féodal  municipal  que  nous  abolissons."110 What  is  more,  the  benefits  of  class
distinction  would  out-weigh  any divisive  feelings  that  may emerge:  the  actions  they  would
encourage included the cultivation of land, which would be necessary for self-sufficiency; the
building and expansion of families, necessary for the small island to  grow in population and
defend itself; a method for Corsicans to distinguish themselves by establishing their status and
rights through their patriotic duties, the lack of which was something which many of the  old
Corsican "nobles" disliked about Paoli's regime; and finally, by having a politically competitive
class system, Rousseau, ironically, was able to ensure a particular level of equality.  That is,  by
creating classes which citizens could graduate through, access remained equally open to all –
again, so long as laws do not particularize who belongs to a class, equality is maintained.111
Equality is also maintained through a propitious division of the island into twelve regions
of relative equality in terms of natural resources, and by preventing the emergence of large cities
(especially a  large  capital  –  which  Rousseau described as:  "un gouffre  où la  nation presque
entière va perdre ses mœurs, ses lois, son courage et sa liberté").112 What is more,  this division
would make the island as a whole stronger:
Au dedans l'Île est assez grande et coupée par des montagnes; ses grandes et nombreuses rivières
sont peu navigables; ses parties ne communiquent pas naturellement entre elles; mais la différence
de leurs productions les tient dans une dépendance mutuelle par le besoin qu'elles ont les unes des
autres. La Province de Cap Corse qui ne produit presque que du vin a besoin de blés et d'huiles que
lui fournit la Balagna. Corte sur la hauteur donne de même des grains et manque de tout le reste;
Bonifazio au pied des rochers et à l'autre extrémité de l'Île a besoin de tout et ne fournit rien. Le
projet d'une égale population demande donc une circulation de denrées, un versement facile d'une
juridiction dans une autre et par conséquent un commerce intérieur.113
To this end the entire system of commerce would need to be manipulated to prevent inequality
amongst people and regions. The finest way of doing this, according to Rousseau, was to limit
the amount of commerce taking place and money changing hands:
110 Ibid., p. 919.
111 Ibid., pp. 903-904.
112 Ibid., p. 911.
113 Ibid., p. 922.
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Corses, voilà un beau modèle! Ne vous étonnez pas qu'il y eût plus de vertu chez les Romains
qu'ailleurs, l'argent y était moins nécessaire. L'État avait de petits revenus et faisait de grandes
choses. Son trésor était dans les bras des citoyens. Je pourrais dire que par la situation de la Corse
et par la forme de son gouvernement il n'y en aura point au monde de moins dispendieux.114
Thus, just  as  Lycurgus made iron Sparta's official currency to limit commerce and encourage
virtue,  Rousseau  would  use  similar  tricks  to  drive  out  inequality:  he  proposed total  state
ownership of property (or at least, as much as possible) to both maintain equality and strengthen
the government; he attempted to make the movements of people as difficult and inconvenient as
possible so as to maintain an equal distribution of population (including the banning of horse-
drawn carriages and imposing  the penalty of temporary loss of class when  one would move
between  political  regions);  he  also  called on  the  Corsicans  to  "Établissez  alors  des  lois
somptuaires, mais rendez-les toujours plus sévères pour les premiers de l'État, relâchez-les pour
les degrés inférieurs; faites qu'il y ait de la vanité à être simple, et qu'un riche ne sache en quoi se
faire honneur de son argent."115 All of these actions have a particular end in sight: to remove
opportunities in which one's particular will  could encourage negative public actions, while also
moving to particularize the general good. By finding a way of making good actions a part of each
citizen's way of being, Rousseau  was founding "la véritable constitution de l'État"; he is using
laws to develop the character of the Corsican, laws which over time are intended to create the
true citizen. One is seeing a descriptive example of what Rousseau discusses theoretically in the
Contrat social:
Les sages qui veulent parler au vulgaire leur langage au lieu du sien n'en sauraient être entendus…
Pour  qu'un  peuple  naissant  pût  goûter  les  saines  maximes  de  la  politique  et  suivre  les  règles
fondamentales de la raison d'État, il faudrait que l'effet pût devenir la cause; que l'esprit social, qui
doit être l'ouvrage de l'institution, présidât à l'institution même; et que les hommes fussent avant
les lois ce qu'ils doivent devenir par elles. Ainsi donc le législateur ne pouvant employer ni la force
ni le raisonnement, c'est  une nécessité qu'il  recoure à une autorité d'un autre ordre,  qui  puisse
entraîner sans violence et persuader sans convaincre.116
114 Ibid., p. 930.
115 Ibid., p. 931; 945; 936.
116 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 383.
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And not only does  Rousseau want to create this people, but, once again aligning his work on
Corsica with the Contrat social, he makes clear the necessity of consent:
On voit  aisément  comment  le  système  auquel  nous  avons  donné  la  préférence  conduit  à  ces
avantages mais cela ne suffit pas. Il s'agit de faire adopter au peuple la pratique de ce système, de
lui faire aimer l'occupation que nous voulons lui donner, d'y fixer ses plaisirs, ses désirs, ses goûts,
d'en faire généralement le bonheur de la vie, et d'y borner les projets de l'ambition.117
However, the relationship between forming a people and demanding consent is complicated, if
even compatible, and this is perhaps where Rousseau questioned himself most, and may have
ultimately feared his own proposals:
Quoique je sache que la nation corse a des préjugés très contraires à mes principes, mon intention
n'est point d'employer l'art de persuader, pour les leur faire adopter. Je veux leur dire, au contraire,
mon avis et mes raisons avec une telle simplicité, qu'il n' y ait rien qui puisse les séduire; parce
qu'il  est  très  possible  que  je  me  trompe,  et  que  je  serais  bien  fâché  qu'ils  adoptassent  mon
sentiment à leur préjudice.118
It is perhaps for this reason, rather than the invasion of the island by France in 1769, that the
project was never sent to the Corsicans. The draft we have is said to have been completed in 1765
– years before the French invasion. Instead, perhaps, Rousseau knew that it was a project that
would require "l'art de persuader" – that is, the art of the great legislator – an art which he was
unwilling or unable to practice; be it due to health, the lack of opportunity because of Paoli, or
the  acceptance  of  Alexandre  Deleyre's  warning  that  such  a  task  would  require  him to  take
recourse in the deception and cruelty used by Lycurgus and Solon. Rousseau does admit in his
Confessions that the task was beyond his strength. Nonetheless, for our purposes the work offers
an insight into the role of the lawgiver in his system as a whole – in a way which, as will be
demonstrated, is very different when compared to Poland.
117 Rousseau, Corse, OC iii, p. 918. In one of the fragments he gave an ultimatum: "Corses, faites silence, je vais 
parler au nom de tous. Que ceux qui ne consentiront pas s'éloignent, et que ceux qui consentent lève[nt] la main"
(Ibid., p. 942).
118 Ibid., p. 947.
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Chapter VI: Re-founding Poland
Having examined both Geneva and Corsica in Rousseau's writings,  this  thesis now turns to  his
other work of propositional political theory: the Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne
et sur sa réformation projetée (1770-1771).  Rousseau's  work on Poland is  radically different
from his proposals for Corsica and the Contrat social – a point which those who have studied the
work have been forced to come to terms with, and which is essential to the argument being made
in this thesis. Specifically, Pologne differs in that it does not address the founding of a political
society, nor does it offer a constitution. Rousseau makes this clear:
[L]'on ne doit pas oublier ce que j'ai dit dans le Contrat social de l'état de faiblesse et d'anarchie où
se trouve une nation tandis qu'elle établit ou réforme sa constitution. Dans ce moment de désordre
et d'effervescence elle est hors d'état de faire aucune résistance et le moindre choc est capable de
tout renverser. Il importe donc de se ménager à tout prix un intervalle de tranquillité durant lequel
on puisse sans risque agir sur soi-même et rajeunir sa constitution.1
To understand what the risks and possibilities of rejuvenating Poland are, one needs to realize
that Poland in the eighteenth century was, like Geneva, already a well-established state. Because
of this,  Pologne is akin to the  Lettres écrites de la montagne –  it  offers arguments  for a re-
founding based on an already established political system and constitution. Before exploring this
more fully, however, it is worth noting that just as the secondary research dedicated to Corse is
minimal,  the  works  dedicated  to  Pologne takes this  even  further.  In  fact,  in  many  cases
acknowledgment of the work goes only so far as to reference its existence. For example, a recent
biography contains  only one reference to the work – and even that says little: "[Rousseau] did
spend some time trying to compose a plan for a projected new government in Poland, just as he
had  once  done  for  Corsica,  but  he  soon  dropped  the  project  as  unworkable."2 And  in  the
Cambridge  Companion  to  Rousseau "Poland"  is  not  even  included  in  the  index.  Willmoore
1 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, pp. 1036-1037.
2 L. Damrosch, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Restless Genius (Boston, 2005), p. 476.
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Kendall, notes that "it is the least written about of Rousseau's political writings" and goes on to
argue that this lack of interest has led to discrepancies in Rousseau's political proposals being
missed:3
[Rousseau  scholars]  see  no  problem,  particularly  no  problem  of  "continuity,"  as  regards  the
relation between The Government of Poland and […] Rousseau's other ventures in political theory.
For [the] handful of critics who have written on the  Poland […], the book is precisely what we
might fairly have expected from the author of  The Social Contract, given the invitation from a
people "struggling to throw off its chains."4
Of course, Kendall is correct that the two texts are very different, and thus, as mentioned above,
many of the commentaries which attempt to interpret the works in tandem end up failing to
recognize what  is  distinct,  and even incompatible,  about  them.  This  has led to  a  number of
superficial readings  that offer little analysis.5 And those who  have recognized differences have
come up with  interpretations  of  this  which  seem to be  premised more  on convenience  than
analysis.6 For example,  Jeffrey Smith's  2003 argument  begins  by stating "while,  as of 1762,
Rousseau considered Corsica the only country 'still...capable of legislation' that could produce
those virtues [as described in the Contrat social], he has evidently become much less pessimistic
about modern man's prospects by the time of Poland, his final political treatise."7 This, however,
ignores  much  of  what  Rousseau  himself  wrote  –  both  in  the  Contrat  social  and Pologne.
Rousseau did not write with the goal of providing Poland with the virtues he described in the
3 H.C. Mansfield, ‘Preface’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Government of Poland (Indianapolis, 1985), p. viii; W. 
Kendall, ‘Introduction: How to read Rousseau’s "Government of Poland"’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Government of
Poland (Indianapolis, 1985), p. xiv.
4 Ibid., p. xiv.
5 In addition to those addressed in the previous chapter, one can add Fridén's 1998 work in which he argues that 
Rousseau believed that "Poland (like Corsica) possessed one startling resource, its mœurs, undisturbed by 
developments elsewhere in Europe" (B. Fridén, Rousseau’s Economic Philosophy: Beyond the Market of 
Innocents [New York, 1998], p. 71). The problem here is that Rousseau was not attempting to preserve the 
Corsicans mœurs, but help them emerge correctly. This, however, is not what he proposed for Poland (or 
Geneva). Although he was explicit that Poland should avoid radical changes, Polish mœurs were not something 
inherently worth keeping, but simply a reality.
6 Kendall falls into this category. See: W. Kendall, ‘Introduction: How to read Rousseau’s "Government of 
Poland"’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Government of Poland (Indianapolis, 1985), p. xvi.
7 J.A. Smith, ‘Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty in Rousseau’s "Government of Poland"’, The Review 
of Politics 65.3 (2003), p. 420.
 228
Contrat social – the text is much more conservative than this.  As Venturi  noted three decades
earlier: "It is certainly off to see the Contrat social serve as a shield to conservatism in Poland, to
those who rejected any reform of the golden Sarmatian liberty."8 Yet, it is nonetheless in support
of this group which Rousseau's Pologne ends up positioning itself.  Thus, if one wants to find a
unity amongst the two texts, they must begin with their disparity. As Nicholas Dent argued, while
there are "marked differences of content" between Rousseau's  Pologne and  Corse  one area of
unity he does identify is an emphasis on the people who make up the two nations and the way in
which  the  state  must  conform to  their  particular  potentiality.9 Thus,  to  discover similarities
between the texts one must investigate deeper; as Massias has argued: "Même si le texte polonais
est  moins  directement  révolutionnaire  que  le  projet  corse,  il  n’en  comporte  pas  moins  des
dispositions très éclairantes sur la conception très étendue que Rousseau attribue à la puissance
constituante. La encore, tous les domaines sont concernés, de l’économie à l’éducation, rien n’est
étranger au texte constitutionnel."10 Much is the same, yet the outcomes are different. The source
of this distinction, as has been argued, can be stated this way: some peoples are capable of being
founded, others must be re-founded.
To once again  demonstrate this division between founding a  political  system and re-
founding  one, this chapter is divided into six parts: First,  it looks at the history of the  eastern
European  state,  examining  its already  established  constitution  and  government.  Second,  it
examines the intellectual culture both in and related to Poland, and the relationship Rousseau had
to the state, asking what his actual task and goals were or could have been. It then moves on to
more direct comparisons between Pologne and Rousseau's other works. This is divided into four
sections:  first,  an examination of  the  people  of  Poland,  highlighting  why  they  were,  in
8 F. Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1970), p. 129.
9 N. Dent, Rousseau (London, 2005), p. 175.
10 J.-P. Massias, ‘Les projets de Constitution selon Jean-Jacques Rousseau’, in M. Lafourcade (ed.), Les origines 
du constitutionnalisme et la Constitution de Bayonne du 7 juillet 1808 (Donostia, 2009), p. 130.
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Rousseauvian terms, inappropriate  to be given new laws; second,  it  looks at the idea of Polish
freedom being discussed in the text and how it  differs from what Rousseau described in the
Contrat social;  third,  it turns to education  and its importance to re-foundings;11 and finally  it
looks at some of the contextually similar (in the case of the Lettres écrites de la montagne) and
dissimilar (in the case of the Contrat social) arguments.
History of Poland
The first Polish state was founded in 966 when King Mieszko I (962-992) embraced Western
Christianity. Mieszko's Piast dynasty ruled until 1138, after which a weakened Poland began to
suffer from regular encroachments and invasions – especially by the Teutonic Knights. However,
unlike the regular attacks suffered by Corsica (attacks which kept the island in a state of political
infancy), many of these foreigners made home in Poland and founded new villages and towns,
brining with them craftsman and scholars. Thus from the beginning Poland was being integrated
into, rather than segregated from, the rest of Europe.
However, there are two key elements to the emergence and history of Poland which made
if unique in Europe: the relationship with the "huge and more primitive dukedom" Lithuania to
the North-East and the resilient Polish nobility and gentry who, as the dominant class, prevented
the emergence of an absolute monarch.12 In regard to the former, in 1385 the two nations entered
a union of crowns with the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Władysław II Jagiełło, marrying the queen
regnant  Jadwiga  of  Poland.  Initially  both  nations  maintained  political  independence  while
working together to expand and defeat the Teutonic Knights. The union was so successful that by
1490 Jagiełło's  dynasty had managed to extract allegiance from most of Central  and Eastern
11 Whereas education is discussed in Rousseau's works for Poland and Geneva, his proposals for Corsica and the 
Contrat social do not address the topic.
12 N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 16.
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Europe.13 However,  external successes resulted in internal strife,  which leads to the second key
element. The Polish nobility (which made up about ten per cent of the population) began to worry
that their privileged position would become weakened as the state grew and the king's success
was cemented. Thus, they offered military support in exchange for the enshrinement of a number
of privileges, including the creation of provincial dietines and a national diet, and over time legal
immunity,  freedom  of  faith,  and  a  monopoly  over  land-ownership. These privileges  would
ultimately be the basis  of the Polish constitution,  and lead to the emergence of Poland's "noble
democracy," and the Polish General Sejm (1493).14
The Sejm was initially divided between the king and two chambers: the Diet (lower) and
Senate (upper). The Diet was made up of officials elected by the Dietines (or Semjik) with only
the authority to discuss the issues they had been authorized to represent by their Dietine – albeit
as representatives of the gentry rather than their localities generally or the clergy. It would meet
for  six-week  sessions  every  two  years  during which  the  delegates  worked  by consensus  to
achieve the goals that each representative was sent with – there was no legitimacy in deputies
arguing for issues they were not in a position to represent (a caveat that would eventually allow
them to  avoid  agreeing  to  anything  they  personally  felt  they  did  not  have  the  authority  to
address).  Senators  were  spiritual  and  temporal  representatives,  made  up  of  archbishops  and
bishops, important local officials, governors, castellans, state officials, and ministers. The Senate
would meet at the same time as Diets or when convened by the King (who also acted as head of
the Senate),  in addition to  having a core group of twenty-eight Senators who would remain in
session continuously. 
The third official body of Poland was the king, who  ruled when the Sejm was not in
13 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
14 P. Skwarczyński, ‘The Constitution of Poland before the Partition’, in W.F. Reddaway (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Poland (Cambridge, 1950), p. 55; 49.
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session (that is, for 98 our 104 weeks). He managed one sixth of Polish land and population, had
greater military and economic resources, gave royal favours (tenancies to royal land), chose the
sixteen officers of the state, and held a number of other official powers (temporal and spiritual).15
Nonetheless,  these powers were increasingly checked by the gentry,  who actively worked to
extract more political rights and fight off the emergence of an absolutist ruler (the emergence of
which they witnessed to their East and West), instating an era of noble "golden freedom." In 1505
they were able to extort from the king the Nihil Novi ("Nothing New") statute, a right which was
in many ways similar to Geneva's droit negatif by forbidding any new laws or taxes from being
introduced without the consent of both chambers of the Sejm.16 
In  1569  the  Union  of  Lublin  was  agreed  to,  a  treaty  which  ended  the  political
independence of Poland and Lithuania and paved the way for perhaps the greatest of the nobles'
rights: in 1573,  when the last of the Jagełłonian dynasty died, the nobles secured the power to
elect future monarchs.  What is more, as the nobles' powers grew, the king's began to vanish.
Poland emerged as a true constitutional state with a social contract – there was a pacta conventa
between king and "society" (in reality, the gentry) which was signed by both parties, and would
be renewed with every new king. New duties could be, and were, added to this contract, which
would become law,  but  lasted  only as  long as  the  king  who had signed them  reigned. This
contract also forbade the establishment of a hereditary monarch.17 After a century of the nobles
consolidating internal  power,  however,  external  problems  began  to  re-emerge. In  particular,
uprisings in the Ukraine and invasions from Turkey and Sweden became important issues in the
seventeenth century. This external pressure,  rather  than  pushing the nobles  to work together,
encouraged  the most powerful families to  buttress   their own positions in any way possible –
15 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (Oxford, 2005), pp. 256–257.
16 Ibid., p. 254; N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 19.
17 P. Skwarczyński, ‘The Constitution of Poland before the Partition’, in W.F. Reddaway (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Poland (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 51–53.
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even  if  it  meant turning to  foreign powers –  and by  the late  eighteenth century  Poland had
become a volatile place.18 However, it maintained its surprisingly well established constitutional
government. In fact, the very volatility which emerged was in some ways a point of pride. From
the sixteenth century until the partitions in the eighteenth century, a popular Polish catchphrase
was Nierzadem Polska stoi; that is, "it is by unrule that Poland stands."19 Thus, "anarchie" was
seen as a prime principle of Polish government,  while elsewhere in Europe  it was seen as a
source  of  chaos  and terror.  Rousseau himself  wrote  that  anarchy was  the  cause  of  Poland's
problems in  the  late  eighteenth  century  and  this  belief  was  maintained  into the  nineteenth
century:20 "To the Prussian and Russian historians who interpreted its downfall as part of their
own  rise  to  fame,  it  exhibited  a  degenerate  form  of  government  which  had  been  rightly
supplanted  by  the  progressive  and  benevolent  rule  of  their  own  monarchs."21 The  Polish,
nonetheless, continued to praise their historic constitution: the Polish novelist Kazimierz Brandys
(1916-2000) wrote that for three-hundred years before its partition and the loss of independence,
Poland had remained free from upheaval while "Europe was staggered with peasant revolts,  an
Inquisition, dynastic wars, religious wars, the Hundred Years War, [and] the Thirty Years War."22
This stability was in some ways both based on, and in spite of, two constitutional practices: the
liberum veto and the confederacies.
The  liberum veto was  a  constitutional  rule  which  grew out  of  the  Sejm's  consensus
method of operation and the fact that representatives had no legitimate right to legislate on issues
on which they had not been given approval. It ultimately allowed any single member of the Sejm
to halt all business – that is, it was a political right enjoyed by every member of the Diet which
18 N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), pp. 20–22.
19 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (Oxford, 2005), p. 246.
20 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 959. Anarchy was both an accepted description of the Polish political system and 
devoid of ideological baggage.
21 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (Oxford, 2005), p. 246.
22 Quoted in N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 1.
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allowed for the rejection of the entire slate of legislative work of that session. To understand how
disruptive this  was  one need only look at Sejm success rates: from 1697-1733 eleven out of
twenty  sessions  were  ended  by  veto;  from  1733-1763,  only  one  session  was  successfully
concluded.23 This led to decentralization and a larger role being played by the Dietines. What is
more, this political formality was supported by Poland's enemies abroad – Russia in particular
adopted the position of "guarantor" of the "noble democracy."24 Those nobles who looked outside
of Poland to strengthen their own position internally were encouraged to use the liberum veto at
times when foreign powers  felt potential reforms could strengthen the state comparatively – in
fact, every European power had at least one deputy in their pay who they were able to use to end
an unfavourable session. Thus, as Davies has pointed out, the liberum veto, a tool originally used
to  protect  Poland  from  the  emergence  of  an  absolutist  leader  became  the  tool  of  foreign
absolutists.25
The importance of the liberum veto to the nobles was made clear when King Stanisław
August Poniatowski (1732-1798), who was a reported lover of Catherine the Great and a would-
be enlightened despot himself, maneuvered to turn Poland into a 'modern state.' During his reign
(1764-1795) he attempted  to increase crown power  and limit the powers of  the wealthy Polish
magnates by limiting the liberum veto. The result was outright conflict, and the emergence of two
"confederations" –  the other constitutional practice which resulted in instability.  These ad hoc
organizations were made up of nobles who shared political aims, and agreed to work together to
achieve  shared  goals or in their own self-defence – "a legalized form of civil war."26 What is
more, they were legitimized out of the contract between the gentry and the king: if he failed in
23 Ibid., p. 265.
24 N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 22. This state of affairs was made especially clear 
in the 1730s when Russia invaded Poland to depose king Stanisław Leszczyński (who was a French and 
Swedish nominee).
25 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (Oxford, 2005), p. 266.
26 Ibid., p. 260.
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his obligations, as outlined in the contract he had made with Polish society, it was the nobles'
duty to correct this state of affairs – this was referred to as the "omnipotence of the gentry."27 And
the  necessity  of  these  occasional  confederacies  should  not  be  surprising  –  the  inability  to
institutionally legislate during moments of crisis (due to the  liberum veto) required some other
method of maintaining order. 
During  Stanisław's rule  two confederations  emerged:  the  Confederation  of  Radom in
1767, a Russian supported group of protestant and orthodox nobles,  and the anti-Russian and
Catholic Confederation of Bar in 1768. It was during this time of legislative stale-mate, political
anarchy, and potential civil-war, that one finds Count Michal Wielhorski (1730-1794), a member
of  the  Confederation  of  Bar,  contact  Rousseau  and  ask  for  political  advice.28 Unfortunately,
unlike  with  Buttafoco,  we  do  not  have  the  original  correspondence  between  Rousseau  and
Wielhorski, although one is able to piece together the essential problem and proposal.
The problem, as Wielhorski saw it, was the long-standing Polish fear that their monarchy
would, as it had elsewhere in Europe, decline into tyranny – a fear which was at the "very heart
of the Polish political  tradition."29 This meant,  ironically,  that  the reforms being proposed by
Stanisław, albeit prudent in the face of the liberum veto and Polish instability, were also seen as
evidence  of  this  move towards  absolutism  and  therefore,  necessitated  the checks  on  the
monarch's  power.  Wielhorski  thus set  Rousseau  the goal  of protecting Poland from both her
encroaching neighbours and herself.30 What power Wielhorski had to implement any reforms is
questionable – it could be the case, as Willmoore Kendall has put it, that he was simply asking
27 P. Skwarczyński, ‘The Constitution of Poland before the Partition’, in W.F. Reddaway (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Poland (Cambridge, 1950), p. 60.
28 Ultimately this was futile. In 1772 Frederick the Great, Catherine the Great, and Joseph II agreed to intervene in 
Poland, and by 1795 the Polish state no longer existed.
29 J. Lukowski, ‘Recasting Utopia: Montesquieu, Rousseau and the Polish Constitution of 3 May 1791’, The 
Historical Journal 37.1 (1994), p. 70.
30 N. Dent, Rousseau (London, 2005), p. 175.
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what "kind of constitution Poland should give itself if and when it found itself in control of its
own  destiny."31 Thus,  the  potential  for  actual  implementation  in  Poland  is questionable.
Regardless of the possibility of actualizing Rousseau's proposals,  however,  to understand what
the proposals meant one must look at the relationship between Rousseau and Poland.
Intellectual Culture, Rousseau, and Poland
Before moving on to  Rousseau's  particular arguments  for Poland, it is worth highlighting the
place  of  the nation within the broader intellectual world during, and leading up to,  the time of
Rousseau's own interest. To start, Poland was not a cultural hotbed. The "Polish Enlightenment"
– which roughly coincided with the reign of Stanisław, but more broadly ran from the 1720s,
continued through the partitions, and concluded with the November Uprising in 183032 – was
made up of somewhere between 700-800 direct participants publishing "in the spirit of belonging
to the Enlightenment" and upwards of 2000 people if one incudes "those individuals who played
a role as a lively literary audience, and thus participated in the intellectual ferment, even if only
passively."33 This is a miniscule number in relation to the population as a whole. The influence of
this group is also questionable; in 1790 Stanislaw Staszic exclaimed: "How far behind Poland is!
What efforts have been made by other countries… Poland has just entered the fifteenth century
while  the  rest  of  Europe  is  almost  finished  with  the  eighteenth."34 This  was,  of  course,  an
exaggeration  –  even  before  the  eighteenth  century  Polish  intellectuals  were  aware  of,  and
engaging with, the problematic aspects of Poland's political system and as early as the sixteenth
century there were those who viewed the aristocracy's "golden freedom" as harmful.
One such thinker was Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski (1503-1572) whose writings were read
31 W. Kendall, ‘Introduction: How to read Rousseau’s "Government of Poland"’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The 
Government of Poland (Indianapolis, 1985), p. x.
32 B. Grochulska, ‘The Place of the Enlightenment in Polish Social History’, A Republic of Nobles: Studies in 
Polish History to (1964), p. 245.
33 Ibid., p. 249.
34 Quoted in Ibid., p. 250.
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across Europe, and, although hardly known today, was mentioned in the same breath as many of
the most influential thinkers of the era.35 He offered a "synthetic view of the state and society"
and "fearlessly condemned the oppression of the peasants, the exclusion of the bourgeoisie, the
ignorance of the clergy, the luxury of the nobility." In some ways his writings have a resemblance
to Rousseau's: "His ability to combine the best features of the ancient political thought and to
adapt them to the realities of sixteenth century Europe brought [Modrzewski] the attention of
such writers  as  Bodin,  Althusius,  and Grotius."36 Modrzewski  was  followed by other  Polish
intellectuals,  including: Mikolaj  Rey  (1505-1569),  who  was  known  for  his  "acute  social
conscience"; The Polish Brothers and the spread of Socinianism, which would come to have an
important theological impact across Europe; and Grzegorz Pawel z Brzezin (1525-1591),  who
made  a  name  for  himself  as  a  "leveller  of  the  most  militant  stamp."37 There  were  also
conservative critics, such as Piotr Skarga (1536-1612) who supported the absolutist divine right
of kings and the Counter-Reformation (which, in the noble democracy, made him as much of a
critic of the state as those who preached equality).
With  time  issues  were  located elsewhere.  Stefan  Garczynski  (1690-1756),  expressing
concern over Poland's  apparent  backwardness,  attacked  the clergy.38 Stanislaw Staszic  (1755-
1826) and Hugo Kollataj (1750-1812) both argued that Polish underdevelopment was directly
linked to a lack of resource exploitation. The latter argued for a reformed tax system capable of
maintaining the state and army, while the former saw industrial  development as the solution,
noting the potential within Poland for huge economic growth.39 Thus, by the eighteenth century
35 See Rev. John Beale's letter to Robert Boyle, 13 March 1673: "For doctrine, I should have good helps from 
Picherell, Grotius, Modrevius, and a hundred more, some assisting in one point, some in another" (R. Boyle, The
Correspondence of Robert Boyle [London, 2001], pp. 345–346).
36 A. Ulam, ‘Andreas Fricius Modrevius–A Polish Political Theorist of the Sixteenth Century’, The American 
Political Science Review 40.3 (1946), p. 485.
37 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (Oxford, 2005), p. 273.
38 B. Grochulska, ‘The Place of the Enlightenment in Polish Social History’, A Republic of Nobles: Studies in 
Polish History to (1964), p. 250.
39 Ibid., pp. 250–251.
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there was a strong sense of something being wrong with Poland, but the ability to pinpoint the
cause, or the path to correcting it, remained unclear. Of course, this was not a universal belief –
one  of  the  more  subscribed  to  Polish  intellectual  movements in  the  eighteenth  century  was
largely made up of aristocratic opponents of the Enlightenment and reform.
Sarmatianism was  the  dominant  ideology  amongst  the  Confederation  of  Bar,  largely
supportive of the rights and ways of the gentry,  and arguing that the Polish form of democracy
was  "exceptional,  specific,  and  superior  to  all  foreign  forms  of  political  life."40 Although
recognizing  that  Poland  faced  some  institutional  problems,  it  sought  a  particular national
solution. The minor inconveniences caused by their political system (as they saw them), and the
tyrannies  they  witnessed  amongst  their  neighbours,  made  a  foreign  solution  unpalatable.
However,  in reality,  the Polish knew practically little of Western Europe: "When they talked of
the absolutum dominum which they much feared, they were not thinking of France or Spain. For
them, the only real models of judgement were the 'clerical' despotism of Austria, the 'oriental'
despotism of Turkey, and the 'barbarian' despotism of Muscovy."41 The political "realities" which
they were aware of made absolutism look, if not entirely less stable than Polish anarchy, certainly
less desirable,  and similarily to Geneva, the many refugees who had settled in Poland, fleeing
prosecution at home, encouraged this. However, the ideology was complicated by references to
ideals that were not particularly Polish: democracy and republicanism.
Importantly,  the West knew  just as  little of Poland. Eastern Europe from the sixteenth
century was, as a whole, an "intellectual object under construction" (although perhaps not to the
same extent as Corsica). Amongst the scholarly classes the state  began to be discussed  in the
40 H. Hinz, ‘The Philosophy of the Polish Enlightenment and Its Opponents: The Origins of the Modern Polish 
Mind’, Slavic Review 30.2 (1971), p. 345. Sarmatianism was based in a mythical legend of the Polish gentry. It 
was said that they were direct descendants of Sarmatians (an ancient Iranian tribe) who had come to Poland and 
enslaved the local population.
41 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (Oxford, 2005), p. 275.
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mid-sixteenth century,  as Polish thinkers  themselves  began to be made known.  The state was
seen  during this  time in a number of  different  ways – some saw it  as  a  "haven of  political
liberty", both in terms of its elected and contractual monarch, and for its religious tolerance (for
some),  while others saw its liberalness as a weakness and its noble "democracy" as little more
than an unruly and oversized oligarchy.42 Bodin in particular saw the decentralization of Poland
as running counter  to the prevailing trend in Europe. Thus, it offered something for everyone:
"the  Republic  […] provided an  inexhaustible  fund of  curiosities.  Its  increasingly ineffective
practices gave Absolutists ample material for demonstrating the superiority of their arguments;
whilst its libertarian ideals gained the admiration of republicans and constitutionalists."43 Poland
was a playground for the imagined political philosophies coming from the West – it was not the
land of barbarians (which Corsica was), but it was also not, as Voltaire would say, "our part of
Europe."44 The difficulty of fitting Poland into a wider political understanding was compounded
by the inability to fit its constitution into the accepted tripartite distinction, with many thinkers
struggling to simply come up with an accurate title for the Polish king.45
It is not surprising, then, that in the eighteenth century Poland remained "an object of
bewilderment, if not contempt, to outside observers."46 Charles de La Condamine  (1701-1774)
wrote: "Le gouvernement de Pologne, sa constitution, sa manière de faire les élections, de tenir
les Diètes, est si absurde qu'elle ne peut subsister."47 In Montesquieu's  Lettres Persanes it was
reported that Poland "qui use si mal de sa liberté et du droit qu'elle a d'élire ses rois, qu'il semble
42 Although not every sect felt that extreme toleration in Poland was ideal and not every religion was tolerated to 
the same extent (or at all, at times, as made clear by Jewish pogroms).
43 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (Oxford, 2005), p. 272.
44 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994),
p. 360.
45 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 [Oxford, 2005], p. 277.
46 J. Lukowski, ‘Political Ideas among the Polish Nobility in the Eighteenth Century (To 1788)’, The Slavonic and 
East European Review 82.1 (2004), p. 2.
47 Quoted in Ibid., p. 2.
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qu'elle veuille consoler par là les peuples ses voisins, qui ont perdu l'un et l'autre."48 He returned
to  it in  De l'esprit des  lois,  writing, in reference to the  liberum veto,  that "l'indépendance de
chaque particulier est l'objet des loix de Pologne; & ce qui en résulte l'oppression de tous."49 On
the other side of the ideological divide, Polish enemy Frederick the Great wrote: "The throne is
so blatantly on sale that it seems as if it is purchased in the public market, and the liberality of the
king of  Poland clears  away all  opposition by conferring [offices]  upon the great  families."50
Frederick's ideological supporter, Voltaire, also had much to say about Poland, from the Histoire
de Charles XII (1731) to La princesse de Babylone (1768), he was willing and happy to attack
the aspects of the Polish system which he opposed: inequality, corruption, legalized disorder due
to the confederacies, and the liberum veto.51 He attacked Sarmatianism and the Confederation of
Bar directly on at least two occasions: the first under the name of J. Bourdillon in the 1767 Essai
historique  et  critique  sur  les  dissensions  des  églises Pologne,  and  the  second,  as  Le  Major
Kaiserling au Service Roi de Prusse, in the 1768 Discours aux confédérés de Kaminiek. In both
he  attacks  the  "noble  democracy",  depicts  the  Confederates  of  Bar  as  a  rebellion,  decries
religious  fanaticism in Poland,  calls  for  the emancipation of  the  peasants,  and compares  the
political  system negatively to  the enlightened monarchs  of  Prussia  and Russia.52 In  the end,
Voltaire went so far as to directly support and encourage military intervention in the country (by
both Catherine and Frederick), arguing that it could be justified as an act in support of religious
toleration.53
Not every Enlightenment commentator was as harsh. Mably,  who was also invited  by
48 Montesquieu, Lettres persanes (London, 1735), p. 134.
49 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des loix, i (Geneva, 1748), bk. xi. v (p. 243).
50 Frederick II, The Refutation of Machiavelli’s Prince: or, Anti-Machiavel (Athens, Ohio, 1981), p. 127.
51 Voltaire, Histoire de Charles XII, i (Basle, 1731), pp. 106–109; 34–35; 112–113; La princesse de Babilone 
(Geneva, 1768), p. 103.
52 H. Hinz, ‘The Philosophy of the Polish Enlightenment and Its Opponents: The Origins of the Modern Polish 
Mind’, Slavic Review 30.2 (1971), p. 345; L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the 
Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994), p. 263.
53 E. Andrew, Patrons of Enlightenment (Toronto, 2006), p. 117.
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Wielhorski  to write proposals for the reformation of the Polish constitution, was less hostile to
Polish  history  and  traditions,  but  was  nonetheless  radical  in  his  proposals.  Believing,  like
Rousseau, that "a constitution must have a definite relation to the traditions, the customs and the
temper  of  the  people,"  he  studied  Wielhorski's  notes  and  wrote  the first  draft  of  his  Du
gouvernement  et  des lois de la Pologne with the Polish people,  state,  and history in mind.54
Although the  first  partition  in  1772 meant  that  the  work's  original  purpose  was  lost,  Mably
remained interested in the plight of the nation and visited from 1776-1777, a trip which allowed
him further reflection  and led to  the publication of his writings on Poland in 1781. This final
version is a large tome which offers a fairly radical project.  Reforms include a call to embrace
republicanism and abandon the "barbarie des Sarmates";55 ultimately (although not immediately)
free the peasants,  arguing: "Il  serait très  facile de faire voir,  de la manière la plus évidente,
combien la république deviendrait en peu de temps puissante et heureuse, si elle intéressait à son
sort les bourgeois, les paysans & ces juifs";56 embrace constitutional change to secure a stable,
albeit limited, hereditary monarch; eliminate the liberum veto;57 and, seemingly contradictory for
a man who has been cast  as a proto-socialist,  calls  for Poland to embrace economic reform,
pushing for a modernized economic system and a stronger engagement in commerce. He wrote:
[V]ous êtes accoutumé à m'entendre blâmer le commerce, & souvent d'une manière assez dure.
J'aurai l'honneur de vous répondre que le commerce est nécessaire à tous les peuples qui ne sont
pas sauvages et qui veulent sortir de leur barbarie. Je le louerai, lorsque sans faste et sans luxe il
sert des besoins simples et n'irrite pas nos passions. Le commerce, qui a besoin d'être encouragé
pour parvenir jusqu'à un certain terme qui est louable, veut être arrêté dans ses progrès, des que,
passant ce terme, il n'est propre qu'à relâcher les liens de la société par la corruption qu'il introduit
dans les mœurs.58
54 E.A. Whitfield, Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (London, 1930), p. 12; D. Stone, Polish Politics and National Reform,
1775-1788 (New York, 1976), p. 272. The first manuscript was read by Rousseau, and some have argued it 
inspired him to take up the task (J.K. Wright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-century France: The 
Political Thought of Mably [Stanford, 1997], p. 163).
55 G.B. de Mably, Oeuvres complètes de l’Abbé de Mably: Du gouvernement de Pologne, et des Etats Unis 
d’Amérique (Paris, 1797), p. 13.
56 Ibid., p. 114.
57 Ibid., p. 174.
58 Ibid., pp. 155–156.
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In the end, the unifying theme amongst commentators on Poland was a call for radical change:
"In such an atmosphere, it was a bold spirit indeed who dared to say anything favourable of the
Polish constitution. Even apologists […] and the proponents of Reform, from Baudeau to Mably,
were given to blackwashing Poland in the hope of provoking change."59 However, Rousseau took
a radically different approach to solving the problems facing Poland. 
To understand the divergence this thesis is attempting to draw attention to, one may want
to begin with the titles: the  Projet de  constitution pour la Corse is about the foundation of a
people – about their constitution. Again, Rousseau highlights  the importance of "constitutions"
(the most important law) in the Contrat social when he explains that constitutional laws are not
simply written, but they are a people's morals, customs, and opinions – those things which were
given  to  them during  their  initial  founding and  form  the immovable keystone  of a  society.60
However,  when  turning  to  Poland,  he  gives  his  work  the  title:  Considérations  sur  le
gouvernement de Pologne. That is, he is offering thoughts on a state and people which already
have laws and government; which has already been founded. In fact, in an early draft of the work
Rousseau gave it the title Constitution et République, but later crossed these three words out and
replaced them simply with "gouvernement" – clearly this was an important distinction to him.61
If it is indeed the case that Rousseau was unwilling to replace or radically manipulate
Poland's already established constitution, one may ask why it was a task Rousseau felt worthy of
taking on? One can begin to  answer this question by addressing why he was contacted.  Again,
with the Corsicans it is not surprising – he identified the island in the Contrat social specifically,
and this would have created an interest from the island itself. In the case of Poland, however, it
may have been his writings on equality: "Rousseau held an inevitable appeal for szlachta [noble]
59 N. Davies, God’s Playground A History of Poland: Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (Oxford, 2005), p. 281.
60 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 394.
61 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 1733.
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ideologues,  whose  political  philosophy  was  so  often  reduced  to  despairing  egalitarian
moralization."62 Rousseau  and  the  nobles  shared  an  interest  in  the  ideas  and  problems
surrounding equality – as to did Mably. In fact, this may be the reason Rousseau took on the task.
It is  known that Rousseau read Mably's  work,  and perhaps  it was  seeing his warnings in the
Contrat social being ignored (with regard to redrafting constitutions) that led to him to offering
his own proposals. 
In regard to Rousseau's intellectual ability to respond, we know that Rousseau knew little
about Poland directly – he himself admits that the majority of  what he knew came from a six-
month study which included reading a manuscript written by Wielhorski,63 Mably's work, a piece
by  Pfefel's  describing  the  laws of  Poland,  and  a  discussion  on  Polish  anarchy  by  Claude-
Carolman de Rulhiere (his Histoire de l'anarchie de Pologne would not be published until after
Rousseau's own work was complete, but they did communicate while Rousseau was writing).64
Beyond  Rousseau's  minimal  acquaintance  with  Poland  as  a  subject,  it  should  also  be
remembered, as mentioned above, that Eastern Europe at this time was an "intellectual object
under  construction."  Larry  Wolff  has  written  that  it  was  Rousseau's  "perfect  innocence  and
ignorance of the nation and its neighbors that enabled him to theorize imaginatively."65 He goes
on  to  argue  that  "the  Considerations transcends  its  commission  as  a  critique  of  Polish
government  and made its  contribution  to  the  Enlightenment  as  an  original  work of  political
theory."66 While important to keep in mind when considering historical accuracy, this overstates
62 J. Lukowski, ‘Recasting Utopia: Montesquieu, Rousseau and the Polish Constitution of 3 May 1791’, The 
Historical Journal 37.1 (1994), p. 69.
63 Some version of his Essai sur le rétablissement de l'ancienne forme de gouvernement de Pologne.
64 T. Szkudlarek, ‘On Nations And Children: Rousseau, Poland And European Identity’, Studies in Philosophy and 
Education 24.1 (2005), pp. 21–22; L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of 
the Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994), p. 272. It should be noted that all these sources were connected to 
Wielhorski and the Confederates of Bar.
65 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994),
p. 236.
66 Ibid., p. 238.
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the argument on two fronts. First,  everything was possible in the  Contrat social because the
"people" being discussed were imagined (albeit, as an ideal people of the correct metaphorical
age). In contrast, the Polish people, even if not thoroughly known by Rousseau, were still known
in  their imagined entirety.  Rousseau may not  have had a  totality of  knowledge in  regard  to
Poland, but what he did have still posed problems that he did not face when writing the Contrat
social. Second, a "perfect innocence" is unlikely. Although Rousseau makes it clear he was not
an expert on Poland, and Poland itself was not a common topic in the same ways Corsica was, it
was a topic discussed amongst political theorists and Rousseau would have been familiar with it
through the works of others – for example, criticisms are found in Jean Bodin's Six livres de la
République (1576)  and Pufendorf's  Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms and
States of Europe (1695) – and supporters of the Polish state included Calvin's successor Theodore
Beza,  who praised  the  Pacta  Conventa  in  his  De jure  magistratuum  (1574), as  well  as  the
influential  Huguenot  philosopher  of  political  contractualism  Stephen  Junius  Brutus,  who
discussed Poland in the Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579). Thus, Poland was, albeit in a limited
manner, a topic of intellectual discussion which Rousseau would have been familiar 
Nonetheless,  Rousseau's awareness was limited, and in this sense  Wolff may be  correct
when  he  argues:  "Rousseau's  recasting  of  the  Government  of  Poland  was  [...]  intellectually
removed from its subject, from Poland itself."67 Although it was directed towards a conception of
Poland, it was Rousseau's particular conception. His limited knowledge may have forced him to
come up with a "literary solution" which was born out of his own imagination and philosophical
system.  The point, however, is that it is a systematic and Rousseauvian solution.  In this way,
Rousseau's writings on Poland allow one to gain a deeper understanding of his system when
67 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994),
p. 237.
 244
considered  in  their  particular  context,  if  not  a  deeper  understanding  of  Poland. Rousseau's
response  takes  all  of  Poland's  mystery,  absurdity,  and  instability  –  everything  which  made
everyone else see Poland as awkward, dangerous, and politically problematic – as a starting point
from which the rest of his argument  is born. He saw his work as offering the necessary and
essential response to these conditions – imagined or not.
An Inappropriate People
While  Rousseau saw an affinity between the  people  of  Corsica and the people  he imagined
suitable  for  his  social  contract,  he  recognized  incongruences  between  the  Eastern  European
nation  and  the  imagined  world  in  the  Contrat  social.  Nonetheless,  although  different  raw
materials,  they  remained  the  materials  to  be worked with.  This  is  perhaps  most  clearly
demonstrated in  Rousseau's,  previously quoted, description of a  people who are ready to be
legislated for.68 When compared to the Polish people, it is clear that they (like the Genevans) did
not fit the description: Poland was both already in a union (both in convention, as a noble class
who had come to see themselves as united, and technically, with the Union of Lublin) as well as
having felt the yoke of laws (it had a well-established and stable constitution, and the Sejm had
been meeting for nearly three hundred years). The Polish people had deep-rooted customs and
superstitions,  and the rival Confederations of Radom and Bar (who threatened civil-war;  i.e.,
hardly a "docile" people) were themselves split along religious beliefs. In fact, there was  very
little confessional affinity, with  populations which could be labeled Catholic, Judaic, Calvinist,
Lutheran, Islamic, Eastern Orthodox, and Uniate (owing to toleration having been a legal statute
from 1573 – something  else Rousseau did not  approve of  in  the  Contrat  social).69 Poland's
68 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 390-391.
69 P. Skwarczyński, ‘The Constitution of Poland before the Partition’, in W.F. Reddaway (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Poland (Cambridge, 1950), p. 68; N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 5. 
This began to change in 1717 when limitations were placed on protestant and orthodox services, as well as 
attacks launched on Arians, Tatars, Jews, and Muslims. Catholicism was declared the official confession of 
Poland in 1766 and 1768 (Ibid., p. 18).
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population was also too divisive to have a sense of a national identity beyond that found amongst
the nobles. Instead, Poland in the eighteenth century was made up of ethnic Poles, Lithuanians,
Jews (who made up 10 per cent of the total  population), Germans, Ukrainians,  Belorussians,
Ruthenians, Tartars, and even a substantial Scottish population – ethnic Poles only made up about
half  of  the  total  population.70 Finally,  there  was  very  little  unity amongst  the  burgers  and
peasants, let alone any sense of "being" Polish.
Size was also an issue. By the seventeenth century Poland was almost a million  square
kilometres and contained around six million people, second only to Muscovy in size.71 Rousseau
was clear on the problems facing such a state:
Comme la nature a donné des termes à la stature d'un homme bien conformé, passé lesquels elle ne
fait plus que des géants ou des nains, il y a de même, eu égard à la meilleure constitution d'un État,
des  bornes à  l'étendue qu'il  peut  avoir,  afin  qu'il  ne soit  ni  trop grand pour pouvoir  être  bien
gouverné, ni trop petit pour pouvoir se maintenir par lui-même.72
While geography was an advantage to places like Geneva and Corsica, the opposite was true in
Poland:
Évitons,  s'il  se  peut,  de  nous  jeter  dès  les  premiers  pas  dans  des  projets  chimériques.  Quelle
entreprise, Messieurs, vous occupe en ce moment? Celle de réformer le Gouvernement de Pologne,
c'est-à-dire de donner à la constitution d'un grand royaume la consistance et la vigueur de celle
d'une petite république. Avant de travailler à l'exécution de ce projet, il faudrait voir d'abord, s'il est
possible d'y réussir. Grandeur des Nations! Étendue des États! première et principale source des
malheurs  du  genre  humain  et  surtout  des  calamités  sans  nombre  qui  minent  et  détruisent  les
peuples policés.73
There was also a legitimate concern that Poland would be invaded, and it had no realistic chance
of defending itself (unlike Corsica which had just freed itself). Poland "lies on a natural invasion
route for those entering Europe from the East and those attacking Russia from the West. It also
70 B. Grochulska, ‘The Place of the Enlightenment in Polish Social History’, A Republic of Nobles: Studies in 
Polish History to (1964), p. 248; N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 5; W. Lithgow, 
The Totall Discourse, of the Rare Aduentures, and Painefull Peregrinations of Long Nineteene Yeares Trauayle 
(London, 1632), p. 422.
71 P. Skwarczyński, ‘The Constitution of Poland before the Partition’, in W.F. Reddaway (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Poland (Cambridge, 1950), p. 51.
72 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 386.
73 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 970. Rousseau goes so far as to suggest Poland give up some of its territory and 
shrink (Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 971).
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means Poland has no 'natural frontiers' across that east-west Axis."74 Rousseau was aware of this
deficiency, stating at the beginning of his work: "La Pologne est un grand État environné d'États
encore plus considérables, qui par leur despotisme et par leur discipline militaire, ont une grande
force offensive. Faible au contraire par son anarchie, elle est, malgré la valeur polonaise, en butte
à tous leurs outrages."75 Wielhorski argued that this was not a new position for Poland: "Telle fut
long-temps la situation de notre Patrie, que, la voyant fur le bord du précipice, nous craignions
qu'elle n'y fût engloutie par le moindre accident."76 Poland was in a precarious position – on the
one hand, it  had  fertile land, and during  the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it had become an
important exporter,  but  she was also prone to natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, and
crop-killing frosts.77 Thus, in good times, Poland's neighbours relied on its exports and in bad
times, Poland relied on others – not an ideal situation, according to Rousseau.78 Finally, there was
an affinity amongst the Poles and the French which Rousseau was not supportive of – their royal
and aristocratic families intermarried, the polite language was French, and the Enlightenment
itself was a source of inspiration for those aware of it.79 This led Rousseau to warn the Polish to
refrain from embracing French customs less they become another bland European people.80
Since  the  Polish  were  not  the ideal  people  found  in  the  Contrat  social Rousseau
developed his political proposals to fit their particular position; at the outset of Poland he wrote:
Si  l'on  ne  connaît  à  fond la  Nation  pour  laquelle  on  travaille,  l'ouvrage  qu'on  fera  pour  elle,
quelque excellent qu'il  puisse être en lui-même, péchera toujours par l'application, et bien plus
encore lorsqu'il s'agira d'une nation déjà toute instituée, dont les goûts, les mœurs, les préjugés et
les vices sont trop enracinés pour pouvoir être aisément étouffés par des semences nouvelles.81
74 N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 3.
75 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 959.
76 M. Wielhorski, Essai sur le rétablissement de l’ancienne forme du gouvernement de Pologne (London, 1775), p. 
ix; 2–6.
77 N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 4; 17.
78 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 390.
79 N. Ascherson, The Struggles for Poland (New York, 1991), p. 8.
80 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 962.
81 Ibid., p. 953.
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And in the Contrat social he warned: "Ce qui rend pénible l'ouvrage de la législation est moins ce
qu'il faut établir que ce qu'il faut détruire; et ce qui rend le succès si rare, c'est l'impossibilité de
trouver  la  simplicité  de  la  nature  jointe  aux  besoins  de  la  société."82 It  was  this  threat  of
destruction when presented with an established people which made Rousseau conservative in his
proposals (and,  again, perhaps led to him making any proposals at all).83 Although radical in
thought, Rousseau was not a revolutionary, and one need no more evidence of this than what he
wrote for Poland.
Polish Freedom
Perhaps  the  clearest  distinction  (between  Rousseau's proposals  for  Poland  and  those  in  the
Contrat  social and  for  Corsica) can  be  seen in  the development of  freedom  as  a  concept.
Rousseau does not attempt to offer Poland the chance to achieve the freedom he developed in the
Contrat social; he does not discuss moral freedom (the freedom to obey one's own self-imposed
moral imperatives) nor civil freedom (the freedom to be part of and obey self-imposed laws). In
fact, although Rousseau argues for some access to legislation for the Genevan people (in the form
of the General Council's access to the droit negatif), he cannot even offer this to Poland: "Je sens
la difficulté du projet d'affranchir vos peuples. Ce que je crains n'est pas seulement l'intérêt mal
entendu, l'amour-propre et les préjugés des maîtres. Cet obstacle vaincu, je craindrais les vices et
la lâcheté des serfs."84 It was a noble goal (in both senses of the word noble) to free their serfs,
but it is not a goal for the immediate future:
Affranchir les peuples de Pologne est une grande et belle opération, mais hardie, périlleuse, et qu'il
ne faut pas tenter inconsidérément. Parmi les précautions à prendre, il en est une indispensable et
qui demande du temps. C'est, avant toute chose, de rendre dignes de la liberté et capables de la
supporter les serfs qu'on veut affranchir.85
82 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 391.
83 In contrast, perhaps, to him never submitting his proposals to Corsica.
84 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 974.
85 Ibid., p. 974.
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Rousseau  also denied them  spiritual  freedom.  Again,  in  Geneva he proposed a  religious  re-
founding as a source of a new moral and educational grounding for all citizens. He believed the
dogma of the Reformed church had degenerated and what was needed to correct this was a more
tolerant religion – a religion which was "saintly, sublime, genuine religion, men, as children of
the same God, all recognize one another as brothers, and the society that unites them does not
dissolve even at death" – a sentimental and pure  Christianity.86 In Poland, however, religious
reform was impossible – beyond the diversity, the political fault lines amongst the confederations
ran along denominational identities. In fact, the topic of religion is essentially ignored in the
document – there are only two mentions of it, and they are both found in the discussion on Numa.
Thus,  neither  moral,  civil,  nor  spiritual  freedom,  are  proposed.  Instead,  he  offers  a
freedom akin to that which Moses gave the Jews – the freedom to continue to be Polish in spite
of the threats facing Poland:
Je ne vois dans l'état présent des choses qu'un seul moyen de lui donner cette consistance qui lui
manque: c'est d'infuser pour ainsi dire dans toute la nation l'âme des confédérés;  c'est d'établir
tellement la République dans le cœur des Polonais, qu'elle y subsiste malgré tous les efforts de ses
oppresseurs. C'est là, ce me semble, l'unique asile où la force ne peut ni l'atteindre ni la détruire…
Vous ne sauriez empêcher qu'ils ne vous engloutissent, faites au moins qu'ils ne puissent vous
digérer. De quelque façon qu'on s'y prenne, avant qu'on ait donné à la Pologne tout ce qui lui
manque pour être en état de résister à ses ennemis, elle en sera cent fois accablée. La vertu de ses
Citoyens, leur zèle patriotique, la forme particulière que des institutions nationales peuvent donner
à leurs âmes, voilà le seul rempart toujours prêt à la défendre, et qu'aucune armée ne saurait forcer.
Si vous faites en sorte qu'un Polonais ne puisse jamais devenir un Russe, je vous réponds que la
Russie ne subjuguera pas la Pologne.87
This aspect of the work has raised questions in the literature (as well as leading people to claim
him to be the "father of modern nationalism").88 Jeffrey Smith has called it a paradox of liberty –
the idea that Poland could become more free as they became closer to losing the state.89 It also
86 R. Whatmore, ‘Rousseau and the Representants: The Politics of the Lettres Ecrites De La Montagne’, Modern 
Intellectual History 3.03 (2006), p. 406; Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, pp. 464-465.
87 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, pp. 959-960.
88 P. Hassner, ‘Rousseau and the Theory and Practice of International Relations’, in C. Orwin and N. Tarcov (eds.), 
The Legacy of Rousseau (Chicago, 1996), p. 209.
89 J.A. Smith, ‘Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty in Rousseau’s "Government of Poland"’, The Review 
of Politics 65.3 (2003), p. 10.
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resulted in  Smith asking:  "If  the Poles'  extensive liberty were less threatened (or completely
secure), would Rousseau hold them to be less 'truly' free (or not free at all)?" Along the same vein
of criticism, Marc Platter has pointed out that Rousseau attempted to instil a national identity in
spite of "the almost insuperable barriers to making freedom and virtue reign in large states."90
However,  with  this thesis this problem resolves itself: it is not an issue of gaining liberty for
Poland – this is impossible with Russia and Prussia on her doorstep. It is instead an issue of
strengthening the state as much as is possible while also bringing the  Polish people together.
Freedom, as Smith is trying to imagine it – and not surprisingly, as this is how Rousseau had
elsewhere described it – is republican freedom. However, Rousseau instead offers a different type
of a freedom, and this is the only type of freedom compatible with the historical founding of the
Polish people as described by Wielhorski – a freedom for a people who have never been secure:
anarchic freedom. It is the only freedom Poland could have realistically hoped to obtain. Instead
of developing a constitution for the Polish people Rousseau offers a means of maintaining the
constitution because of (and therefore, in spite of) the threats facing Poland.91 The Polish people
were on the brink of entering the wilderness; if possible, it would be ideal to prevent this from
happening, but realistically, attempting to instil in them an idea of what it is to be Polish, an idea
that would continue to exist without the state, was the only way Rousseau  thought  the Poles
could be secured.
Je ne vois dans l'état présent des choses qu'un seul moyen de lui donner cette consistance qui lui
manque: c'est d'infuser pour ainsi dire dans toute la nation l'âme des confédérés;  c'est d'établir
tellement la République dans le cœur des Polonais, qu'elle y subsiste malgré tous les efforts de ses
oppresseurs.92
The goal was the revitalization of Polish institutions and a national education system.
90 M.F. Platter, ‘Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism’, in C. Orwin and N. Tarcov (eds.), The Legacy of 
Rousseau (Chicago, 1996), p. 194.
91 Chatper VII in Pologne is dedicated to the means of maintaining the constitution.
92 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 959.
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Polish Public Education
Although one is tempted to frame  the reforms  for Poland  around  political issues  (such as the
liberum veto and the confederacies), this would ignore one of the most important aspects of both
the  reforms  that  would  eventually  take  hold  in  Poland,  as  well  as  Rousseau's  own interest:
education.  Rousseau  himself  begins  his  chapter  on  education  in  Pologne  stating:  "C'est  ici
l'article important."93 And importance was not missed in Poland. By 1773 a reformed and unified
nationwide education system had been established in the collapsing state, run by the first ministry
of  education  in  Europe  (the  Commission  for  National  Education).  How  much  influence
Rousseau's own proposals had on this is difficult to say – what one does know, however, is that
by the time of the French Revolution Rousseau was "enmeshed with the ideological and political
debates on the advantages of public versus private education, the idea of the education of the
citizen, and the general theme of the renewal of society by means of education."94
It  is  important  to  note that  education was  not  a  topic  ignored  by other  thinkers.  The
Enlightenment project,  to  some  extent,  relied  on  the  belief  in  that  transformative  power  of
education – starting with John Locke:
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all characters, without any
ideas.  How comes it  to be furnished? Whence comes it  by that vast store which the busy and
boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the
materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience.95
If enlightenment was possible, man's passions and morals needed to be malleable and the stage at
which this malleability takes place is childhood – as Rousseau made clear in  Émile.  In most
cases, however, this was a philosophical investigation, rather than an explicitly political task. The
movement towards politicizing education is discussed in Natasha Gill's recent work on education
in the eighteenth century. She notes that with the emergence of the educational treatise, those
93 Ibid., p. 966.
94 J. Bloch, Rousseauism and Education in Eighteenth-century France (Geneva, 1995), p. 4.
95 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford, 1979), p. 104.
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who hoped to reform education started with "techniques of child-rearing" such as "breastfeeding,
physical  exercise,  habit  formation,  competition,  discipline"  and  drew  connections  to
philosophical  debates  on  "freedom,  equality,  individual  potential,  the  structure  of  moral
consciousness, the forms of political life, and the possibility of harmonious social relations."96 It
is  not  suprising,  then,  that  education  emerged  as a  political  topic.  In  d'Alembert's  1753
Encyclopédie article "Collège" one finds criticisms of the current Jesuit curriculum which led to
calls for improving the state of education in France, and importantly, a call for the government to
take the lead and  request proposals for "un excellent plan d'études."97 There was an awareness
that  an  enlightened education  was  not  simple  or  easily  accomplished  task,  and  it  required
political will behind it. 
One  of  the problems  facing  reformers  however,  was  the  contradiction  between  an
individualistic education respecting a child's dignity and potentialenlightenment, and the creation
of a systematic  mass education  which produced social virtues.98 Rousseau's unique method of
overcoming this problem was to treat the nation as the individual.  Again,  and  to draw out the
body-politic metaphor, Rousseau saw each nation as a unique individual which required its own
particular system of education, just as  Émile required his own tailored schooling.  Importantly,
Rousseau's  proposals  for  Poland's  education  were more  than  an  intellectual  exercise  –  the
education of the polis was, for Rousseau, essential. In his  Discours sur l'économie politique he
argued that "L'éducation publique sous des règles prescrites par le gouvernement, et sous des
magistrats établis par le souverain, est donc une des maximes fondamentales du gouvernement
populaire  ou légitime."99 And while this  fact  was no less  true for Poland,  education had the
96 N. Gill, Educational Philosophy in the French Enlightenment: From Nature to Second Nature (Farnham, 2010), 
p. 1.
97 From 1756, Jansenists in the Parlement of Paris began to attack the Jesuits, who had been responsible for the 
running of colleges in France. They were finally expelled in 1762.
98 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
99 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 260-261.
 252
additional importance there as a method of ensuring a lasting Polish people:
C'est l'éducation qui doit donner aux âmes la forme nationale, et diriger tellement leurs opinions et
leurs  goûts,  qu'elles  soient  patriotes  par  inclination,  par  passion,  par  nécessité…  Tout  vrai
républicain suça avec le lait de sa mère, l'amour de sa patrie, c'est-à-dire des lois et de la liberté.
Cet amour fait toute son existence; il ne voit que la patrie, il ne vit que pour elle; sitôt qu'il est seul,
il est nul: sitôt qu'il n'a plus de patrie, il n'est plus; et s'il n'est pas mort, il est pis. L'éducation
nationale n'appartient qu'aux hommes libres; il n'y a qu'eux qui aient une existence commune et qui
soient vraiment liés par la Loi.100
The upshot being education was a political good which, in the face of foreign enemies who could
not be defended against by traditional means, encouraged the formation of a patriotic citizenry
which would make for an "indigestible" people.101 That is to say, by instilling a feeling of national
unity and  pride,  Poland would possess that  virtue  (or  virtù)  which Machiavelli  argued made
republics  so difficult to conquer  (so difficult, in fact,  that he advised  potential conquerers that
they either be destroyed, entirely embraced by the new prince by relocating there, or allowed to
continue to live under their own laws).102 However, the method of creating this unity (just like the
argument for it)  was  counter intuitive for the  Enlightenment. What is  intriguing in regard to
Rousseau's proposals to achieve this is the way in which he took an accepted  Enlightenment
presumption – a belief that men are malleable – and used it to instil in the Polish people their
own qualities rather than create a new enlightened people. That is to say, he twisted the argument
made  by  philosophers  of  education  (in  particular  Morelly)  that  men  could  be  made  into
'enlightened'  or  'universal'  creatures,  and instead,  and much more  in  the  vein  of  the ancient
lawgivers,  argued  that  the  same  tools  should  be  used  to  create  the  opposite:  a  unique  and
particular man – a Polish character:
Il faut maintenir, rétablir ces anciens usages, et en introduire de convenables, qui soient propres
aux Polonais.  Ces usages,  fussent-ils  indifférents,  fussent-ils  mauvais même à certains  égards,
pourvu qu'ils ne le soient pas essentiellement, auront toujours l'avantage d'affectionner les Polonais
à leur pays et de leur donner une répugnance naturelle à se mêler avec l'étranger.103
100 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 966.
101 T. Szkudlarek, ‘On Nations And Children: Rousseau, Poland And European Identity’, Studies in Philosophy and 
Education 24.1 (2005), p. 22.
102 Machiavelli, Prince, v (ed. Mansfield, pp. 20-21).
103 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 962.
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What  is  more,  the  person  qualified  to  educate  the Pole  was  not  a professionally trained  or
enlightened  gentleman.  In  fact,  Rousseau  warned  the  Poles  not  to turn  education  into  a
profession. Instead, the ideal educator would simply be a citizen using the opportunity to teach,
to demonstrate, their exemplary Polish qualities while progressing through the varying levels of
society and government.  The teacher was someone and something which all children would be
able to become. On this point he states: "J'exhorte les Polonais à faire attention à cette maxime,
sur laquelle j'insisterai souvent: je la crois la clef d'un grand ressort dans l'État."104
Rousseau also returns  to  the education developed in  Émile,  arguing that  it  should be
"negative" – as he put it: "Je ne redirai jamais assez que la bonne éducation doit être négative.
Empêchez  les  vices  de naître,  vous aurez  assez  fait  pour  la  vertu."105 By this,  he means  an
education which aims towards preventing mistakes from being instilled in children before all
else. However, whereas nature is the arbiter of Émile's education, the nation is to be the arbiter of
Poland's children:
On ne doit  point permettre qu'ils jouent séparément à leur fantaisie,  mais tous ensemble et en
public,  de  manière  qu'il  y  ait  toujours  un  but  commun auquel  tous  aspirent  et  qui  excite  la
concurrence et  l'émulation. Les parents qui préféreront l'éducation domestique, et feront élever
leurs enfants sous leurs yeux, doivent cependant les envoyer à ces exercices. Leur instruction peut
être domestique et particulière, mais leurs jeux doivent toujours être publics et communs à tous;
car il ne s'agit pas seulement ici de les occuper, de leur former une constitution robuste, de les
rendre agiles et  découplés;  mais de les accoutumer de bonne heure à la règle,  à l'égalité,  à la
fraternité, aux concurrences, à vivre sous les yeux de leurs concitoyens et à désirer l'approbation
publique.106
Just as the education which was appropriate for Émile was a natural education, the education
appropriate for Poland is a national education – as Szkudlarek has put it, natural has a double
meaning: "not only does it denote that which is  born into us, but also that  into which we are
born."107 The Polish share a unique place in the world, and therefore need to be given a particular
104 Ibid., p. 967.
105 Ibid., p. 968.
106 Ibid., p. 968.
107 T. Szkudlarek, ‘On Nations And Children: Rousseau, Poland And European Identity’, Studies in Philosophy and 
Education 24.1 (2005), p. 29. Italics in original.
 254
and shared education – or risk becoming European:
Il n'y a plus aujourd'hui de Français, d'Allemands, d'Espagnols, d'Anglais même, quoi qu'on en
dise; il n'y a que des Européens. Tous ont les mêmes goûts, les mêmes passions, les mêmes mœurs,
parce qu'aucun n'a reçu de forme nationale par une institution particulière.108
In the end, Rousseau was not proposing, as d'Alembert put it, "un excellent plan d'études." That
is much too universal. Instead, Rousseau proposed a plan for being Polish – just as he argued for
his fellow Genevans to remain Genevan, and the Corsicans to do everything within their power to
avoid becoming European.
Contextually Similar Arguments
Chapter Three of this thesis looked at Rousseau's use of the body-politic metaphor, where it was
shown  that he "went  into  full  anatomical  detail  and  then  he  had  very  specific  purposes  in
mind."109 Importantly, this metaphor was not only used to depict ideals:
En lisant l'histoire du gouvernement de Pologne, on a peine à comprendre comment un État si
bizarrement constitué a pu subsister si longtemps. Un grand corps formé d'un grand nombre de
membres morts,  et  d'un petit  nombre de membres désunis,  dont tous les mouvements presque
indépendants les uns des autres, loin d'avoir une fin commune, s'entre-détruisent mutuellement, qui
s'agite beaucoup pour ne rien faire, qui ne peut faire aucune résistance à quiconque veut l'entamer,
qui tombe en dissolution cinq ou six fois chaque siècle, qui tombe en paralysie à chaque effort qu'il
veut faire, à chaque besoin auquel il veut pourvoir, et qui malgré tout cela vit et se conserve en
vigueur;  voilà,  ce  me  semble,  un  des  plus  singuliers  spectacles  qui  puissent  frapper  un  être
pensant.110
This  is  clearly  not  the  same  political  ideal  being  described  in  the  Contrat  social.  Instead,
Rousseau warns at the beginning of Pologne that "Une bonne institution pour la Pologne ne peut
être  l'ouvrage  que  des  Polonais  ou  de  quelqu'un  qui  ait  bien  étudié  sur  les  lieux  la  nation
polonaise et celles qui l'avoisinent. Un étranger ne peut guère donner que des vues générales,
pour éclairer non pour guider l'instituteur."111 Again, this is hardly the genre of hero-founders
examined in the first chapter of this thesis (or the second chapter of Pologne). Nor does one see
108 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 960.
109 J.N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge, 1985), p. 197.
110 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, pp. 953-954.
111 Ibid., p. 953. Note the topic being an institution rather than constitution.
 255
similarities to the legislator in the Contrat social – a person who shared none of the passions and
had no relation to the people being legislated for, who lived outside of the body-politic, and who
would leave when their work was done.112 In fact, while Rousseau's corporate metaphor often
begins with a discussion of,  or reference to,  birth,  when discussing Poland, he  speaks of re-
birth.113 And just as he claimed to be offering Geneva its own constitution in the Lettres, he tells
the Poles: "J'expliquerai ci-après le régime d'administration qui sans presque toucher au fond de
vos lois, me paraît propre à porter le patriotisme et les vertus qui en sont inséparables au plus
haut degré d'intensité qu'ils puissent avoir."114 The point of all this being, Rousseau's proposals
for Poland are distinct from his other political works.115 This is the problem that has puzzled a
number  of  Rousseau  scholars.116 However,  this  is not  because  it  is  unsystematic,  but
systematically distinct; it fits into that other category of Rousseau's political writings described in
this  thesis  – a re-founding.  Once  one  is  aware  of  this,  it  is  possible  to  see  that  Rousseau's
Considérations  sur  le  gouvernement  de  Pologne et  sur  sa réformation  projetée does  offer  a
number of similar arguments to at least one of Rousseau's other works – the Lettres écrites de la
montagne.
Rousseau offers three "Causes particulières de l'anarchie" in Poland: the liberum veto, the
confederations,  and  the  use  of  private  armies  by  citizens.117 For  example,  when  Rousseau
remarked that Poland had lost a body with true legislative power, he was blaming the  liberum
112 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 381; B. Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton, 2001), pp. 21–22; 
133.
113 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 954.
114 Ibid., p. 961.
115 Kendall has drawn out a number of specific arguments in the Contrat social which have been dropped, or the 
opposite position is taken. These areas include: the general will and popular sovereignty; civil religion; the role 
of a civic education; the importance of natural law; and the problem of a peoples' given political history (i.e., the
very fact Rousseau is willing to work with a state which already has a political history is questioned).(W. 
Kendall, ‘Introduction: How to read Rousseau’s "Government of Poland"’, in J.-J. Rousseau, The Government of
Poland [Indianapolis, 1985], p. xiv-xv).
116 Ibid., p. xv.
117 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 994.
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veto and confederates for shutting down the Diet as a house of legislation. He wrote that:
L'affaiblissement de la législation s'est fait en Pologne d'une manière bien particulière, et peut-être
unique. C'est qu'elle a perdu sa force sans avoir été subjuguée par la puissance exécutive. En ce
moment encore la puissance législative conserve toute son autorité: elle est dans l'inaction, mais
sans  rien  voir  au-dessus  d'elle.  La  Diète  est  aussi  souveraine  qu'elle  l'était  lors  de  son
établissement. Cependant elle est sans force; rien ne la domine, mais rien ne lui obéit.118
Although Rousseau remarks that this is a unique situation in Poland, this is not because of the
veto itself, but instead because of the lack of domination from one part over others. In Geneva
one found a similar law, but used in a very different way. As has been shown, the general council
of Geneva constitutionally had sovereignty, but because of the droit negatif this sovereignty was
little more than nominal. The smaller aristocratic executive councils dominated by holding veto
power  over  anything  the  grand  council  would  hope  to  accomplish  (or  prevent  from  being
accomplished) with its sovereignty, resulting in Geneva, like in Poland, forming rival blocs (the
aristocratic members of the smaller councils and the democratic agitators – the  Représentants)
and a civil instability which at times turned into armed conflict. In both cases a constitutional law
was the cause of turmoil, yet Rousseau did not argue for abolishment of the vetoes – even though
to the reader of the Contrat social they were clearly illegitimate and contrary to political right.
According to Rousseau: "la souveraineté, n'étant que l'exercice de la volonté générale, ne peut
jamais s'aliéner; et que le souverain, qui n'est qu'un être collectif, ne peut être représenté que par
lui-même."119 He continues in the next chapter:
Par la même raison que la  souveraineté est  inaliénable,  elle est  indivisible.  Car la  volonté est
générale, ou elle ne l'est pas; elle est celle du Corps du peuple, ou seulement d'une partie. Dans le
premier cas, cette volonté déclarée est un acte de souveraineté, et fait loi. Dans le second, ce n'est
qu'une volonté particulière, ou un acte de magistrature; c'est un décret tout au plus.120
This  section  includes  the  footnote:  "Pour  qu'une  volonté  soit  générale,  il  n'est  pas;  toujours
nécessaire qu'elle soit unanime; mais il est nécessaire que toutes les voix soient comptées: toute
118 Ibid., p. 975.
119 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 368.
120 Ibid., p. 369.
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exclusion formelle rompt la généralité."121 Thus, a sovereign which is limited is not sovereign,
and by allowing a particular will to veto the general will  one creates something quite different
from that  which  was  proposed  in  the  Contrat  social.  Nonetheless,  even  in  the  face  of  this
apparent  contradiction,  in  the  cases  of  both  Poland  and  Geneva  Rousseau  embraced  these
inconvenient  and  philosophically  illegitimate  laws,  and  instead  took  a  conservative  attitude
towards constitutional reform.
In Geneva, Rousseau was critical of the magistrates attack on the general council, but he
was also critical of  Représentant attempts to reform government. Rousseau saw no reason to
modify and redistribute political power – he felt Geneva's initial constitution was almost ideal in
terms of founding a republic. The solution, according to him, was not to replace the droit negatif,
but to make it work – and to do this, he proposed its expansion to the general council, making it
possible  to  veto  any form of  constitutional  manipulation  by any level  of  government.  With
respect  to  Poland  he  took  a  similar  approach.  He  makes  this  clear  at  the  beginning  of  his
proposals: "J'expliquerai ci-après le régime d'administration qui sans presque toucher au fond de
vos lois, me paraît propre à porter le patriotisme et les vertus qui en sont inséparables au plus
haut degré d'intensité qu'ils puissent avoir."122 Elsewhere he argues: "Le liberum veto n'est pas un
droit vicieux en lui-même, mais sitôt qu'il passe sa borne il devient le plus dangereux des abus: il
était le garant de la liberté publique; il n'est plus que l'instrument de l'oppression."123 It was not a
case of abandoning the veto so as to create stability, but to, and similarly to Geneva, embrace it
and use it as a constitutional safeguard:
Le liberum veto serait moins déraisonnable s'il tombait uniquement sur les points fondamentaux de
la constitution: mais qu'il ait lieu généralement dans toutes les délibérations des Diètes, c'est ce qui
ne peut s'admettre en aucune façon. C'est un vice dans la constitution polonaise que la législation
et l'administration n'y soient pas assez distinguées, et que la Diète exerçant le pouvoir législatif y
121 Ibid., p. 369.
122 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 961; italics mine.
123 Ibid., p. 995.
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mêle  des  parties  d'administration,  fasse  indifféremment  des  actes  de  souveraineté  et  de
gouvernement,  souvent  même  des  actes  mixtes  par  lesquels  ses  membres  sont  magistrats  et
législateurs tout à la fois. Les changements proposés tendent à mieux distinguer ces deux pouvoirs,
et par là même à mieux marquer les bornes du liberum veto.124
What is  more,  and again,  similar  to  what  was seen in  Geneva,  the  greatest  threat  to
stability in Poland came not from a particular bloc, but a lack of patriotic unity and respect for
the  laws.  Rousseau's  proposals,  therefore,  looked  towards  reforming  the  people  and  their
relationship to their laws, rather than the laws on which they were founded. In Geneva he argued
that this could be achieved through a religious re-founding which would disentangle politics from
religion,  and  through  the  use  of  the  cercles as  institutions  which  could  promote  republican
virtues.  For Poland, although Rousseau could not  make  use of religion, he offered something
similar: "Par où donc émouvoir les cœurs, et faire aimer la patrie et ses lois? L'oserai-je dire? par
des jeux d'enfants,  par  des institutions oiseuses aux yeux des hommes superficiels,  mais  qui
forment  des  habitudes  chéries  et  des  attachements  invincibles." Rousseau  wanted  to  instil
patriotic virtue in the hearts and identities of the Poles to overcome any institutional or legal
shortcomings – as well as prepare them for the potential and perhaps inevitable end of the state.
This is why Rousseau argues that: "Il n'y aura jamais de bonne et solide constitution que celle où
la loi régnera sur les cœurs des citoyens."125 This is not a political project as one would imagine
it, but instead, a programme of social engineering – education rather than legislation; re-founding
rather than founding.
A method of achieving this reform is highlighted the lessons from ancient lawgivers  on
ceremony:126
Le même esprit guida tous les anciens Législateurs dans leurs institutions. Tous cherchèrent des
liens qui attachassent les Citoyens à la patrie et les uns aux autres, et ils les trouvèrent dans des
usages particuliers, dans des cérémonies religieuses qui, par leur nature, étaient toujours exclusives
124 Ibid., p. 995.
125 Ibid., p. 955.
126 Using the methods and tools of the founder is not contrary to re-founding – it is a question of ends, rather than 
means.
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et nationales (voyez la fin du  Contrat social), dans des jeux qui tenaient beaucoup les citoyens
rassemblés, dans des exercices qui augmentaient avec leur vigueur et leurs forces leur fierté et
l'estime d'eux-mêmes,  dans des  spectacles  qui,  leur  rappelant  l'histoire de leurs ancêtres,  leurs
malheurs,  leurs  vertus,  leurs  victoires,  intéressaient  leurs  cœurs,  les  enflammaient  d'une  vive
émulation, et les attachaient fortement à cette patrie dont on ne cessait de les occuper.127
This statement has echoes of a quote already examined – Rousseau's own experiences as a child
in Geneva and the celebrations of "Le Régiment de St. Gervais."128 Rousseau advises the Poles to
avoid any public displays which one would be familiar with elsewhere in Europe: "Il faut abolir,
même à la Cour, à cause de l'exemple, les amusements ordinaires des cours, le jeu, les théâtres,
comédies, opéra; tout ce qui effémine les hommes, tout ce qui les distrait,  les isole, leur fait
oublier  leur  patrie  et  leur  devoir."129 Instead,  Rousseau  tells  them to  "re-establish"  ancient
manners,  and  introduce  new  ones  which  are  compatible  with  the  Polish  character:  "il  faut
inventer des jeux, des fêtes,  des solennités qui soient si  propres à cette Cour-là qu'on ne les
retrouve dans aucune autre. Il faut qu'on s'amuse en Pologne plus que dans les autres pays, mais
non pas de la même manière." He continues: "Rien, s'il se peut, d'exclusif pour les Grands et les
riches. Beaucoup de spectacles en plein air, où les rangs soient distingués avec soin, mais où tout
le peuple prenne part également, comme chez les anciens."130 And:
Ne  négligez  point  une  certaine  décoration  publique;  qu'elle  soit  noble,  imposante,  et  que  la
magnificence soit dans les hommes plus que dans les choses. On ne saurait croire à quel point le
cœur du peuple suit ses yeux et combien la majesté du cérémonial lui en impose. Cela donne à
l'autorité un air d'ordre et de règle qui inspire la confiance et qui écarte les idées de caprice et de
fantaisie attachées à celles du pouvoir arbitraire.131
Even dress is seen as a way of differentiating Poland from her European neighbours:
Je regarde comme un bonheur qu'ils  aient  un habillement particulier.  Conservez avec soin cet
avantage; faites exactement le contraire de ce que fit ce Czar si vanté. Que le Roi ni les Sénateurs,
ni  aucun homme public  ne portent  jamais  d'autre vêtement que celui  de la  nation,  et  que nul
Polonais n'ose paraître à la Cour vêtu à la française.132
127 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 958.
128 Rousseau, d'Alembert: 123-124.
129 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 962.
130 Ibid., pp. 962-963. It is worth noting that Rousseau proposes a class system for Poland not unlike the one he 
imagined for Corsica. However, unlike in Corsica, Rousseau is not founding the passions of a people through 
this system (Ibid., pp. 1020-1029).
131 Ibid., p. 964.
132 Ibid., p. 962.
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And the education system Rousseau proposed embraces these examples of public extravagance
by encouraging public games in which competition is central, and winners are awarded prizes so
as to "excite la concurrence et l'émulation."133 He offered the example of bull fighting in Spain as
a public event encouraging vigour which the Polish could look to as an example – although he
suggested they do something involving the more natural Polish quality of horsemanship.134 Again,
broad examples can be found elsewhere, but imitation is not the goal. 
In addition, just as one can recognize similarities between Rousseau's proposals (not least
of all  those for  Geneva), it  is also  striking to  note how different proposals  can be  elsewhere.
While Corsica is told to embrace simplicity to the point of vanity, in regard to Poland Rousseau
writes: "Ne négligez point une certaine décoration publique; qu'elle soit noble, imposante, et que
la magnificence soit dans les hommes plus que dans les choses. On ne saurait croire à quel point
le  cœur  du  peuple  suit  ses  yeux  et  combien  la  majesté  du  cérémonial  lui  en  impose."135
Importantly,  the aim is similar: like Corsica, Rousseau wants to create a feeling of membership
amongst the Polish people – but this membership is not born from a new constitution and an
agricultural  lifestyle;  it  is  found in  the  rediscovering  of  an  original  Polish character.  Unlike
Corsica, Poland is "une nation déjà toute instituée, dont les goûts, les mœurs, les préjugés et les
vices sont trop enracinés pour pouvoir être aisément étouffés par des semences nouvelles."136
Rousseau's proposals are not constitutional and are rarely legislative.
To understand the basis of all of Rousseau's political proposals one must return to the first
task facing the legislator:
Comme, avant d'élever un grand édifice, l'architecte observe et sonde le sol pour voir s'il en peut
soutenir le poids, le sage instituteur ne commence pas par rédiger de bonnes lois en elles-mêmes,
133 Ibid., p. 968.
134 Ibid., p. 963.
135 Ibid., p. 964.
136 Ibid., p. 953.
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mais il examine auparavant si le peuple auquel il les destine est propre à les supporter.137
The architectural foundations of Poland had already been set – and although the structure was in
a wretched state, facing both collapse from the inside, and invasion from outside, its foundations
were nonetheless strong. It faced depopulation, internal strife, and was under constant threat, but
it was also a nation which had a long and impressive history. It is for this reason that Rousseau
proposed: "Corrigez, s'il se peut, les abus de votre constitution; mais ne méprisez pas celle qui
vous a faits ce que vous êtes."138 Again, it is not a founding he advises, but a re-founding, and
because of this distinction, he warns the Poles:
J'ai cru parler à un peuple qui sans être exempt de vices avait encore du ressort et des vertus, et
cela supposé, mon projet est bon. Mais si déjà la Pologne en est à ce point que tout y soit vénal et
corrompu jusqu'à  la racine,  c'est  en vain qu'elle  cherche à réformer ses lois et  à  conserver sa
liberté, il faut qu'elle y renonce et qu'elle plie sa tête au joug.139
Rousseau remains pragmatic. Nothing is lost in attempting to save Poland (and, in contrast to
Mably's proposals, much suffering may be averted). However, he is not overly optimistic. Not
every people can be re-founded, and if the Poles are too far gone, there is nothing that can be
done for them.
137 Rousseau, Contrat social, OC iii, p. 384-385.
138 Rousseau, Pologne, OC iii, p. 954.
139 Ibid., p. 1022.
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Conclusion
The goal of this thesis has been to draw out some initial variances in legislators and peoples in
Rousseau's thinking. It has been shown that there is not only a historical basis for this distinction
(both in ancient thought, and to a certain degree, amongst Rousseau's contemporaries), but that it
plays  out  in  Rousseau's  own  writings  on  Geneva,  Corsica,  and  Poland.  He  recognizes  that
Geneva  had  an  intially  supreme  founding  –  one  which  became  the  blueprint  for  what  he
developed in  the  Contrat social. However, everything deteriorates, and with time so to did the
institutions of Geneva. Its constitution, however, remained in some form. His advice was not to
give it new and improved laws, but to turn the people back on themselves – to remind them what
it was that made them who they  were; what it was that gave them their "true" constitution. A
remarkably similar proposal was given to Poland – he warned them not to look to France or
England to save themselves, but inwards. He refused to manipulate their laws and constitution,
but did all he could to institutionally support them. Much of his proposals, thus, looked towards
educating  the  Polish  people  even  in  the  face  of  a  clearly  illegitimate  political  system  (by
Rousseau's own standards). Finally, there was Corsica – that people who through centuries of
suffering had not developed their own character, laws, constitution, or serious customs; a people
ready to be given the laws the Genevan's  had once been lucky enough to receive;  the laws
outlined  in  the  Contrat  social.  They  were,  and  Rousseau  was  explicit  about  this,  the  only
appropriate people left in Europe for which such a project was possible.
These, therefore, are the distinctions in the propositional works authored by Rousseau –
but  they  are  not  unsystematic.  In  fact,  if  one  accepts  these  distinctions,  a  number  of  the
difficulties in understanding Rousseau's political works begin to become less difficult. One of the
advantages of this analysis over others is its resistance to simply examining his political thought
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through a particular conceptual lens – is he a radical or a conservative? A Calvinist or deist?
Communitarian or individualist? Much analysis of his work attempts to fit him into categories or
schools, or worse, uncover his hidden ideas. This is not surprising as Rousseau is a particularly
problematic  thinker –  one can legitimately see the  Contrat social as essentially  a  republican
treatise, while Pologne can be placed on the pantheon of nationalistic texts. This has allowed for
a number of radically diverging interpretations of his works as a whole. However, to put it in the
most  simple  of  terms,  this  thesis  overcomes these problems by  showing  Rousseau's  political
philosophy as essentially pragmatic. He had ideals, but he also knew they were not universally
applicable. The Contrat social may very well be an ideal goal, but the differences found between
it and his propositional works  are based on non-ideal particularities, and thus, lead to differing
potentialities. It is just as Socrates told his interlocutors in The Republic: 
[D]on't insist on my showing that every detail of our description can be realized in practice, but
grant that we shall have met your demand that its realization should be possible if we are able to
find the conditions under which a state can most closely approximate to it.1
For this  same reason  Rousseau offered varying plans to  various  peoples  who were found in
different  conditions.  Nonetheless,  the  core  of all  his  proposals  remains  consistent  –  he  is a
systematic pragmatist. As he wrote in Pologne:
Le même esprit guida tous les anciens Législateurs dans leurs institutions. Tous cherchèrent des
liens qui attachassent les Citoyens à la patrie et les uns aux autres, et ils les trouvèrent dans des
usages particuliers, dans des cérémonies religieuses qui, par leur nature, étaient toujours exclusives
et nationales (voyez la fin du  Contrat social), dans des jeux qui tenaient beaucoup les citoyens
rassemblés, dans des exercices qui augmentaient avec leur vigueur et leurs forces leur fierté et
l'estime d'eux-mêmes,  dans des  spectacles  qui,  leur  rappelant  l'histoire de leurs ancêtres,  leurs
malheurs,  leurs  vertus,  leurs  victoires,  intéressaient  leurs  cœurs,  les  enflammaient  d'une  vive
émulation, et les attachaient fortement à cette patrie dont on ne cessait de les occuper.2
This is always the goal – the differences are found in potentialities.
1 Plato, Republic, 473a-b (ed. Lee, p. 262).
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